The Post-Soviet Nomenklatura as an Institutional Resource of Authoritarianism (II PART)

As can be seen from the visualized form, this transformation occurs primarily in four directions:

• Technocratic reintegration;
• Symbiosis with oligarchic capital;
• Ideological evolution;
• Transnational digital surveillance forms.

These mechanisms together constitute the sustainable foundations of modernized authoritarianism.

The New Technocratic Nomenklatura

Post-Soviet regimes have created a new elite class—post-nomenklatura technocracy—by combining past political loyalty with modern technocratic competence. The peculiarity of this class is that it not only creates the appearance of rationality but also remains a pillar of authoritarian structure (Brown, 2009i).

Their discourse is expressed through Western managerial terminology such as “digital transformation,” “optimization of public services,” and “smart governance.” This ensures a form of authoritarian performative legitimacy, allowing for the reproduction of power through the illusion of “governance efficiency” beyond just coercion and fear (Frye, 2010).

Western actors, too, from time to time show a tendency to be deceived by the new technocratic discourse emerging in the post-Soviet space. The carriers of this discourse use concepts like “good governance,” “rule of law,” and “transparency,” which formally align with the normative frameworks of the European Union and other international organizations, forming a reformist image on international platforms. However, in practice, this rhetoric serves the maintenance of authoritarian stability. This new post-Soviet nomenklatura class formally meets the accountability expectations of Western donors but empties them of content and redirects them toward goals such as restricting political pluralism, centralizing power, and deepening institutional dependency (Rupnik, 2012). In this way, they acquire external legitimacy by mastering the normative language of the West while reinforcing the authoritarian status quo domestically.

Symbiosis with Economic Oligarchy

In the years following the Soviet Union, former nomenklatura elites turned their administrative resources into economic power during the privatization processes of the state. This created a nomenklatura–oligarch symbiosis (Ledeneva, 1998i).

As a result, a structured interdependence formed between political power and the management of economic resources. Oligarchic groups preserve their relations with the state through institutional guarantees such as legal protection and access to state contracts, while in return they maintain political loyalty and allegiance to the regime. In Azerbaijan, SOCAR and the oil sector in general, and in Russia, corporate actors such as Gazprom and Rosneft, which are closely integrated with the state, are key examples of this symbiosis (Sakwa, 2013).

This model serves authoritarian regime consolidation in two main ways:

• Political loyalty is incentivized through economic levers — loyalty to the regime is conditioned by access to economic resources;
• Resource-based dependency system — through economic tools, the behavioral range of all potential political actors is pre-regulated and kept within the regime’s boundaries.

Thus, the oligarchic-economic symbiosis becomes both a guarantor of political loyalty and a tool of institutional control for the authoritarian regime.

Hegemony from the Past to the Future

If in Soviet nomenklatura the dominant image was “protector of the proletarian revolution,” in the post-Soviet context it has become “guardian of national interests” and “bearer of statehood tradition.”

Key components of this system include:

• Sacralization of national holidays and historical narratives – formation of collective memory intertwined with state ideology;
• Framing the opposition as “pro-Western” and “anti-state” elements – neutralizing public support for alternative political thought by portraying it as dangerous;
• Cult of leadership and dominance of the “guarantor of stability” image – centralizing authoritarian governance around personal legitimacy.

This ideological evolution, especially among younger generations, on the one hand promotes apoliticism, and on the other hand, normalizes state-centric governance as the standard (Silitski, 2005).

Global Adaptation of the Modern Nomenklatura

Modern post-Soviet nomenklatura is no longer limited by national borders; it integrates into transnational spaces, consolidating its presence globally. This globalization-driven adaptation aims at both the protection of capital and the expansion of information control.

Key mechanisms include:

• Protection of capital through offshore financial networks and foreign real estate – securing and legitimizing wealth via opaque financial infrastructures (Cooley & Heathershaw, 2017);
• Use of transnational legal regimes – especially English common law – to arbitrate disputes and legally shield assets;
• Application of digital surveillance systems – monopolizing the information environment through control over AI, cybersecurity structures, and social media platforms (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019).

This new stage, in Ledeneva’s (1998) terms, is a transformation model where “digitalized systemic corruption” and “monopoly over information” combine to provide global foundations for authoritarian stability.

“Digital nomenklatura authoritarianism” – here, authoritarian rule is legitimized not only through patrimonialism and coercion, but also through a normative image of technological efficiency. For the West, it appears as “modern governance,” while internally it serves as an apparatus of effective control.

