Introduction
Robert Fico is one of the most scandalous and controversial figures in post-communist Europe, and the most enduring face of Slovak politics…
His political career is not just the story of one party or government, but a chronicle of attempts to tamper with the democratic system of an entire state.
Fico is not only a player who freely maneuvers between the left and right poles of Slovak politics, but also a master manipulator who has turned these contradictory positions into his own political technology.
In many ways, his story mirrors that of other authoritarian leaders: the son of an uneducated and poor family who became a leader, a manipulator emerging from the people, a politician who does not conform to a fixed ideological classification and who easily switches sides—a pragmatic populist... With these characteristics, Fico resembles Orbán in Hungary, Erdoğan in Turkey, and Putin in Russia. Another similarity is his presence on the political stage of his country for at least 30 years.
The zigzags in Robert Fico’s political life—from the Communist Party to social democracy, from social democracy to nationalist populism—are not merely an ideological quest, but also a part of a long-term plan to hold on to power. This article seeks to analyze Fico’s turns not only as the portrait of a political figure but also in the context of his contradictory relationship with Slovakia’s democratic institutions.
In this piece, the KHAR Center examines Fico’s political portrait not just in chronological terms, but also through the contours of his hunger for power, manipulative ability, and systematized revanchism.
Relevance of the Topic
The changes in Robert Fico’s political positions are not solely related to his personal political interests, but are closely tied to institutional instability and public discontent in Slovakia’s political system. In an era when populist rhetoric is gaining traction, such behavior reflects both the strategic adaptation efforts of political leaders and the shifting demands of voters. For this reason, analyzing Fico’s political behavior is highly relevant for understanding the resilience of democratic institutions in the region and the behavioral patterns of politicians.
Main Question of the Analysis
Are the zigzags in Robert Fico’s political behavior linked to his desire to remain in power, or are these changes the result of institutional weaknesses and public discontent in Slovak politics?
Sources of Information
This article draws on academic and scholarly sources, information presented by news and analytical portals, as well as official government reports and human rights and media freedom reports by international organizations.
A Portrait of Fico: Opportunist, Populist, Pragmatist...
Fico has been present in every labyrinth of Slovak politics over the past decades—sometimes as a communist atheist, sometimes as a loyal leftist Catholic willing to form coalitions with radical right-wingers for power, sometimes as the “man of the people” providing stability and prosperity, and at other times as an enemy of democracy and free speech...
The Lawyer Son of a Poor Family
Robert Fico was born in 1964 in the small industrial town of Topoľčany in Czechoslovakia, the son of a forklift operator father and a shop assistant mother. He was an excellent student in secondary school and entered the law faculty of Comenius University, one of the most prestigious universities in the country, in 1982. He later continued his academic career, specializing in criminal law, and worked in his field until he entered active politics.
In his childhood, he aspired to become a sports journalist, an archaeologist, or a politician—while he didn’t realize the first two dreams, he did manage to fulfill the third (The Slovak Spectator, 2000). As in all socialist regimes, even if you studied well in Czechoslovakia, the way to secure a place in the system and rise within it was through joining the Communist Party and being active within it. While still in his second year—at the age of 21—Fico became a member of the Socialist Youth Union, the youth wing of the Communist Party (HN, 2014). When the communist regime collapsed in 1989, he moved to the Party of the Democratic Left (PDL), created as its successor.
Unlike many politicians in post-communist Europe who stood out during that period, Fico did not show any particular activism—he was not among protesting students or reformist intellectuals. Instead, he always remained in a waiting position and seized opportunities as they came (Journal of Democracy, January 2025). One such opportunity came in 1992, when he was elected to the Slovak parliament at the age of 28.
When Fico was elected, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were still one country. After the “velvet divorce” between the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993 (Wilde, 2019), the newly formed states—particularly Slovakia, which had previously taken a backseat in governance—began reshaping their political landscapes. This vacuum provided fertile ground for the rise of nationalist-populist figures like Vladimír Mečiar and state-oriented, leftist-pragmatist politicians like Fico.
In 1996, Fico ran for the party leadership but withdrew in favor of the eventual winner at the last moment—an act that led to rumors of bribes and shady deals (RFE/RL, 2002a). In 1998, he was elected deputy chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left. That same year, he sought to become the attorney general, but party leadership denied him the opportunity, citing his young age (The Slovak Spectator, 2014).
A Man of Opportunities
By that time, Fico was already looking for ways to break away from the party that inherited the communist legacy. Having started his political career in communism and continued it through socialism, Fico topped his party’s candidate list in the 1998 elections (in Slovakia, voters vote not only for the party but also for individuals within the party). However, a year later, citing dissatisfaction with the government’s performance, he resigned from the Party of the Democratic Left. It would later become clear that at that time, Fico had already begun discussions with Fedor Flašík, František Határ, and Monika Flašíková-Beňová about forming a new political party (The Slovak Spectator, 2002a).
