Through this table, Washington is signaling its intention to frame its influence in the region within an institutional framework for decades to come. For the United States, this agreement is part of a long-term geopolitical strategy. This strategy aims to redraw the balance of power in the region and determine the main pillars of a new economic and security architecture (Politico, 2025).
Domestic Constraints of the U.S. Strategy
There is one point that Washington should not overlook: its ambition to write the rules is not limited to foreign diplomatic activism but is also linked to domestic political factors. Against the backdrop of the 2026 Congressional elections and the 2028 presidential election, attention to South Caucasus policy may change. Resources allocated to the war in Ukraine, strategic competition with China in the Asia-Pacific, and ongoing tensions in the Middle East may limit the financial and diplomatic capital available for the region. In American public opinion, the South Caucasus holds low priority, which puts continuity at risk.
However, if the scenario develops optimistically, Washington will gain a real opportunity to balance Russia’s influence. Since 2020, Moscow’s role as a mediator in the region has weakened due to the war in Ukraine and domestic economic crisis. The U.S. can use this weakness to build separate strategic platforms with Armenia and Azerbaijan, aiming to break the Kremlin’s “security monopoly.”
On the other hand, this agreement provides a geo-economic advantage over players like China and Iran. China, through its Belt and Road Initiative, seeks entry into the South Caucasus. For Beijing, the region is a gateway to the European market via the Middle Corridor. China is strengthening its soft power in the region through investments in ports, railways, 5G, and digital infrastructure (Khar Center, 2025). Washington’s attempt to write new rules appears as a threat to China’s long-term economic influence, and Beijing may seek to neutralize this through indirect diplomatic balancing policies.
Iran, meanwhile, seeks to strengthen its position in transit links with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Tehran effectively uses three main tools: the North–South Transport Corridor, gas supply agreements with Armenia, and security influence along its border with Azerbaijan. New transport corridors, energy routes, and trade lines formed with U.S. support will impose strategic constraints on both Beijing and Tehran.
Furthermore, this process offers Washington an opportunity for normative influence. Trade, energy, and security agreements to be signed with the parties will entail not only economic benefits but also the export of geopolitical standards. This means the consolidation of Western institutions in the region, the long-term preservation of U.S. diplomatic influence, and maintaining a leading position in “writing the rules of the game.”
Thus, the document achieved at the White House table indicates Washington’s plan to remain in the South Caucasus as a strategic actor that creates structure and sets rules.
Impact of the White House Document on the Regional Balance of Power
Through this agreement, Azerbaijan will diversify its transit routes and broaden its circle of foreign partners. If the year 2020 was a military victory, the White House document of 2025 is the transformation of that victory into political capital (Reuters, 2025). For Baku, this is an attempt to step away from Moscow’s security umbrella and toward Washington’s economic, military, and diplomatic platform. Domestically, the document will serve as legitimacy capital for the ruling power, to be presented through state and loyalist media as a “diplomatic triumph.”
However, increased tensions with Moscow will not be limited to cooling diplomatic relations; they also pose risks to the security of strategic transport and trade routes, especially northern railways and highways. In the context of confrontation with Russia, the closure or restriction of these routes could cause serious disruptions in logistics and supply chains for Baku. Furthermore, existing mutual dependence in energy markets could be turned into a political pressure tool by Moscow, indirectly harming Azerbaijan’s economy.
Armenia, for its part, gains economic and some degree of security guarantees from the agreement. This could mean easing the long-standing economic blockade, opening borders, and attracting Western investments. Realizing these dividends will require Armenia to undertake legal and institutional reforms and gradually reduce its energy dependence on Russia.
However, behind these dividends lie serious humanitarian and legal gaps: the mechanism for the return of war refugees, protection of cultural heritage, and the fate of former Nagorno-Karabakh separatists in detention are completely absent from the signed documents (en.arovat.am, 2025). This could generate heavy domestic political debates and diaspora pressure for Yerevan.
All of this is taking place against the backdrop of the decline of Russia’s “natural mediator” position in the region. The Kremlin can no longer fully guarantee Armenia’s security or maintain decisive influence over Azerbaijan (nestcentre.org, July 2025). This is forming a new dynamic in the regional balance of power: the White House is bringing fresh political air to the region, while Baku and Yerevan try to filter it through their own interests.
Russia: Losses and Pressure Tools
The framework agreement signed at the White House contains elements of strategic defeat for Moscow. For many years, the Kremlin acted as the “sole security guarantor” and main mediator in the South Caucasus, keeping both Armenia and Azerbaijan within its sphere of influence. For the first time, this format is effectively sidelined by a high-level U.S. diplomatic initiative.
