The Trend of Eurasianism in Turkiye: Ideological Currents, Political Dynamics, and Geopolitical Implications (Part II)

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As noted in the first part of this article, the complexity of Turkish Eurasianism lies in the fact that it does not represent a single ideological current. Instead, it brings together a variety of actors under one umbrella—even groups that appear ideologically opposed—each drawn by different motivations. Turkish Eurasianism lacks ideological depth and is also shallow in terms of geopolitical objectives. When all its aspects are examined, two main factors emerge that align Turkish Eurasianism with Russian neo-Eurasianism: anti-Western sentiment and a desire for authoritarianism. These two elements serve as a common ground uniting Eurasianist actors in Turkey who represent different worldviews.

Who Are Turkiye’s Eurasianists?

The Perinçek Group
The Turkish counterpart—or more accurately, satellite—of Aleksandr Dugin’s Eurasianism in Russia is the group led by Doğu Perinçek. In recent years, this group has openly supported China and Russia, opposed the West, and acted as a supporter of the ruling government.

Doğu Perinçek can be considered one of the most controversial figures in Turkish politics. In the 1970s, he represented the Maoist–pro-China wing of the Turkish left. Before the 1980 coup, he published the Aydınlık newspaper, where he exposed other leftists. In 1974, he called the Cyprus operation an “invasion,” but later held rallies alongside the nationalist President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Rauf Denktaş. In the 1990s, he established ties with the PKK, even meeting with its leader Abdullah Öcalan. Later, he declared that he was fighting against the PKK. He built a public image by leaking secret intelligence reports about the so-called “deep state” and was imprisoned in the “Ergenekon” trials orchestrated by Erdoğan and the Gülen movement between 2008–2014. After 2016, he formed an alliance with the ruling AKP and MHP. The list of his ideological zigzags is seemingly endless (BBC, 2018).

Despite these contradictions and consistently receiving less than 1% of the vote in elections, Perinçek continues to play a role in Turkish politics and maintain some level of influence (Milliyet, 2024). When he was released from prison after the Ergenekon trials, he was a staunch opponent of Erdoğan, publishing articles like “Even America Can’t Save You” (T24, 2016).

However, after the 2016 “FETÖ coup attempt,” Perinçek made a major turn and began aligning himself with Erdoğan’s government. Even though he claims, “We didn’t move toward Erdoğan, he asked for our help to eliminate the Gülenists,” it is no secret that this was a mutually exploitative relationship (BBC Türkçe, 2018). Today, the Perinçek group plays the role of locomotive for Russia- and China-centered Eurasianism in Turkey under the patronage of Erdoğan’s government.

Doğu Perinçek, his son Mehmet Perinçek, and other members of the Aydınlık group—comprising politicians, writers, and former military officers—have gained access to pro-government television channels where they systematically promote Russian and Chinese propaganda. Mehmet Perinçek is considered one of the key actors in this group (AKİT TV).

This group includes the Patriotic Party (formerly the Workers’ Party), Ulusal TV, the Aydınlık newspaper, journals like Bilim and Ütopya, the publishing house “Kaynak Yayınları,” and the youth wing known as the “Turkey Youth Union” (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022a).

The Perinçek group does not see NATO and the West solely as harmful from a foreign policy and security perspective but also portrays them as a political threat domestically. Especially under the Erdoğan administration since 2016, suspicion of the West and the “foreign enemy” narrative has been kept alive among the Turkish public, which is particularly sensitive to such topics.

Domestically, this group explicitly supports authoritarianism, which aligns with their Eurasianist stance. Those who support this line of thinking desire a “Eurasian-style” Turkey—governed by a regime that limits fundamental freedoms and possesses a unique interpretation of “democracy” (Perspektif, 2022).

“Ulusalcı” Eurasianists
Apart from the Perinçek group, the relatively “classic” Eurasianists in Turkey are those referred to as “ulusalcılar” (nationalists) or “Kemalists.” These are secular, radically leftist, and anti-Western factions who use the popularity of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a political shield, interpreting his legacy in ways that suit their agendas.

Perinçek was initially considered part of this group, but a segment of the “ulusalcı” camp later distanced themselves from him to avoid appearing too pro-Russian or pro-Chinese (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022b). While they refrain from overt Russian and Chinese sympathies, they often engage in subtle support of both powers. Representatives of this group can be found across the spectrum—from the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) to academia, retired generals, and mainstream media outlets.

