The Impact of Authoritarian Governance on Foreign Policy: The Case of Azerbaijan

Introduction

Context

The influence of authoritarian regimes on foreign policy has become increasingly visible in the international system, especially after Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This new global configuration has intensified ideological polarization between democracy and authoritarianism and has complicated the geopolitical position of countries in the South Caucasus, including Azerbaijan. President Ilham Aliyev’s increasingly harsh rhetoric against the West and his anti‑Western positions illustrate how this polarization shapes Azerbaijani political behavior (Əliyev, 2024). Nevertheless, the zigzags and uncertainties observed in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy present it more as an actor driven by pragmatism and regime security rather than by any ideological choice. For years, Baku has sought to preserve the ability to maneuver among different centers of power, such as Turkey, Russia, the West (the United States and the EU), and China. Today this policy takes on a more instrumental character aimed at ensuring domestic stability and consolidating the regime.

Growing tension in relations with Russia since June 2024 has manifested itself especially through violent repressions against Azerbaijani citizens. This provides a clear example of how clashes between authoritarian regimes ultimately result in violence directed at ordinary people. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is closely linked to its domestic model of authoritarian governance. Because of the excessive centralization of the presidency, the lack of transparency in decision‑making, and the weakness of parliamentary democratic oversight mechanisms, the country’s foreign policy is aimed mainly at strengthening the legitimacy of the regime and establishing economically advantageous relations. In this context, Azerbaijani diplomacy uses its energy resources and strategic location as instruments to neutralize international demands concerning democracy and human rights.

At the same time, balancing has long been the dominant concept in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. On the one hand, this policy rests on security cooperation with Russia, on the other hand, on dialogue with the West on energy and security. However, in recent years balancing has become a more difficult process to manage due to increasing domestic political repression and geopolitical changes in the region.

Purpose of the article

This study aims to analyze the evolution of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy in the context of authoritarian governance. By examining the ideological, institutional, and pragmatic aspects of the foreign policy course that has formed during Ilham Aliyev’s rule, it seeks to show how deeply it is connected to the domestic political regime.

Main question

How does Azerbaijan’s authoritarian governance model shape the country’s foreign policy rhetoric and behavior?

Autocracies are more prone to aggression in foreign policy

In theoretical approaches to foreign policy, Kant’s thesis on the impossibility of wars between democracies is often cited as a reference point (Kant 1966). The peace‑loving character of democracies is explained primarily by the commonality of values and political culture based on pluralism, tolerance, and the inclusion of various social groups in the decision‑making process. Leaders of democratic states carry democratic norms – such as tolerance toward the opposition and the inclusion of opponents in governance – into the international arena as well (Kулагин 2000a).

By contrast, in democratic countries there exist internal institutional constraints and the special role of public opinion that limit the adoption of radical foreign‑policy decisions. Because the ruling elite must gain support for its political course from everyone, including the opposition, which is capable of blocking the activities of political institutions, the support of interest groups and a free press also matters.

Research shows that authoritarian regimes are more prone to aggression and confrontation in foreign policy. One explanation for authoritarian leaders’ tendency toward aggressive foreign policy is that it serves to distract public attention from domestic socio‑political problems; another is that it stems from the absence of structural and institutional constraints on those in power in authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian leaders can keep dissatisfied citizens under pressure; therefore neither voter support nor public opinion plays a role in their foreign policy strategy choices. However, authoritarian states do not always realize their aggressive potential in practice and build relations with democratic states on the basis of “forced peaceful coexistence” (Kулагин 2000b).

Understanding the general patterns of behavior in foreign policy of authoritarian and democratic regimes allows us to better comprehend the nature of strategic decisions made by political elites depending on the type of governance. For a comprehensive analysis of contemporary Azerbaijan’s foreign policy directions, it is essential to examine the ideological and conceptual foundations of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918–1920). It was during that period that the first foreign policy vectors, reflecting the competition of different values and models of identification, were formed.

