On March 26, 2025, the Armenian Parliament adopted a draft law initiating the country’s accession process to the European Union in its final reading (News.am 2025). This draft law, presented as a citizens’ initiative by the “Democratic Forces Platform” after gathering 60,000 signatures and approved by the Armenian government on January 9, marked the country’s first official step toward EU membership (Yevropeyskaya Pravda 2025). While the EU welcomed Yerevan’s decision, threatening responses emerged from Russia (Ria.ru 2025).
Naturally, this step does not imply that Armenia will become an EU member in the near future. What lies ahead for Yerevan are, at best, long and complex procedures and, at worst, serious geopolitical risks. The principal obstacle and major threat remains Russia. As the events in Georgia have demonstrated, Moscow perceives European integration in the South Caucasus with deep resentment and hostility and is willing to use every available tool to obstruct it. The key question now is whether the West can shield Armenia from these threats, and whether Armenia will remain consistent in its pursuit of the European path.
Introduction
The foundation of Armenia’s relationship with the European Union lies in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in Luxembourg in 1999 (European Union 1999). The agreement aimed to strengthen Armenia’s democracy and economy, support its transition to a market economy, and create a framework for legal, economic, social, cultural, scientific, and technological cooperation, as well as enhance trade relations and investments. It entered into force the same year. Similar agreements were signed at the time with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
In 2004, Armenia joined the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which also encompassed issues of stability and security, along with 16 other countries (EEAS 2021). An action plan for Armenia under the ENP was published in 2005. In 2009, Armenia was also included in the EU’s Eastern Partnership alongside Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine.
Armenia launched negotiations in 2010 for an Association Agreement with the EU, which envisioned deeper cooperation. While Yerevan continued to express strong loyalty toward Russia during the initial phase of the process, it also demonstrated an unexpectedly high level of eagerness in advancing its ties with the EU.
Nevertheless, Armenia joined the Free Trade Area Agreement—a project seen by Russia as a countermeasure to the EU’s Association Agreements with post-Soviet states. This agreement was signed on October 18, 2011 (“Treaty on the Free Trade Area of October 18, 2011,” n.d.). However, on October 26, then-Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan announced that Armenia’s accession to the Free Trade Area Agreement with CIS countries would not hinder its EU integration process, stating that this issue had been discussed with European partners, who had raised no objections. At the same time, the Prime Minister emphasized that Armenia would not join the Customs Union initiated by Russia, justifying the decision by pointing to the absence of shared borders with Customs Union member states—an arrangement uncommon in global practice (Regnum 2011).
Tigran Sargsyan repeatedly stated that membership in the Customs Union held no significant value for Armenia (Chernenko 2012).
Despite Armenia’s deference to Russia and its close bilateral ties, Brussels remained optimistic in the early stages of the negotiations. Stefan Füle, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, stated at the end of 2012 that negotiations with Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia could be concluded by the following year’s Vilnius Summit (Worldwide News Ukraine 2018). In the summer of 2013, it was announced that negotiations on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between the EU and Armenia had been completed. A statement released on July 24 confirmed that the parties had reached an agreement on key issues during the seventh round of negotiations (RFE/RL 2013). Brussels was confident that Armenia would sign the agreement alongside Georgia and Moldova at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November.
However, this confidence would prove short-lived.
PUTIN’S VICTORY IN VILNIUS
In the second half of 2013, Russia gained the upper hand in its geopolitical tug-of-war with the European Union over influence in the post-Soviet space. The first tangible sign of this shift came when Armenia announced its decision to join the Russia-led Customs Union. Amidst mounting political, military, and economic pressure from Moscow, Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan yielded on September 3, 2013, agreeing to join what was then the initial stage of Vladimir Putin’s vision to revive the former Soviet space through the creation of the Eurasian Union.
Despite Armenia’s claims that joining the Customs Union would not contradict its integration process with the European Union, Brussels had no illusions about the real implications of Sargsyan’s move (Arka.am 2024). At the time, Lithuania held the presidency of the EU Council, and its Foreign Minister Linas Linkevičius commented that Armenia had made a choice: “If this is their decision, it means they will not be signing the free trade agreement with the European Union. We respect every country’s choice, but they cannot sign two agreements with differing tariff regimes.” (15min.lt 2013)
Yerevan’s decision could hardly be justified on economic grounds. Rather, it was widely interpreted as part of Russia’s broader strategy to sabotage the Vilnius Summit and obstruct the EU’s integration efforts with post-Soviet countries. Armenia’s economic dependency on Russia—and most crucially, the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict—were key factors influencing this strategic reversal. Putin’s visit to Azerbaijan in August 2013 and his informal tea meeting with President Ilham Aliyev raised doubts in Yerevan about the firmness of Moscow’s support for Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue (RFI 2013; Vedomosti 2013).
