China's growing influence in global and regional political balances has placed it at the center of international attention. It is increasingly evident that the South Caucasus region has long been on Beijing's radar. Particularly, the recent history of bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and China forms a solid basis for examining these ties. Studying this topic also serves as an attempt to clarify the geopolitical future of the South Caucasus. This analytical piece investigates the growing influence of the People's Republic of China in the South Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia) over recent decades. The aim is to analytically compare China’s economic, infrastructural, political, and cultural influence in the region with its experience in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan). For China, the South Caucasus is not only a strategic component of the "Middle Corridor" connecting Asia to Europe, but also a potential multipurpose, multi-vector political battleground in a context of shifting geopolitical balance.
As a methodology, this analytical piece presents academic approaches to the topic and seeks to answer key questions through a comparative analysis of empirical data by country. It aims to form conclusions through cross-thematic comparisons.
Topical Relevance and Introduction
China’s expanding influence in the Eurasian space over recent decades has produced not only economic but also geopolitical and institutional consequences. The South Caucasus is now emerging as the next target zone of this influence. The model China tested in Central Asia—creating dependency through infrastructure projects and lending—is gradually extending toward the South Caucasus.
This trend is being reinforced by both global (the West–Russia confrontation, the uncertainty caused by the war in Ukraine) and local factors (deterioration of relations with the West, growing sympathy for the Chinese model). At the same time, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) proposed by China has become one of the main tools of its regional influence (Silver, 2022).
The topic is relevant both practically and theoretically. Practically, it affects the strategic decisions of South Caucasus countries; theoretically, it allows for a comparative analysis between the Chinese and Western models and an examination of new power centers in post-Soviet transformation processes.
The key research question is: By what means does China build its influence in the region, and does this influence remain purely economic, or does it carry political consequences as well? This question will be evaluated through mechanisms such as debt, infrastructure dependency, soft power, and energy cooperation. The Central Asian experience and the varying approaches of South Caucasus countries will serve as the basis for comparison.
The methodological approach is based on international political economy and regional power balance theories. Analytical frameworks such as debt-trap diplomacy, soft power, and neo-imperial influence will be utilized. The research draws on both empirical data (economic indicators, contracts) and normative documents (official statements, reports, academic studies) (CFR, 2023).
Structurally, the article first examines China's experience in Central Asia, then analyzes the South Caucasus countries’ approaches to this model, followed by an exploration of the Western response and future scenarios. The goal is not merely to list facts, but to assess the implications of these processes for regional sovereignty, security, and development models.
Theoretical Framework
To analyze China’s influence in the South Caucasus, this paper utilizes several complementary—sometimes contradictory—theoretical frameworks. These allow for an understanding of China’s strategy from economic, political, and normative perspectives.
The first framework is the concept of “debt-trap diplomacy” (Chellaney, 2017). According to this theory, China lends large sums to economically vulnerable countries, thereby gaining control over their strategic infrastructure. This framework is used to assess how Chinese investments impact the economic sovereignty of South Caucasus countries.
The “geoeconomic zones of influence” framework (Blackwill, 2016) explains China’s non-debt-based influence tools—ports, roads, technology, and logistics infrastructure—as instruments for institutional and normative influence in the region. This framework is applied in the article using examples such as the Anaklia and Baku ports.
China’s use of “soft power” and “normative diffusion” (Nye, 1990) is used to evaluate its cultural influence. This allows an analysis of voluntary and accepted forms of influence.
Finally, the frameworks of “complex interdependence” (Keohane, 1977) and “multi-vector balancing” help explain the rationalized choices of South Caucasus countries maneuvering between China, Russia, and the West.
Experience in Central Asia
China has significantly increased its influence in infrastructure, energy, diplomacy, and security sectors across Central Asia. By signing various agreements with each country, China tailors its approach to specific national contexts. However, all these approaches appear to serve a single purpose—enhancing China’s economic and political influence. This study investigates whether this influence extends beyond mere cooperation—an important question in analyzing how China is accelerating and deepening its South Caucasus policy.