The First Republic and the conceptual foundations of its foreign policy

At the beginning of the twentieth century, geopolitical processes in the world as well as philosophical and ideological trends influenced ideas about identity among Azerbaijani intellectuals. These ideas and debates seriously impacted the foundational principles of the internal and external policy of the Republic established in 1918. The interplay of two different civilizations – the East and the West – provided an opportunity for the writer Jalil Mammadguluzadeh to portray the clash of conceptual visions about Azerbaijan’s future through the three sons in his work My Mother’s Book. Through the voices of a Russia supporter, an Iran advocate and a Turkey enthusiast, Mammadguluzadeh depicted the main ideological currents existing in Azerbaijani society at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries: a current that prioritized religious and national identity and another that promoted cultural and universal values instead of a search for “identity”. None of these currents was based on pragmatic political thinking or on the practice of an independent state’s foreign policy; they were rather the product of romantic conceptions.

The outlook emphasizing cultural and universal values and progress (later subsumed under the concept of the “West”) viewed Europe as a beacon. Its guiding idea was twofold: on the one hand it prioritized future progress, putting religious and ethnic identity in second place, and on the other it incorporated pragmatism by considering realpolitik. Məhəmməd ağa Şahtaxtinski, who can be considered Azerbaijan’s first cosmopolitan, wrote: “Europeans are moving forward. The very concept of ‘the progress of humanity’ arises from the observation of European life. Therefore, any people who do not want to crawl in the world must live in the European way” (Şahtaxtinski 1919).

The nationalist segment, for whom the awakening of national consciousness and national identity was important, held the pessimistic view that the West’s outlook on the East excluded the integration of non‑Europeans into the modern world. Although they had assimilated the basics of European thought, they could not escape the influence of religious and ethnic identity. In fact, realpolitik in the context of Turkish nationalism also conditioned this. The ideas of Ali Bey Huseynzade – “With Turkish blood, Islamic faith, French thought and European appearance” – gave rise to the slogan of the era, “Islamization, Turkification, Europeanization” (Hüseynzadə 2007, 480).

1918–1920 – the foreign policy of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic

On 7 December 1918, during the opening session of the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, M. A. Rasulzadeh delivered a declaration about the principles of state building and foreign and domestic policy, expressing a conceptual vision that embodied this triple formula: “The National Council has raised the tricolor flag that represents independent Azerbaijan; the three‑colored flag symbolizing Turkish freedom, Islamic culture and modern European power shall always wave above our heads” (Rəsulzadə 1918).

For the secular republic, Islamization was largely “formal” in terms of foreign policy orientation. Iran, the largest Muslim country in the region, denied the existence of the newly created Azerbaijani state and at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 referred to its “historic rights” to territories in the Caucasus – from Derbent southward – and parts of Turkey that had belonged to Iran in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, demanding the return of a vast territory of 578,000 square kilometres (Quliyeva 2018). Responding to the opposition of Muslims in Iran to the state created by Muslims to the north, Rasulzadeh wrote in his 1918 article “Azerbaijan and Iran”: “The Azerbaijani Republic is not a name invented by some ‘dreamers’ as Tehran newspapers think. The Azerbaijani Republic is a government established by the Azerbaijani Turkic nation, which wants to live with an independent national life and has realized its nationality” (Məmmədova 2022). As a result of the activities of the government and its representatives at the Paris Peace Conference, Azerbaijan was recognized de jure by Iran in autumn 1919.

The main allies of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic were, on the one hand, the Ottoman Empire, and on the other, European countries. Orientation toward the Ottoman state stemmed not only from national identity but also from the necessity of national security and defence. Until its defeat in the First World War, Turkey was unquestionably the only ally on which Azerbaijan could rely. In an appeal to the Azerbaijani people on 17 June 1918 when the second government began its work, it declared: “With the independence of Azerbaijan, the sacred desire has been realized. We believe that with the unshakable will of our people and with the support of the Ottoman Empire, which is our compatriot and our co‑religionist, a happy future for our Motherland will be ensured” (Şüküroğlu 2018).