The SMER (Direction – Social Democracy) Party, which Fico and his associates referred to as the “third way,” was founded in November 1999. In reality, it was not a new path or direction—it was an organization without ideology, blending leftism with populism (Spac and Havlik, 2015).
Fedor Flašík later described how the party and Fico as its leader emerged with these words:
“Our main need was to implement a generational change in politics. We knew that Fico didn’t actually represent a new political generation—we were truly stuck. If we brought forth the best and smartest person, but someone completely unknown, we saw that without controlling the media, we couldn’t raise him to the top. So we decided on someone already known in politics, who could also attract new faces” (The Slovak Spectator, 2002b).
There were several reasons for Fico’s rise in Slovak politics. First was the atmosphere of profound change in the country. In 1998, Slovakia’s fragmented political opposition and non-governmental organizations united in a major coalition against the authoritarianizing Mečiar government. This alliance of democratic forces succeeded—Mečiar was ousted, and Slovakia stepped onto the path of liberal democracy (Wilson Center, 2011).
The next government, led by Mikuláš Dzurinda, pursued a pro-Western foreign policy aimed at membership in the European Union, NATO, and the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). This course continued during Dzurinda’s second government (2002–2006) (DGAP, 2014).
The Western-oriented path and reforms resulted in the country joining both the EU and NATO in 2004. At the same time, reforms in taxes, pensions, and healthcare, encouragement of foreign investment, and a reduction in the state’s role led to an unprecedented inflow of foreign capital into the country (The Slovak Spectator, 2006).
Public dissatisfaction with the problems brought by the EU-alignment reforms led to the end of Dzurinda’s rule, but those reforms laid the foundation for the economic growth that Fico would later proudly claim as his achievement (BTI, 2024). In fact, Fico was one of the politicians who most loudly criticized the problems that would later yield positive results attributed to him.
Another advantage for Fico was that the political line represented by Mečiar at the time was considered undesirable by Western actors. Disappointed with Dzurinda and not wanting Mečiar to return to power, Western circles began to “wink” at Robert Fico, then the country’s most popular politician, in the early 2000s. Similarly, Fico declared that he could form coalitions and cooperate with anyone except Mečiar and promised that he would not take any steps that would harm Slovakia’s NATO or EU membership (RFE/RL, 2002b).
A Sharp Turn on the “Third Way”
Domestic and international support allowed Fico to turn SMER into the third-largest party in parliament just three years after its founding. In the 2002 parliamentary elections, the party received 13.5 percent of the vote. However, since Fico at that time accused the vast majority of Slovak political actors of being “elitist” or “part of the system,” it was impossible for him to be included in any coalition (Foundation Robert Schuman, 2002).
SMER remained in opposition until 2006. During this time, however, it succeeded in uniting left-wing parties around it, enabling it to defeat the fragmented and divided right wing. In 2006, SMER won 29.1 percent of the vote and became the leading party, ushering in Fico’s era of designing Slovak politics (Foundation Robert Schuman, 2006).
The 2006 election made it clear that for Fico, interests mattered more than principles. Liberal and right-wing parties publicly declared they would not enter into a coalition with him. Only two parties remained as options: Vladimír Mečiar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), which Fico had for years accused of authoritarianism, elitism, corruption, etc., and the radical nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS), known for its scandalous statements against Roma and Hungarians.
Fico formed a coalition with both the “man of the past” Mečiar—whom he had promised Western actors he would never cooperate with—and the Slovak National Party, whose far-right positions had triggered protests in the West.
This decision led to SMER’s expulsion from the Party of European Socialists (PES) (Euractiv, 2006), but Fico did not reverse course.
Fico began his first premiership with a series of social initiatives: he introduced a New Year’s bonus for pensioners, reduced VAT on books and medicines, regulated healthcare prices, halted the privatization of hospitals, expanded workers’ rights, and increased salaries for doctors and teachers. In 2007, Slovakia recorded 10.4 percent growth—becoming one of the fastest-growing economies in Europe (as mentioned earlier, this was largely the result of the previous government’s reforms and foreign investment).
There was also significant progress in media freedom—by 2007, Slovakia had risen to the top three in the press freedom index (RSF, 2007).
In the early years, Fico also appeared committed to Western integration and his promise of continued EU cooperation. Slovakia’s accession to the Eurozone, having already joined the EU in 2004, was finalized under his premiership in 2009.