Turkmenistan
Can Turkmenistan’s natural gas resources currently shield it from falling fully under Chinese influence? Long-term gas agreements have been signed, and pipelines have been built. China and Turkmenistan have reached a significant phase in energy cooperation—the total volume of natural gas trade between the two has reached 415 billion cubic meters, and overall trade turnover has exceeded 83 billion USD (Newscentralasia, 2024). Another important point is that China is the leading buyer in Turkmenistan’s gas export market, providing China with significant leverage over the country.
Moreover, while these statistics reflect trade volume, a report published by the pro-government “Business Turkmenistan” website offers clearer insight into Turkmenistan’s dependence on China. According to the report, in the first quarter of 2024, trade turnover between Ashgabat and Beijing was approximately 2.6 billion USD. Around 92% of this—about 2.39 billion USD—came from Turkmenistan’s natural gas sales to China (Eurasianet, 2024). In contrast, trade between Turkmenistan and the European Union is nearly half of this figure. In 2024, the EU’s total exports to Turkmenistan amounted to 700 million euros, and imports from Turkmenistan reached 400 million euros. Notably, 86% of the EU’s imports from Turkmenistan consist of mineral products. EU exports to Turkmenistan mainly consist of machinery and transport equipment (50.1%) and chemical products (16%) (FACTSHEET-Turkmenistan, 2025).
Uzbekistan
In recent years, China has become one of the leading actors in Uzbekistan’s foreign economic relations. As of the end of 2023, Uzbekistan’s debt to China stood at 3.775 billion USD, accounting for approximately 13% of the country's total external debt (BISI, 2024). A significant portion of this debt is held by the China Development Bank (CDB), making it Uzbekistan’s third-largest creditor. Together with other Chinese financial institutions, including the Export-Import Bank of China, they account for about half of the total debt (Gazeta, 2023).
China is not only a lender but also a primary financier and executor of major infrastructure projects in Uzbekistan. As of 2023, Chinese-financed projects were being implemented in 10 of Uzbekistan’s 12 regions, including the Republic of Karakalpakstan. These projects cover renewable energy, industrial, and logistics sectors and aim to address electricity shortages and boost employment (Intellinews, 2025a). Thus, China holds a strategic position not only in debt relations but also in shaping the country's internal infrastructure.
However, while the total value of planned Chinese-financed projects exceeds 10 billion USD, full financing for all of them has yet to be secured (Intellinews, 2025b). This situation simultaneously expands Beijing’s potential for economic influence while revealing that this influence is not yet fully institutionalized or financially guaranteed. Especially in the strategic mineral extraction sector, Chinese investors appear to hold more favorable positions, increasing their prospects of becoming dominant actors in Uzbekistan’s natural resource sector.
Nevertheless, the European Union also plays a significant role in Uzbekistan’s economic landscape. Over 1,000 companies with European capital operate in Uzbekistan, managing a combined investment portfolio exceeding 30 billion euros (Eureporter, 2025). The EU’s economic presence in Uzbekistan is embodied by multinational corporations such as EDF, Total Energies, Voltalia, Siemens Energy, Airbus, Linde, Suez, Orano, Knauf, OTP Group, and MOL Group. These companies contribute not only capital but also cutting-edge technologies, innovation, and human capital development.
The EU offers a more complex and sustainable model of cooperation, particularly through green energy transition projects, in contrast to China. The sectoral structure of investments also highlights this difference: while China focuses primarily on physical infrastructure and natural resources, the EU prioritizes industrial modernization, energy efficiency, and technological transformation.
In conclusion, although China has a growing economic presence in Uzbekistan, its influence is not monopolistic. The European Union presents a serious alternative to China in both the volume and quality of investments. Thus, a multipolar cooperation model based on competitive dynamics between Beijing and Brussels is emerging in Uzbekistan’s future economic trajectory.