Dismantling the Authoritarian Legacy: The Nomenklatura System and Democratic Transition Strategies in the Post-Soviet Space

For a long time, the Soviet nomenklatura system was considered merely a political legacy of the past or a historical remnant of ideological governance. However, this research demonstrates that political developments and regime durability in the post-Soviet space fundamentally challenge this view. The study clearly substantiates that the nomenklatura is one of the key institutional pillars, ideological resources, and structural mechanisms of continuity in post-Soviet authoritarianism.

The main characteristic of this phenomenon is its capacity for transformation and adaptation — a structure inherited from the Soviet system continues its function in different forms by adapting to new conditions. The research shows that this adaptation is observed in three main dimensions:

1. Structural flexibility – Nomenklatura figures do not become opposition during political transitions, ideological shifts, or institutional reforms; instead, they align with and integrate into new forms of power.
2. Ideological plasticity – Without abandoning the collectivist rhetoric of the Soviet era, they develop new discourses substituting it with concepts such as “national interests,” “stability,” “national leadership,” and “statehood tradition.”
3. Network-based governance – The system of patronage and personal connections persists in both state apparatus and economic-financial systems. These informal networks retain real power over institutions, neutralizing the effects of formal legal changes.

This combination of characteristics turns the post-Soviet nomenklatura into the functional engine of authoritarian regimes. Its management practices, connections with repressive apparatuses, and dominance in symbolic politics make it one of the main pillars of the institutional and ideological structure of authoritarianism.

Empirical Evidence and Results of Comparative Analysis

The comparative part of the research shows that in countries like Azerbaijan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, the post-Soviet nomenklatura presents itself as the main bearer of stability, statehood, and national leadership.

On the other hand, the experiences of the Baltic states and, to some extent, Georgia demonstrate that detachment from the nomenklatura is possible. For this to occur, the following are critical:

• Changes in personnel policy;
• Ideological reforms in the education system;
• Strengthening democracy-oriented narratives in politics;
• Promotion of geopolitical integration (e.g., cooperation with the EU and NATO).

Because the influence of the post-Soviet nomenklatura is not only structural but also rooted in cultural codes.

Summary of Key Theses

The main theses of this research can be summarized as follows:

• The post-Soviet nomenklatura ensures the technical continuity of authoritarian regimes through management and repression skills;
• Thanks to ideological plasticity, it generates legitimacy-endowing discourses such as “experience,” “preservation of statehood,” and “national leadership”;
• Through technocratic and oligarchic syntheses, it builds the structure of a new type of performative and digital authoritarianism;
• With transnational tools (offshore financial flows, use of international legal systems, control over cyberspace), it protects local authoritarianism from global risks;
• Ultimately, modern post-Soviet authoritarianism is based on political leaders and the structural class behind them — the post-nomenklatura elite.

Strategies for Breaking Free from Nomenklatura Reproduction

The Soviet nomenklatura system has deep institutional and symbolic roots that can be explained through theories such as Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983), Antonio Gramsci’s “ideological hegemony” (Gramsci, 1971), and Guillermo O’Donnell’s “delegative democracy” (O’Donnell, 1994).

• According to Gramsci, authoritarian structures function not only through coercion but also through “manufacturing consent.” Nomenklatura produces this consent by presenting the state as the only rational force;
• O’Donnell notes that regimes that are “democratic in form, authoritarian in essence” are characterized by the immutability of former elites and unlimited presidential powers;
• Linz and Stepan (1996) emphasize that achieving democratic consolidation requires eliminating “authoritarian residuals” (traces of old structures).

Based on this theoretical framework, freeing the post-Soviet space from the influence of the nomenklatura requires both institutional and ideological struggle.

Proposed Strategies and Country Examples

Georgia
 During the Saakashvili era, one of the main pillars of the “New Georgia” movement was comprehensive institutional reform. Especially the transformation in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and security structures is considered one of the most radical examples in the post-Soviet space. A large part of the existing personnel corps — thousands of police officers and officials — were dismissed, and systematic anti-corruption efforts became a state policy priority. This process was not limited to personnel renewal; it also led to normative changes in governance culture: the implementation of transparency mechanisms, increased public accountability, and the shift of law enforcement to a citizen-oriented model (World Bank, 2007).

However, even these steps were not sufficient to fully break free from the post-Soviet nomenklatura. In the post-Saakashvili period, Georgia’s political elite quickly regressed back toward traditional post-Soviet authoritarianism (Khar Center, April 2025).

