The Evolution of Authoritarianism in Uzbekistan: Authoritarian Modernization

These five theoretical approaches explain the evolution of authoritarianism in Uzbekistan across different stages:

• Personalist authoritarianism elucidates the political structures of the Karimov era and the regime’s reliance on the individual leader for continuity.
• Dynastic authoritarianism explains the establishment of familial rule through the appointment of Mirziyoyev’s daughter to a senior governmental position.
• Electoral authoritarianism highlights how elections functioned as tools of legitimacy both in the early years of the Karimov regime and under Mirziyoyev’s leadership.
• Hybrid regimes and competitive authoritarianism help unpack the nature and limitations of the reformist rhetoric that emerged after 2016.
• Authoritarian modernization explains the implementation of economic and technocratic reforms without expanding political freedoms.

The synthesis of these theoretical perspectives provides a complex and effective analytical framework for understanding political dynamics and regime resilience strategies in transitional systems such as Uzbekistan.

Historical Roots: The Era of Islam Karimov (1991–2016)

The formation of Uzbekistan’s political regime and its authoritarian character are closely linked to Islam Karimov’s rise to power and the institutional engineering implemented during his rule. This period can be seen as a classical example of post-Soviet authoritarianism, marked by personalist rule, a strengthened repressive apparatus, and regional-clan governance.

Building a Personalist Regime: The 1992 Constitution and Presidential Powers: Although the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan formally invoked democratic state principles, in practice, it reinforced the legal foundation of a strong presidential system. The constitution granted the president extensive powers, including the authority to dissolve parliament. This reflects Barbara Geddes’s definition of personalist regimes, where institutional checks are subordinated to the will of the leader.

Karimov exploited these powers to remove political rivals, strengthen control over the media, and gradually construct a fully centralized authoritarian regime. He declared victories in the 1991, 2000, 2007, and 2015 presidential elections—elections held in accordance with the logic of electoral authoritarianism. These were widely criticized by international observers (OSCE/ODIHR, 2000; 2015).

Formality and Dysfunctionality of Political Institutions: Despite the existence of parliament, political parties, and the judiciary under Karimov, these institutions lacked genuine political power. Political parties such as the People's Democratic Party and the Liberal Democratic Party functioned as “loyal opposition” structures under state control. All elections featured uncompetitive and managed candidates, rendering political pluralism purely cosmetic (Olcott, 2005; Fumagalli, 2007).

The Oliy Majlis (Supreme Assembly) lacked real legislative authority, and most legislation was initiated by the presidential administration. This corresponds with Schedler’s description of “non-transparent competition” and “dysfunctional institutions” within electoral authoritarian regimes.

The Repressive Apparatus: National Security Service and the 2005 Andijan Events: One of the pillars of Karimov’s regime was the National Security Service (SNB), which operated with near-complete autonomy. It carried out widespread surveillance, repression, and coercion against both real and potential opposition. According to human rights organizations, thousands of people were imprisoned during this period under accusations of “religious extremism,” and independent journalists and rights defenders were subjected to intimidation and persecution (Human Rights Watch, 2004).

The 2005 Andijan massacre—where hundreds of civilians were killed—marked the climax of the regime’s repressive policy. While the government framed the event as an “Islamist uprising,” international observers assessed it as the violent suppression of peaceful protests (International Crisis Group, 2005). The event revealed the authoritarian essence of the regime and led to a dramatic deterioration of relations with the West.

Censorship, Informal Ideology, and Legitimacy Strategies: The ideological sphere in Uzbekistan was strictly controlled. State media amplified the cult of the leader, and foreign media were heavily restricted. The so-called “Uzbek Model”—an ideological framework emphasizing development based on national specifics, gradual transition, social stability, and a central role for the state—served as a tool for regime legitimation (Bohr, 2004).

Through this ideological model, the regime justified its detachment both from the Soviet legacy and from the perceived “dangerous influences” of Western liberalism. Legitimacy was built on authoritarian stability and the concept of national sovereignty (Turaeva, 2012).