Prominent figures of this current include Banu Avar, Hulki Cevizoğlu, Soner Yalçın, Yılmaz Özdil, Barış Yarkadaş, Naim Babüroğlu, İsmayıl Hakkı Pekin, Mustafa Özbey, Sinan Baykent, Cem Gürdeniz, Cihat Yaycı, Gönül Kenter, Hüseyin Vodinalı, Merdan Yanardağ, Ceyhun Bozkurt, Hasan Ünal, and Kemal Üçüncü.

Their long-standing role in mainstream media and opposition to the Erdoğan government has boosted their popularity, especially on social media, which is now a primary platform for shaping public opinion. The most prominent media outlets representing this group include Oda TV, Veryansın TV, Sözcü newspaper, Tele-1, and the “Kırmızı Kedi” publishing house.

Due to the persecution and imprisonment of Oda TV’s founder Soner Yalçın and its columnists during the Ergenekon trials, the outlet became a favored news site among the discontented segments of society. However, in the last year, Oda TV’s apparent shift toward a pro-government stance has affected its popularity (Turksolu, 2024).

Soner Yalçın, known as a “conspiracy writer,” and the other “ulusalcı” writers of Oda TV are primarily known for their anti-Western and pro-Russian views (ODA TV, February 2025). While not all writers of Sözcü can be classified as Eurasianists, the publication’s editorial tone clearly reflects Eurasianist leanings. Tele-1, controlled by the “ulusalcı” group, is known for offering the most open support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (YouTube, March 2025).

“Veryansın TV,” founded by Nihat Genç in 2019 after leaving Oda TV, positions itself as a leftist, neo-nationalist media outlet and calls itself “a channel uniting genuine and national intellectuals” (YouTube). Many writers who openly defend Kremlin narratives and consider post-Soviet states part of Russia’s “natural sphere of influence” have passed through Veryansın TV. These include retired military officers like Naim Babüroğlu, Hasan Ünal, Ahmet Yavuz, and Kemal Üçüncü. Writers like Hüseyin Vodinalı, Gönül Kenter, and “Blue Homeland” architect Cem Gürdeniz continue to work actively at Veryansın TV.

‘Nationalist’ Eurasianists
This category includes factions within the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), İYİ Party, Ülkü Ocakları, and the Victory Party. These can be divided into two opposing sub-groups: utopian Pan-Turkists and pragmatic Putin admirers.

In principle, the current active version of Eurasianism in Turkey should not align with the first group. While both share anti-Western and anti-NATO sentiments, Pan-Turkists of the 1960s–70s traditionally opposed the left and envisioned Eurasianism as a Turkic-centered alliance in the post-Soviet space led by Turkey.

For “ulusalcı” Eurasianists, this definition never applied. Subconsciously, they have always considered the post-Soviet states part of Russia’s backyard, and any geopolitical initiative independent of Russia has been met with scorn and condescension.

Even though they support the idea of a “fully independent Turkey,” this independence has only been defined as separation from the West and NATO. When it comes to Russia, they display a loyal, even submissive stance. A prime example of this hypocrisy is their attitude toward the PKK. While vehemently opposing U.S. support for the PKK, they turn a blind eye to Russia’s tolerance of the group, its office in Moscow, and its active presence there.

Another glaring contradiction was evident during Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system. This deal was framed as a symbol of Turkey’s independence from the West. However, the fact that it created dependency on Russia was largely ignored—particularly by the “ulusalcı” camp (Medyascope TV, 2020).

More surprisingly, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which traditionally advocated for a “Turkic world-centered” foreign policy, supported the S-400 deal. Its leader, Devlet Bahçeli, declared: “Only traitors from FETÖ, PKK murderers, and global powers oppose the S-400s” (AA, 2019).

Such extreme pragmatism, which contradicts the founding philosophy of the MHP in areas like nationalism, Islamism, and the Kurdish issue, is likely driven by the desire to remain in power as a coalition partner. However, the MHP fundamentally supports authoritarian governance, a “value” that unites Eurasianists across all factions with the Erdoğan regime.

Even though he opposes Erdoğan and was imprisoned for it, Victory Party leader Ümit Özdağ’s admiration for Putin and anti-Western stance also stem from this shared “value” (Tamgaturk, 2023).