Ukraine
 The “Lustration Law” adopted in 2014 was envisioned as one of the institutional cleansing mechanisms in Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition. The law aimed to dismiss individuals who held high state positions during Viktor Yanukovych’s rule, especially heads of executive and law enforcement bodies. The goal of this approach was theoretically to weaken the political and administrative influence of the former regime and prevent the re-establishment of corrupt networks. However, due to the selective nature of its implementation, legal ambiguities, and its use in some cases as a tool of political competition, the law’s actual impact remained limited. Transparency International Ukraine (2015) emphasized that this process did not result in the anticipated systemic transformation in anti-corruption efforts and governance transparency. Thus, instead of becoming a deep structural reform, lustration produced more fragmented outcomes.

Analysis
 Lustration should not be limited to the removal of individuals who cooperated with the former regime. The main goal should be to dismantle the institutional loyalty networks that produced and protected these individuals—governance mechanisms built on bribery, fear, and personal loyalty. These networks consist not only of people; they live on in administrative reflexes, decision-making culture (cultural lustration), and bureaucratic behavior codes. If these structures are not changed, political lustration will remain a merely cosmetic reform.

Meritocracy and Transparent Personnel Policy

Estonia
 In the 1990s, Estonia radically restructured its personnel policy in public administration. The core of the reforms was the depoliticization and professionalization of civil service recruitment. For this purpose, independent testing and interview commissions were established, personnel selection was conducted based on transparent criteria, and professional skills were prioritized over political loyalty. Performance evaluation and career development of civil servants were regulated within institutional frameworks. This approach not only significantly reduced corruption risks but also laid the foundation for technological transformation in governance. As a result, since the early 2000s, Estonia became a pioneer model of “e-governance,” gaining international recognition through digital services, electronic management, and mechanisms of online democratic participation (OECD, 2011).

Azerbaijan
 In the Presidential Administration and other central executive structures, the main criterion for personnel selection remains personal and political loyalty rather than formal professional competence. Although the testing system for civil service recruitment plays a filtering role in some lower and mid-level positions, appointments to senior posts are made through informal political ties, personal relationships, and patronage networks (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2024). This practice is part of the widely observed “administrative-clientelist” governance model in the post-Soviet space.

If public opinion believes that the state’s personnel policy is guided not by the question “who is more competent?” but by “whose man is he?”, this marks the beginning of two parallel and dangerous processes: deepening public dissatisfaction and institutional degradation.

In such a context, state governance suffers not only from a loss of efficiency but also from a loss of legitimacy, ultimately transforming state structures into an apparatus “governed by loyalty,” thereby sharply increasing both political and social risks.

Democratic Memory-Building

Example 1: Poland
 The Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej — IPN) is one of the main institutional pillars in Poland's process of restoring historical justice and confronting the past. Its mandate includes documenting the repressions carried out during the communist era, preserving the memory of the victims, and organizing wide-reaching public awareness initiatives on this topic. In addition to collecting and researching archival materials, the IPN also engages in identifying individuals responsible for large-scale human rights violations in the past and, in some cases, holding them legally accountable. At the same time, the institute contributes to strengthening democratic values by initiating public discussions on the lessons of totalitarian experiences in schools, universities, and public platforms. Thus, the IPN does not merely focus on archiving historical facts; it also plays a crucial role in shaping Poland’s collective memory policy and in building a culture of reckoning with the authoritarian legacy of the past (IPN, 2023).

Example 2: Azerbaijan
 The continued closure of archives related to repression victims from public access remains one of the most serious institutional obstacles to the process of reckoning with the past. This limitation not only hinders the objective study of historical facts, but also serves to preserve state control over the formation of collective memory. In such a context, the official discourse reproduces the image of the former political elite and continues to present the Soviet-era nomenklatura class as “experienced statesmen.” This approach leads to the legitimization of past authoritarian governance practices and, in some cases, even to their association with “stability” and “administrative competence.” As a result, public demand for justice regarding past violations weakens, while the political actors responsible for those abuses continue to operate as legitimate figures within new political configurations (Freedom House, 2024).

Analysis
 Without an alternative memory policy, the traces of the authoritarian past continue to live on in collective consciousness. This memory normalizes the status quo, equates authoritarianism with “security,” “discipline,” and even “pride,” and portrays a democratic future as impossible. That is why democracy is also a cultural phenomenon. It requires the transformation of memory and an open confrontation with the past. Otherwise, societies emerge in which the right to vote is granted, but citizens are not free from authoritarian modes of thinking.

