Post-Imperial Hegemony and Legal Discrimination: Traces of the Russian Model
The Russian Federation enforces the notion of “limited sovereignty” in the post-Soviet space not only rhetorically but through practical and institutional mechanisms. This approach is characterized by Moscow’s perception of its post-Soviet neighbors not as independent actors based on international law, but as passive subjects within its “historical sphere of influence.” This strategy permeates information space, economic ties, and the behavioral models of law enforcement bodies (Tolz & Hutchings 2021).
In this context, the killing of two Azerbaijani migrants by police in Yekaterinburg exposes the ethnic hierarchies embedded in Russia’s legal system, systemic racism within the state’s “security reflex,” and institutionalized discrimination against non-Russian citizens and migrants. Annual reports by Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations indicate that migrants from Central Asia and the South Caucasus face police violence, lack of legal protection, and labor exploitation in Russia (HRW 2025). The Yekaterinburg incident is another expression of this broader picture. The Kremlin’s response also reflects the Russian state apparatus’s post-imperial rationalization model.
This approach can be explained through political philosopher Seyla Benhabib’s concept of the “imperial citizen.” According to Benhabib, post-imperial states with centralized power structures create formally modern but substantively discriminatory systems to keep former subordinate populations in a legally inferior position (Benhabib 2004). In such models, while citizens are formally equal in law, they face different legal regimes based on cultural, ethnic, and geographic backgrounds. Police violence against migrants, judicial bias, and ethnically stereotyped public discourse in Russia are clear examples of this legal dualism.
Thus, the Yekaterinburg incident is not coincidental. It is a systemic behavior of a state model in a post-imperial political space that limits sovereignty, applies law based on ethnic hierarchy, and fragments accountability. This model must be understood not merely as diplomatic rhetoric but as a defined epistemological and legal structure.
Baku – The Populism Beneath Selective Outrage
The official Azerbaijani response to the Yekaterinburg incident, accompanied by emotional and harsh rhetoric, is presented at first as a defense of national interests. Yet the sequence, timing, and depth of these steps raise questions: if the Azerbaijani government genuinely pursues a principled, law-based foreign policy, why did it remain silent for years about the Kremlin-aligned propaganda of platforms like “Sputnik”?
This question points not only to Azerbaijan’s diplomatic strategy but also to the nature of its internal political regime. In Azerbaijan’s authoritarian governance system, the concept of sovereignty does not function as a normative and institutional principle but rather as a politically contextual and instrumental tool. This aligns with what is known in international relations as the “contextualized sovereignty” approach (Lake, 2009)—where sovereignty is based not on values but on utility.
Within this framework, the concept of “performative sovereignty” becomes especially relevant. With this term, political scientist William Walters refers to sovereignty acts that are presented symbolically, directed at the public, and staged theatrically rather than leading to real institutional change (Walters, 2004). This same pattern is observable in Azerbaijan: sovereignty acts are staged in response to certain international events only to send a message to the domestic audience. The goal is not adherence to international legal norms but to maintain populist legitimacy and redirect public dissatisfaction.
A striking example emerges in the context of the 2022 “Declaration on Allied Interaction” signed with Russia. This document formalized commitments for close cooperation in military, information, and security spheres between Azerbaijan and Russia. If Azerbaijan holds such a principled and firm stance, why is this agreement still in effect today? Why are the informational and security concessions provided under this agreement never mentioned in current rhetoric?
This contradiction clearly reveals the strategic behavior of Ilham Aliyev’s regime: opportunism over principle. The regime’s main objective is to avoid a legitimacy crisis at home, to dominate the agenda with anti-Russian patriotic narratives amidst regional tensions, and to replace widespread discontent with the “foreign threat” narrative. This is a classic example of authoritarian populism—speaking in the name of the nation, creating an image of an external enemy, and eliminating demands for citizens’ rights and institutional reforms from public discourse (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017).
Moreover, such displays of selective sovereignty are not limited to relations with Russia. Similar patterns occur in interactions with other regional actors—such as Iran or Turkey. In this light, the Azerbaijani government’s outrage stems not from principled diplomacy, but from a controllable emotional strategy.