From mid‑1919 the Azerbaijani government and its representatives at the Paris Peace Conference sought allies among the European states. This resulted from both a desire to approach the free world and the need for a “shield” against real threats. Nasib Nasibzadeh, a researcher of the foreign policy of the republic, wrote that “the ability of the Azerbaijani National Council to find a common language with the victorious Entente and its representatives in the Caucasus should be regarded as its great diplomatic victory. In the circumstances that had arisen, orientation toward England was a correct step and it soon bore fruit” (Nəsibzadə 1996). From November 1918 to August 1919 British troops were stationed in Azerbaijan. Although they entered Baku with the intention of occupation, the policy they pursued in Azerbaijan was not of an occupational nature. In his 1919 book “Azerbaijan”, published in Baku, Adil Khan Ziyadxanov wrote: “The attitude and relations of the Allies toward us became evident from the very first day, and a veil of respect was drawn between us. The outcome of a hundred different events, of course, was that when the representatives of civilized nations came to our land, they saw with their own eyes that in Azerbaijan, public and political life flowed in a direction favored by the population, and they appreciated the true state of affairs. I can say with complete hope and courage that the more we interact and associate with great, civilized nations, the more the friendly relations between us will be strengthened and the more we will learn about each other’s true conditions” (Həsənli 2009a).

Cəmil Həsənli wrote that “taking into account the complex historical conditions of the period in which it existed, those who founded the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and carried out its foreign policy oriented themselves toward creating a modern republic based on secular values and democratic principles, thereby determining the place of Azerbaijanis in world politics and geography” (Həsənli 2009b). This was not simply about being “with French thought, European appearance” and “living in the European way”. The goal was to establish a republic with a parliamentary system and bring democratic values from Europe to Azerbaijan, thereby determining Azerbaijan’s place in the geography of democracies and including it among modern developed states.

The historical basis for the formation of foreign policy in the Second Republic

When Azerbaijan declared its independence in 1991 as the successor of the first republic, it had to establish bilateral relations with world states and secure representation in international organizations. Bringing to an end the occupation war launched by Armenia and obtaining a ceasefire were among the priorities that the foreign policy of the newly independent state had to resolve. In the context of resolving territorial issues that had turned into a subject of dispute among the allied republics after the collapse of the USSR, international recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and confirmation of the aggression it faced became the first test for its foreign policy. The four resolutions adopted in 1993 by the UN Security Council recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and acknowledging its occupation were significant (Azərbaycan Milli Kitabxanası 1993).

In conceptual terms, several vectors re‑emerged as potential directions for foreign policy. The Iranian vector lost its attractiveness in realpolitik terms because, unlike the early twentieth century when it was considered conceptually, by the late twentieth century Iran was under sanctions, unable to develop and exert influence. Also, the main ideological force in building the second republic was nationalism, so the “two‑part Azerbaijan” narrative led to perceiving Iran as a threat. Moreover, seventy years of communist rule had weakened the religious factor.

The “European” vector discussed at the beginning of the twentieth century was replaced by the idea of the “collective West” and again seen as a beacon of development and progress. Turkey’s NATO membership and its aspirations to join the European Union enhanced the dynamism and appeal of the Western vector. In contrast, the Russian vector represented an antagonist to the West for the new state. To this day, these two geopolitical power centers remain in competition in the South Caucasus, including Azerbaijan. Each offers a different geopolitical concept and model.

View toward the West

With the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, a unipolar world order emerged. The “global world” model promoted by the West, led by the United States, embodied liberal values. This model, based on trade and consumer culture, recognizing no borders, accepting the dollar as the global currency and fueled by the development of the internet and social networks, presented a universal culture as an alternative to ethnic and religious identities. For newly independent countries like Azerbaijan, the correct path seemed to be integration into this world system. Yet the path had its drawbacks. For instance, the Azerbaijani economy, reflecting the repercussions of the economic crisis in the USSR, was unable to compete with developed countries and transnational corporations, as well as in the fight for new markets. The local producers risked losing their own domestic market in competition. Politically and legally, integration into global institutions meant local governments might become dependent on those who manage those institutions and their laws. This factor made conflict between national governments and international institutions inevitable. As a result, nationalist thinking, dictatorships and authoritarianism found fertile ground, offering an opportunity to challenge global culture and democratic values under the guise of national sovereignty and security as well as national identity.

