INTRODUCTION
In the modern world, energy is not only an economic factor but, at the same time and even more so, a tool of political power. Especially in authoritarian regimes, energy resources are one of the main, and perhaps the primary, factors ensuring continuity. At the same time, this potential functions as a political shield against external pressures and serves to legitimize authoritarianism at the international level.
Azerbaijan is one of the clearest examples of countries that use their energy resources as a political shield against external pressures. Since the signing of the “Contract of the Century” (BP, 2014) in 1994, which forms the basis of the country’s economic structure, oil and gas have been the main factors expanding Azerbaijan’s maneuvering capacity in the international system and granting official Baku immunity in the eyes of major powers.
In this research paper, the KHAR Center analyzes the role of energy diplomacy as a security shield for authoritarian regimes through the example of Azerbaijan.
Main question: How does Azerbaijan use its energy resources to legitimize authoritarianism?
The applied methodology covers the scientific foundations and the research implementation plan of the article prepared for the KHAR Center. The goal is to systematically explain how Azerbaijan’s energy reserves are organized as a “shield” for authoritarian governance, through which mechanisms they function, and how this relationship affects domestic and external dynamics.
The study will focus on the following theoretical principles and connect them to empirical findings:
- Energy diplomacy (foreign policy maneuvers through energy)
- Resource wealth and authoritarian stabilization
Sources of information:
- Official documents: A collection of strategies related to energy in Azerbaijan, currency and budget reports, as well as annual reports prepared by state companies (for example, SOCAR).
- Reports and analytical materials of international organizations: Studies by BP, the World Bank, IEA and similar reports, and think tank publications (in this context, the relevant analyses of the KHAR Center will be taken as a primary reference).
- Media archives: Articles by well-known local and international media, official statements, parliamentary reports, and legislative documents.
Political Stability in Rentier States and the West’s Double Standards
Energy resources are not only the main source of economic development but also a crucial factor shaping political power and international influence. Especially since the mid-20th century, oil and gas have turned into hybrid elements in states’ foreign policies, combining aspects of both hard and soft power. Today, energy ranks among the most important criteria defining the balance of power in the international relations system. Despite Russia’s open policy of occupation, it still remains one of the key actors in global politics and continues to influence intra-Western relations—one of the clearest examples of how powerfully energy serves as a shield.
Pulitzer Prize-winning American researcher and writer Daniel Yergin, in his world-famous book The Prize, explains the relationship between energy and geopolitics, describing energy as the “currency” of the international system. According to Yergin, even though leadership and dynamism in the modern economy have shifted to knowledge-based industries—what the Japanese call knowledge-oriented industrial systems—oil remains the driving force of the industrial world and the lifeblood of the civilization it has created:
“Oil is the most fundamental element in the sphere of international power and the world economy, the most critical point in wars and conflicts, and the most concrete power influencing decisions on the international stage.” (Yergin, 1995, Turkish translation)
Another American researcher, Jeff Colgan, argues that oil is both the curse of domestic and foreign politics with the following reasoning:
“Studies on the resource curse show that the ease with which oil revenues are centralized and controlled by the state leadership weakens political accountability and erodes domestic democratic mechanisms. I demonstrate that the effect of this ‘resource curse’ is not limited to domestic politics—it also extends into international relations and forms the conceptual basis of the ‘petro-aggression theory.’” (Colgan, 2013a)
One of the most frequently cited approaches to understanding the link between energy resources and authoritarian stability is the “rentier state theory.” The first model of this theory was introduced in the 1970s by Iranian economist Hussein Mahdavy, who argued that in such systems the government receives its revenues “not from the labor of its people but from resource rents coming from foreign purchasers.” (Mahdavy, 1970)
In the 1980s, Hazem Beblawi further developed this theory, presenting the rentier state in the following way:
“First, rent conditions dominate in a rentier economy. Second, the economy is strongly linked to external rent-seeking. Third, a small segment of society plays a role in generating this rent, while the majority benefits from its distribution and welfare. Consequently, governments play the primary role in earning and distributing the rent.” (Beblawi, 1990)
Another researcher, Michael Ross, who emphasized that oil-rich countries have less democracy, less economic stability, and more civil wars than countries without oil, takes a similar position. According to Ross, until the 1970s, oil-rich countries resembled the rest of the world, but today they are 50% more likely to be governed by autocrats than non-oil countries. (Ross, 2012a)
Thus, according to rentier state theory, resources are the curse of democracy. In this context, energy resources function as both an “economic cushion” and a “political shield” for authoritarian regimes. States with energy resources act more freely in the face of external pressure and are more resilient to sanctions and international criticism. At the same time, through their position in the energy market, they are able to create mutual dependence with Western or regional powers. This elevates energy diplomacy from a purely economic tool to an instrument of security.
