Abstract
In this analysis, the Khar Center offers a theoretical perspective on church–state relations in Armenia, provides a brief historical overview, and highlights the role of the Armenian Apostolic Church in shaping Armenian national identity. Amid the increasingly regular clashes between the government and the Church in recent years, it explores the institutional and ideological conflict arising from the tension between the Church and secularization efforts. The main goal of the analysis is to examine how the Church’s historical authority has become a subject of political and social debate in recent years, especially during Nikol Pashinyan’s rule, and to assess the evolving dynamics of state–church relations. The article adopts a historical-institutional approach to analyze both the normative framework of religion–state relations in Armenia’s Constitution and the growing secular trends and criticisms of the Church in public discourse.
Moreover, the ideological influence and political opposition activity of the Church are evaluated in light of the “Greater Armenia” fantasy and the rise of revanchist tendencies after the 2020 Karabakh War. The analysis interprets Armenia’s identity transformation not just through geopolitical and legal factors but also through deep psychopolitical and cultural changes.
Main question: What functional and symbolic role does the deepening confrontation between the state and the Church in Armenia play in shaping national identity, political legitimacy, and ideological hegemony, and how does this struggle affect the country’s trajectory toward secular modernization and European integration?
Keywords: Armenia, Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), State–Church relations, National identity, Secularism, Nikol Pashinyan, Catholicos Karekin II, Authoritarianism, “Greater Armenia,” Karabakh War, Revanchism, Clerical Oligarchy, Ideological Confrontation, Eurointegration, Legitimacy, Psychopolitics, Political Theology, Religious Opposition, Peace Process (Armenia–Azerbaijan).
Introduction
As Armenia transitions into the modern era, the issue of national identity has become central to the country's political, cultural, and ideological agenda. In this context, the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) has not merely functioned as a religious institution, but has been a central actor in shaping the Armenian people’s collective memory, national resistance, and political imagination. However, the secular governance attempts introduced by Nikol Pashinyan and his reformist team after the 2018 “Velvet Revolution”—especially their departure from the long-dominant dream of “Greater Armenia”—have brought the long-standing yet quiet ideological compromise between the Church and the state into open confrontation.
This conflict is not merely over political power, but also centers around the question of what kind of identity Armenia will adopt in the future: will it be secular, Western-oriented, and citizen-centered, or mystical, historicist, and under the Church’s guidance? Following the defeat in the 2020 Karabakh War, public discontent and identity crisis have allowed the Church to reactivate revanchist rhetoric, while the state (government) has taken an ideologically defensive position—deepening the confrontation to a point where one side may overpower the other. This analysis seeks to objectively examine the function of religious institutions in Armenia’s contemporary transitional period, the transformation of state–church relations, and its impacts on national identity.
Theoretical Perspective on Religion–State Relations: The Armenian Context
Religion–state relations in Armenia are deeply tied to the country’s historical, cultural, and political trajectory. Armenians adopted Christianity as early as 301 CE, and for them, religion—especially the AAC—has always been a key pillar of national identity, not merely spiritual life. This historical heritage has created a unique structure of church–state relations that continues into modern Armenia’s secular state model.
Theoretically, religion–state relations in Armenia resemble a cooperative model. Constitutionally, Armenia is a secular state. Article 1 of the Constitution states: “The Republic of Armenia is a sovereign, democratic, social and legal state.” However, Article 18 recognizes the “exclusive role” of the Armenian Apostolic Church in shaping national identity and spirituality and grants it a “special status.”
The 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations provides for registration of religious groups, guarantees freedom of belief, and prescribes state neutrality toward religion. However, in practice, this law is applied selectively—especially in the case of non-Apostolic denominations—and has faced criticism (Legislationline.org, 1991). Some international organizations report that despite legal provisions for religious pluralism, the AAC’s hegemonic position creates unequal conditions for other religious groups (USCIRF, 2023).
Hence, Armenia’s model is not strictly secular. In a framework resembling positive neutrality, the state cooperates with the AAC and supports its activities, while also legally acknowledging other religious communities. The Church plays an active role in the army, education, and social services and holds ceremonial precedence in state protocol (Payaslian, 2007a).
Therefore, although legally framed by the principle of secularism, Armenia’s religion–state relations are marked by symbolic and functional asymmetry due to historical and cultural realities. The Church’s role as a component of national ideology contributes to tensions in religious diversity and freedom of conscience.