Russia’s proposed concept

Despite all its negative aspects, the “global world” model was more attractive and advantageous than the alternative – the “Russkiy mir” concept promoted by Russia. This concept, proposed by Aleksandr Dugin, is ethnically grounded at its core (Перцев 2022). Although the Kremlin keeps its distance from Dugin, today Russia’s policy in Ukraine and the Balkans, its delayed use of Russian populations in the post‑Soviet space as if they were time bombs and its efforts to impose the hegemony of the Russian language indicate Russia’s aspiration to play the role of Eurasian policeman. Moscow’s main goal is to remove states on the Eurasian continent and in the post‑Soviet space from the global world and bring them into the “Russian language geography” under its hegemony. Those who do not belong to the Russo‑Slavic group will be included in the “Russian political space” while retaining their national identity (Дугин 1997). For Russia and other authoritarian states this is a consensus, because at the core of this model are elements that strengthen authoritarianism – patriarchy, anti‑Western content, autocratism and nationalism.

The elimination of conceptual approaches to foreign policy

During his one‑year rule (1992–1993), President Abulfaz Elchibey adopted a course of rapprochement with Turkey, distancing from Russia and toughening relations with Iran. After Heydar Aliyev came to power in 1993, he excluded conceptual approaches from foreign policy and focused on realpolitik. This policy of pragmatism was based on a balanced and multi‑vector strategy (Мамедьяров 2017). Heydar Aliyev’s strategy aimed to establish normal relations with Russia in the north, Iran in the south, ethnically allied Turkey and both the Eastern and Western states. This policy was conducted along the lines of Turkic identity, nationalism, solidarity with Muslim states, rapprochement with the West and China and friendship with Russia and Iran. It can therefore be said that it lost its conceptual essence and was based on ideology‑lessness. The rapid transition of a carrier of Soviet ideology to a new ideology seemed impossible, just as the rapid Turkification, Islamization or liberalization of a “KGB officer” seemed unrealistic.

In his inauguration address in October 1993, Heydar Aliyev outlined the contours of foreign policy in one sentence: “One of the main tasks for strengthening our republic’s independence is to have a smart and competent foreign policy capable of defending Azerbaijan’s interests on a global scale” (Heydər Əliyev 1997). In realpolitik, the “smart and competent foreign policy” was realized through a balanced policy based on the formula of “good relations with everyone” and pragmatism.

Normative foundations of foreign policy in the first decade of independence

The contours of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy strategy and priorities were fixed in one sentence in Article 10 of the Constitution adopted in 1995: “The Republic of Azerbaijan builds its relations with other states on the basis of principles envisaged in universally accepted norms of international law” (Azərbaycan Respublikasının Konstitusiyası 1995). Under the new constitution, the president was responsible for ensuring compliance with international treaties that Azerbaijan had acceded to.

1993–2003: Main lines of Heydar Aliyev’s foreign policy

During Heydar Aliyev’s presidency the main aims of foreign policy were:
 • achieving the recognition of independence and ensuring the legitimacy of the regime in the international arena;
 • obtaining a ceasefire in the Karabakh region and starting peace negotiations;
 • establishing good relations with all states, especially centers of power with interests in the region;
 • joining international integration processes;
 • solving economic problems through “oil diplomacy”.

The multi‑vector and balanced foreign policy course pursued during Heydar Aliyev’s ten‑year rule is evident in cooperation documents signed with actors from different ideological camps. Although the overall picture indicates that foreign policy was more West‑oriented, Heydar Aliyev’s efforts to cooperate closely with the European Union and other Western institutions cannot be understood as an attempt to bring to Azerbaijan the democratic and progressive inclusive governance model practiced in those countries. Rather, they were aimed at ensuring recognition of independence, legitimizing the ruling elite in this region and securing economic and trade interests. The repressive policy toward opponents and the media domestically laid the foundations of authoritarianism and produced early signals of the imitation of democracy, which was ideologically inconsistent with the values of Western democratic institutions. The domestic policy of authoritarianism made it inevitable to exclude conceptual foundations from foreign policy.

In the tenth year of the “Contract of the Century” some rapporteurs of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe warned that “the revenues generated from the operation of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline could encourage some officials and politicians to stray from democracy” (AŞPA 2005a).

Energy diplomacy

Cooperation with the West served both the legitimization of the regime and the protection of economic interests, playing the role of an instrument for strengthening the authoritarian regime. These two goals laid the foundation of energy diplomacy, which conditioned the signing of the “Contract of the Century”. The energy diplomacy launched by this contract was diversified over the next thirty years through gas projects such as TAP and TANAP, energy cooperation memoranda and other large projects for the export and transport of energy resources. “Energy diplomacy did not lead to real economic development but inflated statistical indicators, increased the resources of the authorities, and as a result became an instrument for repressing carriers of critical opinions and political opponents, as well as a source of corruption” (AŞPA 2005b).