In his book The Oil Curse, Ross notes that oil increases the likelihood that even low-income democracies will move toward authoritarian regimes. One of the few exceptions to this rule is a number of Latin American countries that have democratized despite being rich in oil. According to Ross, there are two reasons for this: first, these countries had democratic experience before oil production began, and second, their oil revenues were relatively small compared to the major oil-producing states. (Ross, 2012b)
As Ilham Aliyev puts it, energy resources are a “gift from God” (Euronews, 2024). However, another example of a country where these resources have not become a curse for democracy is Norway. The main reason for this, again according to Ross, is its democratic legacy. Before discovering oil in 1969, Norway already had a well-established democracy, a strong parliament, a high level of education, and robust mechanisms of public oversight over the state. Thus, when the wave of oil wealth arrived, Norway already possessed an advanced industrial base and a deeply rooted democratic system—factors that limited the potential for resource waste and the emergence of the resource curse. (Center for Public Impact, 2019a)
However, Norway did not stop there. In order to avoid falling into the resource curse and to prevent an economic crisis similar to that experienced by the Netherlands after the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea (the so-called Dutch disease), Norway established the Government Pension Fund in 1990, channeling oil revenues into it. (Center for Public Impact, 2019b)
Azerbaijan, by contrast, resembles in many ways a classic rentier state model. A large portion of its budget and economy still depend on oil and gas revenues. The state is able to maintain an illusion of social stability through these revenues, but this simultaneously reduces accountability and transparency. In other words, the sense of welfare is provided not through a “social contract,” but through the redistribution of state income.
As a result, the country’s energy diplomacy has led not to genuine economic development but to inflated statistical indicators, an expansion of the regime’s resources, and ultimately the transformation of wealth into a tool for repressing dissent and political opponents—a source of corruption. In this context, the West acts as a partner of the Azerbaijani government in legitimizing authoritarianism through the use of energy resources. (KHAR Center, July 2025)
Azerbaijan’s Energy Strategy: From an Export Model to a Geopolitical Instrument
Since the mid-1990s, Azerbaijan’s energy policy has been based primarily on the export model. The foundation of this model was laid by the signing of the “Contract of the Century” in 1994 and the launch of the Azeri–Chirag–Gunashli (ACG) project in 1997. From that time onward, oil and gas exports have become the main pillars of the national economy.
Production and Export
In 2022, Azerbaijan produced 32.6 million tons of oil, of which 26.3 million tons were exported. During the same period, the country produced 46.7 billion cubic meters of natural gas, of which 22.3 billion cubic meters were directed for export. (Ministry of Energy, 2023)
In 2023, Azerbaijan produced 30.2 million tons of oil, selling 25.2 million tons abroad. In the same year, gas production totaled 48.3 billion cubic meters, with 23.8 billion cubic meters exported. (Ministry of Energy, 2024)
In 2024, Azerbaijan extracted 29.1 million tons of oil, of which 24.4 million tons were sold abroad. Gas production in 2024 increased by 2 billion cubic meters to reach 50.3 billion cubic meters. Gas exports in 2024 rose by 5.8% compared to the previous year, reaching 25.2 billion cubic meters. (Ministry of Energy, January 2025)
In the first nine months of 2025, Azerbaijan produced 20.7 million tons of oil, slightly less than in previous years. Of this amount, 17.4–17.6 million tons were exported. (TradingView, October 15, 2025) During the same period, gas production reached 37.5 billion cubic meters, of which 18.3 billion cubic meters were sold abroad. (APA, October 15, 2025)
Calculations for 2022–2024 show that while Azerbaijan’s oil production and exports have been declining, gas production has been increasing. Thanks to more than 7% growth in gas exports, overall energy exports have remained stable.
This can be explained by Europe’s policy of diversifying natural gas sources following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and, within this framework, by Azerbaijan’s increased gas exports to Europe. The growth in exports is mainly due to the increase in gas sales to Europe through the Southern Gas Corridor.
