Summary
This analytical piece explores the weakening of the social foundations of liberalism in Europe and the United States and the concurrent rise of right-wing populism through both theoretical and empirical lenses.
As a method, it juxtaposes scholarly political materials, presents practical examples in a chronological sequence to emphasize the historical dimension, and seeks to uncover cause-effect relationships in addressing the core question.
Keywords: Liberalism, neoliberalism, far-right, right-wing populism, Europe, USA.
Main Question: In this essay, we will attempt to answer the question: “Is neoliberalism weakening precisely because it remains faithful to its principles?”
Introduction
The international political order, grounded in a liberal worldview, has come under serious pressure in recent years. At the heart of these pressures lies the increasing electoral strength of the radical right in the political arena. As a result, concepts such as the “end of liberalism” or the “post-liberal era” have become widespread in academic and political discourse (Patrick Deneen, 2018a).
In this analysis, the Khar Center attempts to shed light on the essence of this process by systematically examining the internal paradoxes of liberalism and the critiques it has faced amid the rise of contemporary radical right forces. The radical right views liberalism as the principal ideological pillar of “imperialist globalism” (Yoram Hazony, 2018). Liberalism, on the other hand, claims that right-wing populism poses both a cultural and economic challenge to liberal democracy (Pippa Norris & Ronald Inglehart, 2019).
As seen, these critiques also raise questions about the future of the neoliberal idea. In both the US and Europe, this process is unfolding in a manner that diverges from classic ideological debates, shaped instead by crises related to the economy, restructuring of social systems, and migration.
Accordingly, this material seeks to clarify the picture by addressing the issue through both theoretical and practical lenses, incorporating local examples. Alongside answering the central question, this article attempts to draw a conclusion about the future of liberal ideology.
Theoretical Debates: Critiques of the Neoliberal Paradigm
Patrick Deneen explains liberalism’s failure as a consequence of its own internal principles: “Why did liberalism fail? Because it remained true to its principles and ideals and disintegrated from within.” According to him, the extreme limit of liberal individualism leads to the dissolution of social structures and the collapse of collective values. This suggests that neoliberalism is weakening because it has not abandoned its core principles (Deneen, 2018b).
However, alternative and equally compelling arguments exist. Scholars like Colin Crouch attribute neoliberalism’s failure to its departure from its original principles. According to Crouch, neoliberalism continues to exist in form, but its core tenets—market competition and freedom—have been replaced by the hegemony of large corporations, not the state. He argues: “Neoliberalism has created a post-democratic condition in which economic power has become the principal driver of political decisions” (Crouch, 2011).
This trend is most visible in the political and institutional influence of transnational corporations like Google and Amazon, as well as digital platforms such as X and Facebook.
The Impact of Individualism on Social Fragmentation
Francis Fukuyama notes that while liberalism excels at protecting individual rights, its main shortcoming lies in neglecting collective identity: “Liberalism successfully protects individual rights, but it fails to address people’s need for collective identity.” He further adds: “Liberal democracy is not only about the rule of law and free markets but also about fostering a sense of shared belonging” (Fukuyama, 2022a).
Identity Politics and Fragmentation
Amartya Sen highlights the dangers of identity politics, stating: “The concept of singular identity is one of the main sources of violence and hatred” (Sen, 2006). This indicates that in postmodern societies, politics centered on belonging clashes with liberal ideals. Liberal politics should be based not on the question “Who am I?” but on “What can we do together?”
The left’s focus on identity politics has alienated rural middle-class and religious communities, and the populist right has capitalized on this by reinforcing a “we” narrative (Mark Lilla, 2017).
Thus, not everyone agrees with the idea that liberalism is weakening due to its loyalty to itself. Nevertheless, the rise of the right also suggests a dialectical process at play.
The Rise of Populism
While the rise of populism may appear to reflect a shift in mass values, some scholars interpret it as paradigmatic antagonism, viewing populist politics as a threat to the pluralistic foundations of liberal democracy. They argue: “Populist politicians claim to represent ‘the people’—this undermines the foundations of pluralism and liberal democracy” (Müller, 2016).
However, Rein Müllerson points out that the growing confrontation between cosmopolitan elites and populist voters in Western societies stems from an internal dialectical contradiction between democracy and liberalism. This contradiction has been further exacerbated by the negative effects of hyper-globalization. Ideological rivals, therefore, seem to be mutually constitutive (Müllerson, 2020a).
Within this context, Chantal Mouffe views populism as a vehicle for democratic re-mobilization: “Populism is not inherently anti-democratic. It is a means of mobilizing people’s passions for democratic ends” (Mouffe, 2018).
But how valid is this perspective? It is difficult to say, especially since in many countries—including those with democratic electoral traditions like Turkey—populist right-wing leaders have been known to undermine democratic institutions (Khar Center, 2025).