2003–2020: Ilham Aliyev and his foreign policy

After succeeding his father in 2003, Ilham Aliyev declared that he would remain faithful to Heydar Aliyev’s course and announced that he would continue the balanced foreign policy. However, after 2020, changes in priorities and a disruption of balance were observed in his foreign policy. In this regard, dividing Ilham Aliyev’s rule into two periods is appropriate:
 1. 2003–2020;
 2. from 2020 to the present.

Conceptual and normative foundations of Ilham Aliyev’s foreign policy

The first conceptual view of the foreign policy of the second republic was reflected in the National Security Concept adopted in 2007 during the first five years of Ilham Aliyev’s tenure. The concept emphasized that the course of European integration was a priority and that NATO standards were the basis of the military doctrine: “The Republic of Azerbaijan pursues the strategic goal of integration into European and Euro‑Atlantic political, security, economic and other structures” (E‑Qanun 2007a). The concept states that Azerbaijan sees this integration “as a means that will contribute to overall security, economic development and democracy” (E‑Qanun 2007b).

In 2009, Azerbaijan joined the European Union’s Eastern Partnership program, which envisages support for democratic and economic reforms. The adoption of this concept should have generated the principles and strategy upon which foreign policy is based into domestic policy, or conversely the famous dictum “foreign policy is the continuation of domestic policy” should have applied. But the contrary happened: domestically freedoms were suppressed, elections were falsified, political opponents and the opposition faced repression, and independent media were pressured. Therefore, the strategic goal of European integration expressed in the concept appears to have been an imitation of democracy, and the balance policy served to maintain the authoritarian regime. This also revealed that an approach based on flexibility, dynamism, and change rather than on conceptual principles took priority in foreign policy, serving the interests of authoritarianism. The provisions contained in the concept can also be seen as providing a normative justification for the imitation of democracy.

Close cooperation with European institutions requires acceptance of their values and adherence to democratic principles – principles that open the way to progress. Therefore political rapprochement with the European Union clashes with the political views of the authoritarian regime. Tight integration with European institutions implies eliminating monopolies in all spheres of public life, ensuring the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, sanctifying property rights, guaranteeing human rights and freedoms and creating a free, competitive political and economic environment. Because of these principles, the Azerbaijani government, which refused to sign the EU Association Agreement, began negotiations on a Strategic Partnership document with the EU (Azadlıq Radiosu 2022).

In this context, the memoranda signed in 2006 and 2023 on energy cooperation with the EU, the gas pipelines TANAP and TAP to Europe, and other economic projects show that Aliyev’s government is interested in economic, not political, rapprochement with the West. EU countries are Azerbaijan’s largest trading partner, as well as the largest export partner (Azərbaycan XİN 2024).

The West as an external partner legitimizing authoritarianism

The consolidation of power and its reinforcement by all possible means, as well as its emergence as an alternative‑free political force, made the regime an unequivocally stable partner for external actors (Qafqazinfo 2017). In parallel, Azerbaijan, as Ilham Aliyev said, became “a reliable partner in delivering oil to European markets” (Trend 2017a). The paradox here is that, despite its repressive and closed nature, the authoritarian regime is regarded as a “reliable partner” by both the authoritarian camp and democratic partners (Trend 2017b). The imitation policy pursued by the authoritarian regime, the institutions and formalities that display a parody of democracy (e.g., elections, a managed parliament and opposition, controlled media diversity), may be understood by Western institutions and states, which claim to prioritize democratic values above all else, as an indulgence. In this context, Western behavior can be viewed as one of the factors that ensures the legitimization and sustainability of authoritarianism in Azerbaijan.