Islamist Eurasianists
This group is the most unstable segment of Turkish Eurasianists. Conservative factions within the MHP can partly be included here as well. Their main difference from nationalist Eurasianists is their emphasis on Islam rather than ethnicity. For most Turkish Islamists—especially nationalist Islamists—Eurasianism is attractive because it legitimizes authoritarianism, strong-state thinking, and powerful leadership (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022c).

In societies like Turkey, where “strong leader–strong state” ideologies are popular, it is not surprising that Russia-centered Eurasianism—despite being geopolitically adverse to Turkey—has gained so many sympathizers. Both Russia’s imperial ambition and Turkey’s government-backed Islamist circles’ Ottoman nostalgia rest on the same foundation: power and authoritarianism.

Thus, the “Eurasianist reflexes” of Islamists in Turkey often manifest as reflections of government policy. In their view, Erdoğan’s alignment with Russia is a bold challenge to the West, a demonstration of “local and national” resistance, and a sign of Turkey’s leadership. The political consequences of this are not among their primary concerns.

Some in this circle even believe that close relations with Russia, China, and Iran will help prolong the current regime’s rule in Turkey—and they have enough influence to shape politics (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022ç; İletişim Başkanlığı, 2019).

IS THE RULING POWER IN TURKEY EURASIANIST?
 It is not possible to give a concrete and unequivocal “yes” answer to this question. Although a visible shift in favor of Eurasianist currents has been observed in Turkey since the 2016 “FETÖ coup attempt,” it would still be inaccurate to unambiguously define Turkey’s foreign policy as “Eurasianist.” Despite the government occasionally leaning toward organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, and the Eurasian Economic Union—and even at times preoccupying public discourse with debates over joining these groups for weeks or months—these gestures are mostly tactical maneuvers used as leverage against the West (Euronews, 2022; Gazete Oksijen, 2024).

At the same time, it would also be inaccurate to claim that the Turkish government is definitively not Eurasianist. First of all, the conservative worldview of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek—regarded by the ruling elites as one of their principal ideologues—is, in essence, closer to a Eurasianist line. According to Kısakürek’s “Great East” ideology, Islam is a timeless and placeless truth that aims to spread across the world, whereas the West, in order to protect itself from it, has drawn material and spiritual borders, thus giving rise to two opposing moral climates: East and West (Kısakürek, N., 2015).

According to this ideology, Western civilization is a force that uses its superiority in science and technology to establish hegemony over other societies, and Westernization means submitting to Western control and accepting colonial domination (Toker, 2019).

Second, the Erdoğan government is fundamentally authoritarian—one of the most significant commonalities it shares with neo-Eurasianist regimes.

Third, Erdoğan’s government, like Putin’s regime (which has transformed Eurasianism into an ideology of conquest under the spell of “historical greatness”), enjoys feeding the nationalist-conservative segment of society with imperial nostalgia. In this narrative, the West is portrayed as the main obstacle. For these Ottoman romantics, the West is blamed for the collapse of the empire, and values such as secularism and diversity are considered harmful.

This line became particularly evident in Turkey’s political discourse after 2015.

Yet, when the AKP came to power in 2002, it presented itself as a pro-Western, democratic government—so much so that even Russia was concerned. At that time, its main ally in consolidating power was the Gülen movement, promoted as a “moderate Islamist” partner. The AKP and the Gülen movement acted together through two election cycles, until 2011. During this period, neo-Eurasianists in Turkey were viewed as dangerous. In fact, starting from 2007—when the AKP began to firmly consolidate power—Eurasianists began to be imprisoned under the so-called “Ergenekon” criminal investigations (BBC, 2009).

Later, the “Balyoz” (Sledgehammer) trials were added to these cases. Among those imprisoned were today's well-known Eurasianists and “ulusalcı” (secular nationalist) figures, including Doğu Perinçek. These arrests and prosecutions, carried out by police and judicial institutions controlled by Gülenists, remained a topic of heated debate in Turkish politics for many years.

However, after 2011, cracks began to appear in the alliance between the AKP and the Gülenists. The precise timing and causes of the rift remain unclear, but the public announcement of the AKP–Gülen war took place in December 2013.

