Summary
This research by the “Khar Center” investigates Hungary’s transition from a liberal-democratic model to competitive authoritarianism. It particularly focuses on the post-2010 period, during which Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the “Fidesz” party carried out constitutional amendments, strengthened control over the judiciary and media, weakened civil society, and manipulated the electoral system, steering the country toward an illiberal regime. The study also analyzes the European Union’s weak response to these developments and the threats posed to international democratic norms and institutions. The Hungarian example illustrates how leaders who gain legitimacy through elections can undermine democratic institutions, setting a precedent that may influence other countries.
Introduction
Following the collapse of communism in 1989, Hungary was considered a model of democratic transition. However, since 2010, systemic changes under the leadership of Orbán have pushed the country closer to authoritarianism. Changes to electoral laws, weakening of the judiciary and media, and restrictions on civic oversight are central to this transformation. Although the attributes of democracy are formally retained, the system has acquired authoritarian features. The weakening of core democratic conditions—fair elections, political competition, and fundamental rights and freedoms—is a key indicator of this process. In addition to historical and structural factors, the role of political elites and institutional changes are examined as significant contributors to this transformation.
Research Objectives:
- Analyze the nature of the political regime in Hungary
- Identify the factors that explain the shift from democracy to authoritarianism
- Highlight the differences between this regime and classic authoritarian models
Research Questions:
- What factors have shaped Hungary’s political transformation?
- How do democratic institutions function under this regime?
- How is authoritarian rule implemented through non-violent means?
Methodology:
This study uses qualitative methods, combining comparative and historical analysis approaches.
Keywords: Hungary, European Union, political system, authoritarianism, hybrid regime, mafia state, clan capitalism
What Model Does Hungary’s Political System Follow?
After the collapse of the USSR, emerging regimes were initially presented under the guise of democracy. Later, these regimes were characterized by terms such as “managed democracy,” “electoral democracy,” or “sovereign democracy.” Since the 2010s, political science has extensively studied the models of authoritarianism these regimes have developed into. Over the past 15 years, the top-down political system in Hungary has been described in academic literature using terms such as “hybrid regime,” autocracy, “clan capitalism,” and “mafia state.”
Hybrid Regime or Illiberal Democracy
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán refers to his system as an “illiberal democracy” (Orbán 2014). This term was first used in the 1980s to describe regimes in Southeast Asia. Fareed Zakaria popularized the concept when analyzing the political regimes of the 1990s using “Freedom House” data, revealing that half of the so-called “democratizing” countries were in fact illiberal democracies (Zakaria 2004).
In illiberal democracies:
- Parliaments and courts are weakened
- Rights and freedoms are disregarded
- Opposition parties are marginalized
- Independent media is restricted
- Corruption becomes a governance tool
The “Fidesz” party, led by Orbán, holds a dominant position in the legislative, executive, and media sectors. Although the judiciary retains partial independence, it faces pressure. The prosecution office and state media are under direct government control (Peter and Enyeldi 2018a). This model maintains democratic attributes to create an illusion of public participation (Wilkin 2018a), while the actual goal is to centralize control and spread the hegemonic dominance of the ruling party across all sectors of society (Wilkin 2018b).
Autocracy and “Orbánism”
Hungary’s system is also explained using the term “Orbánism” (Cooper 2023a), which is based on maximizing personal power and neutralizing opponents. The foundation of this system includes:
- Formal inclusiveness but essentially extractive institutions
- Concentration of political and economic power in the hands of one figure—Orbán (Cooper 2023b)
Luke Cooper (2023c) describes Orbán as ideologically flexible but strategically hegemonic. His politics evolved through three stages: liberal (1989), conservative (1994), authoritarian (2010). While no violent repression is observed, Orbán uses two main tools:
- Mobilizing the electorate through ethnonationalist rhetoric
- Reinforcing autocratic control through corruption
Orbán’s “national organization” idea, proposed after 2014, deprioritizes individual liberties and emphasizes nationalist and conservative values. This rhetoric also legitimizes mobilization against liberal thought. Cooper calls the regime “autocratic nationalism,” stating: “Orbán's goal was to change the playing field, creating new elite and media structures.”