However, Fico’s democratic image did not last long. Following the global financial crisis in 2009, the state’s role in the economy increased significantly, resulting in a serious budget deficit. It became apparent that many of the government’s social policies were not the product of long-term planning, but rather short-term populist rhetoric. Allegations of corruption and bribery began to surface, but the Fico government showed little interest in investigating them (BTI, 2024b).
In 2007, Slovakia had shared third place in the press freedom index with Estonia. But just two years later—by 2009—it had fallen to 44th place (RSF, 2009). Western hopes in Fico quickly faded.
In 2007–2008, he opposed U.S. plans to deploy missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, calling the idea “pointless” (Radio Prague International, 2008).
In 2008, when Russia invaded Georgian territory, Fico blamed Tbilisi and said, “One side provoked, and we know who that was,” essentially justifying Russia’s military aggression (HNOnline, 2008).
Upon coming to power, he declared that relations with Russia had been neglected during Dzurinda’s 8-year government and pledged to change this. He decided that Russian-made MiG-29 fighter jets would be modernized not in Slovakia, but in Russia. He also initiated cooperation with Russia to modernize Slovakia’s S-300 air defense systems (RIA, 2018).
A Master at Coming Out Dry
In the 2010 elections, Fico’s approval ratings still looked strong, but he was unable to remain in power for two reasons.
First, his previous coalition partners did not secure enough votes to form a government. Second, two days before the election, one of the country’s most popular media outlets, SME, published a scandalous audio recording of the prime minister. In the recording, Fico could be heard saying that, ahead of the 2002 parliamentary elections, he had independently raised €2.49 million in illegal funds for his party and suggested creating a “parallel financial structure” to organize SMER’s election campaign (The Slovak Spectator, 2010).
Nevertheless, SMER once again emerged as the leading party in the elections, but as it was unable to find coalition partners, Fico was forced to resign. Even so, in 2012, another opportunity presented itself.
The new liberal coalition government led by Iveta Radičová collapsed in 2011 after splitting over a vote on the Eurozone Rescue Fund. The SaS party, part of the coalition, opposed the government’s position, leading to its collapse. But what benefited Fico even more was the release—just a week after the government’s fall—of a set of secret transcripts.
The transcripts, obtained during a 2006 operation by the Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS), documented meetings between the owner of one of the country’s biggest investment groups, “Penta,” and representatives of both the government and opposition. The transcripts detailed multimillion-euro secret deals (Global Voices, 2012).
The scandal, later dubbed the “Gorilla Scandal,” not only caused former Prime Minister Dzurinda’s party and allies to lose the election, but also severely undermined public trust in Slovakia’s liberal democracy (Nicolson, January 2025).
In fact, Fico himself was implicated in the Gorilla Scandal; he was reported to have participated in these secret meetings. However, when the transcripts were made public, the SMER leader insisted that in 2006 he was in opposition and not part of the governing system.
The serious damage inflicted on his rivals by the scandal—and Fico’s ability to craft a campaign narrative portraying himself as a “pragmatic leader outside the system”—was enough to lift him back to the summit of Slovak politics (BTI, 2014c).
Due to the Gorilla Scandal, a large majority of right-wing voters abstained from the snap 2012 elections. As a result, SMER became the first party in Slovak history to secure an outright majority—83 out of 150 seats—in parliament (Robert Schuman Foundation, 2014).
In 2013, Fico announced his candidacy for president. However, in the 2014 presidential elections, he lost to former businessman and philanthropist Andrej Kiska. According to experts, the result was driven not so much by Kiska’s popularity as by widespread public concern over Fico’s potential further consolidation of power (Reuters, 2014).
From Democratic Left to Conservative Right
The 2016 parliamentary elections marked a complete reshaping of Slovak politics. At that time, Fico found a new subject of manipulation — migration — and built almost his entire election campaign around anti-migrant rhetoric. But the statistics contradicted him. Slovakia, situated at the tail end of the Balkan migration route, suffered far less from the process compared to its neighbors. In 2015, only 333 asylum applications were submitted in the country of 5.4 million, and just eight were approved (Salzmann, 2016a). In 2016, despite all the uproar, Slovakia granted asylum to just 155 people, including a group of 149 Iraqis (State.gov, 2017a).
Nevertheless, Fico joined the Hungarian and Polish prime ministers in opposing a unified EU migration policy. His statement during the campaign — “Not a single Muslim will be allowed to come here through EU quotas” — sparked considerable backlash at the time (BBC News, 2016). Through his systematic campaign against migrants and Muslims, Fico not only inflamed nationalism but also succeeded in distracting public attention from the country’s core problems. During the same period, Fico’s government, which boasted of populist programs supporting workers’ and public servants’ rights, faced strikes launched by teachers and nurses demanding higher wages, better working conditions, and action against corruption in the healthcare system (PC, 2016; Salzmann, 2016b).
