The ideologically antagonistic relations that have persisted for decades entered an acute phase as of June 13. The latest confrontation between Iran and Israel marks a significant escalation. Israel, under the pretext of “preempting the potential threats posed by Iran’s nuclear program,” launched a unilateral military operation, which Prime Minister Netanyahu later addressed in a speech. In Western media, the attack has been dubbed the “Rising Lion.” In Hebrew, the operation is named Mitva Am ke-Lavi (“The Rule of a People Like a Lion”), a phrase drawn from the fourth book of the Tanakh:
“This people rises like a lion, stands like a lion; it shall not rest until it devours its prey and drinks the blood of the slain” (Miri 2025).
In Saadya Gaon’s Tafsir at-Tawrat bil-‘Arabiyya, the verse is interpreted as follows: the lion “devouring its prey” symbolizes the destruction of Israel’s enemies, while “drinking blood” represents the seizure of their wealth (Miri 2025).
The confrontation has involved the use of drones, long-range missiles, and—according to Iranian claims—next-generation military aircraft. The conflict has caused destruction on both sides, and Israel’s targeting of the Strait of Hormuz places the global economy at significant risk.
The continued exchange of threats between the two states may prolong the conflict or transform it into a multi-vector war. However, it remains debatable to what extent Israel, already conducting military operations on several fronts, is willing to initiate a full-scale war with Iran. Similarly, Iran’s capacity to engage in such a war is uncertain, particularly in light of its recent economic hardships—including devaluation and inflation—and the stagnation in nuclear negotiations with the United States mediated by the European Union.
The impact of the conflict on Azerbaijan is inevitable. Should the parties agree to de-escalate due to the factors mentioned, the situation may ease somewhat for Azerbaijan. Otherwise, if the escalation intensifies, Azerbaijan is likely to face severe challenges, including a possible influx of refugees.
This analysis by KharCenter examines Azerbaijan’s preparedness for emerging geopolitical realities in the context of a prolonged and intensified Iran–Israel escalation, viewed through the lens of dominant regional narratives.
A Brief Overview of Azerbaijan–Iran Bilateral Relations
Following the dissolution of the USSR and the subsequent independence of Azerbaijan alongside other former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan–Iran relations have evolved through various phases marked by shifting dynamics. Although the political and economic spheres of the two regions had been separated much earlier by the treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmenchay (1828), the shared historical legacy, cultural and identity affinities, and ethnic ties between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic of Iran remain salient today. Two provinces (ostans) located in the northern part of Iran bear the name “Azerbaijan”: East Azerbaijan with its administrative center in Tabriz, and West Azerbaijan centered in Urmia. According to Iranian nationalists, the term “Azerbaijan” refers exclusively to Iranian territory south of the Araz River (IRAM Center 2023), while the northern areas under the sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan are historically referred to as Arran and Shirvan (IRAM Center 2023). Azerbaijani historiography, by contrast, emphasizes the Turkic origins of the Safavid and Qajar dynasties, which ruled between 1501 and 1925. Despite these conflicting narratives, both sides recognize the long-standing inclusion of Azerbaijan and Iran within a unified political-economic relationship system.
In addition, the confessional commonalities of the two countries must be noted. Iran is officially a Shiite state governed through a clerical system with elected institutions. According to the State Committee on Religious Associations of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 96% of the Azerbaijani population identify as Muslim, of which approximately 70% adhere to the Shiite denomination (Report.az 2016).
Ethnic commonalities between the two countries also constitute a factor affecting bilateral relations. Although no official statistical source confirms the exact number of Turks residing in Iran, former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, during a 2011 visit to Turkey, claimed that Turkish-speaking individuals constituted 40% of Iran’s population (Jabbarli et al. 2023). Some sources estimate even higher figures when including other Turkic groups such as the Qashqai and Turkmen populations (Jabbarli et al. 2023). In Azerbaijan, according to the 2009 census conducted by the State Statistical Committee, individuals identifying with Azerbaijani ethnicity (which coincides with the ethnic group referred to as “Turks” in Iran and may also be termed Azerbaijani Turks) constituted 91.6% of the total population (State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2015).
Despite—or perhaps due to—the shared religious-cultural heritage and ethnic ties, the bilateral relationship has developed in varied phases. In a 2012 interview with Iran’s IRNA news agency, then Deputy Foreign Minister and now Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi described Iran–Azerbaijan relations as “full of ups and downs.” While maintaining an overall positive tone throughout the interview, he emphasized that the “Zionist regime” sought to disrupt these relations (IRNA 2012).
Particularly during the presidency of Abulfaz Elchibey, the second president of the Republic of Azerbaijan, his rhetoric surrounding “Southern Azerbaijan” led to heightened tensions between the two countries. Notably, Iran’s support for an armed uprising that began in the city of Ganja, and the symbolic gesture of Iran’s ambassador to Azerbaijan at the time, Ali Asghar Nahavandian, presenting a Quran to the insurgent leader Suret Huseynov during a visit to Ganja, merit attention (Jafarli 2022). During the presidencies of Heydar Aliyev and Ilham Aliyev—until the Second Karabakh War—the “Southern Azerbaijan” rhetoric was significantly toned down, which contributed to a relative stabilization of bilateral ties. However, Azerbaijan’s intensifying relations with Israel increasingly became a key factor in Iran’s South Caucasus policy. In addition, disputes over the Araz-Alov-Sharg oil fields, the banning of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, and the later arrests of activists affiliated with the Muslim Unity Movement served as catalysts for periodic shocks in Iran–Azerbaijan relations (Jafarli 2022).
