Abstract
On August 8, in Washington, the initialing of the peace treaty by the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia entered history as a landmark event on the road toward eliminating the real threat of war and establishing peace between the two states. The steps taken and initiatives implemented in the preceding five years, under the background of two different ideological and political visions, served as indicators of how the two leaders approached and related to the peacebuilding process. The initiatives undertaken in the process of resolving the Karabakh conflict, which began as a territorial and ethno-based confrontation and was also perceived as a clash between an authoritarian regime and an emerging democracy, represented both signals of either preserving a warlike atmosphere or moving toward peace, while simultaneously showing which political line carried more weight.
Introduction
The bloody conflict that began 30 years ago moved for a long time from the negotiating table to the battlefield and then back again to the negotiating table, ultimately shifting with the initialing of the peace treaty. By August 8—the date of the treaty’s initialing—serious transformations had already taken place in the political and ideological perspectives concerning the subject, character, and scale of the conflict. It was precisely this difference in political and ideological approaches, along with the diversification of geopolitical priorities, that served as a springboard toward resolving the frozen conflict.
The initialing of the peace treaty actualizes the need to analyze the seven years that have passed since Nikol Pashinyan came to power—factors that led to the outbreak of the 44-day war, the contentious approaches to the peacebuilding process, and the overall transformation experienced by the process.
In this material prepared by the Khar Center, the importance of the leadership factor in resolving the conflict is taken into account, comparing the perspectives, rhetoric, and behaviors of both heads of state, and analyzing them on the basis of discourse analysis within a historical-comparative context.
The purpose of the analysis is to show, through the lens of leadership, the differences and changes in the positions of the parties concerning the Karabakh conflict, to reveal the conditions dictated by new realities, and to examine the initiatives and compromises that led to peace.
The Beginning of a New Era in the Karabakh Conflict
Nikol Pashinyan’s rise to power through democratic elections in 2018 and his desire to change Armenia’s geopolitical orientation indirectly contributed to a reconfiguration in the South Caucasus and to the re-ignition of the frozen Karabakh conflict (Kirillova Anna, 2020). Until September 2020, the new Armenian leadership pursued a policy aimed at affirming itself as the victorious party in resolving the conflict—yet this stance was radically transformed by the realities brought about by the 44-day war.
In 2018, Pashinyan declared: “The ongoing ‘Revolution of Love and Solidarity’ in Armenia opens new opportunities on the Karabakh issue… Just as the 1988 movement led to the de facto independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, the outcome of this Armenian revolution will be the de jure recognition of its independence” (Strokan, Khalatyan, 2018a).
By 2025, however, he had taken an entirely opposite position, declaring: “In reality, the Karabakh issue was used by certain forces as a tool to prevent Armenia from gaining independence, sovereignty, and from forming and developing statehood.” Addressing Armenians displaced from Karabakh, he said: “With the support of ours and the international community, they should settle in the Republic of Armenia and live, create, and establish themselves here as full-fledged citizens of the Republic of Armenia”—thus proclaiming that further Armenian existence in Karabakh was unrealistic (Mkrtchyan, 2025).
The Pashinyan Government’s Approach to the Karabakh Conflict, 2018–2020
Pashinyan indicated that the primary task in the foreign policy priorities of the new government was the resolution of the Karabakh issue, attempting to shift the subject of negotiations from the dimension of territory to the dimension of security guarantees, while at the same time framing the conflict as a clash between an authoritarian regime and democracy.
A New Perspective on the Conflict
Pashinyan viewed the participation of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in peace talks under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group as a “new impetus” toward turning negotiations from “imitation into a real process”: “The effectiveness of negotiations depends on the direct participation of Nagorno-Karabakh, because the leadership of Armenia has neither political, legal, nor moral grounds to negotiate on its behalf” (Safaryan, 2018a).
The Karabakh Conflict as a Clash Between Authoritarianism and Democracy
Pashinyan argued: “The democratic changes taking place in our country have brought new nuances to our ideas about resolving the problem”—thus attempting to elevate the territorial and ethno-based conflict into the dimension of a clash between authoritarianism and democracy. With the statement, “Any attempt to resolve the conflict through military means creates a direct threat to regional security, democracy, and human rights”—he sought to portray the other side as not a supporter of peace but of war, as an aggressor dangerous for democracy, while simultaneously trying to cast the Karabakh Armenians’ demand for self-determination in the light of democratic values (Aslanyan, 2019; News-Armenia, 2020).