The Role of the Armenian Apostolic Church in National Identity Formation: A Brief Historical Excursion
The AAC has been the architect of national identity, the bearer of historical memory, and the ideological shrine of political mobilization. Especially for Armenians living under multi-ethnic and multi-religious empires, the Church has served as a guarantor of cultural continuity and the ideological legitimizer of national sovereignty. This function played a decisive role in shaping the dream of “Greater Armenia,” the establishment of the First Republic of Armenia in 1918, and the occupation of Azerbaijani territories after the restoration of independence in 1991.
During the Ottoman and Russian empires, the Church became the foundation of national education and culture—through schools, publishing houses, and religious centers, it preserved the Armenian language and historical memory (Suny, 1993a). The Church leader, the Catholicos, was seen as the “Patriarch of the Armenian Nation” and a de facto national political leader. The Church united diverse Armenian communities under a common moral and ideological framework and played a key role in shaping a transregional Armenian national identity, even before the diaspora.
The idea of “Greater Armenia” was revived in the 19th century by historians, intellectuals, and the Church elite in a romantic and mythological framework. The Church sanctified the borders of ancient Armenia, framing them as a matter of “historical justice.” During the 1878 Berlin Congress, Armenian representatives, with the Church’s support, internationalized the “Armenian Question.” The Church served as both a religious and political-diplomatic actor (Hovannisian, 1997).
Hence, the “Greater Armenia” dream was transformed from a historical fantasy into a national project idealized and sanctified by the Church.
In the early 20th century, Armenian political organizations (e.g., the ARF-Dashnaktsutyun) initiated armed and ideological mobilization within the Russian and Ottoman empires. The Church granted moral legitimacy to these efforts, framing them as a “sacred duty of national liberation.” Churches in frontline regions became weapon depots and command centers. The Church also mobilized diaspora Armenians—especially in France, the U.S., and Russia—for aid and lobbying.
Following the 1915 events, the AAC was central to the narrative of genocide. Its presentation of the tragedy as the “suffering of the Christian Armenian nation” further bolstered its symbolic hegemony (Walker, 1990).
During the establishment of the Republic of Armenia in May 1918, the AAC acted as the spiritual backbone and ideological symbol of the new state. The Church was a central platform for fundraising, volunteer mobilization, and food campaigns. It played an important role in the Armenian parliament and government. Some historians argue that the Republic was founded under the Church’s shadow, with early constitutional principles built on a synthesis of Armenian-national-religious identity (Panossian, 2006a).
The Armenian Church During the Soviet Period: Repression and Silence
Under Soviet atheistic ideology, the AAC—like other religious institutions—faced harsh repression. In the 1930s, many clergy were executed, and religious practice was severely restricted. In 1938, Catholicos Khoren I and hundreds of religious leaders were arrested or killed by the NKVD. Church properties were nationalized, and religious rituals could only be performed in limited circles; the Church essentially went underground (Konrad Siekierski, 2013).
However, just as Stalin partially normalized relations with the Russian Orthodox Church in 1943, the Armenian Apostolic Church was granted limited operational space in 1945. With the election of Catholicos Gevork II, Etchmiadzin began to regain some activity—but strictly under state supervision (Suny, 1993b).
During the Soviet period, the AAC served a dual role: it was a religious institution and a cultural symbol of national identity. While forced to comply with atheistic norms, it quietly sustained Armenian identity through symbolism. Etchmiadzin also served as a limited channel of contact with the diaspora, albeit under Soviet control—indirectly enabling the transmission of nationalist ideas (Libaridian, 2004).
Although appearing formally loyal to the Soviet regime, the Church preferred to conduct its propaganda via national-cultural values. Thus, although not an overt political force in Soviet Armenia, its endurance and moral authority facilitated its post-Soviet return as a political actor.
Church–State Relations in Armenia from Independence to Pashinyan
The restoration of independence drastically transformed not only Armenia’s political and economic structures, but also its socio-cultural and ideological makeup. In this new era, the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) regained a central role as the moral foundation of national identity, statehood, and political legitimacy. In contrast to the atheist-socialist ideology of the Soviet era, the Church was now idealized and sacralized. The “Greater Armenia” ideology gained symbolic value in official state rhetoric and was embraced by both the diaspora and domestic political circles. The AAC presented this idea as a religious and moral responsibility, promoting a national duty to “restore historical justice.” The characterization of religious monuments in Karabakh as “national heritage” also provided psychological grounds for revanchist discourse in foreign policy. During the First Karabakh War in the 1990s, Etchmiadzin framed the conflict not just as a political or military confrontation, but also as a defense of national and religious identity—a “holy war” that sanctified both the liberation of ancestral lands and the preservation of spiritual unity (Panossian, 2006b).