Kyrgyzstan
Among the Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan holds the most vulnerable position in terms of economic dependency on China. Frequently facing political changes, the country’s weak economic base makes it difficult to manage its external debt. Since gaining independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan’s external debt has reached USD 6.2 billion, which amounted to approximately 45% of GDP as of 2024 (Voice of America, 2024a). Although this ratio is not exceptionally high on a global scale, it poses serious risks for a country with a predominantly agrarian economy.
China is one of Kyrgyzstan’s main creditors. In 2023, Bishkek’s debt to China reached USD 1.7 billion, most of which is owed to the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank). During the pandemic in 2021, the bank deferred a USD 32 million payment, but the amount was later added back to the principal after the deadline passed and had to be repaid in full (Voice of America, 2024b). China did not accept proposals for additional grace periods or alternative payment schemes, which deepens the risk of a debt trap.
China-funded infrastructure projects—such as the Bishkek Thermal Power Plant, the Datka–Kemin power transmission line, and the north-south highway—may become leverage instruments for Beijing in the future. The inability of economically weak countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to repay their debts on time increases the likelihood of China obtaining ownership and operational rights over strategic infrastructure.
The West, particularly the European Union, maintains only a limited economic presence in Kyrgyzstan. The EU’s cooperation is mainly directed toward non-commercial sectors such as the rule of law, education, and agricultural development. From 2014 to 2020, the EU allocated a total of EUR 174 million to these areas. For the 2021–2027 period, projects related to digitalization and climate-resilient economies were also included in programming (European Union, 2021). Compared to the large-scale projects implemented by Chinese state-owned enterprises and banks in Kyrgyzstan, these amounts are extremely limited.
As a result, Kyrgyzstan’s increasing debt dependency on China has become a clear example of “debt-trap diplomacy” in the region. The limited role of the EU and other Western actors illustrates the weakness of alternative mechanisms to counter Beijing’s influence, creating a long-term risk for the country's economic sovereignty.
Tajikistan
Tajikistan, one of the least geopolitically and economically prominent countries in Central Asia, is strategically valued by China despite its limited resource base and weak economic potential. According to data, in 2022, Tajikistan’s external debt reached USD 3.3 billion, approximately USD 2 billion (about 60% of the total) of which was owed to the Export-Import Bank of China (Rondeli Foundation, 2022). This figure creates a serious imbalance when compared to Tajikistan’s GDP of USD 8.7 billion and raises concerns about the country’s financial sovereignty.
The Tajik government presents this borrowing as a necessary means for economic modernization and infrastructure development. However, there are serious questions regarding the use of these funds and repayment mechanisms. Notably, China-financed showcase projects include the construction of a new parliament building and an administrative building for Dushanbe’s municipal government. The economic feasibility of such infrastructure and the sustainability of the associated debt remain unclear. Moreover, the lack of transparency around the terms of these loans reinforces suspicions of “debt-trap diplomacy” (Rondeli Foundation, 2022).
The situation is further complicated by the absence of viable alternatives to Chinese dominance in Tajikistan. The European Union’s investments and technical assistance to the country remain very limited. For the 2021–2027 period, the EU allocated only EUR 142 million for cooperation with Tajikistan (European Commission, 2025). This amount is merely 7.5% of Tajikistan’s debt to China (approx. USD 2 billion), highlighting the EU’s limited economic influence in the region.
The EU’s engagement in Tajikistan is largely confined to technical assistance projects in the areas of rule of law, agriculture, and climate resilience. The EU has virtually no presence in large-scale infrastructure or industrial investments. This indicates that Tajikistan has restricted access to reliable financial alternatives beyond Chinese capital.
In conclusion, Tajikistan’s current economic configuration is characterized by high debt dependency on China and a non-diversified foreign investment structure. The limited economic engagement of the EU and other Western institutions is insufficient to counterbalance this dependency, making Tajikistan one of the countries most exposed to “debt-trap” risks in the region.
Kazakhstan
Among Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan demonstrates a more stable and balanced position in terms of economic dependency on China. At the beginning of 2024, Kazakhstan’s debt to China—mostly through the Export-Import Bank of China—totaled USD 9.2 billion. This figure represents approximately 3.5% of the country’s GDP, and no significant change has been observed over the past three years (Caspianpost, 2024). Compared to other regional countries, this is relatively low and indicates a manageable level of debt.
