Introduction
Only two days after President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump — a meeting held amid high expectations, warm gestures, and optimistic forecasts — the statements made by Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan had the effect of a cold shower.
While evaluating the Erdoğan–Trump meeting and Ankara’s expectations from Washington, Hakan Fidan said:
“At the moment, we are expecting to receive the F-35s and the engines for the KAAN. They are currently pending in the U.S. Congress, and their licenses have been suspended. The licenses must be issued, and the engines must arrive so that the production of the KAANs can begin. The existence of such restrictions in our relations with the U.S. will inevitably push us toward different pursuits within the international system.”
(Medyascope, September 2025)
Since the U.S. embargoes imposed on Turkey’s defense industry are no secret, Fidan’s statement was, in principle, no surprise. The real surprise was that such a high-ranking bureaucrat publicly admitted that “production may not begin” in relation to the KAAN aircraft — one of the government’s most significant propaganda tools in recent years.
A day after Fidan’s remarks, the head of the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), Haluk Görgün, issued a statement correcting the foreign minister’s words:
“Under the leadership of our President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the steps taken in our defense industry continue resolutely. Our KAAN and domestic engine projects are progressing confidently and in accordance with the established schedule. We are building an ecosystem that relies on our own capabilities, leaving behind foreign dependency.”
(X, September 2025)
The following day, Görgün addressed the issue once again. What he said contradicted Fidan’s earlier comments:
“The production of the KAANs has been planned based on domestic, not foreign, engines. The development activities for the main engine of the KAAN fighter jet — the TF-35000 — and its auxiliary power unit, the APU-60, are progressing successfully. The process in the defense industry always works in this way: first you begin with the existing engines, and then national engine projects are incorporated into circulation. We are also producing the KAAN according to a block approach — meaning that we will add to our inventory different versions that become stronger through successive stages, each with enhanced capabilities. Within this framework, there is no delay in the delivery schedule of our KAAN fighter aircraft. To avoid putting our serial production at risk, we do not rely on a single source; we work with different supply channels and evaluate alternatives. The future of the KAAN is in no way dependent on the engine of a single country. We trust our engineers. The serial production process of the TF-35000 continues as planned.”
(Gazete Oksijen, September 2025a)
Fahrettin Öztürk, chairman of the board of TEI — the engine manufacturer within TUSAŞ, which produces the KAAN — also refuted Fidan’s words. Öztürk said that the U.S. Congress had approved Turkey’s request to purchase “GE Aerospace F404” engines for the HÜRJET training aircraft, and that the process regarding the KAAN was ongoing:
“As far as I know, there has been no rejection concerning the F110 engine. So there is no such situation as being unable to produce the KAAN because we lack an engine.”
(GZT, October 2025)
However, apart from this statement concerning the HÜRJET, there is no other concrete fact available at present.
This entire picture triggered debates in Turkey not only about how “local and national” the KAANs truly are, but also about the future of the fifth-generation fighter jet — one that Ankara has long presented as a symbol of the country’s rise in the defense industry. While pro-government journalists published articles echoing the points raised in Görgün’s statements and accused those questioning the KAANs of being hostile to the “local and national” defense industry, they also claimed that Fidan’s words had been misrepresented (Hilal Kaplan, September 2025).
The leader of the main opposition party, Özgür Özel, said, “We stand behind our national pride, the KAAN” (T24, September 2025), but opposition figures — including former Turkish ambassador to Washington, Namık Tan — emphasized that there were serious questions concerning both the aircraft’s domestic and national nature and its operational lifespan (Gazete Oksijen, September 2025b).
Some sources claimed that Fidan’s remarks had caused serious discontent within the government, being seen as having cast a shadow over Erdoğan’s visit to the U.S. According to these sources, Fidan’s statement was linked to “post-Erdoğan scenarios” — in other words, it was a reflection of internal clashes among different factions within the ruling establishment (Birgün, September 2025).