Energy and the Budget
In 2024, 48.35% of Azerbaijan’s budget consisted of oil and gas revenues. Direct oil and gas revenues in the state budget amounted to 17.9604 billion manats, a 1% decrease compared to 2023. This decline resulted from lower crude oil and gas prices on the world markets in 2024 compared to the previous year. (Baku Research Institute, August 2025a)
In the first six months of 2025, the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) grew by 10.8% compared to the beginning of the year, reaching $66.5 billion in assets. During this period, SOFAZ transferred approximately 7.3 billion manats to the state budget. (SOFAZ, July 2025)
During the same period, the total revenues of the energy sector accounted for about 48.1% of total budget revenues. (Azernews, July 2025)
The Azerbaijani government explains the growth of non-oil and gas revenues in the state budget as the result of successful economic policy (Milli Majlis, June 2025), but experts argue that the state budget remains highly dependent—both directly and indirectly—on oil and gas revenues. (Baku Research Institute, August 2025b)
Energy Infrastructure
Today, both the economy and the foreign policy of Azerbaijan rest primarily on the network of oil and gas pipelines that transport the country’s oil and gas abroad. Thanks to this infrastructure, Azerbaijan has turned into a regional energy hub.
The foundation of the country’s energy infrastructure—and of its relations with Western and regional powers—was laid with the signing of the “Contract of the Century” in 1994. Signed between SOCAR and ten international companies representing six countries, this agreement envisioned the joint development of the Azeri–Chirag–Gunashli fields. Initially signed for 30 years and extended in 2017 until the middle of the century, the contract was the first major Western investment in a post-Soviet country. The project brought billions of dollars in foreign investment to the country and laid the groundwork for a new stage in Azerbaijan’s energy sector.
Today, within the framework of the “Contract of the Century,” 336,000 barrels of oil are extracted daily and delivered mainly to world markets through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku–Supsa routes. (BP, official website, a) The ACG fields account for approximately 70–75% of the country’s total oil production.
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, commissioned in 2006, ensured for the first time that Azerbaijani oil was transported to the Mediterranean ports through a route bypassing Russia. Stretching 1,786 kilometers from the Caspian Sea through Georgia to Turkey’s port of Ceyhan, this route became a turning point in Azerbaijan’s energy history. The BTC pipeline’s daily throughput capacity is 1.2 million barrels. (BP, official website, b)
Along with oil, Azerbaijan’s gas sector also drew the attention of international actors. To deliver gas extracted from the Shah Deniz field to Georgia and Turkey, the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) was commissioned in 2006. Through this route, natural gas was first supplied to Azerbaijan and Georgia, and since July 2007, to Turkey. The SCP—also known as the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline—was the first major project to bring Azerbaijani gas to international markets. It also represented the first stage of what is now the Southern Gas Corridor. (BP, official website, c)
The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which transports gas from Shah Deniz to Turkey and then to Europe, started operating in 2018. Its current shareholders are the Southern Gas Corridor Company, BOTAŞ, BP Pipelines Limited, and SOCAR Turkey Energy. TANAP is the most important infrastructure link connecting Azerbaijan’s energy system to the West. (TANAP, official website)
The final segment of TANAP, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), was launched in 2020. As the third and last part of the Southern Gas Corridor, TAP carries Azerbaijani gas directly to European markets through Greece, Albania, and Italy. (SGC, official website)
TANAP’s current transport capacity is 16 billion cubic meters per year. Of this amount, 6 billion cubic meters are supplied to Turkey, and the rest is directed into the TAP pipeline. (S&P Global, April 2025)
With the completion of the SCP (BTE), TANAP, and TAP, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC)—a 3,500-kilometer complex system—became fully operational. With an overall value of approximately $40 billion, this project has played a vital role in transforming Azerbaijan into a strategic energy partner of the European Union, and this role is steadily increasing amid the West’s efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian gas.
Energy Diplomacy and the Illusion of Social Welfare: The Role of the SOFAZ Model in Authoritarian Sustainability
The empirical data above show that energy exports are the main pillar of both economic stability and political continuity for Azerbaijan. In this sense, energy diplomacy functions as a mechanism that provides both economic income and international political immunity.