It is no coincidence that Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, in her statement on the matter, emphasized that peace should be built mainly with the participation of regional actors—such as Russia, Iran, and Turkey—in a balanced environment, and admitted that initiatives from outside, namely from the West, could “sideline” regional players (REN TV, August 9, 2025).
Loss of Mediation Monopoly
The most serious blow for Moscow is that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the subsequent peace agenda are now progressing without the Kremlin’s mediation. This means the loss of both political influence and the status of being the main actor “designing the security architecture” in the region. The White House meeting represents a concrete functional loss for Russian diplomacy.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s policy of rapprochement with the West, especially the suspension of relations with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), has reduced Moscow’s trust in Yerevan to a minimum. From the Kremlin’s perspective, the White House agreement is further proof of Armenia’s “strategic betrayal.”
Azerbaijan–Russia relations are shaped against the background of growing tension and a crisis of trust in recent years. Although cooperation continues in the fields of energy, trade, and security, the strategic advantages Baku has gained through U.S. mediation are an open threat to the Kremlin. In this situation, to preserve balance, Moscow is likely to shift from pragmatic partnership rhetoric to a policy relying more on pressure tools. As a result, Azerbaijan–Russia relations will become a complex playing field with elements of geopolitical confrontation.
Pressure Tools and Possible Countermeasures
To maintain its influence in the region, Moscow can use several tools:
- Existing dependence of the Armenian economy and energy infrastructure.
- Northern routes and security cooperation with Azerbaijan.
- Influence over post-Karabakh humanitarian issues (refugees, demining).
The Kremlin’s likely response will be a more flexible yet harsher strategy in the South Caucasus—pressuring both Azerbaijan and Armenia economically and politically to return to its historical orbit.
For Iran, the White House agreement is a direct diplomatic blow that could sideline Tehran from the game.
Ali Akbar Velayati, the Supreme Leader’s adviser on international affairs, gave a sharp response in an exclusive interview with Tasnim news agency:
“Is the South Caucasus an ownerless region rented out to Trump? The Caucasus is one of the most sensitive geographical points in the world, and this passage will not be a corridor owned by Trump, but a graveyard for Trump’s mercenaries” (Tasnimnews.com, August 9, 2025).
The Strategic Significance of the White House Agreement for Ankara
The document signed at the White House carries special importance for Turkey both diplomatically and geo-economically. For years, Ankara has based its South Caucasus policy on the principle of “one nation, two states,” considering Azerbaijan a central partner in its regional strategy. It is no coincidence that in its official statement on the summit, Ankara described the signed document as an opportunity for peace while also stressing the “dear Azerbaijan” emphasis (Turkish MFA, August 8, 2025).
One of the most important provisions of this agreement for Turkey is the potential opening of a corridor via Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan and from there to the Caspian Basin. Ankara sees this route as both a source of economic gain and a means of securing a direct land connection with Central Asia. This would strengthen Turkey’s “Middle Corridor” project, turning it into an important transit hub on the Beijing–London trade route.
In recent years, Ankara has taken significant steps toward normalizing relations with Armenia. Although the dialogue process launched in 2021 has not yet led to full diplomatic relations, the White House agreement could accelerate this process. Turkish leadership understands that opening the borders will both lift Armenia out of blockade and revive Turkey–Armenia trade.
Position Between the U.S. and Russia
For Turkey, the important point is to play a balanced role in this process, taking into account the concerns of both the U.S. and Russia. The agreement reached with U.S. mediation provides Ankara with opportunities for influence on the Western platform while prioritizing not damaging strategic ties with Russia.
Strengthening Regional Influence
If the peace process continues successfully, Turkey will both strengthen its influence over Azerbaijan and, through economic cooperation with Armenia, consolidate its position as one of the key players in the South Caucasus. This will increase Ankara’s political weight both within NATO and the Organization of Turkic States.
Turkey’s approach is built on pragmatism that will directly benefit from sustainable peace. For Ankara, this is both “brotherhood diplomacy” and part of a strategic game for increasing influence across the Eurasian continent.
Consolidated Analysis
But the biggest question on the table remains unchanged: Will this new regional architecture built “on peace” be sustainable?
Richard Kauzlarich, former U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan, says neither Moscow nor Tehran will be happy about the strengthening of the U.S. role—especially if this TRIP project develops. Therefore, it will be necessary to watch how Iran and Russia respond (Radio Liberty, August 9, 2025a).
Historical experience shows that any agreement reached in the South Caucasus is tested during implementation. In the post-conflict period, maintaining sustainable peace requires more than diplomatic gestures; it demands institutional mechanisms, mutual confidence-building steps, and firm political will from the parties.