Elite Management and Regional-Clan Balancing: Karimov’s personalist rule was also characterized by balancing regional and clan-based elite interests. Power-sharing and rotation of posts among elites from Fergana, Samarkand, and Tashkent ensured internal regime stability (Collins, 2006). These informal elite networks—based on family, region, or ethnicity—played a crucial role in decision-making.

Although Karimov was closely associated with the Samarkand clan, he maintained a careful balance with other regional groups to consolidate his long-standing rule. This reflects a variant of personalist authoritarianism compatible with elite-based governance (Radnitz, 2010).

As a result, Karimov’s rule represents a textbook case of personalist authoritarianism in Uzbekistan. During this period, repression, ideological control, and clan politics were central to the regime’s survival, and these institutional patterns left a lasting legacy for the post-Karimov era.

Foreign Policy and Authoritarian Behavior in the International Arena

 Under Karimov, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy followed a strategy of pragmatic neutrality, sovereignty-based self-defense, and balanced diplomacy—characteristic of post-Soviet authoritarian regimes. His foreign policy served both to secure international legitimacy and to safeguard the continuity of the internal authoritarian regime. Relations with international partners were managed to minimize external pressure and limit foreign interference.

“Sovereign Authoritarianism” and Engagement with the West: In the late 1990s and especially after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the U.S. and the EU sought closer cooperation with Uzbekistan. As part of Washington’s “war on terror,” Uzbekistan allowed the U.S. to establish a military base in Karshi-Khanabad. This enhanced the regime’s international legitimacy and brought in economic assistance (Cooley, 2012). However, following Western condemnation of the Andijan massacre in 2005, Karimov closed the U.S. base and drastically reduced ties with the West. This was a clear demonstration of “sovereignty-centered authoritarianism”: a harsh response to attempts to intervene in domestic affairs.

As Schedler noted, electoral authoritarian regimes tend to deploy “masking” and “deflection” strategies when facing international monitoring and enforcement (Schedler, 2006). In Uzbekistan, this manifested initially as a “masking” strategy and later as a full retreat from engagement.

Authoritarian Consensus with Russia and China

Against the backdrop of deteriorating relations with the West, the Karimov regime turned toward Russia and China. Bilateral agreements and cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) solidified this alignment, which provided both economic investment and political support for authoritarian governance (Ambrosio, 2009).

Geopolitical Balancing and the Turkmen Analogy

Karimov also pursued a cautious and balanced regional policy. While cooperation with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan was stable, relations with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were often tense. Like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan in the 1990s and 2000s adopted a quasi-isolationist model of authoritarianism premised on strong sovereignty (Kendzior, 2014). This posture served as a buffer against regional interventions and protected the regime from external legitimacy challenges.

All these factors indicate that the Karimov regime pursued a comprehensive strategy aimed at preserving stable authoritarianism both domestically and internationally.

First Phase of the Mirziyoyev Era (2016–2020): Environmental Changes in Authoritarianism

One of Mirziyoyev’s earliest and most symbolic moves was the restructuring of the National Security Service (SNB). The dreaded SNB was replaced in 2018 by the State Security Service (SSS), and its long-time head, Rustam Inoyatov, was removed (ICG, 2018). This marked the beginning of a personal consolidation of power and a symbolic recalibration of repressive governance.

However, the new agency was not brought under full civilian oversight nor subjected to accountability. The repressive apparatus was simply reformatted and equipped with more modern, flexible tools (Putz, 2019).

Currency and Banking Reforms

One of the most notable economic reforms was the liberalization of the national currency in 2017. The gap between the official and black-market exchange rates was eliminated, and currency exchange was deregulated. The banking sector was opened to more foreign investment, and measures to increase transparency in credit markets were introduced (World Bank, 2019).

These steps are emblematic of authoritarian modernization: strengthening technocratic economic management and investor confidence without altering the political regime (Laruelle, 2020).

Relative Media Openness and Tolerance of Criticism

At the beginning of the Mirziyoyev era, limited media liberalization was observed. Independent news portals emerged, and government officials occasionally responded to online criticism. The president himself publicly encouraged officials to be open to criticism and promoted public oversight.