Clan Capitalism
Hungary’s regime is also described as “clan capitalism.” In this system, Orbán delegated political and economic power to his close circle, transforming state structures into tools serving his clientele. Under the banner of economic patriotism, wealth is distributed among elite circles (Comelli & Horvath 2018a).
Key features of clan capitalism:
- Corruption is the main tool of dominance
- State intervention has a “patron-clientelist” nature
- Political decisions are made in informal circles rather than formal institutions
- Parliament merely formalizes the “patron’s” will
An example is Orbán’s ally Lőrinc Mészáros buying and shutting down an opposition newspaper, illustrating how capital serves political power (Comelli & Horvath 2018b).
Mafia State
Former education minister and researcher Bálint Magyar calls the regime a “mafia state” (Magyar 2016a). He compares the system to classic mafia organizations, describing its main goals as personal enrichment and power preservation.
In a mafia state:
- Institutions like tax offices, police, and prosecutors serve mafia interests
- The system is concentrated in a small, closed elite group
- State tenders are awarded to regime-aligned companies
- Oligarchs possess both legal political power and illicit wealth
Unlike clans, Magyar argues, the mafia state conceals its wealth and creates mechanisms to hide it due to a lack of legitimate enrichment opportunities (Magyar 2016b).
The principles of a mafia state:
- Legal and economic mechanisms are aligned with elite interests
- Ideology is modeled flexibly according to regime needs
- Political expediency outweighs ideological consistency
In conclusion, Hungary’s political regime is a complex and hybrid form of modern authoritarianism. While classic democratic institutions formally exist, their functionality and substance have been completely transformed. The regime is a synthesis of a hybrid system with elections, a personalist autocracy, clan-based economic control, and mafia-style governance.
Viktor Orbán and Hungary’s Democratic Backsliding
Hungary’s political journey, which began with aspirations for European integration at the end of the 20th century, experienced a radical shift under Viktor Orbán’s leadership. His transformation from ultra-liberal to Euroskeptic might appear reactive to political context, but Hungary’s recent history reveals a deliberate and personal strategy.
Hungarians’ historical trauma related to Russia influenced Orbán’s anti-Russian stance in the 1980s, when he called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops (BBC 2015a). In 1988, as a liberal activist and founder of the Young Democrats Alliance (now “Fidesz”), he advocated for freedom and democracy, supporting Western integration and economic liberalization (BBC 2015b). However, after 1993, Orbán shifted the party to the right with conservative rhetoric, showing authoritarian tendencies initially through internal party restructuring (Hockenos 2024a).
As “Fidesz” leader, he became prime minister in 1998. The government prioritized the wealthy, ignoring pensioners and rural citizens, leading to defeat in the 2002 elections (Hockenos 2024b). This failure pushed Orbán toward populism. “Fidesz” transformed from a conservative party into a national platform, purging internal critics (Hockenos 2024c).
The inefficiency of the center-left government and economic crises of the 2000s paved the way for Orbán’s return (Yglesias 2014a). “Shock therapy” from the World Bank, IMF, and EU caused deep inequalities (Yglesias 2014b). In 2006, the prime minister’s confession of lying further eroded trust in the government (Hungary PM 2006a, b). Disillusionment with democracy and market liberalism grew.
Orbán’s return to power in 2010 with a constitutional majority marked the start of the authoritarian turn. A new constitution, changes to the electoral system, and the appointment of loyalists to key institutions placed the system under “Fidesz” control (Kreko & Enyeldi 2018b). The media was brought under state control, and political opponents were branded as “enemies of the nation.”
During this period:
- Press freedom was curtailed
- Electoral laws were rewritten
- Opposition was marginalized
- Political discourse was polarized
- Checks and balances were dismantled
- Civic oversight increased
In the 2018 elections, Speaker László Kövér remarked: “If we can govern for four more years, our changes will become irreversible” (Kreko & Enyeldi 2018). Victory was achieved through populist tactics like social assistance and fear of migration. Orbán used harsh rhetoric against liberal elites, emphasizing national identity and traditional values.
