(This article was prepared within the framework of the KHAR Center research series “Authoritarian Regimes and Transregional Influence Mechanisms.”)
Introduction
The Balkan region is one of the areas in Europe where the impact of geopolitical confrontations is most strongly felt. The enlargement of the European Union and NATO, debates over identity and history, the failure of institutions to consolidate despite efforts toward Western integration, the effects of global and European anti-democratic trends, attempts to place media under control, economic dependencies, and similar factors create a favorable environment—particularly in the Western Balkans—for the propaganda activities of external actors, primarily Russia.
Russia’s propaganda activity in this region does not manifest only in the dissemination of information that benefits the Kremlin. In a more dangerous form, it takes shape as foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), a phenomenon that the European Union has only recently begun to properly recognize and assess (EEAS, 2025).
As in many European countries, the impact of these activities in the Western Balkans is not limited to the spread of narratives centralized in the Kremlin. Many analyses of disinformation dynamics in the Balkans show that Kremlin narratives are disseminated in ways integrated into domestic politics by local political and social actors as well as media outlets (EU DisinfoLab, 2025).
Moscow establishes informal relationships with internal actors who are willing to promote Russian interests. High-level politicians—including presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, and influential editors-in-chief—are identified as the primary sources and key “amplifiers” of disinformation in the region. The deliberate mixing of facts and opinions undermines trust in public debate, creates an environment in which pro-Russian or anti-Western polarization deepens, and ultimately weakens Western influence and democratic processes. This approach systematically obstructs critical thinking, creates “echo chambers” particularly on social media, and makes societies more vulnerable to manipulative narratives (Asllani, 2025).
The Kremlin’s disinformation campaign relies on hundreds of messages containing dozens of narratives, utilizes thousands of channels, and targets millions of people. The ambition and objectives vary depending on the environment and conditions. Nevertheless, the primary strategic goal remains weakening the West and strengthening the Kremlin within the framework of a zero-sum game approach. This stems from a cynical mindset summarized as: “If it is bad for them, it is good for us; the worse it is for them, the better it is for us” (CEP, 2022).
In this article, KHAR Center examines in detail the mechanisms of Russian influence in two Western Balkan countries where Moscow’s influence is particularly strong—Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The analysis reviews the key narratives, the channels through which these narratives are transmitted, the local actors allied with the Kremlin, and the resilience potential of the societies in question.
SERBIA
The complex system of political relations established on a fragile foundation shaped by the ethnic and religious divisions inherited from the Yugoslav wars became particularly favorable for the Kremlin’s influence and intervention in the Balkans after 2014. Russia strengthened its use of media and information tools, increased its political and economic influence, mobilized proxy organizations to disseminate its narratives, protected its interests, and sought to slow the region’s integration into the West (EPRS, 2023).
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, a new situation emerged for the Western Balkans. The war forced governments in the region to clarify their positions between their historical ally (Russia) and their strategic objective (Europe). Overall support for the European Union has increased in the region. Nevertheless, in Serbia—despite receiving the most substantial financial support from the EU—most citizens still continue to view Russia as their primary ally (EPRS, 2023).
During the Russia–Ukraine war, 36 percent of Serbian citizens blame Ukraine for the conflict; this figure is higher only in Russia itself. At the same time, only 26 percent of Serbs consider Russia to be the aggressor, which is the second lowest rate in the world after Russia (22 percent). Meanwhile, 41 percent of Serbs view Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an act of self-defense, which is even higher than the corresponding figure in Russia (37 percent) (FES, 2025).
Thanks to a media landscape highly susceptible to political influence, Serbia has been identified as a “launching platform” for Russian disinformation operations (Asllani, 2025). The country functions as a regional hub for the localization and dissemination of Kremlin narratives across the Western Balkans and the broader Balkan region.
Russian propaganda is not only consumed within Serbia; it is also combined with local political narratives and repackaged as part of the region’s domestic political discourse before being transmitted to neighboring countries (RSF, 2024).
Disinformation spreads 6.3 times more frequently in Serbia than the average across European Union countries. A study conducted by the Center for Information, Democracy and Citizenship at the American University in Bulgaria analyzed more than 640,000 articles published on websites in 45 countries within Russia’s “Pravda” network between December 2024 and March 2025. In terms of the number of articles relative to population size, Serbia ranked fourth among the 45 countries, after Moldova, Latvia, and Estonia (Support4Partnership, 2025).
Russia’s decision to choose Serbia as a central hub is not coincidental.