Following all these debates, Hakan Fidan was forced to make another statement and adjusted his words in line with the new discourse that the government had shaped through the media:
“It is my duty to work for the lifting of sanctions. When our relevant institutions make such a request, it is my responsibility to raise the issue. If the other side does not provide a logical explanation, my national security requires me to obtain those parts elsewhere.”
(T24, October 2025)
Yet even this does not mean that the knot surrounding the KAAN aircraft has been untied.
In this analysis, the KHAR Center examines both the current situation around the KAAN — its limitations and the questions it raises — and Ankara’s search for solutions to the problem.
The Main Question of the Analysis
What are the short-term obstacles preventing the realization of Turkey’s KAAN fighter aircraft model?
KAAN and the Engine Problem
The KAAN, Turkey’s fifth-generation fighter jet, is an ambitious project developed and implemented by the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ). Ankara presents this aircraft as one of the most important elements of its policy to reduce foreign dependence in defense-industry technologies, claiming that it will surpass the U.S.-made F-35s, which are currently subject to an export embargo against Turkey (GZT, June 2025).
The name KAAN was given to the project by the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli (TRT Haber, 2023).
Although the idea of a national fighter jet has been on Turkey’s agenda since 2010, the project officially began in 2018. Within this framework, the first component of the country’s first national fighter was produced in 2021 (Savunmasanayist, 2021a). The aircraft, whose assembly was completed and rolled out of the hangar in 2023, conducted its first ground-test flight in February 2024, followed by a second test flight in May 2024 (Defenceturk, 2024).
The true flight prototype of the KAAN — the Block-0 — is scheduled for flight tests in the spring of 2026. By that date, the production of three true prototypes is planned. According to recent statements, two of the real prototypes are already at the system-integration stage, while one ground prototype is under production. A total of six prototypes are expected to be produced to complete the flight-test program (GDH Digital, September 2025a).
The Block-1 configuration of the aircraft is planned to be completed in 2029. At the first official presentation held by the Turkish Air Force in 2021, it was announced that during the second phase of the project, ten Block-1-configured aircraft would be delivered to the Turkish Armed Forces.
Between 2034 and 2040, during the third phase of the project, it is planned that other blocks of the aircraft will be developed and serial production will begin (Savunmasanayist, 2021b).
In recent months, however, pro-government sources have started to claim that the number of aircraft to be produced by 2029 will be 20 (GDH Digital, September 2025b).
The KAAN fighters are intended to replace the F-16s currently in service with the Turkish Armed Forces. For that purpose, it is estimated that 148 aircraft will be needed in the first phase. Since TUSAŞ currently has the capacity to produce eight aircraft per year, increasing production capacity has also become an issue on the agenda (GDH Digital, September 2025c).
The prototypes and the first series production of the KAANs are planned to use U.S.-made engines — the “General Electric F110,” which also powers the F-16 — while domestic engines are expected to replace them after 2032. The KAAN prototypes currently being built fly with two F110 engines each. TUSAŞ plans to develop by 2029 a prototype that will fly with a domestic engine. This plan envisions flight tests conducted with one KAAN powered by the F110 and another powered by a domestic engine (Defenceturk, July 2025).
It is not known exactly how many engines the U.S. has delivered to Turkey for the KAAN so far. According to media reports, TUSAŞ applied to the U.S. government twice — in 2019 and 2021 — to purchase five engines each time (Defence Turkey, 2022). The licenses for those purchases were obtained before Turkey’s tensions with the U.S. over the S-400 system — in 2017 (Yetkinreport, September 2025).
Haluk Görgün, the head of the Defense Industries Presidency, also stated in a media interview that although he could not disclose exact figures, the engines needed for the prototypes had already been purchased from the United States and that the formal application process for the engines required for the first block of serial production had been completed (SSBulten, September 2025).
The number of engines Görgün referred to can be roughly estimated from media data. Considering that twenty Block-1 configuration aircraft are to be produced by 2029 and that each aircraft requires two engines, it can be inferred that Ankara is currently waiting for forty F110 engines from the United States.