The policies and campaign of SMER led to several radical right-wing parties — one of them fascist — entering parliament in the 2016 elections. Although Fico’s party again came in first, it suffered significant losses compared to the previous elections, falling to 28.3% (IPU Parline: 2016).
Once again, without hesitation, Fico entered into coalition with parties ideologically at odds with SMER. The coalition included the center-right nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS), the center-right-liberal Most-Híd, representing ethnic minority rights, and the reformist center-right Sieť party. Sieť later disbanded, and the coalition continued as a three-party alliance (Novy Cas, 2016).
From 2016 to 2018, all the duplicity of Fico’s populist politics was exposed. Reports and evidence began to emerge about public tenders, road projects, and agricultural subsidies favoring businessmen close to SMER, a decline in transparency, and increasing corruption in education, healthcare, transportation, the judiciary, and prosecutorial institutions (State.gov, 2017b). Especially controversial were allegations that business groups with links to the Italian mafia had won public tenders in Slovakia — a situation that eventually led to a bloody crime and, ultimately, to Fico’s resignation (Aktuality, 2018).
Who Killed the Journalist?
In February 2018, Slovakia was shaken by news that investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová had been murdered in their home. It was the first time a journalist had been killed in the country’s history.
The 27-year-old Kuciak was one of Slovakia’s brightest investigative reporters, known for his work on serious tax fraud implicating Fico’s government. One of his investigations focused on oligarch Marián Kočner — owner of the same residential complex where Fico lived — and Kočner’s possible tax evasion schemes. Kuciak had even reported being threatened by Kočner and posted on social media that police had failed to respond to his complaint within 44 days (Le Monde, 2018).
Before his death, Kuciak was investigating the operations of Italy’s ’Ndrangheta mafia in Slovakia. In a report for the news portal Aktuality.sk, he documented how Italian businessmen connected to this criminal network had settled in eastern Slovakia and for years embezzled EU agricultural subsidies allocated to this poor, Ukraine-bordering region. The investigation revealed that these individuals had built ties with officials, including those close to the prime minister. A former model appointed by Fico as a controversial chief state adviser, Mária Trošková, appeared at the center of these shady relationships. Her former boss, Viliam Jasaň, served as the Secretary of Slovakia’s National Security Council at the time, further underscoring the depth of these connections (BBC, 2018).
The double murder triggered mass protests across the country. The public blamed Fico and his inner circle. Trošková, Jasaň, and even the Minister of Culture Maďarič resigned. Fico held a press conference in which he placed €1 million on the table as a reward for information leading to the killers — while simultaneously accusing the opposition and media of exploiting the tragedy (The Guardian, 2018).
But Fico could not escape accountability. The country was engulfed in protests. The largest demonstrations in Slovak history were held (The Slovak Spectator, 2018). President Kiska called on the government to enact a radical cabinet reshuffle or hold early elections. In March 2018, Interior Minister Kaliňák resigned, followed three days later by Fico himself. A new government was formed under Peter Pellegrini.
After long investigations and arrests, it was revealed that the murder of Kuciak and his fiancée had been ordered by Kočner (Le Figaro, 2019). However, the oligarch was later acquitted due to “insufficient evidence.” Slovakia’s Supreme Court returned the case to a lower court, which again acquitted Kočner. In May 2025, the Supreme Court overturned the verdict once more and ordered a new trial with a different panel of judges (The Spectator, May 2025).
Return to the Stage from Behind the Curtain
After stepping down in disgrace, Fico was shielded by the man who succeeded him: Peter Pellegrini. Although Fico was not formally part of the new coalition government — once again formed by SMER, SNS, and Most-Híd — he remained the leader of SMER, the largest party in the alliance.
In the 2020 elections, SMER suffered heavy losses, securing only 38 seats. After the election, Fico offered Pellegrini leadership of the party — but only if he gave Fico continued control over the party’s finances. Pellegrini declined and announced he would leave SMER (Dennik N, 2020). He later founded the HLAS party, which quickly gained popularity, though it was essentially SMER under a new name.
In 2023, Fico ran the most radical campaign of his political career — and won. With an openly far-right, anti-Western, and pro-Russian message, he secured 23% of the vote (IPU Parline, 2023). The liberal coalition government had been weakened by three years of COVID-19 mismanagement, economic problems, the Ukraine war, and internal divisions — creating a perfect opportunity for Fico’s return.