First, cultural and historical ties play a significant soft-power role for Russia, particularly among Serbs (EuropeanWesternBalkans, 2024). From the Pan-Slavic movement of the 19th century to the Ottoman period, from the First World War to the Kosovo conflict, Russia supported Serbia in many key historical processes. Moscow has not recognized Kosovo’s independence and has used its position in the UN Security Council to support Serbia—for example, by vetoing resolutions condemning the massacres of Bosnian Serbs and recognizing the Srebrenica massacre as genocide (EPRS, 2023).
Second, the slow progress of Serbia’s accession to the European Union and the lingering memory of NATO military operations in the 1990s serve as powerful catalysts for Russian influence. Polarization in Serbian society and the anti-Western sentiment among a segment of the population create conditions that allow Russia to appeal to people’s emotions. In this context, Russia presents itself as a symbolic counterweight to Western dissatisfaction (Kolovska, 2024).
Third, the Serbian leadership openly pursues Kremlin-friendly policies, manipulating society through energy dependency while maintaining close relations with Russia. The government of President Aleksandar Vučić is comfortable with Moscow’s total control over energy infrastructure. Cheap gas supplies from Russia and an energy sector operating under Moscow’s influence—without meaningful accountability—also serve as a crucial pillar for Vučić’s continued hold on power (KHAR Center, 2025a).
Channels of Propaganda in Serbia
Russian propaganda in Serbia is produced and disseminated through several channels.
1. Kremlin Media – RT Balkan and Sputnik Srbija
The RT (Russia Today) Balkan website, launched by Russia in Belgrade, functions as a central hub for exporting disinformation and manipulation to the Western Balkans (RSF, 2024).
RT Balkan was launched in 2022, precisely when Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Russian media outlets were being banned across Europe. For a period, RT was even able to continue broadcasting in Germany through a license obtained from Serbia (Kolovska, 2024).
At the end of 2024, RT Balkan announced that it would begin operating as a television channel, although such broadcasting has not yet materialized. Another Kremlin media outlet with a longer history is Sputnik Srbija, which has been operating since 2015.
Russian propaganda is known for its ability to adapt to the local dynamics of each country. In Serbia, Moscow selects its local allies among well-known journalists, professors, artists, and prominent public figures. The majority of these individuals belong to radical right-wing circles and Serbian nationalist groups (RSF, 2024).
Sources report that RT Balkan and Sputnik Srbija are among the wealthiest media organizations in the country and pay extremely high salaries to their staff (Kolovska, 2024).
2. Government-Controlled Serbian Media
Russian state media in Serbia serves not only to disseminate Kremlin propaganda but also as a platform for spreading the narratives of the Serbian leadership itself. These outlets intervene in political processes such as elections and protest movements (EuropeanWesternBalkans, 2024).
Media outlets under the control of the Serbian government also play an important role in amplifying the content of Kremlin media. Content produced by RT Balkan is frequently republished by the largest actors in Serbia’s media market and by media figures aligned with the government.
The Pink television channel and the Kurir newspaper are among the most prominent examples. Even media outlets such as RTS, which are relatively less tightly controlled by the government, often cite RT Balkan as a credible source when reporting on Russia.
In other words, the system Russia has established in Serbia functions as an “information laundering” mechanism that exports cheap and easily accessible content to other countries in the region. Content first appears on RT Balkan as “news,” after which it becomes reinforced and legitimized through republication in mainstream and tabloid media outlets (RSF, 2024).
3. Right-Wing Network
A study conducted by the Serbia-based fact-checking and media manipulation monitoring center Raskrikavanje, which examined 25 nationalist and anti-globalization portals, shows that Serbia’s two largest websites—Informer and Večernje Novosti (both under government control)—form the strongest right-wing online media ecosystem that mutually supports itself through reciprocal linking. Their activities extend far beyond simply conducting propaganda for the ruling party. They also include spreading nationalist ideology, increasing polarization and hostility toward external actors, glorifying the authoritarian Russian leadership, and “proving” the superiority of “traditional” values over Western values (Raskrikavanje, 2024).
When spreading narratives related to Russia, the right-wing media ecosystem (tabloids, nationalist portals, and alternative conspiracy websites) often does not operate through a single centralized command. Instead, it functions according to a network logic in which actors amplify one another. High-traffic websites ensure both the flow of content and its visibility, while smaller sites multiply the narratives through repetition or play the role of fabricated “sources.” Within this network, official Kremlin propaganda instruments such as RT Balkan and Sputnik Srbija are also presented as reference points.