Public Emotion and State Response
The incident caused deep emotional resonance in Azerbaijani society. This reaction must be understood both in the context of national identity and diasporic solidarity, as well as a rightful protest against systemic violations of migrants’ rights. In other words, public concern is not just a reaction to this event, but a response to long-standing ethnic and legal injustice. What matters is how the state frames this legitimate public discontent.
The harsh rhetoric of officials, the rapid mobilization of pro-government media into an anti-Russian stance, the emotional exaggeration of information, and the prioritization of symbolic decisions (such as canceling cultural events or shutting down “Sputnik”) indicate that the state is using this response for populist agenda management.
Two parallel processes are unfolding here:
- The pain of society is real, but it is not being addressed with institutional and legal mechanisms.
- The state’s response is symbolic, but behind this symbolism there is no real political will or intention for change.
This mutual inconsistency leads to a situation where the state performs sovereignty and human rights only in episodic and populist contexts. William A. Callahan’s concept of “image politics” explains this phenomenon. According to him, modern authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes maintain legitimacy more through visual and rhetorical symbols than through actual institutional changes (Callahan 2013). In this approach, symbolic performance is prioritized over substance.
In Azerbaijani media, this process is even more evident. Immediately after the incident, a wide anti-Russian campaign was launched on official and semi-official channels. Yet these same media outlets were, only a few weeks ago, promoting rhetoric of “alliance,” “brotherhood,” and “contributions to peace” with Russia. This abrupt shift proves once again that media rhetoric depends not on principles, but on political orders.
Another dangerous aspect of this process is the replacement of the public’s clear legal expectations with emotional mobilization. Instead of demanding legal accountability and institutional responses, the public perceives symbolic gestures as examples of “strong statehood” and is satisfied. In the long term, this weakens the public consciousness of normative statehood.
What Does Genuine Sovereignty Require?
If the Azerbaijani government truly wants to be recognized as a sovereign state, it must take the following steps:
- Institutional Distance: Relations with Russia should be regulated not by emotional fluctuations, but by clear institutions within the framework of information security, diaspora protection, and legal cooperation.
- Normative Consistency: The state must defend the rights of its compatriots not only in high-profile cases but systematically.
- Moral Consistency: The state’s stance on law and human life should not fluctuate based on geopolitical context. These values must be the foundation of the state system, not merely part of its political strategy.
Ultimately, the Yekaterinburg incident is not only a symptom of the current crisis in Russia–Azerbaijan relations but also an exposure of the normative weaknesses within Azerbaijan’s domestic governance model. The state’s reaction serves as an example of “performative sovereignty.”
If this incident disappears from the information agenda within a few weeks, public emotions fade, and relations with Russia return to the previous “functional dependency” regime, it will once again prove the reactive and symbolic nature of Azerbaijan’s understanding of sovereignty.
In fact, this incident presents an opportunity for Azerbaijan—to transition to a sovereignty concept that is legal-based, institutionally reinforced, consistent, and universal. But this will only be possible if the state treats sovereignty not as a tool for populist mobilization, but as the core normative framework of internal governance.
Because true statehood is not measured by episodic acts of anger, but by normative consistency, legal accountability, and institutional integrity. If the opposite happens, sovereignty becomes not a reflection of the state's strength, but a symbol used to hide its weakness.
References
- Tolz, V., & Hutchings, S. 2021. Nation, Ethnicity and Race on Russian Television: Mediating Post-Soviet Difference. Routledge.
- Human Rights Watch. 2025. “Russia: Migrant Workers Face Abuse, Discrimination.”https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/17/russia-xenophobic-crackdown-central-asian-migrants
- Benhabib, S. 2004. The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens. Cambridge University Press.
- Lake, David A. 2009. Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Walters, William. 2004. “Secure Borders, Safe Haven, Domopolitics.” Citizenship Studies 8 (3): 237–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/1362102042000256989.
- Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2017. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Declaration on Allied Interaction between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation. Signed 22 February 2022. https://president.az/en/articles/view/55498
Callahan, W. A. 2013. China Dreams: 20 Visions of the Future. Oxford University Press.