“Fidesz” evolved into a flexible political force, shifting from liberalism to statism and centrism to center-right. Religion became both a source of ideological legitimacy and a means of social influence (Kovalenko 2007). Orbán’s nationalist rhetoric and distancing from the West strengthened his position. Hungary’s radical turn despite being an EU member and market economy participant is explained by Orbán’s ability to read public sentiment. Weak democratic traditions before 1989 and societal obedience after the suppression of the 1956 uprising laid the groundwork (Bozóki & Fleck 2024).
Disillusionment with ineffective governance and mistrust in democratic institutions laid the groundwork for a broader discontent with liberal democracy. This trend extended beyond Hungary. Similar populist and authoritarian tendencies were also observed in the Czech Republic, Serbia, and Slovakia. However, the methods employed by Orbán were manipulative and indirect, rather than overtly repressive.
His ethnonationalist and hegemonic rhetoric directly challenges the legal foundations of liberal democracy (Maastricht University 2023). This is part of a new authoritarian-leaning paradigm emerging from the crisis of globalization and the 2008 economic collapse. Orbán's politics not only pose a threat to Hungary but to the future of liberalism in Europe.
Laws Were Rewritten to Fit the System
In 2010, using the mandate he received from the public, Viktor Orbán decided to reform the judiciary, rewrite Hungary’s legal code, and adopt a new constitution. The new laws made it harder for new parties to gain seats in parliament, while enabling large parties like “Fidesz” to win legislative majorities with fewer votes. The rewritten legal code legitimized “Fidesz”’s clan-based governance and facilitated the party’s further power consolidation by allowing it to bypass internal oversight mechanisms (Bánkuti, Halmai & Scheppele, 2012).
Many of the Prime Minister’s initial political decisions served this goal. One law reduced judges’ retirement age from 70 to 62, creating hundreds of vacancies, which “Fidesz” filled with its allies (Zack Beauchamp 2024a). Later, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court—staffed with Orbán’s "friends"—was expanded to review legislation, effectively securing favorable rulings for the government (Zack Beauchamp 2024b).
In 2018, the judiciary was further reshaped under the pretext of addressing “administrative” issues like election law and corruption, and once again, loyalists were appointed (Zack Beauchamp 2024c). With a two-thirds parliamentary majority and full control over the judiciary, “Fidesz” systematically brought any potentially threatening institution under control (Zack Beauchamp 2024d).
Media
After the 2010 elections, a new media law was adopted at the government’s initiative, introducing heavy fines for violations of moral norms or unbalanced coverage. To enforce this, a Media Council composed of ruling party members was formed (Marius Dragomir 2017a). It was granted authority over all media in the country, resulting in mass layoffs of independent journalists and transforming the media into a tool of government propaganda.
A more effective method to subdue independent press was market pressure: the government purchased ad space from media outlets for public service campaigns, creating dependency on government funding (David 2018a). As state advertising flowed toward pro-government outlets, critical media were driven toward bankruptcy and faced the choice of selling to the state or allied businesspeople (David 2018b). As a result of the 2010 media law and market pressure, by 2017, about 90% of Hungarian media was directly or indirectly under government control, a figure that continues to rise (Marius Dragomir 2017b).
In 2018, nearly 500 outlets were merged into the “Central European Press and Media Foundation,” a new “nonprofit” entity aligned with “Fidesz”—creating the largest media conglomerate in Europe overnight (David Frum 2018c). In 2020, Hungary’s largest independent outlet “Index” was sold to a Fidesz-linked businessman. The “Klubrádió” station, which survived the loss of 90% of its ad revenue in 2011, was eventually taken off the air by the Media Council and now only streams online. Its frequency was given to a pro-Fidesz broadcaster (Zack Beauchamp 2024e). While independent print media exists, it reaches only about 4% of the population and has minimal impact. Social media remains inclusive but has also faced restriction attempts (Pál Dunay 2021).
Managed Electoral System
One of the first legislative reforms by Orbán’s government was to redesign the electoral system. Over half of parliamentary seats are now filled through single-member districts, with the rest through proportional representation. Additionally, electoral boundaries were redrawn. The government exploited loopholes allowing district populations to vary from 60,000 to 90,000, dispersing opposition voters across large districts while concentrating Fidesz supporters in smaller ones (Paul Krugman 2014).
This mechanism did not give “Fidesz” the majority of total votes, but still enabled it to secure a two-thirds supermajority in parliament in 2014 and 2018.