However, this opening was quickly constrained within a framework of selective tolerance: systemic and politically grounded criticism was met with intimidation, legal persecution, and imprisonment (Human Rights Watch, 2021). This signaled a return of masked electoral authoritarianism.

Public Opinion and Reactive Policy-Making

Public opinion began to play a more visible role in the government’s decision-making process. Public surveys, digital complaint portals (such as the “Virtual Reception Office”), and social feedback mechanisms influenced some policy adjustments (Lemon, 2019). This aimed to introduce reactive governance and bolster social legitimacy.

Nevertheless, the president and his inner circle remained the main decision-makers, and the system did not allow for institutionalized collective decision-making. These were procedural, not structural changes.

Structural Reforms and Constitutional Changes (2020–2024)

A 2023 constitutional referendum extended the presidential term from five to seven years and reset term limits, allowing Mirziyoyev to run for a third term. This resembled the “constitutional reset” practice seen in countries like Azerbaijan (Pannier, 2023).

While officially framed as reflecting the “will of the people,” the process lacked genuine debate and viable alternative campaigns. This represents a renewal of personalist authoritarianism and a consolidation of “reformist authoritarianism.”

Cosmetic Electoral Reforms and De Facto Non-Competition

Although some formal electoral changes were introduced—such as gender quotas in municipal elections and digital voting procedures—competitive electoral conditions were not established. Real opposition parties were systematically denied registration (Freedom House, 2024). The Liberal Democratic Party and other “loyal opposition” groups fully supported Mirziyoyev’s political agenda, illustrating the hybrid regime features described by Levitsky and Way: real authoritarian continuity under the facade of pluralism.

Technocratization and Digitalization of State Governance

New technocrats rose to prominence in state administration, and digital services, e-government tools, and open data platforms were implemented. The reduction of bureaucratic barriers, especially in public services, and the digitalization of citizen–state interactions became priorities (ADB, 2023).

Yet this technocratic modernization did not undermine the authoritarian structure of the regime. In other words, technical modernization did not translate into political liberalization.

Unchanged Environment for NGOs and Independent Media

Despite partial permissions for some NGOs and independent media outlets, no fundamental shift occurred. Bureaucratic barriers to NGO registration remained, and human rights organizations continued to operate under strict oversight (Amnesty International, 2023). This reflects the enduring repressive elements of electoral authoritarianism. 

The reforms undertaken during Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s tenure are characterized by limited structural changes, technocratic renewal, and adaptive repression. The regime retains its authoritarian nature while presenting itself as more flexible, modern, and responsive to public opinion. This aligns closely with Heydemann’s model of “authoritarian modernization.”

Authoritarian Resilience and Paradoxes

The modernization efforts undertaken in Uzbekistan since 2016 have revealed a paradoxical trajectory: on one hand, they reflect the technical enhancement of the state's governance capacity; on the other, they have preserved the authoritarian structure and personalist centralization of power. In this sense, Uzbekistan’s development model exhibits both change and continuity. This section explores the main paradoxes of this duality and their theoretical interpretations.

Sources of Regime Stability: Personalization and Repressive Adaptation

Research on authoritarian regime durability suggests that personalist regimes build their stability on strong leader cults, institutional weakness, and the flexibility of their repressive apparatus (Svolik, 2012). Although Mirziyoyev has adopted a more pragmatic and flexible leadership style compared to his predecessor, the political system remains centralized and dependent on the individual leader.

At the same time, the repressive apparatus has not been dismantled but transformed—from “hard repression” to a mode of “selective and preventive control” (Lemon, 2019). This shift shows that repression has become a more efficient and cost-effective tool of authoritarian governance.

The Contradiction Between Modernization and Authoritarian Stability

Heydemann’s theory of authoritarian modernization demonstrates that economic and administrative modernization does not necessarily accompany political liberalization. In Uzbekistan, technocratic reforms such as digitalization, currency liberalization, the establishment of technoparks, and improved public services have been implemented. However, these reforms lack the components of political inclusivity and the rule of law.