This raises the question: is democracy merely an instrument or also an end in itself? For example, using the passions of the people as a political tool implies that democracy is being instrumentalized.
Therefore, presenting populism as a mere method is contentious. Rather, it is often interpreted as a discursive strategy (Ernesto Laclau, 2005). This suggests that right-wing populism, by portraying itself as a method, strips democracy of its function and assigns it an ambiguous new meaning.
Empirical Chronicle: The Crisis of Liberalism by Country
Liberalism is the ideological-paradigmatic framework underpinning modern Western political thought and institutional architecture. Human rights, the rule of law, individual freedoms, and democratic participation mechanisms constitute its main pillars.
However, since the second decade of the 21st century, liberalism’s normative foundations and institutional resilience have faced severe challenges.
This crisis is not solely the result of authoritarian and populist waves—it also stems from liberalism’s internal contradictions and its struggle with continuous renewal.
Traditionally liberal democracies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy have long been considered institutional strongholds of liberalism. Yet in these countries, increasing social inequality, declining trust in political systems, and “cultural fragmentation” have weakened the legitimacy of liberal institutions.
In contrast, in Eastern European countries such as Poland and Hungary—where liberal values were never fully institutionalized—authoritarianism has developed more rapidly and systematically.
The liberal crisis has led to the emergence of new conceptual frameworks in Eastern Europe, such as “illiberal democracy” and “hybrid regimes” (Zakaria, 1997).
In light of this theoretical context, the following sections empirically analyze the institutional sustainability of liberalism and the dynamics of political transformation in the United States, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Hungary. The aim is to show that political changes in these countries are not merely local phenomena, but indicators of structural and global systemic crises.
United States
Michael Sandel critiques liberal meritocracy in the US: “If society only rewards those who succeed through talent and effort, then it inevitably devalues those who do not succeed” (Sandel, 2020).
Donald Trump’s election demonstrated how a populist discourse could become dominant in the face of liberalism.
Could this be interpreted as a backlash against a liberalism that creates “the chosen” while excluding “the others” from politics and public life? Liberalism has created a synthesis known as “progressive neoliberalism.”
This is an alliance between cultural inclusivity and economic inequality: “Progressive neoliberalism... is an alliance between groups seeking cultural recognition and elites pursuing economic advantage. As a result, claims for social justice are detached from their material base—social welfare.”
According to Nancy Fraser, this is a politics of the privileged: inclusivity in culture, but deep inequality in the economic structure (Fraser, 2019).
Francis Fukuyama takes a more concrete view. He argues that identity politics weakens the unifying power of liberalism in the US (Fukuyama, 2018).
His critique suggests that liberalism is not only about “freedom,” but also about the ability to create “shared identity and unity.”
He believes current identity politics undermines this potential by transforming individuals from citizens of a social contract into members of aggrieved groups.
In this sense, we can argue that as macro-identities are being reformed, they must be stripped of polarizing elements.
The US case demonstrates how the left’s focus on racial and gender minorities, and the right’s emphasis on national and religious identity, have eroded common societal values on both sides.
United Kingdom
If we are to speak of the global effects of right-wing populism, the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union—Brexit—undoubtedly stands out as one of the most significant events. It was precisely following this event that questions concerning the future of the European Union began to intensify. “Tracking Brexit is like tracking a moving target” (Benjamin Martill, 2018). While this statement reflects the uncertainty surrounding the process, it also signals a lack of clarity regarding its goals. Brexit may also be interpreted as a broader question about the future of liberalism, as the overall shift occurred against the backdrop of liberal decline. Bulgarian political scientist and public intellectual Ivan Krastev viewed Brexit as a symbol of liberalism’s crisis: “The European Union is not facing a migration crisis, but a crisis of not seeing its own future” (Krastev, 2017).
Of course, the migration crisis can also be considered one of the problems affecting the EU’s future, but what seems to be emphasized here are primarily the issues of political values. “The rise of Nigel Farage and UKIP clearly illustrated the impact of radical right rhetoric on voters during the Brexit process. UKIP’s electoral success can be understood as a revolt of the ‘left behind’—voters who felt excluded by the socio-economic and cultural transformations of the post-industrial era” (Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin, 2014). The underlying cause, then, was primarily the failure to address socio-economic challenges.
Rein Müllerson offers a different perspective. He sees Brexit not merely as a political event, but also as a symptom of the weakening of liberal democracy: “The United Kingdom’s 2016 referendum decision to leave was not only a reaction against the EU, but also a manifestation of global discontent with the liberal order amid the rise of right-wing populism. Populist groups, particularly those on the right, oppose the EU with open rhetoric on issues of migration, sovereignty, and cultural identity” (Müllerson, 2024b).
