For many years, Azerbaijan’s ruling family has dismantled political competition in the country, weakened the opposition, and established complete control over the information sphere, creating a political environment devoid of alternatives. Recent developments show that this model is losing in its competition with new and uncontrollable forms of resistance emerging abroad. The ruling family is currently facing a serious reputational assault at the level of everyday discourse and appears largely helpless in confronting it. Did those who once organized political charges against opposition figures and journalists—descending to attacks at the level of private life and even bedroom footage—ever consider that one day this would return to them in a far harsher form?
All of this unfolds against the backdrop of reports prepared by émigré blogger Mehman Huseynov about Alyona Aliyeva, the wife of President Ilham Aliyev’s son, Heydar Aliyev. These reports do not conform to media principles or political ethics. In response, the Azerbaijani government’s propaganda apparatus has attempted to counter them using classical methods, mobilizing a broad network of media executives under its control, politicians, NGO representatives, and even figures from the fashion and arts sectors. On the one hand, these individuals emphasize how Huseynov’s actions contradict national and moral values; on the other, they highlight the lady’s modesty, altruism, and philanthropic activities through written and video statements addressed to the public.
The effectiveness of such propaganda is questionable, particularly because keeping the issue on the agenda and spreading it to wider audiences may actually increase interest in the content authored by Huseynov. At the same time, the expansion of the issue and public discussions around it inevitably recall the methods the authorities themselves have long used against their opponents, including crude and unlawful intrusions into their private lives. The regime has not only eliminated political competition through violence and curtailed civil and constitutional rights, but for years also installed hidden cameras in the bedrooms of opposition politicians, journalists, and civil society representatives, distributing the obtained footage to subject them to moral terror (OCCRP, 2023). Essentially, within Azerbaijan’s conservative social context, the aim was to instill the perception that opposition circles had no moral or ethical superiority over the ruling elite and to fully discredit them.
A New Phenomenon – Opposition in Exile
During Ilham Aliyev’s rule, Azerbaijani opposition figures, civil society actors, and independent media representatives have faced legal persecution, police violence, and the unlawful practices of investigative and judicial bodies, while operating under constant pressure from security services (HRW, 2024). Due to unbearable harassment, repression, and unemployment, many were gradually forced to leave the country and settle in European states. (This process is still ongoing.) As a result, a new socio-political phenomenon has emerged: opposition activism in exile.
A brief historical note: the first wave of political emigration in Azerbaijan occurred in 1920 following the occupation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic by Soviet Russia. The second wave may be considered those Azerbaijani soldiers captured during World War II who served in Wehrmacht-created legions and later chose not to return to the Soviet Union, remaining in Europe. The fundamental difference of the current wave is that it is taking place during the period of independence and is driven by domestic repression and the intolerable environment created by local authorities.
Over time, the growing number of Azerbaijani political émigrés in Europe has gradually begun to organize and form its own political and informational ecosystem. By utilizing social media, they are able to freely transmit their positions and views back into the country. However, they are not centralized. Alongside those who, despite severe repression, refuse to step outside moral and ethical boundaries in their struggle, there are also individuals—particularly those whose personal reputations were systematically attacked by the regime and whose relatives inside Azerbaijan were threatened—who directly target the ruling family and produce content that falls outside ethical frameworks.
Harsh authoritarianism in Azerbaijan has not only hindered the development of political culture but has also, through its extreme aggression, hate rhetoric, and amoral methods toward dissenters—or, in Islamic terminology, those who refuse to pledge allegiance—cultivated a tradition of political vendetta. The principal motivation of certain émigré bloggers who use humiliating and insulting language toward regime leaders and present aspects of their private lives as compromising material is precisely a retaliatory act against the “below-the-belt” reputational attacks once initiated by the regime itself. While such methods are unacceptable for opposition figures seeking to compete within constitutional and culturally appropriate political frameworks, and for independent journalists adhering to universal media principles, some bloggers recognize no such professional limits. Unfortunately, the disgraceful actions once directed at opponents, rivals, and even the children of prominent opposition figures are now returning to the authorities like a boomerang. One might call it the realization of “karma.”
It must be emphasized once again that Huseynov’s statements about A. Aliyeva, as well as other unethical broadcasts, cannot be considered acceptable or commendable. They should not be normalized. The mutual escalation of hatred benefits neither the parties involved nor the country and its people; it pushes Azerbaijan further away from establishing political culture and civilized political relations. Yet it should not be forgotten that the current authorities themselves are responsible for the situation reaching this point. As a Turkish proverb says: “He who sows the wind reaps the storm.”
Silencing Everyone at Home Was Not Enough
In Munich, Ilham Aliyev briefly answered standard questions from Azerbaijan’s official media—essentially curated and prepared by Hikmet Hajiyev—when journalist Emin Huseynov asked, “Mr. President, would you also answer questions from independent media?” Aliyev responded, “There is no independent media in the world,” and quickly walked away. The main embarrassment occurred during Huseynov’s dialogue with First Lady and First Vice President Mehriban Aliyeva. When Huseynov expressed his intention to ask about the state of democracy in the country, Aliyeva reacted sharply: “Are you the person who hid in an embassy wearing women’s clothing? I wish you good health…” (Aytan Farhadova 2026).