The Gülen movement, using its control over the police and judiciary, leaked a corruption scandal to the media involving ministers of the AKP and their sons. This scandal publicly revealed the hidden power struggle between the two Islamist forces that had been natural allies for over a decade. As a result, the Erdoğan government decided to release from prison the nationalist and Eurasianist figures who had been enemies of the Gülenists (AA, 2014). In other words, the war between two Islamist forces benefited the neo-Eurasianists.

By the time of the 2015 elections, the AKP was entering the race in a weakened state. To stay in power, it radically changed its political alliance base. The Kurds, Gülenists, and “Yetmez ama evet” liberals—previous allies chosen to pursue ambitious goals such as democratization, the Kurdish peace process, and EU membership—were replaced by Eurasianists and nationalists.

After the failed 2016 coup attempt, the Gülenists began to be purged from Turkish political life.

One of the more intriguing coincidences of this period was that Alexander Dugin, the leader of Russian neo-Eurasianism, happened to be in Turkey during these developments and publicly extended messages of “partnership” to Erdoğan’s government.

Dugin claimed that the FETÖ coup attempt was orchestrated in response to Erdoğan’s apology to Putin for the downing of a Russian jet in 2015 that had violated Turkish airspace (AA, 2016).

During those days, Dugin frequently appeared on Turkish TV channels, held meetings with politicians, and was even brought to the Turkish Grand National Assembly with the title “advisor to Putin.” He declared, “Neo-Eurasianism is a worldview against American hegemony. Whenever Russia and Turkey get closer, the U.S. and the West become immediately disturbed and do everything they can to disrupt it” (CNN Türk, 2016). These words inflamed Turkey’s already heightened “survival anxiety” and long-standing anti-Western sentiment in society.

This process accelerated with the inclusion of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Eurasianists in the ruling coalition. In the state apparatus—especially in law enforcement and the judiciary—vacancies created by the removal or imprisonment of Gülenist cadres were quickly filled by representatives of other religious sects, nationalists, and Eurasianists.

Much like in Russia, a political line began to dominate in Turkey that rejected liberalism and secular values, opposed globalization under the banner of “local” and “national” identity, promoted hostility toward LGBT+ and gender equality, and dismissed human rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly as mere “Western values” and therefore invalid.

The AKP’s “New Turkey” vision—designed to guarantee its political and economic power—was built on this axis: a battle against the West’s immorality and a return to authentic Ottoman-Islamic civilization (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022d).

IS THE TURKISH MILITARY EURASIANIST?
 It can quite easily be said that the presence of Eurasianists in the Turkish military—and even their ability to make their voices heard—is one of the most striking paradoxes of Turkish politics. In an army that is among NATO’s strongest military forces, trained and structured according to NATO discipline, and operating under NATO standards, the widespread influence of an ideology fundamentally opposed to NATO and the West is both surprising and noteworthy. How can sympathy for an anti-NATO current exist in a NATO military like the Turkish Armed Forces?

Retired military analyst Hakan Şahin suggests that the reason some retired Kemalist-Eurasianist officers adopted a radically pro-Russian stance was due to certain traumatic events they experienced during their service—such as the 2003 incident in Iraq when American soldiers placed sacks over the heads of Turkish troops, and the “Balyoz” and “Ergenekon” trials and subsequent imprisonments (Şahin, 2022).

Journalist Alper Görmüş traces the Turkish military’s shift from pro-Westernism to Eurasianism to the period when the West began allowing authoritarian tendencies to grow. According to him, the military’s Eurasianist leaning dates back to the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union—when it became clear that the path to maintaining the army’s “power without direct control” no longer lay through the West (Görmüş, 2022a).

This perspective argues that, after the USSR collapsed, the West no longer needed Turkey as a “baton against communism.” Therefore, it would no longer tolerate military coups in Turkey as it once did. Since “communist threat” had been the primary justification for previous coups, and that threat was now gone, the idea of continuing authoritarian influence through reliance on NATO or the West seemed unfeasible. A segment of the military began to drift toward Eurasianism, which seemed more favorable to authoritarianism. Additional catalysts included the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the “sack” incident, and the belief that the U.S. and the West supported the PKK.

According to a 2003 report from the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, released by Wikileaks in 2011, three factions existed within the Turkish General Staff: Atlanticists, “Ulusalcıs” (secular nationalists), and Eurasianists (Habertürk, 2011). According to the report, the “Ulusalcı” and Eurasianist alliance within the military was unaware that their ideological framework aligned with a Russian-led hegemony. Their motivation was the belief that both Turkey and Russia were being oppressed by the West. Moreover, these groups assumed that an alliance with Russia wouldn’t require democratization in Turkey—something the military at the time staunchly opposed.