Revenues generated through the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) allow the government to maintain social stability and mitigate the risks of economic recession. At the same time, the lack of transparency in these revenues and the complete elimination of the government’s accountability factor create the opportunity to sustain the illusion of social welfare.
A large portion of SOFAZ’s 70.1 billion USD assets (SOFAZ, September 2025) is held in the West. According to 2025 statistics, over 50 percent of SOFAZ investments are located in Europe and America (26.2% in North America, 29.8% in Europe) (SOFAZ, March 2025). The Fund’s official website shows that the foreign managers who oversee these assets are mostly citizens of Western countries. The purchase and transportation of gold, which constitutes more than 25 percent of SOFAZ’s investments, is also carried out by a Western company. Of the Fund’s real estate acquisitions abroad, only one property is located in Moscow, while the others are in Europe and Japan (SOFAZ, official site).
The fact that most of SOFAZ’s assets and investments are held in the West has created a widespread belief that this could serve as a pressure instrument against Azerbaijan’s authoritarian regime. However, the reality is not that simple. One does not have to look far: even the Western-imposed restrictions on sending Russia’s frozen assets to aid Ukraine demonstrate that such investments are also a source of lobbying activities, which constitute an important element of the security shield of authoritarian regimes.
From Small Supplier to Strategic Partner – “Energy Marriage” with the EU
The revenues obtained from oil and gas exports make Azerbaijan’s multilateral play within the international system possible. Thanks to these revenues, Baku manages to maintain balance in its relations with the West, Russia, and regional powers alike. Particularly with the growth of its role as an alternative supplier for the West, the Southern Gas Corridor has become not only an economic route but also the lifeline of Azerbaijan’s political security architecture.
Although globally a smaller energy hub, energy relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union entered a new phase after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—Azerbaijan suddenly transformed from a small supplier into a significant partner. Currently, Azerbaijan is the fourth-largest pipeline gas supplier to the EU after Norway, Algeria, and Russia, with a 7 percent share. Azerbaijan’s share in the EU’s overall gas imports is about 3 percent (Zabanova, 2024a).
In the summer of 2022, Azerbaijan and the EU signed a Memorandum of Strategic Energy Partnership (President.az, 2022), making Baku an official strategic partner of Brussels. This memorandum envisions doubling the volume of gas exported from Azerbaijan to Europe through the TAP pipeline by 2027 (BBC Azerbaijan, 2022a). The essence of this document is as follows: aiming to end its dependence on Russian gas by 2027, the EU considers Azerbaijan one of its main partners in achieving this goal. During the signing ceremony in Baku, EU Commissioner Ursula von der Leyen chose to remain silent on issues of democracy, human rights, and freedoms in the country, instead calling Azerbaijan a “reliable partner.” (BBC Azerbaijan, 2022b)
Following the signing of this agreement, Azerbaijan increased its gas exports to the EU from 8.1 billion cubic meters in the previous year to 11.4 billion cubic meters, and in 2023 this figure reached 11.8 billion cubic meters (Zabanova, 2024b). In 2024, exports reached 12.9 billion cubic meters (Interfax, January 2025), and in the first three quarters of 2025 they amounted to 9.4 billion cubic meters (Report, October 15, 2025). Due to high prices, Azerbaijan’s gas revenues surpassed oil revenues for the first time.
Baku also expanded the geography of its exports to Europe. In 2023, Romania, and in 2024, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Italy (the largest importer), Bulgaria, and Greece began importing gas from Azerbaijan. While Slovakia began discussions, Hungary’s state energy company MVM Group acquired a 5 percent share in the Shah Deniz development project and a 4 percent share in the South Caucasus Pipeline Company (Zabanova, 2024c). Since the beginning of 2024, Azerbaijan has also started exporting gas to Serbia, exporting 300 million cubic meters by October (Trend, October 23, 2025). At the same time, Baku and Belgrade reached an agreement to build a 500-megawatt gas power plant near Niš (Seenews, September 2025).
“Buy from Russia, Sell to Europe”
EU leaders this year thanked Aliyev—whom they called an important and reliable partner—for Azerbaijan’s role in helping Europe overcome the energy crisis (EAWorldView, 2025). However, the emergence of claims and suspicions that Azerbaijan might be selling Russian gas to the European Union raises questions about the reliability of this partnership and Brussels’ sincerity. President Ilham Aliyev denied these allegations last year, claiming that Azerbaijan only buys gas from Russia for domestic consumption at favorable prices and sells only Azerbaijani gas to Europe (Interfax, 2024).