Kazakhstan’s external debt structure is diversified. China is only one of the country’s top ten creditors. This list also includes the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Bermuda (as an offshore financial center), Russia, and various transnational financial institutions. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) plays a particularly important role in this context. Although its headquarters are in Beijing and China is its largest shareholder, borrowing takes place on an institutional level rather than directly through Chinese state structures (Carnegie Endowment, 2024). This suggests that China prefers indirect financial influence in Kazakhstan.
However, the European Union plays a dominant role in Kazakhstan’s economic landscape. The EU’s overall economic involvement in the region—especially in trade and investment—surpasses that of China. In 2024, bilateral trade between the EU and Kazakhstan reached a record USD 50 billion, and total EU investments exceeded USD 200 billion (National Interest, 2025). Kazakhstan is the EU’s main partner in Central Asia, accounting for 80% of the EU’s trade with the region and more than 40% of EU foreign direct investments in the region.
Additionally, in 2023, 37% of Kazakhstan’s total exports and 27.9% of its total trade were directed toward the European Union. In 2022, total foreign direct investment in the country reached EUR 54.8 billion, marking a 5.5% increase compared to the previous year (European Commission, 2023). These indicators show that Kazakhstan prioritizes its relations with the EU over China and that China does not hold the primary position as an economic actor.
In conclusion, Kazakhstan’s economic model is a rare example in Central Asia: although it maintains economic relations with China, there is no critical dependency. The European Union functions as both Kazakhstan’s main trade partner and top investor. The level of borrowing from China remains stable and manageable. This situation not only supports Kazakhstan’s economic development and macroeconomic stability but also helps preserve its strategic sovereignty.
Lessons from Central Asia
The economic relations of Central Asian countries with China and the European Union are based on varying degrees of debt dependency, institutional resilience, and economic diversification. These relationships have led to significant geoeconomic differentiation within the region.
Relatively large and economically diversified countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have managed to adopt more balanced strategies in their relations with China, with cooperation with the EU playing a key role in maintaining this balance. For example, Kazakhstan’s debt obligations to China amount to just 3.5% of its GDP, and the EU is both its largest trade partner and primary investment source. Similarly, Uzbekistan’s debt to China remains at a relatively manageable level, and its economic relations are diversified through the presence of numerous transnational corporations backed by European capital.
Conversely, countries with weaker economic structures—such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan—have faced significant risks of debt-trap diplomacy in their financial relations with China. In these countries, debt-to-GDP ratios range between 40% and 60%, and there are serious uncertainties regarding their repayment capacities. Moreover, China's investments in infrastructure and energy sectors in these countries have created potential control over strategic assets. The EU’s presence in these states remains limited to technical assistance and development cooperation and does not provide a financial counterweight to China.
Turkmenistan, unlike the others, has avoided excessive borrowing thanks to its substantial natural gas reserves. However, China’s monopolistic position in Turkmenistan’s gas market has constrained the country’s economic maneuverability. While Beijing’s role as the primary buyer of Turkmen gas and its control over energy infrastructure may not yet constitute full economic dependency, it hinders Ashgabat’s ability to diversify its strategic options.
Overall, China targets regional countries not merely based on economic potential, but more so on institutional weaknesses and opportunities for economic dependency. In countries with weaker economies such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Chinese state banks and corporations play a more aggressive and dominant role. This indicates that China's regional policy is based less on symmetric cooperation and more on asymmetric mechanisms of influence.
In contrast, the European Union prefers to build deeper ties with economically larger and institutionally more resilient countries—particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The EU’s presence in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan remains mostly limited to development aid and lacks the capacity to exert significant geoeconomic influence.
In this context, the economic influence balance between China and the EU in the region is structurally unequal. China has become a dominant actor in weaker states, while the EU has functioned primarily as a balancing force in more stable and strategically significant countries. This divergence should be considered a key indicator for the future trajectory of geoeconomic competition in the region.