Fico’s electoral platform combined a leftist socioeconomic agenda with nationalist rhetoric, appealing especially to older voters. But with just 42 seats, he couldn’t form a government alone. Once again, Pellegrini — whom Fico had earlier elevated — came to his aid. Pellegrini’s party won 27 seats and pledged to form a coalition only with Fico. The radical right-wing SNS also joined, allowing Fico to become prime minister for the fourth time (AP News, 2023). In return, Pellegrini ran for president as the coalition’s candidate and won the 2024 elections in the second round with 53% of the vote.
This ushered in a new regime in which both the presidency and government were held by Russia-friendly, anti-liberal, anti-Western forces.
The Return of the Avenger
Fico’s fourth term in office began more aggressively, vengefully, and radically than any of his previous ones. Between 2020 and 2023, he had repeatedly hinted that he would punish those who had investigated corruption during his earlier governments. Just a few weeks after returning as prime minister, Slovakia’s parliament passed a bill labeling any NGO receiving over €5,000 in foreign funding as a “foreign agent” (Intellinews, 2024).
Fico didn’t stop at removing officials and police officers who had investigated him — he reassigned many of them to remote regions, effectively “exiling” them from their positions (Haughton, Malová, 2023).
Despite opposition protests, the government passed legislation to abolish the Special Prosecutor’s Office, which had been investigating major corruption cases involving Fico’s close circle. The responsibilities of the office were transferred to prosecutors under the general prosecutor’s supervision. Fico’s coalition then passed amendments to reduce penalties for corruption, bribery, tax evasion, and embezzlement — and to shorten the statute of limitations for these crimes. As a result, several corruption cases involving Fico’s allies in politics and business were dropped (Viarius, 2024).
In May 2024, an assassination attempt was carried out against Fico. The assailant, a 71-year-old poet, claimed he acted because of Fico’s opposition to military aid for Ukraine. The prime minister was wounded but survived. Upon leaving the hospital, he blamed the media and opposition for inciting the attack. The assassination attempt then became a pretext for Fico to restrict freedom of assembly: all protests within 50 meters of government buildings were banned (AP News, 2024).
Enemy of the Media
Upon returning to power in 2023, Fico resumed his unfinished agenda in the media sphere. His relationship with Slovakia’s democratic media institutions had long been antagonistic. Even during his earlier terms, he treated journalists harshly, insulting and humiliating them. Terms like “idiots,” “vagrants,” “snakes,” “hyenas,” and “toilet spiders” became part of his vocabulary for reporters as early as 2008 (Aktuality, 2023; Topky, 2016). In 2016, during Slovakia’s EU presidency, when asked about public tender irregularities, he lashed out at journalists, calling them “anti-Slovak dirty whores” (The Guardian, 2016).
This hatred for the media persisted even while Fico was in opposition. In 2021, he said in parliament that “journalists are Soros’ degraded herd of pigs” (SITA, 2021). In 2022, he escalated the rhetoric further, labeling journalists as an “organized criminal group aiming to overthrow the Slovak state” (Dennik N, 2022).
After becoming prime minister again in 2023, he declared media outlets like Denník N, TV Markíza, Aktuality, and SME to be enemies, refused to answer their questions, and banned them from attending his press conferences (The Guardian, 2023). In 2024, despite protests and warnings from international organizations, Fico’s government enacted legal changes to formalize state control over the public broadcaster RTVS. The institution was dissolved and replaced with a new broadcaster, STVR, whose leadership is now appointed by the government and parliament (DW, 2024).
Fico also joined the wave of “anti-LGBT” campaigns that Russia began and Hungary and Georgia continued in Europe and the South Caucasus, respectively. In May 2025, Slovakia adopted constitutional amendments recognizing only two genders — male and female (Hlavnespravy, May 2025).
Europe’s Second Orbán…
Before Fico’s return, Slovakia had unconditionally pledged military and financial aid to Kyiv. Bratislava had delivered Zuzana 2 howitzers, Soviet-era MiG-29 fighter jets, and munitions to Ukraine. Ukrainian military equipment was being repaired in Slovakia (Babel, 2023).
Fico campaigned in 2023 on promises to restore relations with Russia and end military support to Ukraine. Once in power, all state aid was halted — only private sector sales were allowed (Euromaidan Press, 2023). Fico claimed Ukraine was under U.S. influence and stated that he would veto its NATO and EU membership. However, when Ukraine aid was later debated in the EU, he did not oppose the majority. During a meeting with Ukraine’s prime minister, he even said that there were “no serious problems” between Slovakia and Ukraine (Meduza, 2024).
Fico’s official visit to Moscow in December 2024, however, marked a dramatic shift in Slovak foreign policy. He became the third EU leader (after Austria and Hungary) to meet with Putin following the start of the war (DW, 2024).