The Dualism of Peace and War
While presenting the resolution of the conflict through peace and negotiations as a priority, the Pashinyan government also sought to appear militarily superior with statements such as: “If we constantly speak about a peace agenda, this should not create the impression that threats of war frighten us. It is Azerbaijan that should be more afraid” (Danielyan, 2020). The Prime Minister reinforced this by declaring: “In the coming years, Armenia will actively modernize its armed forces, purchase new weapons, and stimulate its own defense production” (Safaryan, 2018b). Statements such as “A compromise will be possible when Azerbaijan declares that it is ready to take into account the Karabakh people’s right to self-determination” sought to present the Armenian government as the stronger side (Strokan, Khalatyan, 2018b).
The starting point of new escalation in the Karabakh conflict can be considered Pashinyan’s statement in August 2019, in Stepanakert: “Artsakh is Armenia, period” (Strokan, Khalatyan, 2019).
In response to this statement, Ilham Aliyev, declaring: “Karabakh is the historical and eternal land of Azerbaijan. Therefore, Karabakh is Azerbaijan, exclamation mark,” demonstrated the immutability of his rhetorical approach to resolving the conflict (Azadliq Radiosu, 2019). In Aliyev’s speeches, peace was presented as the priority, while war was portrayed as the last resort for resolving the conflict. By stating, “The Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict must be resolved on the basis of the norms and principles of international law,” and simultaneously, “If they want the issue resolved peacefully and for the Armenian people not to suffer losses, they must withdraw from our lands. We do not want war, but we want our lands. Our presence here today, on this liberated land—Lalatapa—shows that we are bringing that day closer”—Aliyev underscored his uncompromising stance on the issue of territorial integrity (Geneva.mfa, 2018).
The Replacement of Rhetorical Escalation With Compromise
The outcomes of the 44-day war not only caused a radical transformation in the Pashinyan government’s approach to the subject, character, and resolution of the conflict, but also led to changes in Armenia’s priorities and strategy in matters of national security and foreign policy. Since the autumn of 2020, the main line of Pashinyan’s political course consisted of eliminating the threat of renewed military escalation, preventing threats to Armenia’s sovereignty, seeking new alternatives to diversify the country’s security guarantees, securing international guarantees, and at the same time opening communication lines to escape logistical isolation. These commitments placed before the Armenian government the reality of the necessity of compromises.
According to military experts, Azerbaijan’s superiority in both numbers and technology, along with its control of strategically important high ground within Armenia, created a risk of Armenia’s disintegration in the event of a new war (Vartanyan Olesya, 2025a). In parallel, after the September 2022 clashes on the two countries’ border, Aliyev’s statement that “until our border is delimited, no one can say where the border lies” was perceived by Armenia as a threat to its territorial integrity (Jamnews, 2022). Against the backdrop of all these realities, in the past five years, the Pashinyan government has been observed retreating in the face of many of the demands advanced by the Azerbaijani leadership.
Peace Initiatives of the Pashinyan Government, 2020–2025
Attempts at Reconstructing Political-Ideological Views in Armenian Society
- The new political realities of the postwar period offered reconstruction to Armenian society and demonstrated the inevitability of replacing century-old mythological approaches with reality. Nikol Pashinyan explained the psychological, political, and practical transformation in the following way: “The government and I personally came to the conclusion that Historical Armenia and Real Armenia not only do not coincide, but often contradict each other and even create serious threats for one another” (Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, 2024). In the government’s new interpretation, non-recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity was equated with a threat to Armenia’s own existence, while the idea of preserving modern Armenia, even if within today’s small recognized borders, was instilled (Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, 2022a). This approach culminated in Yerevan’s official declaration of recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. In response to Baku’s condition to amend Armenia’s Constitution for the signing of a peace treaty, work began toward constitutional reform.
Transformation in the Approach to the Status of Karabakh
- The geopolitical reality of the postwar period also reformed the outlook on the subject of the conflict—the status of Karabakh. Nikol Pashinyan declared: “Armenia has never had territorial claims against Azerbaijan, and the Karabakh issue is not a matter of territory, but of rights”, thus revealing a fundamental change in Armenia’s approach to the problem: the status of the disputed territory became a secondary issue, while security guarantees moved to the forefront (Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, 2022b). The ruling elite was forced to admit the reality that “the inflated expectations of Armenian society concerning the status of Nagorno-Karabakh” had turned into an obstacle to gaining the support of the international community. Yerevan removed provisions and terminology related to Karabakh from the draft peace treaty being negotiated with Baku (Vartanyan Olesya, 2025b).