Other changes further disadvantaged opposition parties. The previous system required a runoff if no candidate reached 50%, but this was abolished—victory now required only a simple plurality. Another rule required national parties to run in at least 27 single-member districts, while another law made it harder for smaller parties to unite (Zack Beauchamp 2024f). Consequently, opposition parties split the anti-Fidesz vote, allowing Fidesz candidates to win with a relative minority (Wilkin 2018c–e).
Technical tricks were used in the legislative process—some electoral changes were buried in unrelated laws, such as counterterrorism measures (Zack Beauchamp 2024g). This strategy is called “autocratic legalism”: replacing democratic practices with authoritarian ones through seemingly legal and transparent means (Zack Beauchamp 2024h). As a result, international organizations describe Hungary’s elections as free but unfair (European Parliament 2022).
With the new laws, election fraud became unnecessary—the electoral system itself made opposition victories functionally impossible. The best proof was the 2022 elections, where opposition parties formed a united list yet still failed to win a majority (Korkut 2022a–d). Despite carefully selected candidates and tactical campaigns, the opposition lost again due to financial constraints and inability to communicate via state-controlled media. “Fidesz” retained its two-thirds majority, winning 98% of rural single-member districts.
“The situation has deteriorated to the point that Hungary has become an ‘electoral autocracy.’ The EU’s failure to take firm action has enabled the emergence of a hybrid regime where elections take place, but democratic norms are not respected.” (European Parliament 2022b)
Opposition and Civil Society
Surveys before the April 2010 elections showed that Hungarians ranked highest in democratic disillusionment and distrust among neighboring nations (Richard Wike 2010a). Orbán responded by promising more justice and democracy, as well as a purge of communist elites from state institutions. At the time, many Hungarians viewed Orbán and “Fidesz” as akin to Putin—offering security and stability after chaos (Wike 2010b).
The government targets the opposition with corruption allegations and heavy fines (Kreko & Enyeldi 2018c). Law enforcement frequently launches investigations and publicizes them widely, even though no prominent opposition figure has been jailed. As a result, the public has normalized such accusations as part of the political game (Kreko & Enyeldi 2018d).
Analysis shows that administrative pressure and restrictions have cultivated distrust in the opposition. Government media control also limits opposition access to mass audiences and credibility. For example, in the 2022 elections, the opposition coalition focused on war, monopolies, and inflation—but failed to present itself as a viable alternative (Korkut 2022e–g). Orbán capitalized on this, campaigning on stability during uncertain times and exploiting fears.
Hungary’s dependence on Russia for energy and trade has complicated Orbán’s position on the Ukraine war. Unlike other EU leaders, he refrained from criticizing Putin. His justification was that if the opposition came to power, Russia might cut off gas, collapsing the Hungarian economy (Rényi 2022).
Opposition parties (except far-right Jobbik) promised to “Europeanize” Hungary, but Fidesz voters believe past efforts to integrate with Europe destroyed the welfare state, endangered jobs, and left people uncertain about the future—making votes for Fidesz appear rational (Kreko & Enyeldi 2018e).
Despite income inequality, Orbán remains popular among the poor. He manipulates their concerns about national identity and provides employment through public works programs. Children from these families receive free hot meals in schools and kindergartens (Kreko & Enyeldi 2018f–g). These voters fear that a change in government would jeopardize their benefits. Many rural residents worry that voting for the opposition would be discovered, costing them their jobs and subsidies (Kreko & Enyeldi 2018h). Another concern is that a refugee influx would force the government to share public support with migrants (Soguel 2020a).
Election results and voter behavior indicate that rather than reacting to inflation or living standards, citizens prefer the familiar leader over an unknown alternative. Both the poorest regions in the northeast and the wealthiest areas in the west voted for Orbán. The opposition remains mostly confined to Budapest. The last elections showed that even in Europe, “illiberal democracy” is possible.
Authoritarianism’s Threat to NGOs
Another institution authoritarianism perceives as a threat is civil society. In Hungary, the crackdown on NGOs is carried out by portraying them as “traitors.” Government officials accuse NGOs of acting on behalf of foreign interests and receiving external funding (Soguel 2020b). In 2023, the Hungarian parliament passed a legislative package aimed at limiting “foreign influence,” targeting both NGOs and political parties. In 2017, Orbán introduced a “foreign agents” law inspired by Russia, which was repealed in 2021 under EU pressure (Gosling 2025).