China’s Entry into the South Caucasus
Azerbaijan
The South Caucasus holds strategic importance for China as a gateway from Central Asia to Europe. Among the countries in the region, Azerbaijan has become a central focus in China’s strategy due to its economic, demographic, and geographic advantages. This context reveals not only economic interests between the two countries but also a deepening political and institutional alignment. Azerbaijan’s efforts toward deeper integration with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its application for BRICS membership illustrate the country’s multi-vector foreign policy orientation (Eurasianet, 2024).
In practical terms, strategic partnership documents signed with China and agreements in transportation and logistics align with Azerbaijan’s Middle Corridor strategy. However, the structural risks of this cooperation—especially considering the debt dependency model China has implemented in other countries—are noteworthy. The example of Hambantota Port and the rising Chinese debt levels in Central Asia serve as warnings that such a model could, in the future, pose a threat to Azerbaijan’s economic and political sovereignty (CACI analyst, 2024).
Azerbaijan’s management problems in the infrastructure sector—such as corruption, lack of transparency, and poor construction quality—further amplify these risks (Gain Integrity, 2020). In this context, the conditions and oversight mechanisms of Chinese loans are of critical importance. Azerbaijan’s institutional weaknesses and low financial transparency make it more susceptible to the “debt-through-dependency” risk.
At the same time, Azerbaijan also has expectations for infrastructure cooperation with the European Union. However, the EU’s strict transparency requirements and legal norms have limited actual financial inflows in this area. This has pushed the Azerbaijani government toward more flexible alternatives such as China, which imposes fewer political conditions. Hikmet Hajiyev’s call in Brussels—demanding more investment and political attention—can be interpreted less as a sign of genuine interest in Western models and more as a bargaining tool to negotiate with alternative actors (Caliber, 2025).
Statistical indicators support this trend. Despite EU investments amounting to USD 24.7 billion between 2012 and 2023, recent years have witnessed a decline in interest (Report, 2024). Meanwhile, China is strengthening its position as a rising actor. What matters here is not only the volume of investment but also the nature of investment terms—specifically, the absence of control over freedom and accountability—which defines the core of the issue.
This analysis suggests that Azerbaijan–China relations encompass elements of geopolitical and normative convergence. It also demonstrates that the Azerbaijani government is moving away from Western influence in search of alternative sources of legitimacy within a non-liberal international system.
Thus, while Azerbaijan–China cooperation creates economic opportunities, it also poses strategic risks amid institutional fragility and authoritarian governance. This relationship could lead to Azerbaijan’s geopolitical marginalization, pulling it further from Western platforms and more deeply into China’s orbit.
Georgia
Georgia, which connects the South Caucasus and its Asian neighbors to the Black Sea basin and further to the West, holds significant geostrategic value for China’s regional interests. One indicator of China’s growing engagement is the increasing number of Chinese-registered companies in Georgia. A total of 1,893 Chinese companies have been registered, four times more than in the period before 2013. In 2024 alone, 291 new Chinese companies were registered—marking the peak of this trend (Transparency, 2025). This dynamic suggests that China views Georgia not only as a transportation corridor but also as a socio-economic space of strategic value.
China’s influence in Georgia is most clearly demonstrated by the Anaklia Deep Sea Port project. In May 2024, the tender for the project was awarded to Chinese companies “China Communications Construction Company Limited” and “China Harbour Investment Pte. Ltd.” (ChinaObservers, 2025). This can be seen as part of China’s long-term strategy to expand its influence in the Black Sea region. China’s involvement in the Anaklia port project raises the possibility of friction with the West, particularly the U.S. and the EU. However, the political consequences of this potential clash remain uncertain.
