Introduction
In recent years, a weakening of democracy on a global scale has been observed. The main causes of this decline include the rise of authoritarian leaders, the growth of populist political movements, the manipulation of information, the spread of disinformation through social media, and restrictions on civil liberties (Diamond, 2019). In many countries, independent judiciaries, free media, and electoral institutions are falling under government control. The weakening of democracy is also intensified by internal factors such as economic inequality, corruption, and public distrust (Inglehart and Norris, 2019). The weak influence of international organizations and geopolitical interests further accelerate this process. As a result, the decline in global democracy poses serious threats to global stability, human rights, and the rule of law.
Today, global democracy faces serious challenges. The evolution of authoritarian regimes into new forms, the widespread use of populist rhetoric, the transformation of technology into a tool of control, and economic injustices deepen this trend (Guriev and Treisman, 2019). The restoration and strengthening of democracy is possible only through the empowerment of institutions as well as civil society, education, and global solidarity. Otherwise, democracy risks collapsing not only as a political model but also as a value system.
The illusion of the global spread of democratic values and institutions has, since the second decade of the 21st century, increasingly been replaced by deep concerns. According to reports by Freedom House, the V-Dem Institute, and other respected international organizations, democratic indicators around the world have been consistently declining since 2005 (Repucci and Slipowitz 3; Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). This process is referred to as “the decline of democracy” or “democratic backsliding” and is observed not only in authoritarian regimes but also in countries that are considered models of liberal democracy.
The causes of democracy’s decline are multifaceted: the rise of authoritarian populism, elected autocrats hollowing out legal institutions from within, information manipulation, and the spread of digital authoritarianism are among the main factors (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018a). Global security crises, economic instability, migration flows, and public polarization further undermine an environment favorable to democracy. As a result, civil liberties are restricted, the separation of powers is disrupted, and elections begin to carry merely symbolic meaning.
In this analysis, the KHAR Center will examine the reasons behind the global decline of democracy through a multidimensional approach and explore the risks that current trends pose for the future of the political order.
Purpose of the Analysis
The main objective of this analysis is to examine the global democratic decline observed in the 21st century in a multidimensional way, investigate the structural and institutional causes of this process, and identify how this regression manifests in both global and local (Azerbaijan) contexts. The analysis also aims to expose the legal and political mechanisms used by elected autocrats to strengthen their power, including the weakening of democratic institutions and erosion of the rule of law. Additionally, the analysis seeks to identify the threats this decline poses to the international democratic system and to discuss possible mechanisms for future democratic revival.
Key Research Question
Through which institutional, social, and normative mechanisms does democratic backsliding occur in the modern world, and in what specific forms does this process manifest in authoritarian regimes like Azerbaijan?
Sources of Information
- Academic Literature – Works by internationally recognized scholars on theories of democracy and authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, Lührmann & Lindberg, Mounk, Foa, etc.).
- Empirical Reports – Annual democracy indicators and country reports by organizations such as Freedom House, the V-Dem Institute, and the Economist Intelligence Unit.
- Official Documents and Media – Election commission reports, constitutional amendments, information on media control.
- Additional Sources – Investigative journalism, NGO reports, and documents from international observation missions.
Analytical Tools
- Discourse Analysis – Examines political rhetoric and normative changes concerning democratic institutions (e.g., “authoritarian measures in the name of democracy”).
- Use of Classifications and Indices – Applies concepts like competitive authoritarianism and democratic backsliding using indicators such as “Freedom in the World” (Freedom House) and the “V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index.”
- Country Case Studies – Processes in selected countries such as Hungary, Poland, the USA, India, and Azerbaijan are analyzed individually.
Limitations
- In certain authoritarian countries (including Azerbaijan), limited information flow makes it difficult to obtain statistical and objective data.
- The variation of normative standards across countries – the concept of “democracy” varies across political-cultural contexts, creating an epistemological barrier.
- Although the analysis includes a brief historical excursus, it mainly focuses on the contemporary period (primarily post-2000); a full analysis of historical causes is beyond the scope of this work.