In parallel, strict laws were introduced on trade unions defending workers’ rights, effectively limiting their right to strike (Comelli & Horvath 2018a). The government also launched smear campaigns against union leaders (Comelli & Horvath 2018b).
Corruption as a Central Tool in Hungary’s New System
Corruption has been widespread in Hungary since the communist regime. In the 1990s, the pervasiveness of corruption in all areas of life was one of the key reasons for the public’s aversion to the communist regime in Central Europe. Nevertheless, the majority of Hungarians still oppose bribery, as ordinary people do not benefit from corruption (Jancsics 2024a).
From 2010 onward, “Fidesz” began a systematic transformation of large-scale corruption schemes. These schemes formed as complex networks controlled by the upper echelon of the political elite. Orbán’s inner circle controls not only political institutions but also the economy, and they have “consistently appropriated vast amounts of state resources” (Jancsics 2024b). They use shell companies to conceal profits and have passed laws that legalize corruption. For example, Hungary’s $2.5 billion tobacco industry was turned into a state monopoly in 2012 (NOERR 2024). Under the pretext of “preventing youth smoking,” the National Tobacco Non-Profit Trading Company distributed licenses to government-aligned networks. This scheme, operated by over 500 shell companies, was led by Lőrinc Mészáros, a former mayor of Orbán’s hometown and one of Hungary’s richest individuals (Statista 2024).
These schemes also benefit lower-level members of “Fidesz.” “Legislators used the restructuring of the tobacco market not only to benefit a few oligarchs but also to reward the party’s ‘clients’” (Jancsics 2024c).
One of the factors strengthening Orbán’s rule was the roughly $34 billion in financial assistance Hungary received from the European Union between 2014–2020 (Scheffer 2024). These funds were used to cultivate an oligarchic class, 90% of whose income came from public procurement tenders, with prices inflated by 1.7 to 10 times (Corruption Research Centre Budapest 2019). Figures like Mészáros became wealthy through state contracts. The opposition believes his wealth actually belongs to Orbán. Orbán’s father and son-in-law have also profited from state contracts (Magyar and Madlovics 2019).
Despite Hungary violating EU rules, the inflow of aid helped establish authoritarian clan capitalism. Orbán’s inner circle used these funds to develop their private businesses (Dunay 2021b). When Orbán’s son-in-law made investments in gross violation of existing standards, resulting in a €40 million loss, the government resolved the issue by paying a hefty EU fine. While hospitals were in poor condition, subsidies were funneled toward building football stadiums that served the interests of pro-government individuals (Kenneth Roth 2021). This clan capitalism was financed by state budgets through fines and EU funds that served the interests of a new economic elite.
The use of budgetary resources by authoritarian regimes to solve their internal problems is a common behavioral pattern and in the long term leads to serious violations of democratic principles.
Economy
In the 1990s, Hungary privatized state assets to boost competitiveness and reduce growing foreign debt, promoting capitalism and attracting foreign investment. The country liberalized rapidly and built a more open economy than many “older” capitalist states. Foreign companies — mainly from Austria, Germany, and Italy — came to dominate major banks, supermarkets, IT, and mobile operators. Manufacturing was led by firms like Audi, General Electric, Mercedes Benz, and Bosch. Hungary became a neoliberal colony.
To many, Hungary appeared as a success story of capitalism: a transition from a planned economy dictatorship to market capitalism and democracy. Governments reduced the corporate tax rate to 9%. Although politicians praised small businesses, the economy was driven by foreign corporate giants. The main source of budget income became consumption taxes, and the economy became export-oriented. This caused wage stagnation and increased tax evasion. Public sectors, especially healthcare and education, suffered from financial problems.
Hungarians lacked actual control over economic life; they lived mainly by selling their labor. In rural areas outside the capital — home to about 20% of the population but generating 40% of GDP — wages were below both national and European averages. Access to services and social protection was more limited in the provinces (Dunay 2021c).
The global economic crisis of 2008 hit Hungary hard and deepened existing problems.