This contradiction can be explained by the fact that modernization serves not as a pathway to regime transformation, but as a mechanism for reinforcing regime durability and securing international legitimacy (Burnell & Schlumberger, 2010).

Elite Stability and Clan–Regional Regulation

The regional-clan balancing mechanisms of the Karimov era have been preserved in a modified form under Mirziyoyev. Although he has formed new elite groups around himself, these changes remain personalized rather than structural. The previous elite networks have simply been rotated or adjusted within the system (Eshonkulov, 2021).

A New Stage of Familial Consolidation: The Appointment of Saida Mirziyoyeva

In 2025, the appointment of President Mirziyoyev’s daughter, Saida Mirziyoyeva, as the head of the Presidential Administration marked a new institutional turning point in Uzbekistan’s authoritarian evolution. This event illustrates how authoritarian modernization is evolving in parallel with familial-political consolidation, increasing the likelihood of a dynastic political succession.

That such an appointment occurred during an ongoing period of formal reform rhetoric indicates that Heydemann’s concept of authoritarian modernization is no longer limited to technocratic or administrative spheres. Instead, regime legitimacy and stability are now also being structured through intra-familial and clan-based appointments. This suggests the restoration of personalist authoritarianism in the form of dynastic personalism in post-Karimov Uzbekistan.

Saida Mirziyoyeva’s appointment can be interpreted as the early stage of what is referred to in the literature as “dynastic succession.” As Barbara Geddes has noted, personalist regimes often resort to the inclusion of family members in order to preserve long-term control (Geddes, 2003b). In the context of Uzbekistan, this appointment can be viewed as the formalization of a political succession structure.

This development also exposes the growing dualism between formal reforms and informal familial power. Thus, Saida Mirziyoyeva’s appointment stands as an important empirical example indicating that authoritarian modernization is shifting away from institutional transformation and toward familial political adaptation.

International Context and Authoritarian Learning

The Mirziyoyev regime seeks to maintain a balanced foreign policy with both Western countries and authoritarian powers such as Russia and China. Although symbolic steps have been taken to project a reformist image internationally, these actions have not resulted in any meaningful weakening of domestic political monopoly.

Such behavior reflects the logic of authoritarian learning: regimes observe and emulate one another’s experiences in consolidating stability within the framework of controlled reforms (Way, 2015). Uzbekistan has followed the precedent set by countries like Azerbaijan and Russia, combining cosmetic reforms with entrenched authoritarianism.

In summary, the transformation of authoritarianism in Uzbekistan is characterized more by changes in form than in substance. Modernization and technocratic reforms do not proceed alongside political liberalization; rather, they serve to rejuvenate the regime. This reinforces the conclusion that deep institutional reforms are necessary for genuine political change.

In this context, Uzbekistan may be understood as a symbiosis of electoral, personalist, and dynastic authoritarianism: on one hand, the system selectively renews itself; on the other, it deepens informal mechanisms to preserve political monopoly.

Conclusion

The evolution of authoritarianism in Uzbekistan has occurred in two major phases. The first phase, from 1991 to 2016, was marked by the establishment of a repressive personalist regime under Islam Karimov. During this period, the mechanisms of state control were exercised through harsh repression.

The second phase began with the rise of Shavkat Mirziyoyev and has been characterized by intensified institutional control and technocratic modernization efforts. His reforms—particularly the introduction of digital governance and partial openness in certain socio-political sectors—have increased the regime’s adaptive capacity.

However, the findings of this study show that these modernization reforms have not resulted in fundamental political transformation or the foundational changes necessary for democratic transition. The regime continues to maintain political monopoly while preserving formal institutions, and severe constraints remain in place regarding elections, media freedom, and elite structure.

The case of Uzbekistan offers important insights for the analysis of authoritarian stability and transformation potential in Central Asia. It illustrates how authoritarian regimes adapt and how formal democratic elements and technocratic reforms can be instrumentalized to reinforce authoritarian durability.

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