Keywords: Democratic decline, democratic backsliding, competitive authoritarianism, elected autocrats, institutional weakening, populism, rule of law, political polarization, digital authoritarianism, civil liberties, political legitimacy, liberal democracy, authoritarian stability, information manipulation, authoritarian consolidation.
Historical Excursus: The Crisis of Representation and the Rise of Populism
The concept of democracy has existed in various forms throughout history. In ancient Athens, citizens would gather in the agora to directly discuss public issues. In medieval England, people would gather in town halls to make decisions (Robert Dahl, 2000). In modern times, democracy is mainly built on the principle of representation – citizens participate in elections to express their opinions and choose leaders who govern the state. However, the functioning of this system is increasingly criticized.
In many modern democratic countries, citizens believe the political system does not reflect their interests. They feel they have no say in politics, that leaders are distant and unresponsive, and that they primarily serve the interests of the wealthy and powerful (Inglehart and Norris, 2019). These anti-elitist views both increase distrust in the representative system and lead to growing support for populist movements (Mounk and Foa, 2018).
According to a 2024 international survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, citizens in many countries are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy. This dissatisfaction has significantly increased even in high-income countries (Pew Research Center, “Global Democracy 2024”). In another 2023 survey, a majority of people living in democratic countries reported that politicians do not care about their opinions, and many said that no real political party represents them (Pew Research Center, “Politics and Representation 2023”).
These results show that public trust in political institutions has weakened, and this weakness has taken on the character of a systemic crisis. This is not just ordinary political disappointment – citizens believe democratic institutions no longer represent them and are demanding more fundamental changes (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018b).
Some experts propose institutional reform and the creation of more transparent, accountable governance mechanisms as a way out of this crisis (Diamond, 2008). Others emphasize the importance of strengthening elements of direct democracy – referendums, citizens’ assemblies, and participatory tools (Smith, 2009). The rise of populism demonstrates that people want closer and more relatable politicians “from among the people.” However, this approach is not free from risks either, as populist rhetoric often undermines institutional stability and promotes emotional decision-making (Urbinati, 2014).
In this context, the key question is: Which approach can be more effective in ensuring stronger citizen participation in politics – increasing elements of direct democracy, or reforming the representative system to be more functional and fair? This question is of vital importance for the future of 21st-century democracy.
Theoretical Framework: The Concept and Analysis of Democratic Decline
Democratic decline or democratic backsliding has become one of the most critical subjects of contemporary political science. To understand this process, various theoretical approaches have been developed, explaining the different forms and causes of states sliding toward authoritarianism.
One of the most influential theories is the model of competitive authoritarianism proposed by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. According to this model, some regimes preserve the formal appearance of democratic institutions—elections, independent media, judicial systems, and political competition—but systematically manipulate them to eliminate real competition (Levitsky and Way, 2010a). In such regimes, elections are held, but they are neither free nor fair; independent media is brought under control, opposition faces pressure, and the legal system operates under the influence of the ruling power.
Another important approach is the model of democratic backsliding developed by Anna Lührmann and Staffan I. Lindberg. This model argues that authoritarianism does not usually emerge through coups or military dictatorships but rather through the gradual weakening of democratic institutions by leaders who often come to power through elections. They use “legal tools” to amend constitutions and laws to serve their own interests, thus collapsing the system from within (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). This also overlaps with the concepts of “illiberal democracy” or “electoral authoritarianism.” For example, Erdoğan declared even before coming to power that democracy was not a goal but a means for him (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 1997). Turkey’s current political landscape clearly demonstrates what his goal was—potential alternatives have been imprisoned, all media placed under control, and democracy ideologically discredited.
Yascha Mounk and Roberto Stefan Foa’s research describes a socio-political process known as normative disaffection. Their 2017 study published in the Journal of Democracy shows that in Western societies, especially among the youth, enthusiasm for democracy has significantly declined. Young people no longer see democracy as an essential or effective governance model compared to previous generations (Foa and Mounk, 2017). This indicates a weakening of democratic legitimacy and an increase in long-term threats to stability.