RT Balkan is largely nourished by the broader global RT ecosystem. Readers are directed from the main website, rt.com, to the local Serbian site, and from there to other websites belonging to the same network in different languages. Sputnik, meanwhile, is frequently presented by local nationalist portals as an “internal source.” Although the number of links leading to RT Balkan is several times higher, Sputnik is more deeply integrated into Serbia’s local media ecosystem, largely thanks to the local right-wing media network. The Serbian branch of Russia’s new propaganda network created after 2022—Pravda (Portal Kombat)—operating through the site pravda-rs.com, is also part of this system (Raskrikavanje, 2024).
4. Automated Disinformation Channels — Pravda Kombat and Social Networks
Pravda-rs.com is the first website of the Pravda network in the Western Balkans. Later, additional sites were launched in Bosnian, Albanian, and Macedonian. However, research shows that more than 95 percent of all Pravda-Kombat news content in the Western Balkans is published in Serbian. Most of these news items originate from pro-Kremlin Telegram channels.
The automation system of the network is extremely productive. The time between the appearance of a news item on a Telegram channel and its publication on websites belonging to the Pravda network ranges between three and twelve minutes. The network also uses Russian platforms such as VK Video and Yandex to translate, produce, and distribute content (RFE/RL, 2024).
As throughout the Balkans, Telegram in Serbia plays a key role as a platform for the rapid dissemination of propaganda content and the intensification of radicalization. Analyses show that pro-Kremlin Telegram channels are used not only for spreading disinformation but in many cases also for mobilization and campaigning. The research organization Detektor has identified 23 popular Telegram channels—most of them created in Russia after 2022 but operating with a focus on the Western Balkans and publishing in Serbian and Russian. According to the analysis, these Telegram channels are followed by more than half a million people, and through these platforms campaigns are conducted to supply military equipment to Russia, raise funds, and recruit soldiers (Detektor, 2024).
Among the main instruments for spreading Serbia-based disinformation and conspiracy theories throughout the region, Facebook and Instagram also stand out. Analysts from Debunk identified as early as several years ago 1,339 groups and pages on Facebook that systematically disseminate disinformation and conspiracy content across the Balkans. Analyst Daniela Vukčević states that much of the disinformation about the war between Russia and Ukraine is imported from Serbia. Even disinformation circulating in regional Facebook groups in Croatia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is often transmitted through Serbia directly from Russia (Debunk, 2022).
5. Soft Power and the Church
The Kremlin’s propaganda ecosystem in Serbia is not limited to media; cultural, educational, religious, and diplomatic infrastructure also plays an important role. The Russian House in Belgrade is one of Moscow’s oldest cultural centers abroad, having been opened in 1933. However, it attempts not to appear as the main hub for events related to Russian language and culture in Serbia. Russia instead carries out its activities in this sphere in a more dispersed manner and highlights Serbian partners rather than Russian actors (AIDDATA, 2023).
Russia provides funding to dozens of NGOs in Serbia. The main themes of these projects include shared history, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Russia–Serbia relations, and they primarily target young people. The Kremlin implements these activities in Serbia through twelve different channels. Among the most prominent are the Gorchakov Fund, Rossotrudnichestvo, and the Russian Embassy in Belgrade, while Gazprom Neft and Russia’s military company ENOT Corp are also among the actors involved. Those receiving Russian financial support include not only NGOs but also diaspora organizations, Orthodox churches, and political parties. The political parties in Serbia receiving Russian financial support—Dveri, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Oathkeepers, Third Serbia, and United Serbia—share a common ideological orientation: they are right-wing and skeptical of the European Union (AIDDATA, 2023).
Rossotrudnichestvo and the Russian House have focused more strongly in the past four years on youth exchange programs and social media activities (FBC, 2024).
Another element of Russian soft power in Serbia is the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center located in the city of Niš. In Western analyses, this organization is often assessed as part of Russia’s political influence mechanisms (EPRS, 2023). There have also been repeated assessments in Western circles suggesting that the organization serves as a cover for Russian intelligence activities (AIDDATA, 2023).
The church, one of the Kremlin’s main pillars of influence in Europe, is also a leading actor in propaganda activities in Serbia. The close relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Moscow Patriarchate is one of the key factors institutionalizing the narrative of “Orthodox-Slavic brotherhood.” The Kremlin utilizes this factor by incorporating religious elements into cultural programs and legitimizing its narratives as “values” (AIDDATA, 2023).