Economic Dependence and Risks
Economic ties and political protocols are undoubtedly important tools for reducing the risk of conflict in the long term. Steps such as opening regional transport corridors, liberalizing border crossings, and connecting energy infrastructure create mutual dependence, increasing the economic cost of conflict for both sides. However, economic integration alone does not eliminate political and ethnic contradictions.
The weakest link in this process is how historical traumas are preserved in public consciousness. In both countries, enemy images entrenched for years remain alive in the education system, media rhetoric, and political discourse. Unless these stereotypes are softened, a peace document could at any moment turn into an “agreement on paper,” pushing a final peace settlement into an uncertain future.
Competition of Major Powers
Finally, the competition of major powers calls the sustainability of the matter into question. Moscow sees the U.S. role in this agreement as a threat to its sphere of influence, while China seeks to protect its economic and infrastructure interests. Iran, with or without Russia, insists that it will not allow the U.S. into the South Caucasus (Radio Liberty, August 9, 2025).
In such a multipolar environment, each major power will try to ensure that the process continues in a way that serves its own interests. This could overly complicate the balance policies of Azerbaijan and Armenia.
In short, this regional architecture built “on peace” must not remain on paper—it must also be strengthened in real life. This requires strategic patience, political will, and psychological transformation within societies. Otherwise, today’s White House signature could end up not as a historic document of tomorrow but on the “list of missed opportunities.”
The Future Fate of the Washington Agreement
The document signed at the White House is neither the final point on the road to peace nor merely a beginning. It opens a new page in the political calendar of a long-frozen conflict that occasionally flared up again. But this page is blank, and what text will be written on it remains uncertain.
On one hand, it can be read as the official announcement of the Caucasus’s transition to a new phase: the return of the U.S. to the mediation format, the rebuilding of the region’s geo-economic ties, and the revival of diplomacy as a central player after military victories.
What makes it a “political manifesto” is precisely this multifaceted character. On one hand, it shows the parties the possibility of a peace agenda; on the other, if not implemented, it will remind them that peace remained only at the declarative level.
In history, such documents have either become the cornerstone of long-term stability or turned into a forgotten sheet gathering dust in diplomatic archives. Which fate this document will meet depends on concrete and measurable steps to be taken in the coming years.
Most importantly, the White House’s witnessing signature gives the parties a kind of “psychological momentum.” To take advantage of this momentum, the opening of borders, the activation of trade and communication channels, resolution of humanitarian issues, and gestures that will increase mutual trust must be carried out without delay. Otherwise, the wave of hope created by this document may quickly fade.
Thus, the product of the meeting at the White House is both a sketch of the region’s future political map and the first test to determine whether this map will become a reality. It demonstrates both the possibilities and the fragility of diplomacy at the same time.
References:
Politico. “Trump embraces role of peacemaker in Azerbaijan and Armenia deal.” 8 Avqust 2025. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/08/08/trump-peacemaker-azerbaijan-armenia-00501073
Khar Center 2025. “3+3” Initiative: The Architecture of Authoritarian Coordination and Anti-Western Geopolitical Alignment in the Caucasus. https://kharcenter.com/en/researches/33-initiative-the-architecture-of-authoritarian-coordination-and-anti-western-geopolitical-alignment-in-the-caucasus
Reuters. “Trump announces peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia.” 8 Avqust 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-announces-peace-agreement-between-azerbaijan-armenia-2025-08-08/
en.arovat.am, 2025. ANCA Calls out White House for Pushing Armenia-Azerbaijan Deal without Artsakh Return, Prisoner Release, or Sovereignty Safeguards. https://en.aravot.am/2025/08/09/361800/
nestcentre.org, iyul 2025. No longer looking to the Kremlin: how Russia is losing influence in the South Caucasus. https://nestcentre.org/no-longer-looking-to-the-kremlin/
REN TV, 09 avqust 2025. https://ren.tv/news/politika/1357618-mid-rf-normalizatsiia-otnoshenii-baku-i-erevana-startovala-pri-sodeistvii-rossii
Tasnimnews.com, 09 avqust 2025. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/05/18/3372497/
Türkiyə XİN, 8 avqust 2025. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-167_-azerbaycan-ve-ermenistan-arasindaki-baris-sureci-hk.en.mfa
Azadlıq radiosu, 9 avqust 2025a. Vaşinqton razılaşmaları sülhə töhfə verəcəkmi? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8k18-238D0
Azadlıq radiosu, 9 avqust 2025b. https://www.azadliq.org/a/iran-sulh-sazishini-alqishlayir-xarici-mudaxile/33498654.html