Economic indicators also reflect the current geopolitical dynamics. In 2023, the main sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Georgia were the Netherlands (USD 386.3 million), the United Kingdom (USD 364.3 million), the U.S. (USD 182.2 million), Turkey, Russia, and China (USD 98.4 million) (Civil Georgia, 2023). In 2024, total FDI volume amounted to USD 1.3 billion—a significant decline compared to previous years: 30% less than in 2023 and 41% less than in 2022. FDI from EU member states dropped by 55%, from CIS countries by 40%, and from the U.S. by 45%. Only investments from the UK saw a 23% increase (FactCheck, 2025). These figures indicate that Georgia’s investment environment is unstable and that Western investor interest is decreasing, creating a strategic window of opportunity for China.
In this context, cooperation with China has become one of the main vectors of change in Georgia’s foreign policy. The Anaklia port agreement and the 2023 Georgia–China strategic partnership treaty provide the institutional foundation for this reorientation. China presents the Georgian government as a carrier of the “peace, stability, and development” policy, while Georgian officials increasingly depict China as an “alternative partner” and a model for development. For instance, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s characterization of China in October 2024 as “one of the best examples of state modernization” confirms this view (Transparency International, 2025).
All these developments show that the Georgian government is inclined to build closer ties with China to compensate for tensions in relations with the West. As traditional Western orientation weakens, the Chinese model is being promoted in Tbilisi as both an economic alternative and a source of political legitimacy. Georgia’s rapprochement with China thus appears not merely tactical but as a strategic shift. The government’s sympathy for China is clear and explained not only by geoeconomic interests but also by normative orientations.
Armenia
Unlike Azerbaijan and Georgia, Armenia has not signed a strategic partnership agreement with China. However, this does not imply a lack of interest in closer relations. On the contrary, Armenian officials have expressed their willingness to deepen relations with China without limitations. This approach has gained importance particularly after the Second Karabakh War, as Armenia seeks to reduce its dependency on Russia and build a more balanced and multi-vector foreign policy (SCMP, 2025).
Armenia’s interest in China is not limited to rhetoric—concrete projects are also in focus. In recent years, Chinese state enterprises have been active in several sectors. For instance, in 2024, China funded the construction of a new studio for Public Television; in 2023, the renovation of the Kaps Reservoir; the construction of Masrik-1, the first industrial-scale solar power plant in Gegharkunik; and the reconstruction of the Talin–Gyumri section of the North–South highway by Sinohydro Corporation all reflect the scale of this cooperation (ACSES, 2025). These projects increase Armenia’s strategic relevance within the Belt and Road Initiative’s South Caucasus component.
Armenia’s role in regional transport routes, especially compared to alternatives in Iran and Georgia, makes it an attractive option for China. However, the Armenian government remains cautious in its rapprochement with China, trying not to damage its relations with the West. Armenia’s foreign policy is guided by a selective and balanced approach to China, which distinguishes it from Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Armenia maintains a more stable and positive dynamic in its relations with the West. EU support to Yerevan has significantly increased in recent years. For instance, under the Global Gateway strategy, the EU plans to increase investments in Armenia to EUR 2.5 billion. In April 2024, the “Resilience and Growth Plan” further expanded this support, increasing financial assistance by 50%. The allocated EUR 270 million—consisting of EUR 200 million in grants and EUR 70 million in investment incentives—supports Armenia’s reform agenda and sectoral development (Armenpress, 2025).
Compared to other countries in the region, this positions Armenia more favorably in its relations with the West. While visa liberalization is being discussed between Georgia and the EU, and Azerbaijan’s PACE mandate has been suspended, the EU’s support to Armenia enhances its normative credibility. Additionally, Armenia’s leadership avoids ideological praise of China and does not present it as a political model, setting it apart from its more authoritarian neighbors.
In conclusion, while Armenia lags behind Azerbaijan and Georgia in developing relations with China, this lag is not due to geopolitical weakness, but rather to a balanced and cautious foreign policy approach. Armenia remains committed to its partnership with the West while cooperating with China on a geo-economic, technocratic basis and maintaining ideological neutrality.
Conclusion
The intensification of relations with China in the South Caucasus reflects not only economic dynamics but also shifts in geopolitical orientation and institutional choices. While Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia are proceeding along different trajectories, a common trend is evident: against a backdrop of uncertainty or cooling relations with the West, cooperation with China is increasingly seen as an alternative path.