Russia’s activities in the Western Balkans also have direct security implications, including military cooperation, intelligence operations, and cyberattacks. Joint exercises between Russia and Serbia, such as the “Slavic Brotherhood,” demonstrate Moscow’s intention to maintain a strategic military presence in the Balkans (Toçi, 2025).
Russian Propaganda Narratives in Serbia
Russian propaganda in Serbia operates in several directions in terms of producing and exporting narratives. Official Kremlin media outlets constantly keep in circulation claims such as “the West is preparing a coup in Serbia,” “a new Maidan,” and allegations about NGOs having connections with Soros or the CIA, while simultaneously coordinating with pro-government Serbian media.
At the same time, Russian propaganda media extensively use nationalist narratives widespread in Serbia and in Republika Srpska, the Serb entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina. These narratives form the foundation of their communication strategy in the region and help portray Russia in public opinion as a defender of Serbian interests (EuropeanWesternBalkans, 2024).
One of the main agenda topics for Russia’s local propaganda allies in Serbia is the war in Ukraine. Serbian media—including major outlets such as TV Happy, Informer, and Večernje Novosti—consistently promote the popular Kremlin narrative that the West has directed its entire military potential against Russia and that Moscow has no choice but to respond. The thesis that “the West is hypocritical while Russia is the victim” finds considerable resonance in a society already influenced by anti-NATO rhetoric.
Kremlin disinformation claiming that European countries are experiencing a long-term energy crisis and have “returned to the Middle Ages” is also widely circulated in Serbian media. In general, disinformation related to energy is among the most common themes in Serbia. Numerous media outlets—including Informer, Novosti, and Pink—have even spread false stories claiming that in Switzerland people were offered a reward of 200 euros for reporting neighbors who heated their homes excessively. Claims that EU sanctions harm Europe more than Russia are also among the most frequently repeated Kremlin narratives in Serbia (Istinomer, 2022).
Belgrade also easily conceals its pro-Russian position through the Kosovo issue. Moscow’s stance on Kosovo provides fertile ground for maintaining the narrative of “Western injustice” in Serbia. Within this framework—where the European Union and NATO are portrayed as a “pressure bloc”—Russia is depicted as Serbia’s “only defender.” This line has been exploited for years by disinformation proxies and continues to appear prominently in regional analyses as one of the central narratives (Metodieva, 2019).
Another cover that allows pro-Russian positions and Kremlin narratives to operate without significant obstacles in Serbia is the claim of neutrality. The government of Aleksandar Vučić has for years pursued an “à la carte” foreign policy—benefiting simultaneously from EU funds and Western economic opportunities while also using Russia’s position on Kosovo and its supply of cheap gas for its own interests (KHAR Center, 2025a).
The policy of avoiding alignment with blocs allows the Serbian leadership both to avoid provoking Russia’s anger and maintain economic ties, while domestically sustaining the narrative that “the West is pressuring us.” For Russia, this situation creates practical opportunities to disseminate its narratives.
Kremlin narratives in Serbia are connected not only to foreign policy but also directly to domestic politics. Protests against the government are traditionally portrayed in Kremlin media as destructive activities orchestrated by foreign actors. On this issue, Kremlin media and pro-government Serbian outlets use similar language. Moreover, Kremlin involvement in this sphere is not limited to media manipulation; from time to time claims also emerge that Moscow has “assisted” the Serbian authorities in preventing protests in the country (Reuters, 2025).
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (REPUBLIKA SRPSKA)
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the second Balkan country where Russian propaganda operates most comfortably. The source of this comfort lies not in the country’s central political system but in Moscow’s continuous support for Republika Srpska—the Serb entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina—and its leadership.
The state model established after the Dayton Agreement, consisting of mutually distrustful political structures, has turned Bosnia and Herzegovina into a favorable arena for Russia. Rising nationalism in Republika Srpska represents the greatest obstacle to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s European integration, and Russia has consistently supported the government of Milorad Dodik in order to maintain this obstacle. To achieve this, Moscow has relied both on local media and on Serbian media—which act as exporters of propaganda throughout the region—to keep anti-Western and anti-NATO narratives alive (KHAR Center, 2025b).
While only about 11 percent of people in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina support Vladimir Putin, in Republika Srpska this figure is around 80 percent (Prelec, Gajic, Krivokapic, and Palloshi-Disha, 2025).
The former president of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, has played the role of one of Russia’s most prominent “fifth column” figures in the Western Balkans. Initially, Dodik presented Bosnia and Herzegovina’s position as “neutral,” arguing that the country should not take sides in the conflict. However, as the war continued, he increasingly and openly adopted Kremlin narratives (Turcalo, 2025).
