Introduction
This essay discusses the highly intriguing topic as the rise of nationalism is being observed all over the globe, altering the mainstream political agendas. Since some view territorial autonomy as a self-determination right and others see its “exceeding level” as a pathway towards nationalistic irredentism, perhaps, it would be more pertinent to address the particular area of inquiry through conflicting perspectives (Hilpold 2017, 302-335). Subsequently, the essay you are reading scrutinizes the notion of “territorial autonomy” as a factor of political stability in the context of nation-states gauging its positive and negative impacts based on the cases of South East European countries. The necessity of the subject of this essay is inherently connected to the notion that stateness is a fundamental provision of democratic transitions, as democracy can not function without a state (Linz and Stepan 1996, 5). On the other hand, territorial autonomy, stateness within the state, can also mirror the democratic need. Hence, elaborating on Linz’s and Stepan’s (1996) argument of dependence of democracy on stateness, one can also argue that stateness can not also function without democracy. Thus, a strategically wise position is to find a sustainable equilibrium between stateness and democracy in this setting. If it is not too mistaken to make an abstraction at this point, I am keen to emphasize that failing to maintain the aforementioned balance leads to at best dissatisfaction and, at worst conflict, and human rights atrocities.
Before moving on to the main discussion of the particular essay, it is a prerequisite to define some key concepts. In the context of this paper, the term territorial autonomy implies the right of self-governance of the territorial entity within the sovereignty of the nation-state. Territorial autonomy is potentially symmetric or asymmetric (“Territorial autonomies | World Autonomies,” n.d.). Symmetric territorial autonomy is the state of equilibrium among territorial entities, which constitute the nation-state, in terms of power and privileges, while asymmetric territorial autonomy signifies the autonomy dependent on central nation-state power in a hierarchical manner (“Territorial autonomies | World Autonomies,” n.d.).
Another term used in this essay is federalism. Despite conceptual proximity between the terms territorial autonomy and federalism, the latter is commonly used to define a certain political structure or a type of nation-state, which is constituted by territorial entities that enjoy autonomy regardless of being symmetric or asymmetric. Despite the proximity mentioned above, it would be contextually significant to conceptualize federalism to serve the purpose of clarity. Federalism is the unifying political organization of separate states or polities within the same political system allowing each to preserve its integrity (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2024).
Some scholars argue that autonomy and federalism promote stability, contributing to positive peace and pluralism and reducing the risks of secessionist violence. Others hold firm beliefs that they actually weaken central power, eventually impeding its capacity to mitigate instabilities and violence caused by ethnic divisions and separatism. Subsequently, based on these theoretical underpinnings, the paper will factually discuss the historical and contemporary examples and developments from the South East Europe, as the region experienced substantial border changes, ethnic conflicts, and socio-political regime changes. Assessing these cases may result in an insightful analysis evaluating to what extent undergone governance experiments could be successful in terms of political stability.
Territorial Autonomy and Federalism in the Southeastern European Context: Does it Enhance or Undermine the Stability?
Nevertheless, we should acknowledge that examining political stability as being dependent on limited determinants can be a flawed approach, as a variety of factors may cause political stability or instability within a nation-state, including, yet not confined to economic crises, mismanagement, and international dynamics, this essay seeks to reveal correlations between territorial autonomy and federalism and political stability a priori considering these relationships valid. Thus, we are going to evaluate the arguments supporting the claim that territorial autonomy and federalism undermine political stability, as well as, the arguments challenging this perspective. These historical arguments are related to past developments in the Southeastern European region.
In his famous work “Thinking about Democracy”, Arend Lijphart argues that when ethnic identities become the major political force ethnically divided societies are likely to be fragmented under the federal structure (Ljiphart 2007, 83-85). A clear example of the aforementioned fragmentation is the collapse of former Yugoslavia, which is briefly analyzed below. Backing to Ljiphart’s argument, another scholar, a British philosopher, Brian Barry also mentions that power-sharing enforces ethnic divisions rather than unifying ethnicities into coherent national identity (Barry 1975, 406).
Yugoslavia’s disintegration can be viewed as a consequence of an excessive degree of federalism used to govern the country. Federalism, which was not able to transform but only “freeze” ethnic nationalism existing in constituting countries through authoritarian means, led to the dissolution of the federation in 1990 (Van Winkle, Ryan 2005). Official history created by Tito’s authoritarian rule neglected the ethnic dimension of the Yugoslav Civil War of the 1940s and left nationalistic narratives available to be revived following the death of the autocratic ruler (Van Winkle, Ryan 2005). However, this was not the sole and exclusive reason for the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. As noticed by Van Winkle and Daniel Ryan, the failure of socialist political institutions also greatly played a role in the disintegration e.g. Yugoslavia could not build strong institutional fundaments under the federalist socialist structure experiencing hurdles in the transition of power in the post-Tito period (Van Winkle, Ryan 2005). Citing Gojko Vuckovic, the scholar who specialized in international politics, Van Winkle and Daniel Ryan reiterate that “inconsistency in formulation and interpretation of the Yugoslav nation” induced the unsustainable reforms of Yugoslav political and administrative institutions. (Van Winkle, Ryan 2005). This can be considered a part of Yugoslavian federalism, as constitutional amendments between 1948 and 1971 transferred the political and economic decision-making power to member republics, which eventually caused a crisis after the death of the authoritarian leader (Van Winkle, Ryan 2005).