The Church’s Role in Armenia’s Psychopolitical Foreign Policy
Armenia’s foreign policy has long been shaped more by historical trauma than by geopolitical realities or rational interests. In particular, the trauma of the 1915 Ottoman-era events occupies a central position in the country’s collective memory and plays a defining role in its international relations. This trauma has fueled Armenia’s self-perception as a moral victim and led to a foreign policy rooted in identity-based narratives. Consequently, Armenia has often presented itself in regional politics as the ethically superior party, prioritizing normative and emotional arguments over pragmatic diplomacy (Elman Fattah, 2019).
This approach, amplified by the diaspora’s influence in the West, placed the genocide claim—alongside demands for recognition, reparations, and territorial restitution—at the top of Armenia’s international agenda. However, in regional contexts, especially relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, the burden of this historical narrative has obstructed diplomatic flexibility and left Armenia geopolitically isolated (Cornell, 2017).
In this framework:
- The Church has served as a key ideological connector with the diaspora;
- It has functioned as a political certifier of the genocide discourse;
- It has represented Armenia morally in international settings, often participating as part of diplomatic delegations.
As a result, between 1991 and 2020, Church–state relations in Armenia deviated from a secular model, evolving into a theocratic-political symbiosis. The AAC acted as an ideological engine, political instrument, and moral actor in foreign policy. While reinforcing revanchist nationalist ideology, this alliance limited Armenia’s diplomatic maneuverability and contradicted the principles of a secular state. Ultimately, this structure impeded the development of rational strategies in both governance and international relations.
The Armenian Apostolic Church and the Consolidation of Authoritarian Governance
During Armenia’s post-Soviet state-building, the AAC became fully integrated as a key pillar of national political identity. Over time, it moved beyond the spiritual domain and began to influence political decision-making, becoming a tool for legitimizing authoritarian rule.
Religious Symbols as Instruments of Authoritarian Legitimacy
During the presidencies of Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan (1998–2018), the Church synchronized its operations with the state and helped morally justify authoritarian governance. The participation of Church representatives in official state ceremonies, their silence or tacit approval during instances of election fraud, and their general alignment with the government served to bolster the perception of the regime as being “in line with divine will” (Ishkanian, 2008b). This blurred the boundaries between state and religion and turned the AAC into an ideological architect of authoritarianism.
Statements by Church leaders reinforced the government’s authoritarian actions in the name of “stability” and “national values,” neutralizing public discontent through religious sentiment.
Theological Mythologizing of “Greater Armenia”
The Church also transformed Armenia’s foreign policy and territorial ambitions into theological missions by wrapping nationalist rhetoric in religious symbolism. During the Karabakh conflict, the AAC promoted concepts like “sacred land” and “divine mission,” turning nationalist ambitions into religious obligations (Panossian, 2006c). This represented the instrumentalization of religion for militaristic goals.
Levon Ter-Petrosyan Era (1991–1998): Distant Harmony
Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, attempted to build a Western-style secular governance model. His political vision prioritized democratic institutions over theocratic and nationalist impulses. While he acknowledged the AAC as a bearer of national culture and historical identity, he aimed to minimize its influence on political decision-making. However, subsequent developments revealed that he was unsuccessful in realizing these goals.
Robert Kocharyan Era (1998–2008): Ideological Integration of the Church
Under Kocharyan, the AAC moved beyond being a religious institution to become one of the pillars of national ideological architecture. Church–state relations were further consolidated, and the AAC was granted privileges such as:
- Delivering religious services in the military,
- Promoting religious education in schools,
- Participating in state protocol events.
In return, the Church remained silent on state corruption and election fraud or implicitly supported the regime (Payaslian, 2007c).
This created an unofficial, mutually beneficial alliance: the state utilized the Church for moral legitimacy, and the Church gained institutional status and privileges (Ishkanian, 2008a).
Serzh Sargsyan Era (2008–2018): The Peak of Religious–Political Symbiosis
During Sargsyan’s presidency, the AAC evolved from a symbolic and cultural institution into an overt political power center. Especially during election periods, the Church violated its neutrality and openly supported the ruling Republican Party (HHK), becoming the focal point of public criticism and political debate. Senior clerics made campaign statements presenting the incumbent regime as the only guardian of “national values” and “stability,” thereby transforming religious discourse into political propaganda.