The contradiction between Fidan’s and Görgün’s statements in Ankara thus stems precisely from this issue of forty engines. As Görgün himself mentioned, there is no problem with the production and flight schedule of the KAAN prototypes, because the engines used in those prototypes were secured under earlier agreements, and their delivery faced no obstacles.
However, as Hakan Fidan stated, the real problem lies in the Block-1 series production — the first batch of twenty aircraft planned for delivery to the Turkish Air Force in 2029. The reason is simple: the licenses for the engines required for those aircraft have not been granted due to Turkey’s inclusion under U.S. CAATSA sanctions. Moreover, experts argue that the current “F110-GE-129” engine does not meet the military performance expectations for the KAAN, and that obtaining or modernizing newer versions of the engine again depends on the state of relations between Turkey and the United States (Mevlütoğlu, September 2025a).
If the U.S. does not lift the CAATSA embargoes, the production of the Block-1 configuration will be delayed, triggering a chain reaction that will also affect post-2030 targets. Even if, as planned, the domestic engine is ready after 2030, it is known that the first aircraft produced will be allocated to meeting the internal needs of the Turkish Armed Forces.
This could also create problems regarding Turkey’s commitments under KAAN sales contracts that it has already signed — for example, with Indonesia. In June 2025, Indonesia’s defense minister announced that his country had signed a contract with Turkey to purchase forty-eight KAAN aircraft (İletişim Başkanlığı, June 2025).
The minister did not specify the contract’s value or delivery schedule, but some sources report that it spans twelve years (Defenceturk, September 2025a). Indeed, Indonesia stated that it would buy KAANs equipped with domestic engines, yet there is still no certainty that such an engine will be ready by that time.
Does Turkey Have an Alternative?
The overall picture that emerges shows that, at least until Turkey completes the production of its domestic engine, the flight of the KAAN will depend on the United States’ position. Although Haluk Görgün has avoided emphasizing this fact, both he and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan gave statements carrying the message that “we are not without alternatives.” However, experts largely agree that this is not as easy as it sounds.
According to military industry and aviation analyst Kubilay Yıldırım, the number of engines in the world that meet the KAAN’s requirements is extremely limited:
“Apart from the U.S.-made Pratt & Whitney F-100, there is no other Western alternative.”
(Medyascope, September 2025a)
The idea of using the “Eurojet EJ200” engine — the one employed in “Typhoon” fighter jets — for the KAAN has also been discussed in previous years. Experts note that, from a technical standpoint, the EJ200 remains one of the Western-made engines that could potentially be applied to the KAAN today (Defence Turkey, 2014).
However, specialists emphasize that this too depends on Turkey’s political relations with Germany and the United Kingdom (Mevlütoğlu, September 2025b).
The notion of Turkey procuring engines from Russia or China has also occasionally been raised. Former head of the Defense Industries Presidency (SSB), İsmail Demir, stated in 2022 that the first prototypes would fly with F-16 engines and that three alternatives were being considered for subsequent phases. These alternatives were said to include Japan (IHI Corporation XF9), China (Xi’an Aero-Engine Corporation WS-10/WS-15), and Russia (UEC Saturn AL-31) (Turdef, 2022).
According to media reports, following Hakan Fidan’s recent statements, Beijing may seek to capitalize on the opportunity by offering to sell Turkey its WS-15 engine or to jointly develop an engine (Defence Security Asia, September 2025).
However, there are two major issues with this scenario. First, Turkey faces the risk of encountering embargoes similar to those it experienced after purchasing the S-400 systems from Russia. Secondly, experts warn that shifting toward Chinese or Russian engines would mean having to redesign the KAAN almost from scratch (Medyascope, September 2025b).
Sources within the government also highlight that switching to an alternative engine could greatly complicate the KAAN project (Hacaoğlu, October 2025a).
In other words, it appears that Turkey has no real alternative other than producing its own engine in the medium and long term — and, in the short term, reaching an agreement with the United States over the S-400 issue to secure the lifting of CAATSA sanctions. In fact, lifting CAATSA would also be critically important for ensuring the future supply of components for the domestic engine.