However, a month ago, Jean-Paul Garot, a member of the European Parliament, addressed a written question to the Commission, arguing that Azerbaijan does not possess sufficient gas resources to meet its energy commitments to the EU. Therefore, he claimed, Azerbaijan buys Russian gas and resells it to Europe, accusing the Commission of hypocrisy (European Parliament, September 2025).
According to experts, Aliyev’s denial and the EU’s silence do not constitute strong counterarguments. British energy analyst Aura Sabadus believes that the interests of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey in gas supply overlap, making these two countries a secret backdoor for Moscow. In her view, while Russia and Azerbaijan may appear as competitors in gas exports to Europe, Moscow—having previously obstructed Western projects involving Azerbaijani gas—has reconfigured relations since 2022, and it is highly likely that Russia’s “laundered” gas is being transported to Eastern Europe through Azerbaijan and Turkey (Sabadus, 2023a).
She further explains her reasoning by pointing out that Azerbaijan cannot meet the promised gas volumes to the EU using its own resources:
“Considering Azerbaijan’s forecast that annual domestic consumption will reach 15 billion cubic meters, we can see that the total domestic and external demand will exceed the country’s resource capacity by at least 5 billion cubic meters. This raises questions about how this excess demand is being met. Azerbaijan struggles to satisfy both foreign and domestic demand but has signed supply or swap agreements with Russia and Iran. Turkey imports nearly all of its own gas needs but has signed supply contracts with EU countries. The probability that a significant portion of this gas is transported from Russia to Turkey via pipeline is very high. Azerbaijan and Turkey both appear quite eager to help the Kremlin in this matter.” (Sabadus, 2023b)
Gas and Complacency: Europe’s Energy Dependence and the Strengthening of Azerbaijani Authoritarianism
Concerns that Azerbaijan cannot provide the promised gas volumes to Europe are shared by other experts as well (Zabanova, 2024d). However, for now, the European Union prefers to remain silent about the contradiction between its declared goal of reducing dependence on Russian gas and the claims that it may be buying the same gas indirectly.
Moreover, the problem does not end there. The EU sees Azerbaijan as one of the key alternatives to Russia in terms of energy resources and strategic infrastructure, yet this alternative directly contradicts the Union’s own values, given Azerbaijan’s record on democracy, human rights, and repression of journalists and civil society activists. In October of last year, the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning human rights violations and calling on the EU to end its dependence on Azerbaijani gas exports and cancel the strategic partnership memorandum. The resolution also demanded that any future partnership agreements between the EU and Azerbaijan be conditional upon the release of political prisoners, implementation of legal reforms, improvement of human rights conditions, and commitment to peace negotiations with Armenia (European Parliament, 2024).
Instead, Brussels rewarded official Baku by deciding to hold the 2028 European Political Community Summit in Azerbaijan (APA, May 2025)—another vivid example of a double standard driven by internal political interests.
Such double standards are especially ironic in the context of the EU’s calls for global solidarity against Russia’s aggression and authoritarianism, given that the Union presents itself as a community of liberal and democratic values. The EU’s failure to act in accordance with its own moral and ethical principles in relation to Azerbaijan only reinforces Russia’s long-standing accusations of Western hypocrisy (Gale, 2022).
For years, Western representatives have claimed—or pretended—that economic cooperation and agreements with Azerbaijan would encourage Baku toward democratic reforms.
However, since Azerbaijan became a strategic energy partner of Europe, the Aliyev regime’s unprecedented domestic repression and total elimination of all signs of civil society demonstrate that this hope was nothing but a false illusion. On the contrary, Aliyev’s government fully understands that Europe’s need for gas shields Baku from Western pressure—and it uses this fact as a blackmail tool to further strengthen authoritarian governance.
Unlike its tougher stance toward other post-Soviet countries such as Belarus, where the EU reacts strongly to human rights abuses, Brussels continues to prefer the rhetoric of “cooperation and dialogue” with Azerbaijan (EUNeighbourseast, June 2025). Similarly, comparing EU reactions to its two South Caucasus neighbors—Georgia and Azerbaijan—shows a pattern favorable to official Baku.