The Church’s active role in producing political legitimacy turned it into an ideological pillar of the state apparatus. The sensitive balance between religion and state was broken, with the AAC acting as a legitimizing agent of political power. Furthermore, the 2015 Constitution maintained the Church’s special status, which was criticized by human rights groups as a degradation of secularism (Freedom House, 2016).
Pashinyan Era: Government–Church Confrontation
The Church’s Reaction to Secular Reforms: After the 2018 "Velvet Revolution," the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), which did not align with Nikol Pashinyan's secular governance concept, continued to take an actively oppositional stance against modern and liberal values. The Church’s harsh reaction in areas such as gender equality, LGBT rights, family planning, and education reforms stems from its desire to preserve its conservative-political hegemony (Grigoryan, 2019). This behavior demonstrates how the Church, acting as an ideological power center, challenges the secular legal system.
The Velvet Revolution in May 2018 not only ended the 20-year hegemony of the political elite known as the “Karabakh Clan” in Armenia but also marked the end of an era during which the clerical elite had been considered untouchable. The institutional weight and public influence of the Church sharply contrasted with the personal reputation and lifestyle of modern clerics. Groups emerged that challenged the absolute authority of the Catholicos-Patriarch of All Armenians. Just one month after the revolution, the movement “New Armenia, New Patriarch” launched protests demanding the resignation of Karekin II (Ktrich Nersisyan) (Golos Armenii, 2018). Activists attempted to storm the Catholicos's residence in Etchmiadzin and later blocked his car, escalating the protests to a radical level, although these actions did not yield practical results (Interfax, 2018; Respublika Armeniya, 2018).
Though the new government did not openly support the protests and society mostly adopted a spectator’s stance, this local protest expressed the long-accumulated public discontent with the Church's leadership. Karekin II had not been a spiritual leader who stood above politics, maintained equal distance from all, and exemplified Christian values through his lifestyle. He had close ties with former president Serzh Sargsyan. Not coincidentally, when activists blocked his car near the Gndevank monastery, they shouted, “You leave with Serzh too!” (PARA TV, 2019).
Moreover, scandals related to the personal lives of Church officials, including Karekin II, have further eroded public trust. Reports have revealed that these clerics do not live according to the values they preach and do not embody high moral standards. Information has circulated about their sexual conduct (including homosexuality), business activities, love for luxury and comfort, and prioritization of materialism over spirituality. A 2019 investigation by the Russian news outlet Lenta.ru cited numerous such cases (Lenta.ru, 2019).
Thus, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s revelation about the Catholicos having children did not shock Armenian society. As early as 2015, one cleric told Hraparak newspaper that one of Karekin II’s daughters owned a pharmacy in Yerevan (Hraparak, 2015). That same year, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) disclosed that the Catholicos held an account with HSBC Bank containing $1.1 million (Projects ICIJ, 2015).
Karekin II’s rule also reveals signs of nepotism: 6 of the 49 bishops he appointed to various churches are from his home village. One of them—Ezras (Nersisyan), Bishop of the Diocese of Russia and New Nakhichevan—is his brother. These facts suggest that under Karekin II's leadership, a clerical-oligarchic system has formed that transcends Armenia’s borders. According to political scientist Stepan Danielyan, before the revolution, the government in Armenia was extremely unpopular, the Church was its servant, and the Catholicos was seen as an odious oligarch (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2018).
Following Armenia's heavy defeat in the 2020 Karabakh War, the Church leadership saw the opportunity to intervene in politics. On December 8, Karekin II issued an official statement calling for the Prime Minister’s resignation. This coincided with mass protests by the Homeland Salvation Committee—a coalition of 17 political parties—demanding Pashinyan’s resignation and nominating former defense minister Vazgen Manukyan as interim prime minister (TASS, 2020). The timing indicated a level of coordination between the pro-Russian opposition and the Catholicos. However, subsequent events showed that Etchmiadzin failed to assess the situation and the opposition’s potential accurately. Pashinyan resolved the political crisis by calling snap parliamentary elections and regaining a popular mandate (RBC, 2021).
The Church’s Shift Toward Hard Opposition: Events following the return of four occupied villages in the Gazakh region to Azerbaijan in April 2024 as part of the border delimitation process represent the next phase of the government–Church confrontation. Amid the collapse of institutional opposition, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan of the Tavush Diocese emerged as the face of public protests, declaring the formation of a political movement and leading a march toward the capital (Die Welt, 2024). However, this revanchist effort—backed by former presidents Kocharyan and Sargsyan—also ended in failure. Pashinyan later stated that Catholicos Karekin II was behind Galstanyan’s political activism (News Armenia, 2024).