Concession to Avoid Military Escalation
- The damage inflicted by war in both military and economic terms pushed the Armenian government to neutralize the threat of new war. To avoid potential military operations expected from Azerbaijan, the Armenian government decided to return four Azerbaijani villages that had been occupied in the early 1990s (BBC, 2024).
Diversification of Security Policy
- The Kremlin’s behavior during the 44-day war and then during Azerbaijan’s local military operations in 2022–2023 prompted official Yerevan to renounce Russia’s “security umbrella” and seek a healthier, more reliable alternative in the West. The Armenian government achieved the deployment of a European Union civilian mission to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border (European Council, 2022). Along with this, joint military exercises with NATO and the United States, the visit of the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives to Armenia in September 2022 during military operations, and the April 2024 Brussels summit with the U.S. State Department and EU leaders were steps calculated toward a Western orientation of Armenian diplomacy (Radio Svoboda, 2022). At the same time, efforts were made to move the negotiation process to the Western mediation table.
Initiatives to Exit Communication Isolation
- Realizing that dependence on the Kremlin was dragging the country into disaster, one of the main tasks before the government became the strengthening of Armenia’s sovereignty. Alongside security guarantees, efforts at economic diversification were accompanied by steps to remove the country from communication isolation. After 2020, improvement of relations with Turkey and the opening of borders became one of the priorities of the Pashinyan government. The issue of handing over an extraterritorial-status road called the “Zangezur Corridor” to Russia was perceived as a threat to Armenia’s sovereignty; therefore, the Pashinyan government proposed a new project—“Crossroads of Peace,” which envisioned restoring all transport communications among Armenia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran (Radio Azatutyun, 2023). In this context, one of Armenia’s main political achievements at the Washington meeting on August 8 was that the Pashinyan government managed to secure U.S. support for this project (Khar Center, 2025).
Turning Military Defeat into an Opportunity for Democratic Transformation
- The defeat of 2020 in a conflict that had, for decades, held the country back politically, economically, militarily, in security, and in many other areas, also opened new opportunities for Armenia. In order to escape dependence on authoritarian Russia, to ensure the sustainability of democratic transformation, and to achieve economic development, the Pashinyan government drew the West into the peacebuilding process, simultaneously striving to strengthen its own security and sovereignty. The fact that the West itself had significant interest in communication lines passing through Armenia—key segments of the Middle Corridor—provided Yerevan with comprehensive guarantees of support (Kseniya Polskaya, 2024). The official reluctance of Baku to see the West at the negotiating table and the visible tension with Russia transformed the peace talks into a bilateral format and into a process closer to peace. At the same time, the Armenian leadership turned the new U.S. president’s desire to obtain the Nobel Peace Prize into an opportunity to regain U.S. support for advancing the process: “Armenian diplomacy understood that America was not interested in the South Caucasus, but clearly expressed the idea that since the U.S. president could not quickly stop the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, he could use this case to declare himself an outstanding peace envoy” (Grigor Atanesyan, 2025).
The Line Pursued by the President of Azerbaijan in Conflict Resolution, 2020–2025
A Dualist Approach to Peacebuilding
- In the past five years, the President of Azerbaijan, in international contacts, said: “The conflict is over, now it is time to think about peace”, speaking about plans and initiatives concerning the new situation in the region. Yet in addressing the domestic audience, he announced the threat of new war. He emphasized that revanchism was reemerging in Armenia, that the West was arming Armenia and pushing it into new war, and that it was planning to open a second front in the South Caucasus against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine. He stressed the importance of Azerbaijan being ready for new war at any moment (President.az, 2024). In parallel, the symbol of power—“the iron fist”—turned into an attribute of war for the Azerbaijani audience, while the president and his family often appeared in military uniforms. Ilham Aliyev’s militarist, “hate-speech”-laden, enemy-oriented, and aggressive rhetoric directed at Zangezur (implying Armenian territory) demonstrated from which position the Azerbaijani leadership approached the process (President.az, 2021).