The meeting occurred just one week before January 1, 2025 — the date on which Ukraine’s prewar transit agreement expired. Fico accused Kyiv of blocking gas transit and threatened to cut humanitarian aid and electricity. President Zelensky responded by saying he had offered Slovakia help in finding alternatives, but that Fico had rudely refused. According to Zelensky, Fico’s unwillingness to end dependence on Russian gas stemmed from his blind loyalty to Moscow (Kyiv Independent, January 2025).
In truth, Fico alone cannot be blamed for this. Slovak society must also be seen as a co-author of the country’s political choices. Slovakia arguably has one of the EU’s most pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian populations. A 2025 poll found that only 32% of Slovaks wanted Ukraine to win the war (Cedmohub, February 2025). This societal mood enables Fico to pursue his “dance with Putin” under the guise of “peace.”
Even under these conditions, however, Fico’s overt pro-Russian policy and his meeting with Putin triggered serious protests in Slovakia. Demonstrations lasted several weeks. Around the same time, two MPs from the ruling coalition defected, threatening the coalition’s parliamentary majority. But one of the defectors returned after being offered a ministerial post — and the danger passed.
What Sustains the Fico Phenomenon?
After all this, a question naturally arises: Why does Slovak society keep giving Fico another chance despite his authoritarianism?
Several reasons can be cited. First, Slovak voters are motivated not just by ideology, but also by fear and memory. Fico’s base wants a leader who won’t delay their pensions or energy payments and who keeps equal distance from Brussels and Moscow. Fico reads this perfectly — and blends social welfare with fear politics.
Fico is a populist — he speaks the people’s language, understands their fears, and acts accordingly. Meanwhile, the opposition lacks both leadership and strategic continuity.
Fico’s populism is based on a “us vs. them” narrative — “us” being ordinary Slovaks, and “them” being the West, liberal media, the opposition, and George Soros. This political technique sustains his rule.
Another key factor is his coalition-building skill. He is a master of forming coalitions across ideological lines — left-right, nationalist-progressive, radical-moderate — to stay in power.
Equally important is the EU’s failure to apply real pressure. This stems from multiple factors. First, Fico’s political flexibility: though he opposes EU values and flatters Putin, he doesn't challenge Brussels as openly as Orbán does. His rhetoric toward Ukraine may be harsh domestically, but in EU votes, he avoids the hardline obstructionism seen in Budapest.
Despite the presence of all the classical signs of authoritarianism in Slovakia, Brussels still considers Fico a “manageable problem.” Unlike Hungary, Slovakia is not seen as a significant economic or geopolitical risk. As a result, while the EU imposes harsher sanctions on Hungary, it has mostly limited itself to warnings in Slovakia’s case (European Conservative, 2024).
Fico has exploited this: playing the compromise game in Brussels and the confrontation game in Bratislava. This tactic helps him avoid international backlash while reinforcing his image at home as a leader “fighting foreign enemies.”
Conclusion
If we understand democracy as more than just elections — as the presence of independent institutions, freedom of expression and assembly, and space for political alternatives — then Slovakia today fails to fully meet these criteria. And Robert Fico has become both a cause and a symbol of this democratic deficit.
Fico’s political profile is not just a tale of success built on populism, manipulation, and power. It is also a case study in how institutional weaknesses, a lack of political alternatives, and social pessimism can sustain one man’s long-term rule.
The collapse of public trust in liberal parties — whether due to the Gorilla scandal or internal fragmentation — the systematic weakening of democratic institutions over the past decade, and the broader global trend toward authoritarianism, nationalism, and conservatism all support Fico’s continued dominance. When combined with Fico’s adaptability, his fearlessness in making sharp political turns, and his mastery of manipulation, it’s no surprise that his reign seems endless.
Thus, the real question isn’t just “Why does Fico keep winning?” but also “Why hasn’t a viable alternative emerged?”
If this question remains unanswered, Slovakia’s future will remain overshadowed by its past.
The only real hope lies in Slovak society itself — especially in the passionate segment that protested after the murder of Ján Kuciak in 2018 and again after Fico’s meeting with Putin; in the doctors who forced the government to backtrack after being threatened with arrest for demanding higher wages. These demonstrations prove that there is still a segment of society in Slovakia that rejects authoritarianism, defends liberal values, and refuses to be deceived by Fico’s populism.
Whether this segment can curb Fico’s insatiable appetite for power — that is the most critical question for Slovakia’s future.
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Foundation Robert Schuman, 2002.European victory for the centre right parties. https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/monitor/35-european-victory-for-the-centre-right-parties
Foundation Robert Schuman, 2006. The Left Led by Robert Fico Wins the Slovak General Elections.
https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/monitor/536-the-left-led-by-robert-fico-wins-the-slovak-general-elections?