The Hope for a Domestic and National Engine
Experts evaluate the statements concerning the operational date of the domestic engine as overly optimistic. One example often cited is the TS1400 engine project, which began in 2017 and was comparatively simpler, yet still has not been fully completed — demonstrating that concerns about the TF35000 engine are not unfounded.
According to experts, the fact that Turkey produces engines in accordance with Western standards naturally prolongs the development process. However, Ankara’s insistence on a tight schedule and its export-oriented planning impose enormous pressure on the project (Defenceturk, September 2025b).
On the other hand, a source in Turkey who spoke to Bloomberg on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue said that the process of developing the domestic engine was progressing with delays. The source stated that TUSAŞ was facing difficulties in producing the combustion chamber, turbine, pipework, afterburner, and exhaust nozzle of the TF35000 engine (Hacaoğlu, October 2025b).
Defense industry expert Arda Mevlütoğlu believes that in order to accelerate the process or reduce risks in developing the national engine, Turkey could collaborate with another foreign partner to obtain technology or technical assistance. However, he emphasizes that some critical parts of an engine are treated as closely guarded secrets by the countries that produce them and are unlikely to be shared with Ankara:
“Turkey will be forced to learn and develop these entirely on its own, with its own resources. That means time and money — both of which are in very limited supply on Turkish soil. Receiving support from the U.S. in this matter would depend on the state and tone of U.S.–Turkey relations at that time.”
(Mevlütoğlu, September 2025c)
Furthermore, Mevlütoğlu notes that any foreign technological partnership or support could only serve as a temporary measure to accelerate the process, since large companies with established experience in engine manufacturing are unlikely to welcome such collaboration:
“It is possible to cooperate with a large number of smaller, diverse companies. Of course, the world is not limited to the U.S. and Europe — it is possible to find different technologies in various parts of the world. However, all of these again require time and money, both of which we have in very short supply.”
(Mevlütoğlu, September 2025ç)
The expert also suggests that Turkey might opt for “risk-reducing” interim formulas for the KAAN — for example, a simplified model that could fly with two F110 engines, or a lighter version of the KAAN with a smaller engine. However, given the immense mission and symbolic weight assigned to the KAAN by the government, such an option does not appear very realistic.
The CAATSA Bargain
For this reason, Turkey is left with no realistic option other than making concessions to secure the lifting of the CAATSA sanctions imposed by Washington.
The removal of CAATSA sanctions is directly tied to Turkey returning the Russian-made S-400 systems and providing a guarantee that no further purchases will be made. This condition is explicitly stated in the 2021 version of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) — the legislative act that defines the boundaries of the U.S. defense budget and foreign arms sales, and which remains in force today (KHAR Center, September 2025).
This is also the most complicated aspect of the issue. Even if Donald Trump wants to lift the CAATSA sanctions, the relevant provisions of the NDAA require that Turkey provide assurances.
Well-informed sources report that Ankara has been trying to find a middle ground concerning the S-400s. According to sources in Ankara, Turkey has expressed its willingness to compromise on the issue of the S-400 air defense systems but does not want to surrender the equipment. In the negotiations, Ankara has reportedly proposed reaching a technical and joint military mechanism with the United States to oversee the system (Hacaoğlu, October 2025c).
Sources in the West, however, claim that Trump’s technical team is also looking for a workaround to justify lifting the CAATSA sanctions. One proposal involves Turkey removing a key component of the S-400 system and declaring the air defense system inoperative. But this is said to be considered risky in both U.S. military and political circles for two reasons.
First, removing a single element of the S-400 system does not mean that it has been neutralized, since that component could later be reattached. Second, granting Turkey such permission could set a dangerous precedent for Iran and North Korea, allowing them to evade sanctions by temporarily dismantling parts of their own controversial weapons systems and declaring them “nonfunctional” (Rubin, September 2025). Although this second argument is not entirely convincing, it nevertheless circulates in Washington policy discussions.