Last year, the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina removed Milorad Dodik from the presidency, citing a court ruling against him. Dodik had been one of the principal architects of the authoritarian transformation of Republika Srpska. However, this did not mean the end of Dodik’s political line in the entity. The ruling Alliance of Independent Social Democrats nominated Siniša Karan as its candidate, and after narrowly winning the presidential elections in November he openly declared that he would continue the former president’s course.
Dodik himself challenged his opponents during the campaign with posters declaring: “I remain the main figure. I will be the president of all presidents of Republika Srpska. Isn’t that enough?” (KHAR Center, 2025b).
Main Propaganda Channels
The operation of Russian propaganda in Bosnia is not limited to the simple dissemination of RT content. Here, a variety of interconnected channels form the pillars of the propaganda mechanism.
The leadership of Republika Srpska and media outlets
The first channel is undoubtedly the leadership of Republika Srpska and the media-political circles close to it. These circles jointly pursue a separatist line and harsh rhetoric against Western institutions, which plays an important role in the localization of Kremlin narratives. In Republika Srpska, ruling elites combine ethnonationalist and pro-Russian messaging in order to weaken state-level institutions (Prelec, Gajic, Krivokapic, and Palloshi-Disha, 2025).
The European Commission’s 2025 report shows that the public broadcaster of Republika Srpska, Radio Televizija Republike Srpske (RTRS), continues to spread Kremlin disinformation both regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s path toward EU integration (European Commission, 2025). In addition to RTRS, Alternativna Televizija, Nezavisne Novine, and Glas Srpske also disseminate Russian narratives with great enthusiasm (Sijah, 2024). In this respect, international reports have described RTRS as “functioning like a Russian state channel” (CEP, 2022).
The official news agency of Republika Srpska, SRNA (Srpska News Agency), also plays an important role in distributing Russian content to local portals as “local news” and in “legitimizing” statements by the Russian embassy and official Russian institutions. RTRS and SRNA regularly bring the content of RT Balkan and Sputnik Srbija into the country despite EU sanctions (Prelec, Gajic, Krivokapic, and Palloshi-Disha, 2025). The Banja Luka-based provider M-tel, meanwhile, continues to broadcast the signal of RT despite Bosnia and Herzegovina’s alignment with relevant EU sanctions against Russia. M-tel’s connection to Serbia’s state-owned Telekom Srbija sufficiently explains the reason behind this activity (European Commission, 2025).
Although Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole remains committed to alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, the authorities of the Republika Srpska entity continue high-level contacts with Russia. In addition, the Republika Srpska branch of the federation actively works to support Russia’s occupation policy and obstruct the implementation of EU sanctions. This includes the fact that flights from Russia have not been banned and the broadcasting of Russian state and state-sponsored media has not been suspended. In 2025, ties between Republika Srpska and Russia increased even further. In September of last year, for example, the Institute for Meteorology and Standardization signed a memorandum with Rosstandart, which is under EU sanctions (European Commission, 2025).
The pro-Russian line of Republika Srpska’s leadership should not be explained only by ideological affinity; mutual economic interests are also among the core factors underlying this system of relations. First, Bosnia and Herzegovina was supplied with gas from Russia for a long time. Whenever harsh anti-Western rhetoric intensifies within Republika Srpska, the energy issue turns into a principal card both in domestic propaganda and in discussions with Sarajevo. Control over oil refining and the fuel market has also in practice been in Russian hands. Russian companies have played a dominant role in the oil and gas sectors and have supported the Republika Srpska administration financially. Companies such as Zarubezhneft have controlled key infrastructure such as the Brod oil refinery (Toçi, 2025).
In 2025, despite Republika Srpska’s separatist ties with Russia and obstacles created by Croatian actors, Bosnian parliamentarians took a decisive step toward energy diversification by voting to connect the country’s gas network with Croatia. Croatian parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, above all the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), opposed the management of the Bosnia–Croatia gas interconnection, also called the “Southern Gas Interconnection,” by the Sarajevo-based state company BH Gas. Instead, they wanted a new company based in Mostar, where Croats form a majority, to be created and placed in charge of operating the pipeline (N1, 2024).