Euractiv, 2006. Slovak Party Suspended from PES.
https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/slovak-party-suspended-from-pes/?utm
RSF, 2007. Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2007.
https://rsf.org/en/node/79189?
BTI, Transformation Index, 2024b. Slovakia Country Report 2024.
https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SVK?
RSF, 2009. World Press Freedom Index 2009.
https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/classement_en.pdf?_
Radio Prague International, 2008. Slovak PM Criticizes US Missile Shield Installations in CEE Countries.
https://english.radio.cz/slovak-pm-criticizes-us-missile-shield-installations-cee-countries-8454183?
HN Online, 2008. Slovak Prime Minister Knows Who Provoked This War in the Caucasus.
https://web.archive.org/web/20111005112238/http://hnonline.sk/news/c1-26396000-slovak-prime-minister-knows-who-provoked-this-war-in-the-caucasus
RIA Novosti, 2018.
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The Slovak Spectator, 2010. Vote 2010: Fico Outraged by SME Audio.
https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/vote-2010-fico-outraged-by-sme-audio?
Global Voices, 2012. Slovakia: Corruption, Parliamentary Elections, and SMER's Comeback.
https://globalvoices.org/2012/03/18/slovakia-corruption-parliamentary-elections-and-smers-comeback/?
Nicolson, Tom, yanvar 2025. How a Gorilla Devoured Democracy in Slovakia. https://www.politico.eu/article/gorilla-political-corruption-scandal-slovakia-democracy-mikulas-dzurinda/?
BTI, Transformation Index, 2024c. Slovakia Country Report 2024.
https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SVK?
Robert Schuman Foundation, 2014. Robert Fico's Party, Direction-Social Democracy, (left) wins the absolute majority in the Slovakian elections, an all time first in the country. https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/monitor/1284
Reuters, 2014. Political Newcomer Kiska Trounces PM Fico in Slovak Presidential Election.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-slovakia-election-idUSBREA2S0NN20140329/
Salzmann, Markus, 2016a. Slovakian Parliamentary Elections Marked by Rightward Shift.
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/03/09/slov-m09.html?
State.gov, 2017a. 2017 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Slovakia.
https://www.state.gov/reports/2017-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/slovakia/
BBC News, 2016. Slovak election: PM Fico sees Muslim 'threat'. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35718831
Salzmann, Markus, 2016b. Slovakian Parliamentary Elections Marked by Rightward Shift.
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/03/09/slov-m09.html?
PC, 2016. Slovak Teachers on Strike.
https://politicalcritique.org/cee/slovakia/2016/slovak-teachers-on-strike/?
İPU Parline, 2016. https://data.ipu.org/parliament/SK/SK-LC01/election/SK-LC01-E20160305/
Novy Cas, 2016. Robert Fico so svojimi koaličnými partnermi absolvoval ďalšie kolo rokovaní.
https://www.cas.sk/spravy/politika/robert-fico-oznamil-demisiu-vlady-a-prisiel-s-poriadnou-novinkou
State.gov, 2017b. 2017 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Slovakia.
https://www.state.gov/reports/2017-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/slovakia/
Aktuality, 2018. Talianska Mafia na Slovensku. Jej Chapadlá Siahajú aj do Politiky.
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Le Monde, 2018. Slovaquie: La Police Enquête sur le Meurtre d’un Journaliste d’Investigation.
https://www.lemonde.fr/actualite-medias/article/2018/02/26/slovaquie-la-police-enquete-sur-le-meurtre-d-un-journaliste-d-investigation_5262785_3236.html
BBC, 2018a. Slovakia Grapples with Murdered Journalist's Last Story.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43226567
The Guardian, 2018. Shot Journalist 'Was Investigating Slovakian Links to Italian Mafia'.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/28/slovakian-journalist-was-investigating-political-links-to-italian-mafia
The Slovak Spectator, 2018. Enough of Fico, Thousands of People Shouted at Gatherings Across Slovakia.
https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/enough-of-fico-thousands-of-people-shouted-at-gatherings-across-slovakia
Le Figaro, 2019. Slovaquie: Un Homme d’Affaires Jugé pour le Meurtre du Journaliste Jan Kuciak.
https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/slovaquie-un-homme-d-affaires-juge-pour-le-meurtre-du-journaliste-jan-kuciak-20191219
The Slovak Spectator, May 2025. Supreme Court Explains Ruling in Kuciak Case.
https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/supreme-court-explains-ruling-in-kuciak-case
Dennik N, 2020. Pellegrini sa Odhodlal: Odmietol Fica a Odíde zo Smeru.