There are also discussions about the possibility of storing the S-400 system within Turkey — for instance, at a base such as Incirlik — or even abroad, or transferring it under the control of a third party such as the United States. In that case, the U.S. administration could inform Congress that Turkey no longer meets the “possession” criterion for the S-400 and request the suspension of the relevant NDAA provision.
However, in all such cases, both the U.S. Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State would be required to provide the relevant congressional subcommittees with documented assurances that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400 system, has no intention of reacquiring or reactivating it, and has not purchased any Russian military equipment since July 31, 2019 (Argiri, September 2025).
Proposals such as “putting the S-400s in boxes,” transferring them to U.S. control, or selling them to third countries have already been discussed in the Turkish press last year (Cumhuriyet, 2024). At that time, Ankara was reportedly making such an offer to gain access to F-35 fighter jets, but the current situation suggests that Turkey’s needs have become much greater and more urgent.
Currently, to bypass problems like those now emerging around the KAAN — and, more broadly, the recurring challenges in the defense industry — some have proposed that the Turkish Defense Industries Presidency (SSB) withdraw from its role as purchaser and beneficiary in defense projects (Stein, 2020).
The argument behind this proposal is that CAATSA sanctions directly target the SSB and stipulate that no licenses shall be granted for U.S.-origin products used in any project involving that institution (State.gov, 2020).
However, since CAATSA is, by nature, a political sanction, any change of player or intermediary on Turkey’s part could easily be countered by Washington with an equivalent countermeasure. Furthermore, according to U.S. legal firms that have analyzed the statute, the sanctions cover not only the Turkish Defense Industries Presidency but also the companies cooperating with it. In other words, any Turkish company that imports a U.S.-licensed product cannot transfer it to the Defense Industries Presidency (Hogan Lovells, 2020).
Conclusion
In fact, by stating what everyone already knew, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan revealed that the KAAN — long promoted by the Turkish government as a “local and national” pride project — remains far from free of foreign dependence. His words also demonstrated that resolving the ongoing sanctions crisis with the United States, either fully or partially, holds critical importance for Ankara.
For President Erdoğan’s government, which reacts sharply to any criticism, doubt, or question regarding what has almost become a matter of “national honor” — the defense industry — Fidan’s statement was, without a doubt, neither expected nor desired. This was clearly reflected both in the tone of the statements made by officials responsible for the defense industry and in the attitudes of pro-government media outlets and commentators.
Although both Hakan Fidan and Haluk Görgün emphasized that Turkey was “not dependent” on the United States and would seek “alternative” paths, the reality is clear: Turkey will remain dependent on American engines for its KAAN aircraft at least until it succeeds in producing a fully functional domestic engine.
For Erdoğan, building a strong defense industry serves as the cornerstone of both his ambitious foreign policy and domestic political narrative. Between 2020 and 2024, Turkey’s arms exports more than doubled compared to the 2015–2019 period, while its imports decreased by one-third (Hacaoğlu, October 2025ç). Especially after the popularity of Turkish drones in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, “Baykar,” the company led by Erdoğan’s son-in-law Selçuk Bayraktar, has become one of the world’s leading defense exporters. In 2024 alone, Baykar topped Turkey’s defense industry export list with $1.831 billion in sales (Defence Turkey, March 2025).
Yet no matter how much Turkey strengthens its military industry or insists on the rhetoric of “strategic autonomy,” it remains part of the international system and, both militarily and economically, largely dependent on the West.
No matter how loudly Erdoğan repeats the slogan of “national and local,” confronting the harsh realities of international politics is inevitable. Today, Ankara is paying the price for its claim of strategic autonomy through its purchase of the Russian S-400 systems. That strategic mistake stands as the most significant obstacle to fulfilling the country’s most ambitious domestic projects and defense-industry goals.
At this stage, the most feasible way to overcome these obstacles is for Turkey to reach an understanding with the United States as soon as possible and to make substantial concessions — at least to ensure the lifting of the CAATSA embargoes.
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