Despite the political rhetoric in Republika Srpska strongly promoting close ties with Russia, serious financial setbacks have been recorded in the sector where Russia has a presence—the oil industry. These financial losses show that Russia’s economic activity in Bosnia is explained not primarily by commercial interests, but by broader geopolitical calculations (Turcalo, 2025). On the other hand, some analysts draw attention to the fact that Russian investments in Republika Srpska may consist of hidden deals not reflected in official statistics (Clingendael Institute, 2023).
Import of propaganda from Serbia
Russia’s second important channel in Republika Srpska is the flow of propaganda coming from Serbia. Republika Srpska is among the main recipients of the ready-made and low-cost RT content that comes via Serbia after being localized through RT Balkan. RT Balkan publishes Kremlin-narrative news about Bosnia and Herzegovina every day and features articles supporting the ruling authorities in Republika Srpska (Sijah, 2024). The See Check consortium, created by five fact-checking organizations operating in the Balkans (raskrinkavanje.ba, raskrikavanje.rs, fakenews.rs, raskrikavanje.me, and faktograf.hr), identified 1,400 articles and posts containing manipulation or disinformation across the entire Balkan region in just the first 150 days of the war in Ukraine. The main source of this information was precisely the Serbian press (Sijah, 2024).
Research shows that the “disinformation hub” existing in the Balkans before the full-scale attack on Ukraine—consisting of 29 media outlets, 15 from Serbia and 14 from Bosnia and Herzegovina (especially from Republika Srpska)—is still actively functioning. Of the 20 media outlets that spread the most disinformation about the war in Ukraine, 12 are represented within that very hub (CEP, 2022). Within this network, Sputnik Srbija acts as a “connecting link,” and the network is the most visible source of disinformation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Prelec, Gajic, Krivokapic, and Palloshi-Disha, 2025).
Ties with radical Kremlin propagandists
The third channel emerged after 2022 in line with the new context. This is the direct communication channel between Moscow’s radical propaganda networks and the state institutions of Republika Srpska. In 2024, Rybar, Russia’s sanctioned radical propaganda network in Europe, agreed with the Republika Srpska Agency for Information and Communication Technologies to establish a media school (Pekmez, 2024). Rybar, previously financed by Prigozhin, the founder of Wagner, and currently run by former Russian officer Mikhail Zvinchuk, had earlier announced that it had trained 500 people in Serbia and Republika Srpska on the management of its Telegram channels. After traveling to Banja Luka last year, Zvinchuk stated, following a meeting with the head of the Republika Srpska Agency for Information and Communication Technologies, that they had agreed on new projects, including the media school. The statement noted that Rybar and the government agency of Republika Srpska had reached an understanding to hold systematic master classes with the authors of Russian Telegram channels. The first meeting in this direction was held at the Socio-Political Research Center established by the Republika Srpska government. RTRS, the broadcaster of this institution, reported that it was precisely this center that had first invited Zvinchuk to Bosnia (Pekmez, 2024).
In September 2025, Rybar announced that the school in Republika Srpska had begun operating. Rybar has had a similar school in Kyrgyzstan since 2024, and it has also been reported that it is attempting to establish such schools in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan as well (Hodziç, 2025).
According to European Union documents, Zvinchuk is a member of the working group created in December 2022 by Putin to coordinate Russia’s mobilization in support of the war against Ukraine. Rybar is informally directed by the Kremlin, receives financial support from the state company Rostec, and acts in coordination with Russian intelligence. Rybar sees Bosnia and Herzegovina as one front of this coordinated campaign. Rybar’s Telegram network, which unites more than 250 channels in 28 languages, is followed by over 1.3 million people. On this channel, Zvinchuk systematically denies the Bosniak genocide in Srebrenica and shares posts claiming that a new war will erupt in the Balkans and that Russia will expand toward the Danube (Pekmez, 2024c).
During the most recent presidential elections in Republika Srpska, Zvinchuk, although not an official observer, stayed in Banja Luka for days and made anti-Western statements supporting Dodik’s successor. This is further proof that Russia’s presence in Republika Srpska is not limited to long-distance propaganda, but also takes the form of direct on-the-ground interference (Hodziç, 2025).
It is not only Rybar: other Kremlin propaganda channels centered on Telegram also act jointly with the leadership of Republika Srpska to increase tensions and support separatism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the clearest examples occurred at the beginning of last year, when the prosecutor’s office placed Dodik’s arrest on the agenda. Rybar’s Telegram channels and other propaganda channels collectively carried out a large campaign containing inflammatory and separatist appeals (Support4Partnership, 2025).