Another specific example is the case of Kosovo. Conflict in Kosovo can also be considered the heritage of failed federalist policies of Yugoslavia, as expanded federalism was not accompanied and aligned with democratic reforms. As mentioned above, the inadequacy of Yugoslavian historiography in addressing post-Yugoslavian Civil War nationalism of constituting ethnic identities alongside democratic deficiencies led to the outbreak of the conflict and ended in Kosovo’s fully declared independence in 2008. Post-Yugoslavian experiences, and precisely the Kosovo case perfectly illustrate how contextual developments are important for the success of any project related to territorial autonomy.
However, there were also successful cases of power-sharing such as the Vojvodina Autonomous Province of Serbia and the peace deal signed between North Macedonian authorities and representatives of the Albanian minority in the Post-Yugoslavian era. Despite the unsuccess in Kosovo that led to violent armed conflict, Serbia could succeed with multiethnic Vojvodina providing territorial autonomy to the region. Furthermore, the Ohrid Agreement signed in 2001 between the government of the Republic of Macedonia (currently, North Macedonia) and the Albanian minority led to the successful decentralization of power, and immensely contributed to the democratization of the country. In the case of the latter, the concrete binding legal measures that were adopted for meaningful representation of minorities especially in matters that directly affect personal documentation, culture, use of language, education, and use of official symbols, were highly crucial for effective conflict resolution and power-sharing. (Brunnbauer 2002, 5) Ohrid Agreement also set a 20 % threshold for recognition of official language at the municipal level, if the language is spoken by more than 20 % of the population, the particular language becomes co-official alongside Macedonian (Brunnbauer 2002, 5). This precision, and willingness of authorities to take concrete binding measures was the pathway toward success.
Ljiphart also considers the outcomes of the Ohrid Agreement as a success highlighting how decentralization can be an effective instrument for functional power-sharing (Ljiphart 2007, 83). He also mentions the contradictory results achieved in Vojvodina and Kosovo underlining the necessity of context in attaining success with territorial autonomies (Ljiphart 2007, 85). Nonetheless, neither the Ohrid Agreement can be considered a prerequisite for EU membership of North Macedonia, nor it is proper to argue that North Macedonian authorities perceived the deal as a prerequisite, one cannot deny the contribution of the EU to the adoption of this agreement. Larry Diamond (1999), a political scientist and sociologist, in his piece called “Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation” perfectly describes how EU membership requirements endorse decentralization, which harmonizes the inter-ethnic relationships within the same political system.
Based on the analysis described above, one can argue that a set of policies should be conducted in two directions for successful federalism. As Ljiphart describes in “Thinking about Democracy”, effective power-sharing requires both political representations in decision-making and cultural autonomy. Supporting this, Ted Robert Gurr also argues that power-sharing alongside autonomy meets the ethnic demands in crises (Gurr 1993, 292). Hence, these directions are as follows:
- Policies for narrative integration;
- Policies for institutional cohesion.
Policies for narrative integration—Successful federalism ought to seek narrative integration and similar, if not common understanding of past events, which may subsequently lead to tackling the isolation of social groups that constitute the overarching political system. This includes reconciling and integrating collective memories through the democratization of the educational system and working with societies on the ground to combat the stereotypes that stipulate hostilities. Stereotypes often play a key role in constructing “enemy images”, and can be spread also through informal communication channels, which makes this phenomenon extremely instrumental in escalating tensions within society.
Policies for institutional cohesion - Federalism should be institutionalized alongside ensuring a democratic environment and pluralism. Upholding democratic principles makes the power-sharing process transparent and accountable, which fosters trust among the members of society. Institutional functions ought to be adjusted to societal needs in an up-to-date manner. Based on the European experience of integration, the subsidiarity principle has to be prioritized throughout the process of decentralization and power sharing.
Evidently, the policy directions mentioned above might be comprehended differently in different geopolitical contexts depending on differences in the political realm and varying tactical and operational strategies might be developed accordingly.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it would be difficult to argue whether power-sharing causes political stability or instability per se, as political stability is the result of a set of internal and external determinants, such as memory politics, socioeconomic developments, human rights, international dynamics, etc. In the simplest words, it is hard to figure out whether power-sharing dynamics can solely and exclusively cause any sort of instability or order. However, based on the findings of this essay, it is pertinent to mention that power-sharing and granting autonomies to territorial entities were likely to be the triggering causes of ethnopolitical conflicts if the context had not been taken into consideration. Prior to granting formal autonomy nation-states should engage in eliminating systemic discrimination ensuring the rights of its citizens. However, it also should be acknowledged that success is highly likely when federalism and power-sharing are supported by democratic institutions, as seen in many cases (Stepan 1999). In this context, decentralization should be highlighted as an integral part of the democratization process, as decentralization can be an effective tool in mitigating the problems arising from power-sharing.
Furthermore, it is worth also mentioning that nation-states have to refrain from aggressive nation-building policies in multi-ethnic environments in order to diminish the chances of violence being erupted (Connor 1994). Decision-makers should exercise caution regarding the possibility of identity-based conflict, especially, in a setting where the authoritarian past exists, since perhaps structural violence persisted for years.
All in all, in the Post-Yugoslavian context, the phenomenon of federalism and territorial autonomy resulted varyingly depending on the background, as for some cases, such as Vojvodina and the decentralization of North Macedonia it demonstrated success, but for others, such as Kosovo and Bosnian federalism it remained challenging. Consequently, South Eastern Europe offers a lot of lessons to learn in terms of federalism and territorial autonomy. Nonetheless power-sharing may bring up viable solutions, it also may cause conflicts and violent fragmentation, if not coherently well-designed per democratic principles and human rights.
References
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