Some analyses suggest that the Armenian public’s relatively muted reaction to this 180-degree turn was rooted in the fear of losing Russia’s backing in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia’s use of this unresolved conflict as a form of political blackmail left Armenia with limited room for maneuver (Carnegie Endowment 2015).
Following Sargsyan’s announcement, the Armenian government suggested that it might still sign “some form of document” at the Vilnius Summit (Azatutyun 2013). However, the European Union made it unequivocally clear that no such compromise would be acceptable. EU Commissioner Štefan Füle stated that the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement was an inseparable component of the Association Agreement, and it was not possible to separate the two. “There is no time to prepare a new agreement of a different format with Armenia before the Vilnius Summit,” Füle emphasized (NewsArmenia 2013).
Despite EU warnings, on November 6, 2013, Armenia signed a memorandum to initiate the accession process to the Customs Union. That same month, the Vilnius Summit concluded with what was effectively a geopolitical victory for Putin. Just one week before the summit, Ukraine also announced it would not sign the Association Agreement with the EU, and on November 28, it officially suspended the process (BBC 2013). Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan signed any agreements at the summit.
Eleven months later, on October 10, 2014, Armenia signed the accession treaty to become a full member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) starting January 1, 2015. The Armenian Parliament ratified the treaty in December, and Armenia officially became the fifth member of the EAEU—alongside Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan—on January 2, 2015 (Ekho Kavkaza 2014).
AN ALTERNATIVE ASSOCIATION AND THE VELVET REVOLUTION
In the eighteen months following the Vilnius Summit, cooperation between Yerevan and Brussels remained virtually frozen. During this period, Armenia’s hopes for economic benefits from deeper ties with Russia were largely unfulfilled. As Russia’s economy deteriorated, Armenia—heavily dependent on it—faced direct consequences. In the summer of 2015, widespread protests erupted across Armenia in response to a planned increase in electricity tariffs. The government was forced to delay the hike. Soon afterward, the ruling party proposed constitutional reforms aimed at transforming Armenia into a parliamentary republic, effectively abolishing direct presidential elections. These reforms were widely interpreted as an attempt by President Sargsyan, whose second term was nearing its end, to retain power by becoming prime minister. Although the reforms ultimately failed to secure long-term benefits for Sargsyan’s administration, they were approved in a referendum held on December 6, 2015 (BBC Russian 2015).
Despite these developments, the increasing civic mobilization in Armenia rekindled interest within the EU in reestablishing ties with Yerevan. In March 2015, EU Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn visited Yerevan and expressed readiness to build new relations with Armenia, taking into account its existing commitments to other organizations (President of Armenia 2015). For the Armenian government, the EU’s new approach came as a welcome development.
On October 15, 2015, the Council of the EU authorized the European Commission to begin negotiations with Armenia for a new comprehensive agreement. On December 7, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian met with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini in Brussels, and the two sides officially launched negotiations on a new framework agreement (Ekho Kavkaza 2015).
Negotiations began in 2016 and continued over six rounds. In 2017, EU-Armenia relations reached a critical turning point. In February, Serzh Sargsyan was invited to Brussels and received by EU and NATO leadership (President of Armenia 2017). On November 24, 2017, Armenia and the EU signed a landmark document—the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia 2017). Unlike the agreement Armenia withdrew from under Russian pressure in 2013, CEPA did not include the establishment of a free trade area. The Armenian Parliament ratified the agreement five months later.
In February 2018, the foreign policy chiefs of Armenia and the EU signed a document outlining the priorities of their partnership. Through CEPA, Armenia gained access to European economic resources while remaining a member of both the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), thus hoping to maintain Russian security guarantees. Notably, Russia’s official response to the signing of CEPA was one of silence—an attitude that some interpreted as an opportunistic move by Moscow to circumvent EU sanctions. Still, the Russian state-controlled media launched a propaganda campaign portraying Armenians as traitors and sellouts (Gazeta.ru 2018).
Nevertheless, implementation of CEPA provisions began in June 2018. Full enforcement of the agreement would take three more years—years during which Armenia underwent profound internal changes.