In this sense, it can be said that these developments also represent a social-formative process—hence, it would be mistaken to evaluate them solely within a specific time and space.
Germany
In recent years, the rise of right-wing populism in Germany has significantly reshaped the political landscape of Europe. Following Britain’s exit from the EU, the surge in right-wing populism in Germany has renewed questions about the Union’s fate. The most prominent representative of this rise is the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party, which has reshaped political discourse in the country with rhetoric grounded in fear, threat, and discrimination.
Ruth Wodak, professor of Discourse Analysis at the University of Vienna, characterizes right-wing populist rhetoric in Germany as being “based on the creation and spread of fear, concerns about security, and a sense of alienation” (Wodak, 2015). This rhetoric polarizes different groups into “us” and “them,” constructs images of external enemies, and weakens the sense of social cohesion.
Discourse analysis reveals that right-wing populists generate insecurity and suspicion in society through the manipulation of fear. The rise of AfD, particularly known for its hardline stances on migration and Islam, deepens societal divisions between different groups.
This rhetoric is not merely a political message—it is a powerful tool shaping public attitudes. Right-wing populists target liberal democratic values such as inclusivity, multiculturalism, and human rights, portraying them as harmful or “contrary to the true interests of the people.”
The rise of AfD reflects growing skepticism toward liberal values across Europe.
France
In France, the future of liberalism is undergoing a serious stress test. The National Rally (Rassemblement National) movement led by Marine Le Pen has emerged as a powerful alternative by combining socio-economic discontent with cultural and identitarian discourse that challenges universalist liberal values.
The rise of the populist right has accelerated particularly due to the social fragmentation and centrifugal tendencies produced by globalization. Francis Fukuyama assesses this trend as follows: “The future of liberalism in France depends on its ability to balance individual liberties with collective needs” (Fukuyama, 2022b).
In 2024, President Emmanuel Macron’s decision to dissolve the National Assembly and call snap elections was aimed at temporarily managing this tension. However, the move was also underpinned by more strategic calculations. As noted in a commentary published in the Journal of Democracy: “President Macron believed that the best way to halt the National Rally’s rise was to bring it into power now... He was confident that the party would not be able to field mature and experienced candidates in any of the 577 districts” (Journal of Democracy, 2024).
Macron’s maneuver was effectively an attempt by the liberal center to expose and weaken the populist right by engaging it politically. Yet such a strategy itself indicates liberalism’s vulnerability and the growing contestation of its normative hegemony.
Thus, the future of liberalism in France depends not only on economic and political mechanisms but also on its capacity for ideological continuity. The likelihood that this will deepen political polarization appears increasingly high.
Italy
Italy presents a sharper case, particularly in the context of relations with authoritarian regimes. Unlike in Germany and France, where right-wing populism remains in opposition, in Italy it holds power. Analyzing the populist surge in Italy, Cas Mudde notes that right-wing populism is an ideological reaction built on cultural threat, anti-elitism, and an “us versus them” worldview (Mudde, 2017).
This definition is particularly insightful for understanding recent political changes in Europe, including Italy. The rise of Matteo Salvini’s Northern League demonstrated how such rhetoric operates in practice and what social and cultural anxieties are manipulated to gain voter support.
Salvini’s core themes were fear of migrants, calls for sovereignty against the European Union, and the portrayal of Italian national identity as under threat.
Under Salvini, right-wing populist rhetoric also extended to foreign policy. The Northern League sought to strengthen ties with authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin, Viktor Orbán, and Ilham Aliyev, framing this alignment as a struggle against “the Brussels elite” (Verbeek and Zaslove, 2017).
However, the ascent of the Fratelli d’Italia party in 2022 under Giorgia Meloni marked a new phase in the evolution of right-wing populism in Italy. While Meloni’s domestic speeches—such as “we Italians must reclaim our identity and sovereignty”—fit the classic populist mold, her government has exhibited more strategic and pro-Western behavior in foreign policy.
Amid the war in Ukraine, Meloni openly affirmed her solidarity with the EU and NATO. In December 2022, she stated: “Italy will continue to support Ukraine militarily and humanitarianly. This is not just a matter of freedom, but of Europe’s stability” (Financial Times, 2022).
Researchers note that Meloni’s government, while maintaining populist rhetoric, “acts from within the system”—retaining sovereignty discourse while upholding transatlantic alliances (Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Zulianello, 2023).
This demonstrates that her populism differs from illiberal radicalism but still retains Cas Mudde’s core features: people-centrism, anti-elitism, and identitarianism.
Although Meloni has expressed ideological affinity with “illiberal democracy” regimes like Hungary and Poland, she has taken a divergent stance from Orbán on the issue of sanctions. According to Financial Times, “Meloni is one of the few right-wing populist leaders openly defending Italy’s commitment to EU policy on Russia.”