Lastly, scholars like Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor have developed the theory of authoritarian stability. According to them, modern authoritarian leaders do not rely solely on repression but also on co-optation—bringing political elites and key social groups into the system—to weaken resistance. This dual strategy—violent repression on one hand and concessions and loyalty mechanisms on the other—ensures regime continuity and prevents democratic transitions (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2018).
These theoretical frameworks collectively show that the decline of democracy in the modern world does not happen suddenly and cannot be explained solely by repressive policies. The process often unfolds within a legal framework, using the “language of democracy” but in contradiction with its spirit. Thus, this decline must be analyzed on institutional, social, and normative levels.
Analysis of Democratic Decline in the Context of Azerbaijan
Although Azerbaijan took some steps toward building democratic institutions after regaining independence, for over three decades (33 years), it has exhibited a clear example of democratic backsliding. This process can be analyzed using various theoretical models, all of which are reflected in Azerbaijan’s political reality.
Levitsky and Way’s model of competitive authoritarianism fits well with Azerbaijan’s past authoritarian trajectory. While elections and political institutions are held formally, reports by international monitoring organizations indicate that the conditions for electoral competition were first significantly limited and eventually eliminated altogether. For example, the 2018 presidential election was deemed neither free nor fair by the OSCE/ODIHR observation mission (OSCE/ODIHR, 2018). Subsequent elections have become increasingly non-competitive and unfree. Currently, independent media is under strict censorship and state control, opposition activists are subjected to various forms of pressure, including imprisonment and persecution (Freedom House, 2023). As Levitsky and Way emphasize, although institutions exist formally, real political competition is absent, making elections mere performances (Levitsky and Way, 2010).
Lührmann and Lindberg’s democratic backsliding model explains well the gradual weakening of democratic institutions in Azerbaijan through the use of legal tools. Constitutional amendments made in 2002, 2009, and 2016 sequentially weakened the multi-party system, paved the way for indefinite rule, and centralized power entirely. After the 2020 victory in the Karabakh war, the regime took on characteristics of electoral authoritarianism (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). Under the banner of ultra-patriotism, the independence of electoral commissions and the judiciary was completely dismantled, and political competition became a thing of the past.
Mounk and Foa’s concept of normative disaffection also resonates in Azerbaijani society. Among the younger generation especially, there is a noticeable decline in confidence in political processes and a reluctance to see democracy as an effective governance model. This results in low political participation and weakened civic engagement. For instance, the disengagement of youth from opposition activity and their passive approach to politics damage the legitimacy of democracy (Mounk, 2018).
The authoritarian stability theory by Frantz and Kendall-Taylor also accurately reflects Azerbaijan’s political reality. The regime does not rely solely on repressive mechanisms but also incorporates political elites and influential social groups through various concessions and co-optation tactics. In other words, opposition groups are offered a binary choice: “either authoritarian repression or authoritarian care” (Elman Fattah, 2019). For example, maintaining ties with businesspeople, bureaucrats, and some opposition representatives while ensuring their loyalty to the regime is a commonly used method in Azerbaijan. This dual strategy of repression and co-optation plays a crucial role in regime consolidation (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2018).
Thus, Azerbaijan can be classified as a country where democratic decline occurs at institutional, normative, and social levels in a complex manner. The weakening of democracy cannot be explained solely through political repression and election fraud; it also stems from deliberate manipulation of legal mechanisms and the public’s loss of faith in democracy. This should be seen as both a weakening of democratic legitimacy and a threat to long-term political stability.
1. Competitive Authoritarianism
Levitsky and Way’s “competitive authoritarianism” concept describes a spectrum between democratic and authoritarian regimes. In such regimes, elections and other democratic institutions formally exist, but real political competition is absent. Elections are held regularly and according to rules, but these rules are manipulated to serve the ruling party’s interests. Such regimes feature:
- Elections: Held formally, but real competition is undermined through pressure on the opposition, biased election administration, fraud, and manipulation.
- Media: Independent and critical media is severely restricted; censorship and state control are widespread.
- Judiciary: No independent judiciary; laws are applied according to government interests.
- Opposition: Silenced or weakened through repression, imprisonment, political pressure, and intimidation.