Following the 44-day war of 2020 (also referred to as the Second Karabakh War), the “Southern Azerbaijan” discourse temporarily reappeared in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy rhetoric. This reemergence was largely reactive and, according to Baku, was provoked by the entry of Iranian armed forces into internationally recognized Azerbaijani territory during the war, where they reportedly obstructed Azerbaijani forces advancing toward the city of Zangilan for several days. In 2021, the pro-government military-analytical media portal Caliber.Az produced a video on the incident accusing Iran of “betrayal” (CaliberAz 2021). A subsequent video released in 2022 conveyed a more explicit message in response to Tehran’s claim that Azerbaijan’s creation of the Zangezur corridor under its own control would block the land route between Iran and Armenia, thereby enabling a “Turan/NATO route.” The video declared: “The time has come for Southern Azerbaijan to secede from Iran” (CaliberAz 2022).
As this indicates, the post-war transformation of the geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus exacerbated tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran and led to the reactive reintegration of the “Southern Azerbaijan” discourse into Baku’s foreign policy. Several events that occurred between 2020 and 2024 contributed to a significant deterioration in relations. Iran’s repeated accusations in 2021 that Azerbaijan maintained close ties with the “Zionist regime,” its conduct of military exercises along the Araz River for the first time since the 1990s, Azerbaijan’s retaliatory joint exercises with Turkey, and the 2023 armed attack on the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran are among the key incidents that shaped bilateral tensions.
From April to May 2024, signs of de-escalation began to emerge in the relationship, and Azerbaijan’s “Southern Azerbaijan” rhetoric simultaneously subsided.
Despite serious developments such as the mysterious helicopter crash that resulted in the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and other high-ranking officials following their visit to Azerbaijan, as well as the foiled assassination attempt against Rabbi Shneor Segal in Baku, these incidents did not substantially affect the improving trajectory of Iran–Azerbaijan relations.
The most recent visit of Iran’s current president, Masoud Pezeshkian, to Baku and the signing of Memoranda of Understanding and a Joint Declaration between the parties reflected a shared desire to maintain positive bilateral relations.
However, one does not always control the narrative—sometimes the narrative begins to control you…
A Brief Overview of Azerbaijan–Israel Bilateral Relations
In contrast to its relations with Iran, Azerbaijan’s ties with Israel are not culturally grounded but instead built upon rational political and economic interests. These relations have almost never experienced regression and have consistently progressed along an upward trajectory.
In this regard, a notable document leaked by WikiLeaks in 2009, summarizing U.S. diplomats’ views on Azerbaijan–Israel relations, is worth attention. The document notes that both Azerbaijan and Israel perceive Iran as an existential threat (U.S. Department of State 2009). It also cites Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev likening the relationship to an iceberg, with “nine-tenths of it hidden beneath the surface” (U.S. Department of State 2009).
The document also observes that Israel is understanding of Azerbaijan’s voting behavior on issues concerning Palestine and Lebanon in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and other international bodies, and it recognizes Azerbaijan’s policy of avoiding provocation toward Iran (U.S. Department of State 2009). Although dated, subsequent developments suggest that such behavior has remained consistent.
Since the 1990s, Azerbaijan has played a vital role in Israel’s energy consumption. During the 1990s and 2000s, Azerbaijani energy was of critical importance to Israel, and throughout the Second Intifada (2000–2004), Azerbaijan maintained its position as Israel’s key Muslim partner (Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies 2025). According to 2019 reports in Israel Hayom, Azerbaijan provided around 60% of Israel’s gasoline needs (Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies 2025). A 2025 article by the Atlantic Council reports that Azerbaijan supplies 55% of Israel’s oil imports (Epstein 2025). Ynet notes that at the end of 2024, during Israeli military operations in Gaza, Azerbaijan increased its oil exports to Israel to 55%, ensuring an uninterrupted flow (Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies 2025).
Israel, in turn, has been Azerbaijan’s primary arms supplier. During the 2010s, Israel accounted for 60–69% of Azerbaijan’s arms imports (Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies 2025), including strategic weaponry that proved decisive during the Second Karabakh War. U.S. diplomatic cables indicate that the collective West refrained from supplying strategic arms to Azerbaijan in order to maintain military-political balance with Armenia, while weaponry obtained from Belarus and Ukraine failed to meet Azerbaijan’s expectations (U.S. Department of State 2009). In this context, Israel assumed a critical role by imposing no such restrictions (U.S. Department of State 2009).