While the CEPA represented Armenia’s most significant foreign policy achievement in 2018, domestically, the defining event was the Velvet Revolution, which brought an end to Sargsyan’s rule and laid the groundwork for substantial democratic reforms. On March 2, 2018, Armenia held a presidential election. For the first time in its history, the president was elected by Parliament, not by popular vote, and former diplomat Armen Sarkissian assumed the presidency (Current Time 2018).
Serzh Sargsyan, seeking to extend his power under the 2015 constitutional changes, aimed to become prime minister. Shortly after the presidential election, the ruling Republican Party announced its intention to nominate Sargsyan for the premiership. This sparked mass protests across the country, led by opposition figure Nikol Pashinyan. Initially, police did not intervene, and the government appeared to dismiss the significance of the demonstrations, confirming Sargsyan as prime minister on April 17. This move only intensified the protests. Sargsyan was forced to meet with opposition leaders, but Pashinyan insisted that the only topic of negotiation could be the prime minister’s resignation. After this meeting, Pashinyan was arrested, but the growing support from military personnel and the public forced his release the following day. Sargsyan resigned on April 23 (Radio Svoboda 2018).
Though the Republican Party initially blocked Pashinyan’s election as prime minister in Parliament, continued national strikes and road blockades led to his eventual appointment on May 8, 2018. Declaring that Parliament no longer reflected the will of the people, Pashinyan resigned on October 16 to trigger early elections. The Parliament was dissolved in November, and snap elections were held in December. Pashinyan’s “My Step” alliance secured a landslide victory, winning more than 70% of the vote (Novaya Gazeta 2018). The Republican Party failed to pass the 5% threshold and, for the first time since its founding in 1995, was excluded from Parliament.
THE KARABAKH WAR
Nikol Pashinyan rose to power on the promise of eradicating corruption and poverty in Armenia, while simultaneously pledging a hardline stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. He later sought to demonstrate this uncompromising approach symbolically—by participating in a traditional dance (yalli) in Shusha and popularizing the slogan “Karabakh is Armenia.” The overwhelming public support he enjoyed, Russia’s silence following the “Velvet Revolution,” and increasingly close ties with the West all appeared to boost Pashinyan’s self-confidence. However, circumstances changed significantly in 2020 (Sputnik Armenia 2019).
The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated Armenia’s already difficult economic conditions, and the escalating tensions with Azerbaijan—rising steadily over the previous two years—erupted into full-scale war in September. Beginning on September 20, Azerbaijan launched a 44-day war, regaining control over much of its territory that had been under Armenian occupation. Turkey’s substantial political and military backing for Azerbaijan, combined with Russia’s apparent indifference, played a decisive role in the outcome.
Yet, the agreements reached at the end of the 44-day war revealed that Moscow’s silence had not signaled disengagement but rather a strategic calculation. Russia had remained a central actor throughout the conflict. Once a steadfast patron of Yerevan during the occupation years, Moscow likely shifted its stance in exchange for political loyalty pledges from Baku, positioning itself alongside the emerging Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance.
Russia’s abrupt policy turn was largely prompted by Armenia’s westward reorientation under Pashinyan’s government. Putin, a leader known for favoring unconditional loyalty over strategic balancing, would not easily forgive a post-Soviet state that embraced the very principles—free elections and democratic governance—that he deemed an existential threat to the region. Thus, Armenia’s growing alignment with the West since 2018 was unlikely to be tolerated.
Moscow’s muted response when Russian peacekeepers were withdrawn and Azerbaijan fully restored sovereignty over Karabakh three years after the war was a further indication that Armenia had lost its most powerful regional ally. Putin’s decision in February 2022 to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine—triggering sweeping international sanctions—made preserving relations with regional powers like Turkey a more immediate priority.
Losing its most significant military and political support, Armenia began to distance itself from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). It refused to participate in CSTO exercises and meetings, announced its intention to withdraw from the alliance in 2024 (though the move is yet to be formalized), and joined the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Forbes Russia 2023; Voice of America 2023). By recognizing the jurisdiction of the very court that issued an arrest warrant for Putin, Yerevan sent a clear message: its break with Moscow was now complete.
In March 2024, the Armenian government publicly raised the possibility of joining the European Union. Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated that the issue of EU membership was under active discussion. He noted that Armenia was re-evaluating its strategic options in light of recent threats and that joining the EU was among the considered alternatives (Meduza 2024). Mirzoyan also expressed an interest in deepening ties with the United States.