Right-wing leader Viktor Orbán accurately diagnosed the country’s “illness”: liberalization had failed to meet the expectations of many citizens. He introduced an unorthodox economic policy in response to the “Western financial crisis” and proposed a model of a “non-liberal society.” In 2010, high taxes were imposed on foreign banks and Western companies. In response to corruption accusations, Orbán said he wanted to create a “national capitalist class,” promote domestic investment, and strengthen the local economy (Comelli and Horvath 2018c). Parts of the utility and banking sectors were nationalized, and new taxes were introduced.
These measures, although sometimes ineffective, were seen as attempts to heal the wounds inflicted by the shock therapy of the 1990s.
The boundary between the state and private sector became blurred. Without violence, Orbán strengthened his political and economic power by using corruption as a political tool. These measures weakened democratic norms. The state took a more active role in the economy. Orbán pursued policies to limit foreign involvement, promote ethnic nationalism, and emphasize national sovereignty.
Ethnic nationalism — even if entangled with corruption and authoritarian practices — justified the emergence of a new Hungarian economic elite. “Orbán’s ‘economic patriotism’ has the character of clan capitalism; there is no evidence that his ‘friends’ will not offshore their wealth. He is skilled at emotionally appealing to isolated segments of society” (Comelli and Horvath 2018d).
Over the past 15 years, approximately 700,000 Hungarians have emigrated for work. Remittances account for 3.4% of GDP and in some years, up to 10% (Dunay 2021d), providing crucial economic support.
Orbán also benefited from EU financial aid. After 2004, Hungary recorded stable economic growth. By 2017, “Fidesz” had achieved 4% annual growth, a stable budget, low debt, and reduced unemployment (Peter Kreko, Enyeldi Zsolt 2018i).
However, the negative consequences of Orbán’s economic policy included:
- nationalization of private pension funds;
- reduced welfare spending for the poor;
- depletion of scientific research and education budgets;
- new taxes that discouraged foreign investment in the banking and service sectors.
Manipulation
As leader of a right-wing party, Viktor Orbán declared that his politics were a challenge to European authoritarianism and bureaucracy, calling his project a “national revolution through elections” (Yeremina 2016). He prioritized the Hungarian nation, making it easier for all ethnic Hungarians to gain citizenship — producing over half a million new voters. The preamble to the new Constitution was named the “Declaration of National Faith,” and the country’s name was changed from “Republic of Hungary” to simply “Hungary.”
Refugees and migration became central to Orbán’s speeches, while economic issues were pushed aside. He claimed that Brussels and George Soros planned to flood Europe with Muslim migrants, warning that a “Fidesz” defeat would spell the end of Hungarian Christianity (Soguel 2020b). This campaign was highly successful in the 2018 elections, even though “Fidesz” was losing popularity before the refugee crisis.
The 2017 Civil Society Act stated that the wave of refugees and migrants was supported by Hungarian NGOs funded by Soros. These NGOs were labeled as “foreign-funded” and penalized. The “Stop Soros” law imposed a 25% migration tax on organizations supporting illegal migration (The Guardian 2018).
Propaganda centered on nationalism, Christian and patriarchal values. Anti-Western discourse depicted Western Europe as overrun by migrants, lacking rule of law, and suppressing free speech. Opposition representatives are denied access to state media. While critical online media exists in Budapest and large cities, rural populations rely on state media. State channels emphasize threats from refugees, Soros, and Brussels while highlighting government responses. “Fidesz’s” media control facilitates the spread of misinformation about migration and terrorism. Support for “Fidesz” among rural and low-income city populations is largely a result of manipulation.
State-controlled media is heavily funded to maintain the government’s narrative. Newspapers are distributed for free in public spaces, and state radio and TV reach every household. Advertising is mostly funded by state-owned companies and institutions.
Millions of euros are spent on government propaganda. Since 2015, over €100 million has been used to spread the narrative that “Soros’s secret network is bringing in millions of migrants” (Kreko and Enyeldi 2018j). A key example is the weekly “Figyelő,” owned by a government advisor and deriving 70% of its income from the state. This media outlet not only shapes opinion but also enforces discipline — for instance, it published a list of over 200 academics and human rights defenders labeled “Soros’s mercenaries” (Pablo Gorondi 2018).