The replacement of “oil diplomacy” by “caviar diplomacy”

The “oil diplomacy” begun by Heydar Aliyev in the 1990s was replaced in the 2010s by Ilham Aliyev’s government’s “caviar diplomacy” and the operation of a “laundromat” mechanism through which billions of dollars circulated. This mechanism served the “silence” of European politicians, lobbyists, and journalists (European Stability Initiative, 2012). International journalistic investigations revealed that “caviar diplomacy” worked to ensure that the repressive features of the authoritarian regime were ignored within Europe’s political structures (Sabados 2018). Despite the exposure by independent media and observers of the total falsification of elections, the soft evaluations of the election results by European institutions and the massive politically motivated arrests and gradual elimination of the independent media and civil society, “over many years at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, a coalition opposed to sanctions against Azerbaijan prevailed in all debates concerning Azerbaijan” (ESI 2012a). After the falsified parliamentary elections in the first five years of Ilham Aliyev’s presidency, “the US Embassy in Baku was among the first to welcome the election results” (ESI 2012b).

Following the large‑scale wave of arrests that began in 2023, during its winter session in 2024, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe froze the mandate of the Azerbaijani delegation for failing to fulfil its obligations concerning the protection of human rights and democratic principles before the Council of Europe (BBC 2024).

Formation of a modern country image

One of the main elements of the imitation policy has been creating an image of a modern and developed country abroad. Hosting international events, mainly sports competitions, for which large sums of money were spent, not only became a new source of corruption but also served the function of feeding the authoritarian regime (Azadlıq Radiosu 2017). Political marketing tools were used through various cultural events and through diaspora and lobbying activities to shape the international image of the authoritarian regime, and there was an attempt to form an association with a democratic country image by creating the illusion of modernization.

The Karabakh problem as a standby topic in foreign policy

From 1994, the activities aimed at resolving the knot of the Karabakh conflict were carried out without public awareness, without parliamentary discussion, and in a non‑transparent manner. The roadmap discussed in the negotiation process was monopolized by the political elite, and the failure of diplomacy was blamed on the OSCE Minsk Group (Azadlıq Radiosu 2007). After 2020, the new peace process with Armenia continued under the same principle of secrecy (Bağırov Emil 2025). This reflects the reality stemming from the authoritarian regime’s lack of accountability and responsibility to society.

Radical change in foreign policy after the 2020 victory

After the victory in the Second Karabakh war in 2020 and against the background of the changing geopolitical situation following the start of the Ukraine war in 2022, radical changes were observed in Ilham Aliyev’s rhetoric and behavior regarding foreign policy. His statement that “the development of the region should be ensured by the will of the peoples living in the region; the intervention of non‑regional countries in our affairs is unacceptable” is understood as an exclusion of the West from the Caucasus (APA 2024). In his inauguration speech in 2024, Ilham Aliyev, announcing the priorities of the next presidential term, said that “ideological risks” pose a danger to Azerbaijan and announced that he would be “ruthless” against them (İlham Əliyev 2024a). Here, “ideological risks” refers to Western liberal values being perceived as a threat to the ruling regime.

To understand the nature of the stance and orientation adopted by the Azerbaijani authorities in foreign policy since 2020, we should consider a brief chronology:

New regional security architecture in the Caucasus – the 3+3 format
After the signing of the Shusha Declaration on allied relations with Turkey in 2021, a 3+3 format was proposed, whose author is said to be Erdoğan. It envisages solving the political and security problems of the Caucasus within a platform comprising Russia, Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, while at the same time providing for close economic cooperation among these countries. This new configuration, supported by the authoritarian leaders of the region’s three major states, is actually aimed at eliminating the West’s presence in the region (KHAR Center, 2025).

Azerbaijan’s relations with the two largest states in the region – Iran and Russia – have run along a line where the pressure fluctuates. In 2021, a new phase of tension began between Baku and Tehran, and the possibility of the tension transferring to a military phase was discussed; Azerbaijan’s state television portrayed Ilham Aliyev as the president of the Azerbaijanis in the south. Yet by 2023, Ilham Aliyev presented this as “the interference of extra‑regional powers in the friendly relations between Iran and Azerbaijan”, expressed confidence that “these attempts will be futile and our enemies will not achieve their goals” (APA 2023). The same picture can be seen in the policy toward Russia. Despite tension or relaxation in rhetoric toward Russia over the past twenty years, relations between Russia and Azerbaijan have not gone beyond allied relations. Two days before Russia’s attack on Ukraine – on 22 February 2022 – a declaration on allied relations was formalized (Prezident.az 2022).