In these regimes, democratic institutions exist only decoratively, while the essence of democracy—free and fair political competition—is destroyed (Levitsky and Way, 2010).
Real Country Examples
- Russia: The Putin regime is a prime example of competitive authoritarianism. Since the early 2000s, elections have been held, but opposition leaders face heavy pressure, media is fully state-controlled, and public opinion is tightly managed. The assassinations of opposition figures like Boris Nemtsov and Alexei Navalny, and the closure of critical media outlets, reflect a system where elections are formal but real competition is non-existent.
- Turkey: After Erdoğan came to power, from the 2010s onward, state control over independent media and the judiciary intensified. Following the failed 2016 coup attempt, repression escalated, with hundreds of journalists arrested and opposition leaders persecuted. Although elections are held, the judicial system is politically influenced, media is censored, and opposition figures (e.g., Ekrem İmamoğlu, Ümit Özdağ) have been imprisoned. These trends place Turkey firmly within the competitive authoritarianism model.
- Azerbaijan: The Aliyev regime has entrenched competitive authoritarianism in Azerbaijan’s political system over recent decades. Elections are formally held but are not deemed free or fair by international organizations. Independent media is either highly restricted or forced into exile. State-run media only promotes the government’s position. Repression, arrests, and pressure on opposition persist, and public protests face harsh crackdowns. Civil society activity is severely curtailed.
Other Examples
- Venezuela (under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro): Elections are held, but the state uses media to promote pro-government narratives and suppresses the opposition.
- India (under Narendra Modi): Elections are free, but repression of religious and ethnic minorities and media pressure diminish the quality of competition.
- Hungary (under Viktor Orbán): Elections are held, but laws are amended to suit ruling party interests, and independent media and courts are restricted.
Nuances of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Azerbaijani Context
Azerbaijan’s political system bears all core features of Levitsky and Way’s competitive authoritarianism model. According to this model, while institutions such as elections, courts, and media exist formally, they function under authoritarian control. Azerbaijan stands out through the following components:
1. Electoral Formalism and Political Monopoly
Although presidential and parliamentary elections are held regularly, they do not meet democratic standards. The OSCE/ODIHR’s report on the 2018 presidential elections stated that “the elections were neither free nor fair; a genuine competitive environment did not exist.” The ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) has dominated the political system for years, while access to elections by rival forces is blocked through administrative and legal barriers (OSCE/ODIHR, 2018).
2. Media Under Control
Most major television and print media in Azerbaijan are controlled by government-aligned groups or personally by the ruling family. In Reporters Without Borders’ 2024 Press Freedom Index, Azerbaijan ranked 164th out of 180 countries. While online media has created alternative information sources, legal and technical censorship is imposed on them. The 2021 “Media Law” placed harsh restrictions on free journalism.
3. Repression of the Opposition, Media, and Civil Society
The Azerbaijani regime employs a variety of repressive strategies to eliminate political competition and ensure authoritarian stability. These include:
- Legal restrictions: Laws passed in 2021–2022 significantly curtailed the activities of critical media and political parties. Amendments to the “Law on Political Parties” (2022) made party registration difficult and restricted funding. Since 2009, regulations on NGO registration and activity have been increasingly restrictive. Post-2014 donor laws forced many local and international NGOs to shut down. A new wave of repression in 2023–2024 has nearly eradicated civil society.
- Politically motivated arrests: Independent politicians, journalists, and activists are frequently charged with “hooliganism,” “drug possession,” “disruption of public order,” “tax evasion,” “smuggling,” or even “treason.” These charges serve to legitimize political repression.
- Media exile and defamation: Most independent media is either shut down or forced into exile. State-affiliated media runs systematic campaigns branding opposition leaders as “traitors,” “Western agents,” or “radicals,” reducing public support and weakening political engagement (Amnesty International, 2024).
- Suppression of freedom of assembly: Political rallies are virtually impossible. Baku authorities routinely deny permits for opposition rallies in central areas. Peaceful protests are often violently dispersed. For example, a 2019 protest by the National Council was broken up by police, with dozens detained, and opposition leaders like Ali Karimli and Tofig Yagublu subjected to torture (BBC Azerbaijan, October 2019).