Baku’s Initiative for Peace
- Nevertheless, the initial draft of the peace treaty was prepared by Azerbaijan and, in the spring of 2022, was presented to the Armenian government through the OSCE Minsk Group. The document included: mutual recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both states, confirmation of the absence of territorial claims against each other and the commitment not to raise such claims in the future, implementation of border delimitation and demarcation, establishment of diplomatic relations, opening of transport and other communications, and organization of cooperation in other mutually interesting areas (Krasilnikov Stanislav, 2023a).
From Multilateral to Bilateral Format in the Peace Process
- In the three years following the war, Ilham Aliyev displayed tolerance toward different formats of peacebuilding, including the initiative of sending the peace treaty draft through the Minsk Group. But in the subsequent stage, the opposite process was observed: the Azerbaijani authorities rejected both Western and Russian mediation, while the dissolution of the Minsk Group was advanced as one of the main conditions for signing a peace treaty (Krasilnikov Stanislav, 2023b). Yet, unlike Russia’s unchanged mediation mission aimed at maintaining the status quo, the sides, for the first time, precisely at the Western negotiation table in Prague, declared that they recognized each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty on the basis of the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration (this was also Armenia’s official confirmation of recognizing Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan). The two countries agreed to establish a joint commission within one month for border delimitation and demarcation (Lazarevskiy Club, 2025). However, shortly after this progress, in the autumn of 2023, Ilham Aliyev definitively abandoned the Western format of negotiations (Azadliq Radiosu, 2023).
“Zangezur Corridor” Replaced by “Trump Road”
- Until early 2025, Ilham Aliyev insisted that the communication line passing through Armenia be implemented exactly in accordance with Paragraph 9 of the Trilateral Declaration of November 10, 2020, i.e., the road placed under Russia’s control (President.az, 2025). Even a member of the Milli Majlis, Gudrat Hasanguliyev, made such a proposal: “Azerbaijan should come to an understanding with Russia and independently implement the clause on opening the road through Zangezur under the November 10 agreement. That is, cleanse Zangezur of Dashnaks… Azerbaijan is creating a security zone in Zangezur…, and at some stage may hand it over to Russia’s control in accordance with the November 10 agreement” (Yeni Musavat, 2022). The shift in position at the White House, where the sides—and especially Ilham Aliyev—paraphed the text of the peace treaty with U.S. mediation and agreed that the communication line, which he had called the “Zangezur Corridor,” would be under the control not of Russia but of the U.S., can be considered a serious breakthrough in the peace process.
The factors that conditioned the Azerbaijani president’s change of position and this step could be diverse: either sympathy or trust in Donald Trump, who shares similar values, or a decision based on realpolitik—to choose the stronger side among the great powers. Even the view of skeptics that “the great powers divided the region among themselves (a Trump–Putin division concerning Ukraine and the South Caucasus)” (Haqqin.az, 2025; BBC, 2025b) may explain Aliyev’s trip to Washington.
Conclusion
The analysis of the rhetoric and behavior of the two leaders showed that the change of power in Armenia in 2018 became a serious turning point in the Karabakh conflict. The different political outlooks and priorities of the new leader gave an impulse to the transition of the conflict into a new phase and changed the imitative character of the resolution process. The mutual analysis of the positions, rhetoric, and behavior of leaders representing different values vividly demonstrated the transformation of the decades-long conflict in the past seven years.
The analysis conducted in historical context highlighted the risks of war for democracy and demonstrated the necessity of compromises and steps based on realpolitik in order to prevent these risks.
The main question that emerged after August 8 concerns the sustainability of the step taken toward ending the conflict that has lasted into its fourth decade and bringing peace to the region, as well as under whose political will this step will be carried out. In other words, regardless of the personal sympathies of two authoritarian leaders (the Aliyev–Trump tandem) and regardless of who is in power, the issue is whether the document signed at the White House will turn into a real process.
The approach to resolving the Karabakh conflict, also from the perspective of a clash between authoritarianism and democracy, shows that risks stemming from the regime differences and characteristics of the conflict’s actors exist for ensuring peace. While democracies rarely, if ever, wage war against one another, war between an authoritarian regime and a democracy—or even between two autocracies—is possible. Thus, for a sustainable and guaranteed peace, the democratic character of both sides is necessary. The answer to the question concerning the fate of peace will also be an indicator of the political identity of the architect of sustainable peace.
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