The Organization of Turkic States as a unifying power center
In 2023, Ilham Aliyev stated that “membership in the European Union is not set as a goal in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy concept, and this is the most pragmatic approach” (İlham Əliyev 2023). Instead, he presented the Organization of Turkic States as the main international body into which Azerbaijan could integrate and promoted the goal of turning this organization into an important actor and power center on the global stage (İlham Əliyev 2024b). Although presented by Ilham Aliyev as a “family” where Azerbaijan could be represented and promoted as a strategic choice stemming from national identity, due to the low democratic indicators of most member states, some researchers characterize this organization as a “platform for authoritarian coordination” (Freedom House 2023).

The unity of developing countries against developed countries
The Azerbaijani inclination to join BRICS – an organization of developing countries that stands as an alternative to the Global North, that is, to the institutional unity of developed countries – can also be interpreted as a form of authoritarian coordination. This again shows that the ruling elite is inclined toward structures where authoritarian leaders gather together rather than toward integration that leads to progress (Azadlıq Radiosu 2024). In 2024, Azerbaijan did not become a member of BRICS but was selected as a member of the D‑8, an economic cooperation organization comprising eight Muslim states (Azərtac 2024). In 2024, Ilham Aliyev also stated that Azerbaijan’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, influenced by Russia and uniting some post-Soviet republics, was possible (Azadlıq Radiosu, 2024).

During Ilham Aliyev’s rule, Azerbaijan has signed strategic partnership agreements with China, Israel, Pakistan, Egypt, and several Central Asian countries, and declarations of strategic alliance with Turkey and Russia. These partnerships serve mainly strategic goals such as Security, energy, and the determination of regional spheres of influence and have the potential to further stabilize Azerbaijan’s authoritarian political model.

Ideological and psychological tools of foreign policy

– The propaganda rhetoric based on independence and sovereignty is presented by Ilham Aliyev and government representatives as the only ideological vision guiding foreign‑policy activity. The balancing policy, which emerged from the need to ensure the legitimacy and insurance of Heydar Aliyev’s rule, served not only to legitimize Ilham Aliyev’s rule but also contributed to the formation of a strong leader image in domestic politics. The balanced approach in foreign policy thus became the basic element of propaganda that presents the image of a “strong leader conducting independent policy among the world’s states” to the domestic audience (ApaAnalytics 2024). This propaganda also serves to elevate the president, who pursues an independent policy, to the same level as the leaders of the world’s major states (Həbibbəyli 2021). In fact, the rhetoric based on independence and sovereignty is less about foreign policy and more a political instrument serving the internal audience to portray the image of a strong leader.

– The phrase “ideological risks” functions as a threatening notion in the rhetoric of the Azerbaijani authorities and also acts as a tool that regulates foreign policy behavior. The concept was pronounced by Ilham Aliyev and is presented as a threat to traditional and patriarchal values. The West is shown as the source of this threat, and integration with the West is excluded (İlham Əliyev 2019). In fact this can be understood as a struggle between the idea of a legal state embodying democratic values and a closed governance system with a repressive nature.

– The image of an external enemy, especially the preservation of the image of an eternal enemy, constitutes one of the main lines in the rhetoric directed at foreign policy. This tool, characteristic of authoritarian regimes, is grounded in the conflict with Armenia but is sometimes emphasized in the persons of close neighbours and distant Western countries. Different enemy images come into focus at different times. After all the territories were liberated in 2020 and Ilham Aliyev announced the end of the conflict, the authorities began to portray Iran as the enemy and to form the atmosphere of a new war, or used the same style of propaganda against France. Unlike the rhetoric aimed at the domestic audience, in his personal contacts, Ilham Aliyev demonstrates warm relations with the presidents of these countries.

The crisis of the “global world” concept

The current strengthening of nationalist, far-right, and authoritarian trends globally, the desire of Trump’s America to withdraw from world leadership, the erosion of the concept of the “collective West,” and the inability of democracies to respond to these challenges are shaking the established world order and the “global world” model. The concept of the “Iron Curtain”, which formed after the Second World War and collapsed at the end of the Cold War, may be revived in the current crisis of the global world order. The interests of Azerbaijan’s political elite, which has remained unchanged since the restoration of independence after leaving the USSR, collide with the “global world” concept, which embodies democratic values. For an elite that seeks to keep all resources of the country in its hands, integration of Azerbaijan into democratic institutions, the principle of transparent borders, and economic freedoms are antagonistic ideas. The freezing of the mandate of the Azerbaijani delegation in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 2024 due to the violation of human rights and democratic principles, statements at the presidential level declaring persona non grata several European deputies, and the announcement that decisions of the European Court of Human Rights would not be recognized are examples of the ideological conflict between the authoritarian regime and an international democratic institution (İlham Əliyev 2025).