In Georgia, despite all government pressure and intimidation, a strong civil society, opposition, and media still exist. The EU’s reaction to the Georgian government’s regressive moves—such as adopting laws on “foreign agents” and anti-LGBT measures copied from Russia—has been quite harsh. The EU openly declares that Georgia will not be able to join the Union by 2030 and links the decision to lift visa restrictions directly to Tbilisi’s actions (Evropeyskaya Pravda, October 2025).
In Azerbaijan, however, the systematic destruction of civil society and independent media has brought these sectors to the brink of extinction. Especially since 2013—the year of the last election in which an opposition candidate effectively participated—official Baku has severely restricted the country’s ties with Western institutions, both through legislative changes and intensified persecution. Laws adopted in 2014–2015—“On Grants” (E-qanun, 2014), “On Registration of Grant Agreements” (E-qanun, 2015a), and “On the Right of Foreign Donors to Provide Grants” (E-qanun, 2015b)—practically eliminated NGOs’ ability to receive funding from Western donors. In subsequent years, these laws were made even more restrictive, granting the government the right to confiscate the property of NGOs and civil society representatives (E-qanun, 2023, 2025). As a result of these changes, by April of this year, at least 10 civil society representatives and activists had been arrested (Kavkazskiy Uzel, April 2025).
With the amendments that entered into force on August 1 of this year, civil society activists and NGO representatives were also banned from receiving individual grants or conducting similar contracts and banking operations. This was effectively the final nail in the coffin of Azerbaijani civil society (Kavkazskiy Uzel, August 2025).
Currently, dozens of journalists and civil activists are imprisoned in Azerbaijan, the majority of them arrested after 2022—the year Azerbaijan became the EU’s strategic energy partner.
In September 2022, human rights organizations reported 99 political prisoners in the country, including 4 journalists and bloggers and 3 civil activists (IPD, 2022).
The March 2024 list of political prisoners included 288 names, among them 20 journalists and bloggers, 2 human rights defenders, and 22 opposition members (IPD, 2024).
The new list published at the beginning of this year raised the total number to 357, including 27 journalists and bloggers, 4 human rights defenders, and 27 opposition representatives (Meydan TV, February 2025).
In October 2025, another updated list showed further increases: 392 political prisoners, 31 journalists and bloggers, 7 human rights defenders, and 41 opposition and civil society figures (2 of them peace activists) (Institute for Human Rights, October 2025).
The dynamics of these arrests show that, empowered by the “iron fist” and the role of “victorious leader” following the Karabakh war, Ilham Aliyev has tightened control in domestic politics and turned his “energy marriage” with the West into yet another—and even harsher—opportunity. Meanwhile, the EU responds to all this merely by stating that it will “closely monitor the human rights situation in Azerbaijan” (EEAS, January 2025). The European Parliament’s resolutions calling on Brussels to refrain from steps that could embolden the regime (European Parliament, June 2025) have had no practical effect.
Europe knows that if it pressures President Aliyev on reforms and human rights, he will resort to gas blackmail. Aliyev made this clear in April of this year, openly declaring that if Europe fails to provide concrete guarantees, Azerbaijan will not increase gas sales to the EU and will instead sign contracts with eastern and southern neighbors, challenging:
“Why should I consider your market my main market?” (Brussels Signal, April 2025a).
Brussels’ silence in exchange for energy supplies creates a “safe zone” for Baku. The Aliyev government uses Europe’s energy dependence as its most powerful bargaining tool—through it, it can both reduce external pressure and continue its domestic repression with impunity. Ultimately, a mutually beneficial transaction persists—neither side trusts the other, but both are satisfied with the outcome.
CONCLUSION
The Azerbaijani case shows that oil and gas revenues are not merely economic indicators that reduce political resistance through artificial stability mechanisms; they are also powerful factors that expand the country’s room for maneuver in the international arena and soften external pressures.
Particularly due to the West’s policy of reducing dependence on Russia, the routes that carry Caspian energy resources to Europe have transformed Baku from an ordinary supplier into a geopolitical actor, turning energy trade into a kind of security pact. However, this creates two serious paradoxes for the West. First, rejecting Russian gas directly but potentially buying it indirectly through Azerbaijan and Turkey contradicts the declared goal of reducing dependence. Second, energy cooperation with Azerbaijan continues amid deepening human rights and democracy crises, contradicting the values on which the Union is founded.