Despite the absence of an embassy in Israel for many years, Azerbaijan opened a full diplomatic mission in March 2023 (APA 2023). In September 2024, a memorandum of cooperation was signed between the two countries in the defense industry with the participation of private sector actors (Epstein 2025).
In the U.S., Azerbaijan has cooperated closely with Jewish lobbying groups. The Jewish lobby played a decisive role in the removal of the 2002 aid ban against Azerbaijan (Epstein 2025).
In December 2024, representatives of AIPAC—the largest pro-Israel lobbying organization in the United States—met with President Ilham Aliyev and reportedly told him: “Your support for Israel will be recognized” (Epstein 2025).
In the Event of a Force Majeure in Iran...
This analysis examines the potential demographic impacts of a prolonged escalation in Iran on both countries. As previously noted, if de-escalation occurs, Azerbaijan’s position may ease considerably. If escalation continues, however, a significant refugee influx and other challenges may follow.
From the outset of the conflict, Azerbaijan expressed a clear preference for maintaining the status quo. On the day the escalation began, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan issued a formal statement calling on parties to resolve differences through international law and diplomacy:
“Strongly condemning the escalation of tensions, we call on the parties to resolve existing differences solely through dialogue and diplomatic means, in accordance with the norms and principles of international law.”
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2025)
The very next day, anticipating the revival of “Zionist collaboration” rhetoric by Iranian conservatives, Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov called his Iranian counterpart Seyyed Abbas Araghchi to assure him that Azerbaijan would not allow its territory to be used for attacks on Iran (IRNA 2025). Implicitly, despite close ties with Israel, Azerbaijan clearly does not wish to adopt an anti-Iranian posture. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan’s role in supplying 55% of Israel’s oil amid a prolonged conflict may trigger Iranian accusations. Considering strategic locations such as Tehran are under threat, the potential consequences of such accusations and Iran’s possible efforts to halt Azerbaijani oil exports remain unclear.
The growing scale and media visibility of the conflict may attract disproportionate attention to Azerbaijan, sparking scrutiny of its relationship with Israel in the context of the ongoing violence in Gaza. Rhetoric previously promoted by Iran portraying Azerbaijan as collaborating with the “Zionist regime” quickly resurfaced on Iranian social media platforms.
Claims also emerged suggesting that Azerbaijan supported Israel by using “ethnic Azerbaijani spies” within Iran during the recent strikes—prompting an official response. Presidential aide Hikmet Hajiyev rejected these allegations on his official X account, calling them “baseless” and “fabricated” (Hajiyev 2025).
These developments underscore how sensitive the Azerbaijani government remains to public discourse amid geopolitical crises.
Given the emotional intensity and information volatility of war, a protracted military conflict may subject Azerbaijan’s cooperation with Israel—including oil exports—to broader public debate. The implications of such narratives are uncertain.
Two days after the escalation, President Ilham Aliyev received the new Palestinian ambassador to Azerbaijan on an official non-working day. During the meeting, he reaffirmed Azerbaijan’s “support for the just demands of the Palestinian people, a resolution to the Israel–Palestine conflict based on the two-state principle and relevant UN resolutions, and consistent support for Palestine’s position in UN General Assembly votes” (Oxu.az 2025).
Alongside this narrative, a renewed focus on the “Southern Azerbaijan” discourse may arise. President Aliyev’s situational use of this discourse during previous tensions with Iran could now place him in a difficult position.
Would the Azerbaijani Government Refuse Entry to Ethnic Kin in Need?
If the Iran–Israel conflict turns into a “war of attrition” with high levels of destruction, long-term emigration from Iran for both security and economic reasons is plausible. Just days into the conflict, the Iranian rial had already lost 10% of its value in domestic markets (Bonbast 2025). Iran’s economy was already under strain, with a 200% devaluation over the past three years and hyperinflation (Bonbast 2025). Israel’s likely strategic aim is to collapse Iran’s economy.
In such a scenario, Azerbaijan would not only be bound by the international legal principle of non-refoulement but also bear a moral responsibility toward its ethnic kin.
Conclusion
Azerbaijan is one of the countries likely to feel the consequences of the Iran–Israel confrontation earliest. The conflict could yield multivector repercussions both regionally and domestically. Broadly, Azerbaijan’s stance appears to favor the preservation of the status quo.
A force majeure situation in Iran would test Azerbaijan’s logistical infrastructure, border and customs preparedness, social integration capacity, and the government's ability to manage economic and social tensions through nonviolent means.
In the face of such challenges—particularly those related to migration—the Azerbaijani government may pursue isolationist policies, as appears to be the case already, justified through security and economic reasoning. However, this may create a contradiction in Azerbaijan’s own nation-building narrative: the government embraces “Southern Azerbaijan” as a priority when politically convenient, and marginalizes it when not. As an old Azerbaijani proverb says: “While there were apricots in the orchard, there were greetings; once the apricots were gone, so were the greetings.”
On the other hand, Iran’s use of the “collaboration with the Zionist regime” discourse against Azerbaijan may intensify. Azerbaijan currently supplies 55% of Israel’s oil needs; thus, its role in enabling Israel’s military operations cannot go unnoticed by the affected party.
References
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