Abandoning the policy of balancing

For many years the Aliyev regime pursued a balancing policy between the West and Russia. Yet in recent years its rhetoric and behavior indicate an abandonment of this policy. Propaganda instruments controlled by the regime justify the new course and priorities in foreign policy: “against the background of geopolitical changes, Azerbaijan has begun to form its foreign policy course toward the East and Asia not only as an alternative direction but as a strategic priority” (Əhmədov 2025b). Analysts linked to the Azerbaijani authorities explain the change in foreign policy course with factors such as “geopolitical realities of the twenty‑first century, energy security and violations of international law, and the search for more reliable partnership models” (Əhmədov 2025a). Nevertheless, Ilham Aliyev explains new realities in terms of separating lines. Analysts who analyze the new global realities argue that authoritarian and far‑right tendencies are strengthening and that authoritarian regimes have become more active and consolidated, launching a “crusade against democracies”. The authoritarian camp is converging around China from a strongly anti‑Western, or rather anti‑democratic, position. This can be seen as behavior deriving from the survival instinct of authoritarian regimes. Because Western institutions set democratic institutions and the rule of law as the main conditions for political cooperation and integration with states like Azerbaijan, authoritarian regimes that have long pursued imitation policies seem to have no choice but consolidation. Step by step, since the Karabakh war, the Azerbaijani regime has chosen closer relations with global autocrats, cooperation, and membership with international organizations that do not see democracy and human rights as values, and this seems to be a new foreign-policy strategy. The last five years show that most of Ilham Aliyev’s official state visits, memberships or aspirations to membership in international organizations, and his personal connections have supported this. From 2021 to the present Ilham Aliyev has made seventy‑five foreign trips. The countries he has visited most are either authoritarian regimes or imitation democracies led by authoritarian leaders. Over the last five years, he has visited Central Asian republics nineteen times, Turkey thirteen times, Russia twelve times, and Asian countries six times.

Conclusion: Paradoxes of authoritarian foreign policy

This article’s main question – “How does Azerbaijan’s authoritarian governance model shape the country’s foreign policy rhetoric and behavior?” – has been answered based on the analysis presented. The analysis shows that Azerbaijan’s foreign policy follows a trajectory determined by the regime’s survival needs rather than by an ideological direction. It is characterized by leader‑centered decision‑making, institutional opacity, and the evaluation of external threats through the prism of regime security.

The arguments presented in the article, based on historical comparisons with the People’s Republic, geopolitical analyses of relations with Russia, Turkey, the West, and China, support this conclusion. In particular, the harsh rhetorical shifts and zigzags observed in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy against the background of global ideological polarization after 2022 show that these behaviors originate from utilitarian interests aimed at protecting internal legitimacy rather than from normative principles.

In summary, the main conclusions that can be generalized are:

• Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is not institutional but driven by the dynamics of a personality‑based regime.
• Foreign policy works in sync with domestic authoritarian structures: repression, the search for legitimacy, and the safeguarding of resources all serve the same purpose – the continuity of the regime.
• Comparing with the People’s Republic era reveals ideological ruptures.

The main idea that should remain in the reader’s memory is this: Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is shaped not by an independent and normative approach but by the requirements of the regime type, and this policy becomes a decisive obstacle to the country’s democratic transformation.

This article contributes to the topic by:

• attempting to understand foreign policy not only within the geopolitical framework of international relations but also in the context of the internal political regime’s structure and interests;
• providing an empirical basis for contrasting normative (liberal‑democratic) and instrumental (authoritarian) foreign‑policy models.

Questions that remain open and would be useful to explore in future research include:

• Is there potential for institutional reform in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, and under what conditions might this be possible?
• Against the background of geopolitical changes, will the synchronization between the regime and foreign policy persist, or might a rupture occur under certain conditions?
• Will the hardening of the official rhetoric in relations with the West lead to real structural breaks, or will it remain only a technical maneuver?

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