Until the AKP came to power, the Turkish Armed Forces played a decisive role in Turkish politics for many decades. This role was legitimized electorally by a public that strongly revered the flag, the nation, and the military—especially in the context of counterterrorism. Additionally, the army operated in the shadow of Atatürk’s enduring popularity, which afforded it a comfortable degree of authority.

The early years of AKP rule witnessed significant tension between the government and the military. The West’s support for AKP in these power struggles—especially during reforms aimed at curbing the military’s influence—consolidated the anti-Islamist and anti-Western stance of the “Ulusalcı” and Eurasianist factions within the army. Nevertheless, the AKP won the first round of the fight, successfully reducing the military’s political role and “neutralizing” the nationalist-Eurasianist wing within its ranks.

Developments such as the prioritization of EU membership, the Kurdish peace process, and Ankara’s support for the Annan Plan in the Cyprus dispute were all opposed by Eurasianists. However, the West’s suspicion and arrogance toward Turkey—for example, applying double standards in EU accession negotiations—increased the already-existing anti-Western sentiment in society, preventing the disappearance of Eurasianism as a political current (Görmüş, 2022b).

When the AKP–Gülen coalition collapsed and Erdoğan formed a new political alliance with “Ulusalcıs” and Eurasianists, the stars of the military Eurasianists began to rise again. This time, religious AKP elites and secular nationalist-Eurasianists found common ground in their anti-Western stance.

How dominant Eurasianism is in today’s Turkish military—and how influential it is in shaping security policy—remains unclear due to a lack of transparent data. But in any case, the question is no longer of paramount importance. The Turkish military no longer shapes politics; instead, it operates within a system shaped by one man—Erdoğan. The military is now just one component of that system.

On Turkish television, the main proponents of military-Eurasianist (especially pro-Russian) discourse are retired generals and officers. These individuals now serve as propaganda operatives both for the Erdoğan–Eurasianist alliance and for the Kremlin (YouTube, 2023).

THE INFLUENCE OF EURASIANISM ON TURKISH POLITICS
 How influential is Eurasianism in Turkey, and does this current hold enough power to shape the country’s foreign policy? This question, too, is difficult to answer definitively.

While Turkey's foreign policy has taken visible zigzags and adopted a more pro-Russian tone since 2016, the country’s NATO membership and the broader context of Western interests in the region maintain Ankara’s balancing role. In principle-based decisions—such as refusing to recognize Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, not accepting the annexation of Crimea, lifting objections to Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership, and increasing NATO’s defense budget—Turkey has not deviated from its traditional foreign policy stance.

At the same time, following the 2020 Karabakh war, Turkey’s already active “Ottoman legacy” foreign policy in the Balkans, Middle East, and Africa began incorporating a new dimension: the ideal of a “Union of Turkic States.” This vision—particularly embraced by nationalist and Islamist Eurasianists in Turkey—represents a Turkish version of Russia’s ambition to dominate its former empire and the post-Soviet space.

Likewise, Turkish neo-Eurasianists, like their Russian counterparts, believe that the use of military force in achieving foreign policy goals is both possible and legitimate. This, in turn, increases populist nationalism and provides authoritarianism with further legitimacy (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022e).

Although the number of pro-Russian Eurasianists in Turkey and their electoral base may not appear large, the fact that the Perinçek group unofficially acts as a government partner, is growing stronger in law enforcement, and is delegated informal diplomacy with China and Russia significantly raises the importance of the matter.

The West’s policy missteps—such as supporting coups, backing the PKK-YPG, admitting Greek Cyprus into the EU without resolving the Cyprus issue, and obstructing Turkey’s EU membership process—have transformed Western skepticism in Turkey into full-blown hostility, uniting both right- and left-wing nationalists. Eurasianists consistently exploit and manipulate this sentiment. Nationalist emotions stirred by these missteps are directed against the West, and conspiracy theories claiming that the West wants to divide or invade Turkey are spread to instill fear. Using the Cold War-era slogan of a “fully independent Turkey,” they promote a Russia- and China-oriented foreign policy, while portraying democracy and human rights as Western tools of domination (Büyüknara, 2021).