This brief exchange caused significant resonance within the country. Those responsible for the regime’s propaganda and PR efforts considered Aliyeva’s response highly successful and enthusiastically circulated the dialogue on social networks through a large troll network they manage. Of course, even among those outside the troll network, there were individuals who approved of her answer. Yet many have raised the logical question: if a citizen is forced to disguise himself in women’s clothing and flee the country, are not those governing the country responsible for creating such a situation?
Beyond the routine nature of politically motivated arrests in Azerbaijan, there are countless reports that detainees are subjected to ill-treatment and even torture (Amnesty International 2017). One of the driving forces behind emigration is not only fear of imprisonment but also the fear of humiliation, abuse, and torture.
The aggression, hostility, hatred, and contempt toward critics evident in Aliyeva’s brief response are impossible not to notice. The completely disproportionate reaction and physical violence against 5–6 protesters in Washington also reveal much about the psychological and emotional state of the country’s top leadership. Such nervous, neurotic reactions may indicate that things are not going as smoothly as they appear from the outside.
In reality, all real and potential political alternatives, institutional opposition, free media, and independent civil society in Azerbaijan have been eliminated, and political activity is effectively prohibited. There is no internal political threat to the authorities. The regime has achieved a decisive “victory” over its rivals and critics.
In foreign policy, factors such as representation in Trump’s Peace Council, the ongoing peace process with Armenia, and the increasing relevance of the Iran issue have elevated Ilham Aliyev into a visible and central figure in global geopolitics. Under the current international conjuncture, he wields political weight and influence that exceed the scale of the state he leads. At first glance, it seems the regime has entered a problem-free period and that everything is perfect for it. But this is only superficial.
Having neutralized rivals domestically through ruthless abuse of the state’s monopoly on violence and criminalized all forms of opposition, the regime now faces asymmetric resistance. Whether in the form of unconventional yet ethically framed questions, or attacks that mirror its own past methods—being “struck with its own weapons”—these developments unsettle the regime’s leaders and disrupt their psychological balance. At a high-level press conference with a foreign guest, the guest—seriously or jokingly—remarks that he has learned the Azerbaijani president’s wife is also the country’s First Vice President and advises his own spouse not to adopt such an idea. This small episode publicly demonstrates to the world that an absolute monarchy has effectively taken shape in Azerbaijan.
Asymmetric threats cannot be eliminated using traditional, symmetrical methods. The future scale of this threat and its potential internal repercussions remain difficult for the authorities to predict.
The Discomfort of Peace
The acceleration and irreversibility of the peace and cooperation process with Armenia under the intervention of the Trump administration, along with the resolution of disputes over the Zangezur transport corridor, is not a situation desired by the Azerbaijani authorities. Topics such as the “Zangezur corridor” and “return to historical lands” were invaluable tools for manipulating public opinion. The “neither war nor peace” situation provided broad opportunities to dictate the agenda. Mysterious ceasefire violations along the border—whose perpetrators were unclear—made it possible to accuse Armenia and “the forces behind it” (France, U.S. Democrats, Western NGOs, etc.), thereby sustaining the perception of a persistent external threat in public consciousness.
This sustained perception of external danger allowed the authorities to rally society around themselves, keep everyone metaphorically “in the trenches,” and legitimize repression against peace advocates and those attempting to shift focus to a post-war agenda by accusing them of betrayal or aiding the enemy. All of this manipulative potential has now been lost. Today, under pressure from the U.S. administration, Azerbaijan is taking steps toward economic cooperation with Armenia, even sending fuel to its neighbor and being compelled to release certain Armenian detainees accused of serious crimes.
The peace and cooperation agenda narrows the space for manipulation and opens the way for real domestic problems to become subjects of public discourse. This is a major discomfort for a regime that has no success stories in other areas, particularly in the socio-economic sphere. For the first time since the end of the war, domestic politics and socio-economic issues are being discussed so broadly. The regime’s ability to dictate the agenda has diminished, and its dominance over the information space has weakened.
References:
Aytan Farhadova, 2026. Aliyeva insults an independent Azerbaijani journalist after being heckled in Germany. https://oc-media.org/aliyeva-insults-independent-azerbaijani-journalist-after-being-heckled-in-germany
OCCRP, 2023. Jailed Azerbaijani Opposition Activist’s Private Photos and Messages Leaked. https://www.occrp.org/en/news/jailed-azerbaijani-opposition-activists-private-photos-and-messages-leaked
HRW, 2024. “We Try to Stay Invisible” Azerbaijan's Escalating Crackdown on Critics and Civil Society. https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/10/08/we-try-stay-invisible/azerbaijans-escalating-crackdown-critics-and-civil-society
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2017. AZERBAIJAN: TORTURE AND TRAVESTY OF JUSTICE IN NARDARAN CASE. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/EUR5556332017ENGLISH.pdf
