A year ago, when Georgia’s ruling “Georgian Dream” party pushed the “foreign agents” law through parliament despite the protests of thousands, many regarded it as the beginning of the end of its 12-year rule (BBC, 2024). Considering the traditionally strong pro-European sentiment within Georgian society, one might have expected the authorities to succumb to the pressure of the streets.
However, not only did “Georgian Dream” survive, but in the 2024 parliamentary elections it won a majority of mandates with 53.93% of the votes, according to the Central Election Commission (Civil.ge, 2024a). At the same time, the opposition’s refusal to enter parliament after accusing the government of fraud, and the resulting political crisis, did not turn into social or economic turmoil. These events did not significantly affect the lari exchange rate, GDP growth rate, export volume, or the performance of Georgian companies on the stock market.
Despite year-long protest rallies and the opposition’s resistance demanding the government’s resignation and new parliamentary elections, “Georgian Dream” was declared the victor of the 2025 municipal elections with a convincing win. Voter turnout reached a record low—according to the Central Election Commission, around 1.5 million voters participated, which is just over 40% of the total electorate (Mirzoev, 2025a). In Tbilisi, the city with the most intense protests, voter turnout was only 31%, according to official data (Mirzoev, 2025b). The vast majority of opposition parties boycotted the municipal elections organized by the “Georgian Dream” government, refusing to recognize its legitimacy. However, two parties—“Lelo–For a Strong Georgia” and “Gakharia for Georgia”—decided to participate, arguing that the ruling party could only be defeated through elections.
Against the backdrop of the government’s authoritarian drift and repressive steps, and the opposition’s ongoing protest actions, many perceive not the strong government but the weak opposition as the main reason for the lack of any positive or effective change. The Georgian opposition is accused of failing to capitalize on the widespread protest sentiment in society and of being unable to convert this energy into tangible political results. The main evidence cited includes both the persistence of protests and the extremely low voter turnout in the latest elections (Bochorishvili, 2025).
The Role of the Georgian Opposition in Political Processes
The lack of a systematic approach in the Georgian opposition’s politics has both enhanced the effectiveness of government propaganda and contributed to the decline of protest activity in society. The decision by part of the opposition to boycott elections excludes it from one of the most important mechanisms of participation in the country’s political life, preventing it from channeling public discontent into a political alternative (Civil.ge, 2025). Voluntarily refusing to participate in elections deprives the opposition of its last levers of influence—municipalities and mayorships—effectively handing these positions to the ruling party without a fight.
In the context of waning protest momentum, the opposition’s boycott tactics have also led to the loss of its main pressure tool against the government and have put it at risk of political marginalization. Furthermore, internal conflicts and contradictions within the opposition have eroded public trust. For example, the results of the 2024 parliamentary elections clearly showed how opposition politicians fragmented their own vote (Civil.ge, 2024b).
The opposition justified its refusal to participate in those parliamentary elections as a united bloc by claiming that “voters have diverse political views” (Chedia, 2024). Yet, nearly all of these parties shared the same stance—supporting European integration, independent courts, parliamentary democracy, and broad reforms.
One of the fundamental reasons behind the opposition’s fragmented state lies in the mutual distrust and rivalries among political leaders who were opponents during the era of former president Mikheil Saakashvili. The failure to overcome these differences has become a serious problem, preventing the opposition from fielding a single candidate. Former president Salome Zurabishvili attempted to assume the role of opposition leader, but after the end of her presidency, she could not remain a significant player on the political stage (Kapanadze, 2025a).
In addition, the opposition also faces an identity crisis. The frequent splitting and merging of political leaders and parties, mutual accusations followed by renewed alliances, have created confusion among voters about which party belongs to which bloc and what political agendas they actually stand for.
The fragmentation and missteps of the Georgian opposition have not only caused disorientation but have also fueled debates over the diversification of opposition parties, which in turn has led both to defeat and to the strengthening of the ruling party.
The rivals of “Georgian Dream” are ideologically focused mainly on the urban middle classes of Tbilisi and Batumi and have limited influence in the provinces (Kitachaev, 2025a). The opposition’s messages about European integration, adherence to democratic norms, and the inadmissibility of rapprochement with Russia lose out to the everyday problems and conservative values of the provincial population. One of the main demands of this electorate is security. The fear of war is one of the key instruments used by “Georgian Dream,” and the opposition has been losing this narrative battle as well.
The developments have shown that the opposition’s diversification neither expanded its electorate nor convinced undecided voters. On the contrary, it drained resources, confused the electorate, and ultimately led to defeat. However, some argue that the fragmentation of Georgian society could also serve to reveal the opposition’s potential. The diversity of the Georgian opposition allows it to cover nearly all demographic groups—urban liberals, rural loyalists, the middle class, and even the diplomatic elite (Kapanadze, 2025b). This map suggests that, with the right structural approach, the opposition could have united this diversity under one umbrella and emerged as a genuine political force (Kapanadze, 2025c).