This campaign also received mass support from websites belonging to the Portal Kombat network. A 2024 report by France’s state research center VIGINUM showed the existence of Portal Kombat/Pravda domains targeting audiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Viginum, 2024). These domains include not only those created in Serbia; a separate site, srpska.news-pravda.com, was also created in Republika Srpska itself. In just four months—from January to May 2025—1,721 propaganda materials were published on the site (Rizanaj, 2025).
Official security forces and paramilitary groups
One of the most alarming aspects of Russian influence is the gradual militarization of the Republika Srpska police force through Moscow’s support. According to available information, the authorities of Republika Srpska have acquired weapons and tactical equipment with Russian assistance; this extends the operational capacity of the police beyond an ordinary law-enforcement mandate (Prelec, Gajic, Krivokapic, and Palloshi-Disha, 2025d). Analysts note that representatives of Russian intelligence services very frequently teach at the Republika Srpska Police Academy and at the security faculties of the University of Banja Luka. Russia provides support to the Republika Srpska police both in practical and symbolic terms. For the Republika Srpska government, a police force backed by Russian weapons and training constitutes the foundation of a potential future separatist army (IRI, 2024).
Russia maintains its influence in Republika Srpska not only through official security forces, but also through semi-paramilitary groups. In particular, two organizations stand out here: Serbian Honor (Srbska čast) and the Night Wolves (Noćni vukovi). Srbska čast is a paramilitary organization established under the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center based in Niš, Serbia, and it also has a branch in Republika Srpska (IRI, 2024). In the first months of the war in Ukraine, one of the centers for recruiting fighters from the Balkans for Russia’s Wagner Group was Banja Luka, and this coordination was carried out by Srbska čast. In addition, radical right-wing groups called Balkan Cossacks and Narodne Patrole are active in Republika Srpska just as they are in Serbia and cooperate with Russia (Clingendael Institute, 2023).
Noćni vukovi, one of Moscow’s proactive groups worldwide, is the main organizer of pro-Russian rallies in Republika Srpska and is supported by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Every year on January 9, the Russian embassy and these organizations come together at Republika Srpska Day events, which are contrary to the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (IRI, 2024).
The Kremlin’s soft power headquarters in Banja Luka
As in all target countries, Russia’s “soft power” infrastructure continues to function without interruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Center for Russian Studies at the University of Banja Luka operates as a network under the banner of Russian language and cultural activities. This center works closely with the Russian House in Belgrade and the Russian World Center in Republika Srpska (FBN, 2024).
The Russki Mir Foundation, one of the core elements of the Kremlin’s propaganda network worldwide, has been active in Banja Luka since 2012 and still retains influence in academic circles (Russian Foreign Ministry, 2025).
Local Orthodox institutions and the church act as the principal multipliers of Kremlin propaganda in countries where church worshippers constitute a large or significant share of the population. This factor is also quite strong in Republika Srpska, which makes up 31 percent of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here the church traditionally shares and expands Russia’s “cultural war” against the main principles of the European project (Couetau, 2023).
Main narratives
Alongside Russia’s classic narratives targeting European and NATO countries, specific local features also stand out in Republika Srpska.
The first of these is the narrative that “Republika Srpska is under attack.” This line is built on the claim that the West and Sarajevo want to abolish Republika Srpska. Within this framework, legal steps taken against the separatist behavior of the Republika Srpska leadership are portrayed as political pressure, the legitimacy of central institutions is cast into doubt, and international mechanisms become targets of accusation (Reuters, 2025).
The second narrative consists of claims that integration into NATO and the European Union is against the interests of Republika Srpska. Serbian skepticism toward the EU and NATO is partly shaped by political rhetoric and media narratives that present Western institutions as bodies interfering in the autonomy of Republika Srpska (Asllani, 2025). Within this framework, EU reforms are portrayed as being directed against the political will of Republika Srpska, NATO is seen as a threat through the memory of the 1990s, and propaganda is spread claiming that the West wants to abolish the Federation in Bosnia and eliminate Republika Srpska (IRI, 2024). As Bosnia strengthens its military cooperation with NATO and the European Union, Russia intensifies its activity to obstruct this process and uses the leadership of Republika Srpska as a geopolitical “proxy” against Euro-Atlantic integration (Clingendael Institute, 2023).
The third narrative appears as the reverse of the second: “Russia is the only real ally.” Historical ties, Orthodox Christian solidarity, and Russia’s support for Serbian nationalist objectives are emphasized among Bosnian Serbs. Through stories of both “Orthodox-Slavic brotherhood” and “historical justice,” Moscow is presented as the reliable guardian of Serbian political and cultural identity (Prelec, Gajic, Krivokapic, and Palloshi-Disha, 2025).