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İPU Parline, 2023. https://data.ipu.org/parliament/SK/SK-LC01/election/SK-LC01-E20230930/
AP News, 2023. Slovakia Swears in a New Cabinet Led by a Populist Ex-Premier Who Opposes Support for Ukraine.
https://apnews.com/article/slovakia-new-government-fico-ukraine-bfe5f251d3a3b75e72ccee60f7c591b3
Intellinews, 2024. Slovak Parliament Moves Closer to Approving Foreign Agent Bill Aimed at NGOs.
https://www.intellinews.com/slovak-parliament-moves-closer-to-approving-foreign-agent-bill-aimed-at-ngos-323620
Haughton & Malova, 2023. The Return of Robert Fico.
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/the-return-of-robert-fico
ViaIuris, 2024. Novela Trestného Zákona a jej Dopady – Porovnanie Trestných Sadzieb.
https://web.archive.org/web/20240206191946/https://viaiuris.sk/aktuality/novela-trestneho-zakona-a-jej-dopady
AP News, 2024. Slovakia to boost protections for politicans after assasination attempt on populist premier Fico.
https://apnews.com/article/slovakia-legislation-gatherings-fico-assassination-protection-66ba48210486555a1f49222702dfcc46
Aktuality, 2023. Fico s Dankom Škodia Občanom Selektívnym Prístupom k Médiám.
https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/PsLtMBG/fico-s-dankom-skodia-obcanom-selektivnym-pristupom-k-mediam
Topky, 2016. Fico Zverejnil VIDEO Útoku na Novinárov.
https://www.topky.sk/cl/10/1567321/Fico-zverejnil-VIDEO-utoku-na-novinarov--Prostitutky--slizki-hadi---teraz-je-to-zachodovy-pavuk
The Guardian, 2016. Slovakia's PM calls journalists 'dirty anti-Slovak prostitutes'. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/23/slovakias-pm-calls-journalists-dirty-anti-slovak-prostitutes
SITA, 2021. Novinári sú Sorosova Skorumpovaná Banda Prasiat.
https://sita.sk/novinari-su-sorosova-skorumpovana-banda-prasiat-vyhlasil-fico-v-parlamente
Dennik N, 2022.
https://dennikn.sk/minuta/2694056
The Guardian, 2023. Slovakian Prime Minister Sparks Alarm with Threat to Restrict Media.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/15/slovakian-media-express-alarm-after-prime-minister-robert-fico-threatens-to-restrict-access
Deutsche Welle, 2024. Slovakian Parliament Approves Plan to Revamp RTVS.
https://www.dw.com/en/slovakian-parliament-approves-plan-to-revamp-rtvs/a-69433774
Hlavnespravy, May 2025. https://www.hlavnespravy.sk/vladna-novela-ustavy-presla-do-2-citania/3890856
Babel, 2023. Ukraine received two Zuzana 2 self-propelled guns from Slovakia https://babel.ua/en/news/96866-ukraine-received-two-zuzana-2-self-propelled-guns-from-slovakia#:~:text=Slovakia%20transferred%20two%20Zuzana%202,cars%20last%20year%20in%20August.
Euromaidan Press, 2023. New Slovak Government Rejects Military Assistance Package for Ukraine.
https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/11/08/reuters-new-slovak-government-rejects-military-assistance-package-for-ukraine
Meduza, 2024. ‘His statements about Ukraine mobilize radical segments of society’ Meduza unpacks the Slovak Prime Minister’s anti-Ukraine rhetoric. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/02/14/his-statements-about-ukraine-mobilize-radical-segments-of-society?
DW, 2024. Slovakia’s PM Fico Visits Moscow Amid Ukraine Gas Dispute.
https://www.dw.com/en/slovakias-pm-fico-visits-moscow-amid-ukraine-gas-dispute/a-71138724
Kiev Independent, Jan 2025. Fico Refused Kyiv’s Offers to Help with Gas Supplies, Zelensky Says.
https://kyivindependent.com/fico-refused-kyivs-offers-to-help-with-gas-supplies-zelensky-says
Cedmohub, fevral 2025. Three years of war in Ukraine: %68 of Poles, %44 of Czechs and %32 of Slovaks wish for Ukraines Victory. https://cedmohub.eu/three-years-of-war-in-ukraine-68-of-poles-44-of-czechs-and-32-of-slovaks-wish-for-ukraines-victory/
Europeanconservative, 2024. EU Commission Threatens “Immediate” Punishment if Slovakia Regulates NGOs. https://europeanconservative.com/articles/news/eu-commission-threatens-immediate-punishment-if-slovakia-regulates-ngos/?