The current phase of the Church–government confrontation can be traced to Karekin II’s speech at an international conference organized by the AAC in Switzerland on May 26–28, 2025. In his remarks, the Catholicos accused Azerbaijan—with Turkey’s support—of occupying Karabakh and conducting ethnic cleansing (Mirror Spectator, 2025). This stance, which completely contradicts official state policy, could sabotage the peace process and lead to renewed tensions with Azerbaijan. The intention to derail peace is clear. By opposing Pashinyan’s “give up historic Armenia to preserve real Armenia” doctrine, the Catholicos openly supports continuing traditional hostility toward Azerbaijan and Turkey (Sputnik Armenia, 2024).
Pashinyan is attempting to completely discredit Karekin II in public opinion—by officially revealing private matters about the Catholicos’s personal life—and to lay the groundwork for the election of a new Catholicos-Patriarch (Arminfo, 2025). This appears to be a necessary and inevitable reckoning, as the religious leader who has turned Etchmiadzin into an opposition center poses a serious threat to the government.
Pashinyan’s current foreign policy rests on two pillars: first, establishing peace and cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey; and second, advancing toward European integration. AAC circles, however, not only oppose the peace agenda but also openly oppose European integration, promoting a pro-Russian geopolitical vision (Verelq, 2025).
The Future of the Pashinyan–Catholicos Struggle:
During the Pashinyan era, the tension between the government and the Armenian Apostolic Church has evolved into a deep ideological confrontation. It stems not only from the Church’s attempts to influence political processes but also from Armenia’s post-revolutionary identity quest, secular state-building efforts, and geopolitical orientation. Clerical-oligarchic structures surrounding Karekin II now directly clash with Pashinyan’s Western-oriented, peace-seeking government.
The national trauma following the war, the Church’s attempts to unseat Pashinyan, and the Catholicos’s open opposition to the government’s peace and integration agenda have made this confrontation not merely an internal political conflict, but a dangerous clash over Armenia’s strategic direction. The tension is expected to intensify as the 2026 parliamentary elections approach. For the Pashinyan government, the formation of a new, reformist, peace-oriented religious elite is now essential for political stability and ideological consolidation.
Conclusion
The ongoing confrontation between the Armenian state and Church is not only institutional and ideological but is also personified through key political figures and embodied in public discourse. The open political and ideological tension between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Catholicos Karekin II highlights the core dilemma of Armenia’s identity struggle. This clash represents not only a dispute over authority but also a battle over ideological and cultural hegemony in modern Armenia.
Pashinyan’s secular modernization initiatives and pro-Western political agenda imply a reevaluation of the Church’s constitutional status and historical privileges. This approach challenges traditional narratives that present the Church as a foundational pillar of the state’s ideological framework. In response, Karekin II and his theocratic circle frame this as “the degradation of national identity” and “betrayal of traditional values.”
The 2020 Karabakh War defeat gave the Church the opportunity to harden its political rhetoric and attempt to position itself as the ideological leader of national unity during this period of trauma. Under Karekin II’s leadership, the Church has also exploited the post-war ideological vacuum, portraying Pashinyan’s government as the symbol of national defeat and moral decay. The confrontation thus deepens not only between religion and politics but also as a struggle over legitimacy and identity.
In this context, Armenia’s main challenge is how to shape the ideological architecture of its future statehood. The issue is not merely a division of powers between religious and secular institutions, but a broader civilizational question of redefining national identity. The Pashinyan–Karekin conflict, in this sense, represents a layered, structural, and symbolic battle: a clash between modernization and tradition, Western secularism and Eastern religious-nationalist conservatism in post-Soviet Armenia.
Armenia now faces two fundamental alternatives. On one side stands a traditionalist-revanchist ideological framework seeking to re-establish national identity under the Church’s hegemony and sanctify historical and religious symbols. On the other stands the need to develop a new national ideology based on a modern, secular state model that prioritizes the rule of law, individual freedoms, and civil society. This is not merely a political strategy choice—it is a profound moral and civilizational decision.
Armenia will either continue to bear the “sacred burden of the past” or move forward toward a future identity built on a rational, inclusive, and legal system. Within this context, the ongoing struggle between Pashinyan and Karekin II becomes the defining symbolic confrontation that will shape Armenia’s national ideology and statehood model. The public discourse surrounding this conflict generates not only political consequences but also fundamentally shapes Armenia’s national self-understanding, historical memory, and future vision
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