In addition, the lack of open intra-party primaries in Georgia’s political system complicates internal party dialogue and hinders the development of long-term strategies (Kitachaev, 2025b).
The Gradual Authoritarianization of the Regime
Since coming to power in 2012, “Georgian Dream” has taken a path of gradual authoritarianization, laying the foundations for a one-party system. The party’s founder and the de facto strongman behind the government, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has consolidated control over the main institutions of the state—by establishing dominance over the judiciary and media and placing loyalists in key state positions—thus implementing a “Hungarian model” in Georgia. Despite the symbolic appearance of competition, state institutions are used as tools against political opponents. The main instruments of “Georgian Dream” are propaganda, financial resources, and law enforcement bodies (police, prosecution, judiciary) (Bochorishvili, 2024a).
Controlling the media landscape, the ruling party also uses social networks as a propaganda tool, accusing the opposition of corruption, chaos-mongering, and acting under foreign diktat. “Georgian Dream” exploits national traumas to present itself as the guarantor of peace and stability while portraying the opposition as the side of war and chaos.
The state budget has become not only the main source of funding for the ruling party but also a tool for bankrupting its political rivals (Bochorishvili, 2024b).
At the same time, the ruling party has managed—through legislative means—to undermine the institutional existence of civil society, which promotes civic engagement.
In May 2024, parliament adopted the “Law on Foreign Influence Agents” (Euronews, 2024), which made it harder for both non-governmental organizations and independent media to operate.
In September 2024, the “Law on Family Values and Protection of Minors” (the anti-LGBT law) was adopted (Civil.ge, 2024).
Both laws are analogues of legislative acts previously passed in Russia and were dubbed “Russian laws” by Georgian opposition circles. “Georgian Dream,” however, claimed that these laws aim to protect Georgian national identity and moral values.
Last year, “Georgian Dream” established a special parliamentary commission to investigate the period of 2003–2012—known to the public as the “Tsulukiani Commission” (Khar Center, 2025a). Later, its mandate was expanded to include the post-2012 period, effectively targeting the activities of the opposition. The commission’s primary goal is to persecute former government officials and pro-Western opposition parties.
The head of the parliamentary faction, Mamuka Mdinaradze, declared that based on the commission’s findings, the Constitutional Court would be petitioned to dissolve Saakashvili’s United National Movement and ban its affiliated organizations (Khar Center, 2025b).
Within just one month, six opposition leaders who refused to cooperate with the commission—calling it illegitimate—were arrested (Bochorishvili, 2024b).
In May 2025, the “Law on Successor Parties” was adopted, stipulating that any organization continuing the ideological line or personnel composition of previously banned parties would also be dissolved. This approach is seen as a mechanism aimed at the complete destruction of political pluralism and pro-Western forces in Georgia (Khar Center, 2025c).
Furthermore, administrative penalties for violations were toughened to suppress civic protest and resistance. These rules now also apply to journalists covering protests (Civil.ge, 2025).
Amid the decline of street protests, “Georgian Dream” has further consolidated its position—revoking the mandates of opposition deputies and passing restrictive laws. The mandates of 49 opposition MPs were annulled, and a “healthy opposition” consisting of pro-government figures was created instead (Khar Center, 2025d).
Simultaneously, “Georgian Dream” cultivates public distrust toward the opposition through fear and fatigue, clearing the political field of major rivals without resorting to large-scale violence. Although the system formally appears multi-party and democratic, in practice, opponents of the regime are institutionally delegitimized, and all state institutions function in the interest of a single political force.
Civic Stance
According to recent polls, more than 80% of citizens support European integration. The results also revealed that 60% of “Georgian Dream” voters made their choice primarily out of fear of war with Russia (Oragvelidze, 2025).
The behavior of Georgian citizens in recent years shows that Georgia can be described as a “revolutionary democracy,” where popular resistance plays a decisive role over the authorities (Sabanadze, 2025). Although the ruling elite has succeeded in capturing the state, it has not managed to subjugate its citizens. Georgians’ distrust of autocracy and their spirit of resistance have become integral parts of the country’s mass political culture.
Both polling data and the persistence of civic protests and activism in public life have sent a clear message to the authorities: the real threat does not stem from the crushed political opposition but from civic resistance itself. Therefore, through repressive and restrictive laws, as well as media manipulation, the regime seeks to dismantle the very institutions of civil liberties from which civic resistance draws its strength.
References:
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