- Digital surveillance and online repression: In recent years, online activists have become targets. Those criticizing the regime on social media are tracked, attacked by trolls and fake accounts, and sometimes threatened with cyberattacks and data leaks.
- Economic and social pressure: Opposition-leaning individuals face informal employment bans in the private sector; even their families may be targeted. This fosters fear and discourages political activism.
- Co-optation and divide-and-rule tactics: The regime offers financial or administrative incentives to certain opposition parties or individuals to bring them into its orbit. In return, these actors behave loyally, blurring lines between genuine and fake opposition. This creates a public distinction between the “national opposition” and the “traitorous opposition,” manipulating public opinion.
These repressive strategies aim not only to suppress political struggle but also to maintain authoritarian stability, legitimize one-man rule internationally, and minimize alternative voices within the system. The result is not just a violation of political rights but also the prevention of democratic transformation of society as a whole.
Judicial system and abuse of law
The judiciary is not independent from the executive branch. Politically motivated verdicts, pressure on independent lawyers, and judges’ loyalty to the government have crippled the legal system. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index also reports serious issues in this field.
In sum, Azerbaijan’s political regime exhibits the classic features of competitive authoritarianism. Democratic institutions are merely symbolic and do not permit real political competition. Elections, courts, and media exist formally but serve to consolidate power. This shows that under a constitutional facade, Azerbaijan has transformed into a hard authoritarian system.
Conclusion
In the modern era, the phenomenon of democratic decline emerges as a multifaceted, complex, and dynamic process. These processes are no longer limited to traditional authoritarian coups and overtly repressive policies. Instead, the model of competitive authoritarianism described by Levitsky and Way shows how democratic institutions are systematically undermined despite their formal preservation. In this model, regimes use elections and democratic institutions to gain legitimacy, while simultaneously eliminating competition and thereby eroding the foundation of the democratic system (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Azerbaijan stands out as a typical example of this model: the regime maintains electoral formalism but does not allow political competition, the entirety of the media is under regime control, and opposition activity is effectively criminalized. In this respect, Azerbaijan represents one of the primary examples of the successful implementation of competitive authoritarianism in the post-Soviet space.
The democratic backsliding theory by Anna Lührmann and Staffan Lindberg emphasizes that the new wave of authoritarianism occurs in a “creeping” manner—that is, gradually and institutionally (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). This approach explains the weakening of democratic foundations through the manipulation of electoral systems, legal structures, and judicial institutions in accordance with authoritarian interests. The model currently observed in countries like Hungary and Poland resembles Azerbaijan’s recent past: changes in the legal framework and the subordination of the judiciary to political control result in the preservation of democracy only in form, while its essential functions are disrupted. This type of backsliding weakens the long-term resilience of democratic institutions and restricts political pluralism.
The co-optation and repression strategies proposed by Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor encompass the parallel mechanisms that ensure the durability of authoritarian regimes (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2018). Through co-optation, political elites, family members, and key societal groups are integrated into the system, while opposition and independent media are suppressed through repressive measures, thus laying the foundation for long-term rule. Azerbaijan clearly represents this model through the formal maintenance of elections, the placement of political elites and family members in key positions, the implementation of repressive policies, and increased control over the media. Compared to Russia and other post-Soviet countries, Azerbaijan applies this combination of authoritarian tools with considerable success.
Overall, democratic decline presents a systemic threat to Azerbaijan on institutional, normative, and social levels. The causes and mechanisms of this decline are multifaceted: the restriction of competition, legal manipulations, the erosion of public trust in democracy, as well as the effective application of repression and co-optation strategies. The combined effect of these factors decisively destroys the functionality of democratic institutions despite their formal preservation and eliminates political pluralism.
In conclusion, the case of Azerbaijan is a vital subject of study for understanding how contemporary theories of democratic decline manifest in practice. The processes observed in this country provide both theoretical and empirical insights for global democracy research and underscore once again the importance of a multidimensional analysis of democratic backsliding.
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