Azerbaijan, through its infrastructure and transport corridor cooperation, and supported by normative alignment, is transforming its rapprochement with China into a strategic economic and ideological trajectory. This represents a new form of transregional compatibility, where authoritarian regimes provide mutual legitimacy.
Georgia, amid deteriorating relations with Western institutions, is building a more systematic and deep partnership with China. Strategic projects like the Anaklia port being handed to Chinese companies expand China's influence in the Black Sea. The Georgian government’s portrayal of China as a development model signals a post-liberal normative shift.
Armenia, unlike the other two, maintains a cautious and balanced approach to cooperation with China. Without harming its Western ties, Yerevan engages with China selectively and on technocratic grounds. Its deepening ties with the EU position Armenia closer to normative stability within the South Caucasus.
Thus, rapprochement with China in the South Caucasus does not produce a unified bloc but results in asymmetric integration based on different political regimes and foreign policy priorities. This integration is accelerating against the backdrop of institutional weaknesses, investment gaps, and the lack of consistent Western strategy. However, it deepens where ideological compatibility exists (Azerbaijan and Georgia), and remains regulated in countries that aim to maintain political balance (Armenia).
These differences will be among the key factors in determining how the Chinese factor will shape the region’s geopolitical configuration and to what extent the South Caucasus may oscillate between Western and Eurasian models.
Recommendations
- Reconsider the binary logic of foreign policy choices:
The assumption that South Caucasus countries must choose between Russia and the West must be re-evaluated. Regional and global developments show that China is rising as a third alternative actor capable of reshaping existing geopolitical models. - Recognize the risks of unregulated engagement:
Although China's investment volumes are lower than the West’s, its main advantage lies in the absence of transparency and accountability requirements. This creates an attractive—yet potentially dangerous—environment for cooperation, especially in countries with institutional fragility and authoritarian governance. - Acknowledge the ideological dimension of relations:
Engagement with China is not purely economic. The current governments in the South Caucasus display ideological and value-based sympathy for the Chinese model. This trend risks distancing the region from Western institutions and adopting non-liberal normative frameworks. - Pursue preventive and cautious strategies:
The most rational approach for South Caucasus countries would be to develop a proactive and cautious foreign policy that avoids falling into debt dependency and protects institutional sovereignty. Otherwise, they risk either unregulated subjection to Chinese influence or being dragged into sharper geopolitical confrontations.
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Sosial Tədqiqatlar Mərkəzi, 2024. “China and Azerbaijan: Geopolitical Prospects for Bilateral Relations in the Economic and Logistics” https://stm.az/index.php?ln=en&pg=3&EntID=2276
CACI analyst, 2024. “China's Debt-Trap Diplomacy in Central Asia”
Gain İntegrty, 2020 “Azerbaijan risk report”
https://www.ganintegrity.com/country-profiles/azerbaijan/
Chinaobservers, 2025. “China’s Growing Interests in the Black Sea Region”
https://chinaobservers.eu/chinas-growing-interests-in-the-black-sea-region/
Civil Georgia, 2023. “2023 FDI in Georgia at USD 1.902 Bln” https://civil.ge/archives/620474
FactCheck, 2025 “Foreign direct investment has decreased by 30% as compared to 2023 and by 40% as compared to 2022.”
Transparency İnternational,2025. “Increasing Chinese Influence in Georgia” https://transparency.ge/en/post/increasing-chinese-influence-georgia
SCMP, 2025. “Armenia looks to deepen ties with China while eyeing foreign relations beyond Russia”
ACSES, 2025. “Chinese Companies Involvement in Major Infrastructure Projects in Armenia” https://www.acses.am/chinese-companies-involvement-in-major-infrastructure-projects-in-armenia/
Armenpress, 2025. “ EU investments in Armenia to reach €2.5 billion – joint press release following results of Pashinyan-Costa-Von de Leyen meeting”