As of 2025, Armenia has entered the year with the declared intention to seek EU membership. Parliamentary discussions on a bill to initiate the accession process began in January, and the bill passed its first reading on February 12 (NV.ua 2025). Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan clarified that this did not equate to immediate accession; such a decision would require a national referendum.
CAN ARMENIA CONTINUE TO SIT ON TWO CHAIRS?
Russia’s response to Armenia’s EU aspirations was swift and threatening. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk stated that Moscow viewed Yerevan’s move as the beginning of Armenia’s departure from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). He emphasized that Armenia could not simultaneously be a member of both the EU and the EAEU, derisively calling Yerevan’s step “a ticket for the Titanic” (RBC 2025). In response to a statement by Armenia’s finance minister that there were no intentions to leave the EAEU, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov offered a similarly vague reply (Interfax 2025).
In essence, while the EU has chosen to overlook Armenia’s continued membership in the EAEU, Russia views Armenia’s pursuit of EU accession as grounds for punishment. Should this process deepen further, Armenia will likely be forced to make a definitive choice. The question remains: is Yerevan prepared to make that choice?
At first glance, it appears that Armenia is attempting to capitalize on the regional situation by filling the geopolitical vacuum left by Georgia in the South Caucasus. However, a more sober analysis suggests that Armenia’s announcement of its EU membership intention and the signing of a strategic partnership charter with the U.S. do not yet constitute a clear strategic pivot. In practice, Armenia has taken few concrete steps to detach from Russia.
Despite announcing its intent to leave the CSTO in February 2024, Armenia has not formalized this decision. The Russian military base in Armenia remains operational, and Armenian officials have repeatedly stated that it will not be removed (TASS 2025).
Furthermore, Armenia continues to assist Russia in circumventing international sanctions. It is one of the few countries where the Russian “Mir” payment card still functions. While it does not play as large a role as Turkey or Kazakhstan, Armenia re-exports Russian precious metals and stones—either in raw form or as processed goods—to countries such as the United Arab Emirates (Hetq 2025).
Armenia is also simultaneously benefiting from substantial financial aid from the EU and the U.S., while continuing to enjoy tariff-free trade with Russia under the EAEU framework. The strategic partnership charter signed with the United States primarily promises political and diplomatic—not military—support.
All of this, including the role of Iran, complicates any prediction that Armenia will decisively sever its ties with Russia in favor of the West. Additionally, given the transactional nature of U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration, it remains uncertain how Washington would respond to Armenian overtures.
Moreover, there are credible concerns that the Kremlin, once it regains momentum, may resume its ambitions of reasserting dominance over the post-Soviet space. From 2022 onward, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and encountered significant resistance, Azerbaijan succeeded in restoring sovereignty over Karabakh, and Armenia was able to explore greater geopolitical flexibility. But from 2025 onward, especially if Donald Trump openly pursues a policy of “selling out” Ukraine to Russia, similar maneuvers by Armenia may become increasingly difficult.
Ultimately, much will depend on the trajectory of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the extent to which Brussels and, more importantly, Washington are willing to support Yerevan.
CONCLUSION
Armenia’s steps toward European Union integration, viewed in light of its political decisions and historical experiences, suggest that this path is both promising and fraught with risk. Although Armenia’s relations with the EU have progressed steadily since the late 1990s, Russia’s enduring regional influence and Armenia’s long-standing position within Moscow’s orbit have continually obstructed this process. By joining the Customs Union in 2013, Armenia veered away from the European path. However, following the Velvet Revolution in 2018, the Pashinyan government renewed its focus on EU integration.
The 2020 Karabakh war and its geopolitical aftermath accelerated Armenia’s strategic drift away from Russia. This distancing became more formalized in 2024 through Armenia’s announced departure from the CSTO and its accession to the International Criminal Court. In March of this year, the Armenian Parliament’s approval of a bill launching the EU accession process further signaled Yerevan’s clear and determined intent to integrate with the West.
Nonetheless, Armenia faces multiple challenges on its European journey. Foremost among these is the persistent threat posed by Russia. Georgia’s experience has shown that Moscow can respond aggressively to similar geopolitical shifts. Second, aligning Armenia’s economic, legal, and administrative systems with EU standards will be a long and arduous process. Third, ensuring internal political stability and sustained public support for this strategic course will also be essential.
In conclusion, Armenia is now closer than ever to boarding the European train. Yet maintaining its place on that train will depend on the resilience of its internal political will and the wisdom of its strategies in the face of external threats. If managed correctly, Armenia’s commitment to European integration could represent a historic opportunity—provided it is seized with both foresight and determination.
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