Baku skillfully exploits these contradictions, masking its demand for protection from external pressure through long-term contracts, infrastructure expansion conditions, and the blackmail of “alternative markets.” For now, the European Union responds to this blackmail with declarative statements. As long as Europe’s gas dependence continues and alternative sources do not strengthen in the market, this mutually beneficial game is likely to persist.
However, such a situation is not a long-term solution for Europe. As the energy transition accelerates and alternative sources expand, Azerbaijan’s gas card will lose its former strength. When that happens, the function of the “energy shield” will weaken, and the Aliyev regime will seek a new shield to maintain power. For now, though, both sides seem satisfied with this arrangement. The real losers, however, are Azerbaijani society and democracy—and the fundamental values of Europe itself.
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https://www.bp.com/az_az/azerbaijan/home/who-we-are/operationsprojects/pipelines/scp.html
TANAP, rəsmi səhifə.
https://www.tanap.com/en/tanap-project
Cənub Qaz Dəhlizi, rəsmi səhifə.
S&P Global, aprel 2025. Turkey ready for Southern Gas Corridor expansion; Europe needs clearer stance: minister
SOFAZ, sentyabr 2025.
https://www.oilfund.az/en/report-and-statistics/recent-figures
SOFAZ, mart 2025.
https://www.oilfund.az/report-and-statistics/get-download-file/flip/6_2025_1.pdf
SOFAZ, rəsmi səhifə.
https://www.oilfund.az/investments/real-estate
Zabanova, Yana, 2024 a. The EU and Azerbaijan as Energy Partners: Short-Term Benefits, Uncertain Future https://www.boell.de/en/2024/11/05/eu-and-azerbaijan-energy-partners-short-term-benefits-uncertain-future
Prezident.az, 2022. Azərbaycan ilə Avropa İttifaqı arasında enerji sahəsində Strateji Tərəfdaşlığa dair Anlaşma Memorandumu imzalanıb.
https://president.az/az/articles/view/56689
BBC Azerbaycan, 2022 a. Aİ-Azərbaycan əlaqələri: enerji əməkdaşlığı insan haqları ilə bağlı vəziyyətə kölgə salırmı?
https://www.bbc.com/azeri/articles/c2jnl8z22djo
BBC Azerbaycan, 2022 b. Aİ-Azərbaycan əlaqələri: enerji əməkdaşlığı insan haqları ilə bağlı vəziyyətə kölgə salırmı?
https://www.bbc.com/azeri/articles/c2jnl8z22djo
Zabanova, Yana, 2024 b. The EU and Azerbaijan as Energy Partners: Short-Term Benefits, Uncertain Future https://www.boell.de/en/2024/11/05/eu-and-azerbaijan-energy-partners-short-term-benefits-uncertain-future
İnterfax, yanvar 2025. Azerbaijani gas export to Europe grows 9.3% to 12.9 bcm in 2024 - energy minister.
https://www.interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/108958/
Report, 15 oktyabr, 2025. Azerbaijan transports 4.3 bcm of gas via TANAP in 9 months of 2025
https://report.az/en/energy/azerbaijan-transports-4-3-bcm-of-gas-via-tanap-in-9-months-of-2025
Zabanova, Yana, 2024 c. The EU and Azerbaijan as Energy Partners: Short-Term Benefits, Uncertain Future https://www.boell.de/en/2024/11/05/eu-and-azerbaijan-energy-partners-short-term-benefits-uncertain-future
Trend, 23 oktyabr 2025. Azerbaijan reveals volume of gas export to Serbia
https://www.trend.az/business/4108138.html
Seenews, sentyabr 2025. Serbia, Azerbaijan finalise talks on 500 MW gas plant near Nis - parl speaker.
EAworldview, iyun 2025. Energy, Diplomacy, and Human Rights: Europe’s Azerbaijan Gamble
https://eaworldview.com/2025/06/europe-azerbaijan-gamble/
İnterfax, 2024. Aliyev says claims Azerbaijan re-exporting Russian gas are 'fake news'
https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/104430/?
European Parliament, sentyabr 2025. Does the Commission acknowledge that some of the gas purchased from Azerbaijan actually comes from Russia?