This indicates a shift in Italian populism: while maintaining radical positions in domestic rhetoric, tactical adaptation is observed in foreign policy. This serves as a clear example of populism’s flexibility and its ability to change according to context (Financial Times, 2022).
Hungary and Poland
Hungary, now seen as the weakest link in the European Union, not only limits the EU’s flexibility in dealing with adversaries but sometimes prevents it from acting at all. In such a scenario, the EU—seen as a stronghold of liberalism—struggles to move forward (Financial Times, 2025).
What is clear is that right-wing populism and liberalism are expanding their influence in competition on the same plane. In other words, the rise of one often leads to the decline of the other.
In the specific case of the EU and Hungary, progress by one side can delay or constrain the other. This example illustrates the global nature of the antagonism in question.
In some instances, right-wing populism seeks to ideologize its agenda. For example, Viktor Orbán’s concept of “illiberal democracy” in Hungary is a direct challenge to the core principles of liberalism. Orbán asserts: “Liberal democracy is incompatible with national interests” (Orbán, 2014).
In Poland, the Law and Justice (PiS) party has taken control of the judiciary, undermining the liberal rule of law. The party appointed government-aligned judges to the Constitutional Court, lowered the retirement age of Supreme Court judges, changed the composition of the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS) to allow parliamentary appointments, and subjected judges to disciplinary procedures under political control—striking a severe blow to democratic institutions, especially the judiciary (Wojciech Sadurski, 2019).
This analysis shows that right-wing populism in Eastern Europe fosters a form of authoritarianism more severe than that in the West.
Conclusion
The analyses above demonstrate that the liberal order is not only being challenged as a political system but also as an ideological narrative. While critics emphasize the internal paradoxes of the system, many still believe in its potential for reconstruction.
To strengthen liberalism, it is imperative to consider collective identities, social inequality, and democratic participation. Francis Fukuyama notes: “Without social identity and collective belonging, liberalism loses its resilience” (Fukuyama, 2022c).
The combined theoretical arguments and empirical chronicle presented here suggest that liberalism is not weakening due to its fidelity to principles. In many cases, it has regressed precisely because it has deviated from those principles or failed to adapt to the demands of social change.
Nevertheless, neoliberal ideas and systems have not lost their opportunity for renewal. By enriching itself with new values—particularly through paradigmatic updates on collective identities and cultural pluralism—liberalism may reemerge.
Right-wing populism, however, will continue to conceal its seeds within the vulnerabilities of societies, seeking opportunities to sprout and grow.
Despite this, liberalism will, through its capacity for reformatting, continue to regenerate within this dialectical process.
References
- Deneen, 2018a. Why Liberalism Failed. s 200-216
- Yoram Hazony 2018, The Virtue of Nationalism. s 10-20
- Pippa Norris və Ronald Inglehart (2019) “Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism. s 72-74
- Deneen, 2108b. Why Liberalism Failed.s 3
- Crouch, 2011. The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism. s 7-8
- Fukuyama, 2022a. Liberalism and Its Discontents.s 130-139
- Amartya Sen, 2006. Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. s 20
- Mark Lillanın, 2017. The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics. s 125-126
- Jan‑Werner Müller, 2016. What Is Populism? s 19-20
- Rein Müllerson, 2024a. Imperialism and the Rise of Populism. s 66-68
- Chantal Mouffe, 2018. For a Left Populism. s 4-6
- KharCenter, 2025. https://kharcenter.com/en/publications/the-anatomy-of-a-silent-regime-change-the-case-of-turkiye
- Ernest Laclau, 2005. On Populist Reason. s 11
- Zakaria, F. 1997. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." Foreign Affairs, 76(6), 22–43.
- Sandel, 2020. The Tyranny of Merit.s 23-24
- Nancy Fraser, 2019. The Old Is Dying and the New Cannot Be Born. s 20-25
- Fukuyama, 2018. Identity. s 15
- Krastev, 2017. Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe. s 263
- Robert Ford və Matthew Goodwin, 2014 Revolt on the Right 279
- Rein Müllerson, 2024b. Brexit and the Rise of Right‑Wing Populism. s 21
- Wodak, 2015. The Politics of Fear: What Right‑Wing Populist Discourses Mean. s 20
- Fukuyama 2022b. Liberalism and Its Discontents 64-85
- Journal of Democracy 2024. “Why Macron’s Big Gamble Worked”
- Mudde, 2019. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. s 34
- Verbeek, Bertjan, and Andrej Zaslove. Populism and Foreign Policy. s 234 .
- Financial Times,2022 https://www.ft.com/content/53a73132-cf02-4561-b91f-c91f7ad52f13
- Wojciech Sadurski, 2019.Poland’s Constitutional Breakdow. s 124
- Fukuyama, 2022c. Liberalism and Its Discontents. s 17