Ideological Deconstruction and Promotion of Civic Critical Thinking

Example 1: Czechia
 In Czechia, one of the central directions of the democratic transition process after the Velvet Revolution (1989) was the transformation of the education and media environment. The inclusion of critical history and civic education in school curricula was a strategic step to ensure that the younger generation understands the totalitarian past, grasps the nature of authoritarian governance, and adopts a culture of participation in democratic processes. In this context, textbooks were updated, and teacher training programs prioritized modern pedagogical methods and critical thinking instruction. In parallel, reforms were implemented to preserve and promote media pluralism, ensure diversity in the information space, and privatize and strengthen the independence of formerly state-controlled media institutions.

As a result of these changes, the reflex of passive obedience—formed during long years of authoritarian rule—gradually weakened. Greater diversity of thought emerged in public discourse, civil society institutions became more active, and the culture of democratic participation was strengthened (Kučera, 2019). Thus, these synchronized reforms in education and media became one of the key pillars of Czechia's post-socialist democratic consolidation.

Example 2: Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan
 In Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, the dominant ideological discourse — typical of post-Soviet authoritarian governance models — is built on key codes such as “loyalty to the leader,” “stability,” and “trust in the state.” This rhetoric not only defines the dominant framework of political language but also serves as a symbolic resource to shape citizens’ socio-political behavior. The state's official information policy keeps the media space under full control to reinforce this ideological framework.

The media monopoly is strengthened through both institutional mechanisms (state ownership and licensing systems) and informal means (self-censorship, economic pressure, administrative restrictions). As a result, the dissemination of alternative political ideas, critical views of government policy, and pluralistic public debate becomes virtually impossible. Reporters Without Borders (2024) describes this situation in both countries as a systematic restriction of freedom of expression, where the media is reduced to a tool that merely repeats the ruling power’s legitimacy narrative. Thus, the information environment not only serves to maintain authoritarian stability but also reproduces it ideologically (RSF, 2024).

Analysis
 To deconstruct ideological codes:
 One of the key mechanisms that ensures the continuity of authoritarian regimes is the ideological codes they construct in public consciousness. Over time, these codes — such as “loyalty to the leader,” “stability,” and “the absolute correctness of the state” — become normalized and unquestioned behavioral and cognitive frameworks. Their deconstruction — that is, dismantling and reinterpreting them — is essential for cultural transformation. This process can be carried out in the following directions:

• Civic education programs based on critical thinking
   The education system should teach young people not only factual information but also how to question the sources of that information, evaluate alternative perspectives, and analytically approach socio-political events. This is one of the key antidotes to authoritarian propaganda.
• Support for pluralistic information sources
   Without competitive plurality in the media and information environment, citizens’ ability to question ideological codes remains limited. Independent journalism, public media platforms, and alternative information channels are of strategic importance in this regard.
• Opening authoritarian rituals to public criticism
   State holidays, leader cult ceremonies, and other forms of political symbolism must be critically discussed in public discourse. Understanding the nature of these rituals and exposing their role in producing authoritarian legitimacy is an important step in the transformation of collective consciousness.

Thus, the deconstruction of ideological codes is possible not only through the reform of political institutions but also by questioning the cultural codes embedded in society.

Conclusion

To understand the persistence of authoritarianism in the post-Soviet space, it is necessary to recognize that it is rooted not only in the formal structure of political institutions but also in deeper structural layers. The structure inherited from the nomenklatura system is not limited to the technical mechanisms of the administrative apparatus. It also encompasses the core behavioral codes of political culture, the unwritten rules of state governance, and the established frameworks of collective consciousness. These frameworks reinforce the sources of power legitimacy and create institutional and cultural resistance to change initiatives.

In such a context, it is insufficient to limit democratic transition processes to constitutional reforms and updates to electoral mechanisms. Real change also requires the establishment of meritocracy in personnel policy, the renewal of administrative reflexes, and the transformation of public imaginaries. This must be carried out not only through political reforms but also through gradual transformations in cultural, ideological, and social dimensions.

If this transformation process is limited to merely adopting “new rules,” the old traditions of governance, informal power networks, and authoritarian modes of thinking will be reproduced once again. Therefore, the success of change depends on dismantling these deep-rooted structural and cognitive formations and replacing them with democratic governance values, a culture of transparency, and norms of citizen-oriented political behavior.

While in countries like Azerbaijan and Russia this system serves to ensure the continuity of power and reinforce the repressive apparatus, the Baltic examples show that with political will, meritocracy, alternative memory policy, and ideological deconstruction, it is possible to overcome this legacy. Democratic consolidation can become a reality only by dismantling old governance codes and building transparent, accountable, and citizen-oriented institutions in their place.

Only then will it be possible to put an end to the longevity of authoritarianism in the post-Soviet space and turn the prospect of sustainable democratic consolidation into a reality.

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