Government advertisements are channeled to pro-government media, resulting in a media network controlled by “Fidesz” and its oligarchs. Hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on propaganda through radio, TV, and other channels. In 2017, nearly $250 million was spent on billboards, flyers, TV ads, and mailers promoting Orbán’s “enemies of Hungary” campaign — targeting Brussels and Soros.
Foreign Relations
EU financial support and trade with member states drove significant economic growth in Hungary. The EU played three roles with regard to Hungary (Dunay 2021e):
- System sustainer
- Regime supporter
- Legitimizer of the regime
These roles apply not only to Hungary but also to all hybrid regimes and imitation democracies.
In 2018, the EU hardened its policy and imposed sanctions on Budapest. In 2019, the European People’s Party expelled “Fidesz.” Between 2021 and 2024, more than $31 billion in funds, including the COVID-19 recovery fund, were frozen due to rule-of-law violations (Bozóki and Fleck 2024b).
Yet these steps did not force the Orbán government to change course. Despite harsh criticism, Hungary assumed the EU Council Presidency in July 2024.
Orbán has benefitted from both EU funds and its penalty mechanisms. Brussels’ warnings and fines allowed the government to rally citizens around nationalist sovereignty propaganda. At the same time, Orbán used threats in his dealings with the EU. In January 2018, he warned that cutting EU funding would push him toward China (Budapest Business Journal 2018). In exchange for EU support, Hungary promised to reduce its dependence on Russian energy (Gavin and Jack 2024). In April 2018, Hungary was the only European country not to sign a declaration criticizing China’s “Belt and Road” initiative.
Orbán’s policies opened the door for partnerships with Russia, China, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Calling EU leaders “violinists on the Titanic” (Schwartz and Foy 2024), he acts as an observer in the organization of authoritarian Turkic states and hosts summits.
Hungary’s cooperation with Baku prioritizes the interests of authoritarian regimes. In return for defending Azerbaijan’s interests, Hungary is active in its investment projects. It is one of the few countries to sign a strategic partnership agreement with Azerbaijan.
Since 1999, Hungary’s NATO policy has been stable, with low defense spending. It participated in Afghanistan operations, maintains a large contingent in KFOR (Kosovo), and hosts NATO’s Center of Excellence for Military Medicine.
Conclusion
After the fall of communism, Hungary did not adopt a new constitution but amended the 1949 basic law. The revised system allowed a two-thirds parliamentary majority to make fundamental institutional changes. It was assumed such a majority would never be achieved — until “Fidesz” won 53% of the vote and 68% of parliamentary seats in 2010.
This institutional majority gave Viktor Orbán and his party full control of legislative and executive powers, and the ability to interfere in public life — commerce, education, religion, and the arts. By appointing loyalists, especially in the prosecution service, Orbán shielded himself from criminal liability. His centralization policy weakened checks on state power.
Orbán’s rule retains some public support: elections are held with secret ballots, participation is allowed, there is no threat of violence, Hungary remains an EU member with democratic institutions, and citizens have access to information.
EU membership requires commitment to democratic values, but Hungary demonstrates that autocracy can exist without outward repression. Administrative resources, legal mechanisms, and political-economic power form a hybrid regime that uses free elections for legitimacy.
Orbán’s system serves two main functions:
- Ensuring long-term stability of rule
- Avoiding overt departure from democratic principles
Hungary’s political transformation over the past 15 years is a critical example for the post-Soviet and post-communist space. After early successes in building democratic institutions, Orbán and “Fidesz” gradually dismantled them through constitutional and legal changes starting in 2010. Electoral manipulation, political influence over the judiciary, state media propaganda, and suppression of civil society have made Hungary a model of competitive authoritarianism.
The EU’s insufficient democratic enforcement mechanisms reveal a weakening liberal democratic consensus both within Hungary and in Europe at large. Orbán’s concept of “illiberal democracy” reflects not only internal governance but also his geopolitical stance: resisting Western liberalism, aligning with authoritarian regimes, and undermining democratic accountability under the guise of national sovereignty.
In this context, Hungary’s political system is an important example both domestically and internationally. The use of legal mechanisms by democratically legitimized leaders to erode democracy highlights the urgent need for flexible and principled defense strategies for democratic systems.
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