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-003783_EN.html
Sabadaus, Aura, 2023 a. The EU’s Dilemma With Azerbaijan — Natural Gas or Moral Purity
https://cepa.org/article/the-eus-dilemma-with-azerbaijan-natural-gas-or-moral-purity/
Sabadaus, Aura, 2023 b. The EU’s Dilemma With Azerbaijan — Natural Gas or Moral Purity
https://cepa.org/article/the-eus-dilemma-with-azerbaijan-natural-gas-or-moral-purity/
Zabanova, Yana, 2024 d. The EU and Azerbaijan as Energy Partners: Short-Term Benefits, Uncertain Future https://www.boell.de/en/2024/11/05/eu-and-azerbaijan-energy-partners-short-term-benefits-uncertain-future
European Parliament, 2024. Situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2024-0029_EN.html
APA, may 2025. Azerbaijan to host European Political Community Summit in 2028.
Gale, Alexander, 2022. The EU’s gas deal with Azerbaijan is strategically short-sighted and hypocritical.
EUNeighbourseast, iyun 2025. Azerbaijan: EU concern at sentencing of journalists and political activists.
Evropeyskaya Pravda, oktyabr 2025. В Еврокомиссии говорят, что при нынешнем курсе Грузия не вступит в ЕС даже в 2030 году.
https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/news/2025/10/27/7223447/
E-qanun, 2014. “Qrant haqqında” Azərbaycan Respublikasının Qanununda dəyişikliklər edilməsi barədə” Azərbaycan Respublikasının 2014-cü il 17 oktyabr tarixli 1081-IVQD nömrəli Qanununun tətbiqi haqqında Prezident Fərmanı
https://e-qanun.az/framework/28794
E-qanun, 2015a. Qrant müqavilələrinin (qərarlarının) qeydə alınması Qaydası
https://e-qanun.az/framework/31488
E-qanun, 2015 b. Xarici donorlar tərəfindən Azərbaycan Respublikasının ərazisində qrant vermək hüququnun əldə edilməsi
https://e-qanun.az/framework/31488
E-qanun, 2023. “Cinayət yolu ilə əldə edilmiş əmlakın leqallaşdırılmasına və terrorçuluğun maliyyələşdirilməsinə qarşı mübarizə haqqında” və “Hədəfli maliyyə sanksiyaları haqqında” Azərbaycan Respublikası qanunlarının icrası ilə əlaqədar Azərbaycan Respublikasının bəzi qanunlarında dəyişiklik edilməsi barədə
https://e-qanun.az/framework/56265
E-qanun, 2025. “Cinayət yolu ilə əldə edilmiş əmlakın leqallaşdırılmasına və terrorçuluğun maliyyələşdirilməsinə qarşı mübarizə haqqında” və “Hədəfli maliyyə sanksiyaları haqqında” Azərbaycan Respublikası qanunlarının icrası ilə əlaqədar Azərbaycan Respublikasının bəzi qanunlarında dəyişiklik edilməsi barədə
https://e-qanun.az/framework/60292
Kafkazskiy Uzel, aprel 2025. В Азербайджане число обвиненных по делу о грантах для НПО активистов достигло 10
https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/410362
Kavkazskiy Uzel, avqust 2025. Azerbaijan tightens conditions for foreign funding of NGOs
https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/66938
İPD, 2022. СПИСОК ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ ЗАКЛЮЧЕННЫХ.
https://www.ipd-az.org/ru/political-prisoners-for-27-september-2022/
İPD, 2024. LIST OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. https://www.ipd-az.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/List-of-political-prisoners-in-Azerb-18-03-24.pdf
Meydan TV, fevral 2025. Number of political Prisoners in Azerbaijan increases to 357. https://storage.googleapis.com/qurium/www.meydan.tv/en-article-number-of-political-prisoners-in-azerbaijan-increases-to-357.html
İnstitute For Human Rights, oktyabr 2025. The Number of Political Prisoners in Azerbaijan Has Reached 392.
EEAS, yanvar 2025. EU Priorities for UN Human Rights Fora in 2025
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/eu-priorities-un-human-rights-fora-2025_en
European Parliament, iyun 2025. Joint statement on the harsh prison sentences for journalists, researchers and activists in politically motivated cases in Azerbaijan.
Brusselssignal, aprel 2025. Azerbaijan warns EU it could sell its gas elsewhere
https://brusselssignal.eu/2025/04/azerbaijan-warns-eu-it-could-sell-its-gas-elsewhere/