This narrative also serves as the point of legitimacy for the Kremlin’s next thesis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This thesis seeks to portray Russia in the war in Ukraine not as an aggressor, but as a victim responding to a Western proxy war. At the same time, this narrative includes claims that EU sanctions are harming Europe itself (CEP, 2022).
Narratives in Republika Srpska also include historical revisionism concerning the Yugoslav wars and a specific framing of contemporary ethnic tensions; examples include narratives surrounding NATO’s bombing in 1999 to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and the Srebrenica genocide. Within this framework, Kosovo is often compared to the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war in Ukraine (Asllani, 2025).
Another narrative widely and synchronously spread in both Russia and Republika Srpska in the wartime context is the attempt to synchronize and thereby devalue the massacres committed by Serbs in the former Yugoslavia and the massacres committed by Russia in Ukraine. The massacre committed by Russia in the Ukrainian city of Bucha in 2022 is equated with the Srebrenica genocide through claims of a “staged provocation” or “fabrication,” thereby discredited and presented as a manufactured narrative (EUvsDisinfo, 2023).
Potential for resistance
The reason Russian propaganda moves so comfortably in Serbia and Republika Srpska is not only the Kremlin’s activity, but also—and even more so—internal fractures. Political and ethnic polarization, authoritarianism and corruption, the weakness of institutions, and similar factors create favorable points of penetration for Moscow. At the same time, the unequal conditions of the information market in the Western Balkans, and the fact that the media sphere is under the control of governments allied with Russia, create a serious asymmetry of resources. For this reason, there can be no real talk of a systematic state struggle against Russian propaganda in the region; resistance is formed mostly by civil society, fact-checking centers, and investigative journalism organizations.
One of the best examples of the line of resistance in Serbia is CRTA (Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability — Centar za istraživanje, transparentnost i odgovornost). Alongside monitoring elections and political processes, this organization also tracks manipulation in the media environment and the effects of coordinated information campaigns (CRTA, 2022).
Fact-checking initiatives such as Raskrinkavanje and Istinomjer carry out serious work, especially in exposing disinformation related to the war in Ukraine.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, including Republika Srpska, the situation is more complex. The dysfunctionality of the state, the internal pro-Kremlin media and political ecosystem of Republika Srpska, and the wave of content coming through Serbia all amplify the impact many times over and narrow the potential for resistance even further.
Nevertheless, the Sarajevo-based Raskrinkavanje.ba and Istinomjer operate against disinformation campaigns both within the Federation and within Republika Srpska. Detektor.ba (BIRN BiH), one of the best examples of investigative journalism in the Balkans, helps decode the propaganda mechanism through its investigations into influence networks in Republika Srpska.
In addition to these efforts, there are also regional forms of cooperation in the field of resistance. The See Check consortium, which brings several organizations together, reveals how disinformation waves spread across the region. However, in the face of the organized activity carried out by the Kremlin together with its local allies, these resistance actors, operating with limited resources, do not possess sufficient influence.
CONCLUSION
This study shows that Russia conducts propaganda activity in the Western Balkans—especially in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska)—through systematic and multilayered mechanisms. The joint operation of Kremlin propaganda tools and media outlets controlled by local ruling authorities, the merging of Moscow’s narratives with local religious, ethnic, and political conflicts, informal ties with political circles, the dissemination power of social networks, soft-power institutions, and the capacities of security organs are all used within a single system.
At the center of this system in the Western Balkans stands Serbia. Belgrade functions as the principal platform where Moscow’s narratives are localized and exported across the Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly Republika Srpska, is one of the clearest stages of Kremlin influence, both because of the flow coming from this platform and because of its own direct links with Moscow. This stage also contains serious security risks, including the possibility of new separatism and bloody conflicts in a region whose painful history is not far in the past.
Russia’s influence here is, of course, not explained solely by Moscow’s activity. The internal weaknesses of the countries of the region—religious and ethnic tensions, political polarization, control over media and civil society, democratic backsliding, informal economic ties, and similar factors—also open broad opportunities for Kremlin narratives.
There are fact-checking organizations, NGOs, and journalistic initiatives in the Western Balkans that organize resistance to this systematic and massive influence campaign, but their resources are insufficient to cope with such a large mechanism. In this region, the path to combating Russian propaganda lies in accelerating integration with the West, strengthening democratic institutions, and, as we have also emphasized in our earlier writings, advancing through Europe’s common efforts.
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