Nevertheless, it cannot yet be said that Eurasianists control Turkey’s foreign policy. Rather, they try to maintain a presence and exert influence through media connections, their embeddedness in state institutions, and access to Russia’s propaganda budgets (QHA, 2022). Their influence over politics depends largely on the extent to which Erdoğan permits it.

The Turkish government uses Eurasianists primarily for domestic purposes—against the “Gülen threat,” to legitimize the “strong state” ideology, and to mediate with secular constituencies. Perinçek and other Eurasianists in his camp serve as the secular wing of Erdoğan’s ruling coalition and are ideologically aligned with Islamists and nationalists on the thesis of the “strong leader–strong state.” However, unless a major geopolitical rupture leads Erdoğan to sever ties with the West entirely, they will remain marginal actors used only when necessary.

That said, the real problem lies elsewhere. Despite the current alliance with Eurasianists like Perinçek, the Turkish government is not ideologically Eurasianist. A bigger issue is that the Erdoğan government no longer has a coherent ideology or worldview at all. Turkish foreign policy is now determined directly by Erdoğan and MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli. This policy is not part of a grand strategic vision but consists of short-term, reactive decisions shaped by domestic political needs.

And this policy has only one purpose: to keep Erdoğan in power for as long as possible.

The “Eurasianist basket” used for this purpose is not limited to marginal figures like Perinçek. It includes a broad spectrum ranging from nationalists to “Ulusalcıs,” Maoists to Pan-Turkists.

CONCLUSION
 Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has exhibited inconsistent and unclear behavior in defining its place in global politics. While it would be unfair to blame Ankara alone for this, it is clear that in recent years—particularly under the AKP—this incoherent foreign policy has been used as a powerful tool for domestic propaganda.

Russia’s ambition to dominate the post-Soviet region (and its willingness to use military force to do so), China’s expanding global influence and investments, and the West’s failure to respond decisively and in time to these expansionist moves (even appearing divided in recent years) have been perceived as opportunities by regional powers like Turkey. With the slogan “The world is bigger than five,” the Erdoğan government signaled a search for alternatives in foreign policy. After events like the Gezi protests, the December 17–25 corruption scandals, the July 15 coup attempt, and the abandonment of the Kurdish peace process, Erdoğan began steering toward confrontation with the West.

This confrontation was mainly useful in the domestic sphere. With his legitimacy undermined by growing authoritarianism and corruption allegations, and with his conservative voter base split over FETÖ, Erdoğan needed fresh support—and he found it in the MHP, “Ulusalcıs,” and Eurasianists.

The failed coup of July 15, 2016, gave Erdoğan additional justification for authoritarian rule. With new domestic allies backing him, Erdoğan pursued a Moscow-oriented foreign policy—purchasing Russian S-400s, launching the TurkStream pipeline, and initiating the Akkuyu nuclear power plant project.

This policy, presented to the Turkish public as “defiance against the West,” was also used as a tool of coercion and threat in relations with the West. As a result, the idea of Eurasianism—or rather, its Turkish manifestation as Russia- and China-centered policy—has become a rising trend in Turkish society.

This trend is currently supported by the Erdoğan government for public legitimacy. But the moment it no longer serves Erdoğan’s hold on power, it will likely be discarded. Erdoğan tolerates Eurasianism only because it serves a domestic purpose. If that need is met by the West—especially under someone like Trump—there is no guarantee that today’s Eurasianist allies won’t meet the same fate as the Gülenists.

However, the problem doesn’t stop there. The main opposition force in Turkey—namely, the left, which claims to be the alternative to Erdoğan—is also heavily influenced by Eurasianist tendencies, both in its public discourse and its electorate. A romanticized view of Russia, rooted in the Soviet Union’s support during Turkey’s War of Independence and the anti-imperialist interpretation of that war, still lingers in the Turkish left (Medyascope, 2022).

Whether it’s “Ulusalcılık” and “Atatürkçülük” on the left or “Ottomanism” and “Turanism” on the right, all forms of nationalism in Turkey seem to find a way to connect with Eurasianism—or more precisely, with a course of foreign policy that distances Turkey from the West and moves it closer to Russia and China. Considering that radical nationalism is on the rise globally and that liberal democratic values are being replaced with claims of “local and national” identity, authoritarianism, and protectionism, there are very few grounds left for optimism.

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