The New Technological Rival of Democracy – Digital Authoritarianism

Abstract

The emergence of digital information technologies once raised illusions about the revival of a global wave of democratization. The onset of the Arab Spring in 2011 created the impression that information technologies could become a powerful tool for democratic uprisings against authoritarian governments. However, the opposite happened. Digital technologies—enabling social media, AI-based surveillance systems, and the collection and analysis of large-scale data—have expanded the instruments of state repression and social control, turning into a reality that facilitates “digital authoritarianism.” In parallel, the online information ecosystem, a key aspect of democratic governance, began to deteriorate.

Keywords: digital authoritarianism and digital authoritarian practices, internet authoritarianism, digital repression.

Introduction

Digital technologies such as artificial intelligence, facial recognition, and social media have significantly expanded the means of social control. The installation of data collection systems, biometric and AI-powered data gathering and analysis tools allow for precise and large-scale monitoring of citizens. This, in turn, provides authoritarian governments with opportunities for both detailed and wide-reaching surveillance mechanisms. These capabilities make it easier for regimes to target offline and online dissenters and to exert control over specific groups. Countries like Russia and China have gone particularly far in using technology to consolidate power and suppress dissent and democratic demands, even developing global plans for the use of digital technologies for such purposes (Mantelassi, 2023a). For instance, although China’s well-known “social credit system” is presented as a nationwide, centralized, high-tech social control mechanism, reliable information and analyses of its implementation in certain cities, especially Tianjin, suggest it functions as a pilot project of digital authoritarianism (Cremer, Mattis, Hoffman, 2016).

Authoritarian regimes in the 21st century shape their political strategies around the reality that political debates and organizing now take place primarily in the digital sphere. This makes it easier for authoritarian regimes to restrict internet freedoms, impose full internet shutdowns, and control narratives through censorship—tools that have become globally recognized instruments of digital repression (Mantelassi, 2023b).

Methodological Basis

This research, prepared by the KHAR Center, is based primarily on informative analytical articles and reports by international organizations, drawing from conceptual approaches in academic sources and developed within historical and political contexts. Investigations conducted by media and civil society actors on this topic tend to be less academic and more practice-oriented, meaning the collected data largely reflects political contexts and experiences.

The goal of the research is to illustrate the essence and operating mechanisms of digital authoritarianism, to present how classical authoritarianism is being restructured in a modern technological framework, and to provide examples of new societal models being built by authoritarian regimes through systems of technological control.

The study is structured around the following questions: What practices can be considered elements of digital authoritarianism? Who (which actors) carries out digital authoritarianism, and for what purpose? What are the consequences of digital authoritarianism?

What Is Digital Authoritarianism?

The study of authoritarianism and repressive practices predates the digital era. The term “authoritarian” refers to regimes with absolute rulers (autocrats), non-electoral governments, and more broadly, those that routinely use censorship, surveillance, public opinion manipulation, and repressive legal regulations to suppress opposition and maintain power (Glasius, 2018). Digital authoritarianism, in turn, can be understood as the use of digital information technologies by states to exercise political control, carry out repression and surveillance, and strengthen their rule (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019).

The goal of digital authoritarianism is to preserve and expand power while ensuring the regime's security.

Digital technologies enable new authoritarian practices through tools such as algorithmic control, micro-targeted disinformation, and internet shutdowns. Studies into the elements of digital authoritarianism have been conducted since the 1980s in more than 40 countries, revealing through examples like surveillance of communications and control over television broadcasts that repressive authoritarian practices were already being implemented via the technologies available at the time (Roberts & Oosterom, 2024a).

The concept of digital authoritarianism gained prominence in the 2010s amid significant declines in political freedoms and increased use of digital technologies for state repression. The term “digital authoritarianism” was first used by Erikson and Li-Makiyama and gained traction after being cited in a U.S. House Committee on China hearing and featured in a “Freedom House” report (Freedom House, 2018). Initially applied to China and framed by some authors as specific only to authoritarian regimes, the concept later developed into two main conceptual approaches: one focused on digital practices in authoritarian regimes, the other on how similar practices are used in democracies and hybrid regimes.

Academic Differences in Approach

Steven Feldstein defines digital repression as “the use of information and communication technologies by states to monitor, coerce, or manipulate individuals or groups to suppress dissenting ideas or behaviors.” He categorizes digital repression into five areas: surveillance, censorship, social manipulation and disinformation, internet shutdowns, and targeted persecution of free-thinking users (Feldstein, 2021). Digital repression operates within a broader political repression ecosystem, tightly linked to state-imposed restrictions on civil liberties, such as censorship of political speech, banning of associations, and curbing academic freedoms. In countries with powerful security or intelligence services, digital repression not only reinforces existing mechanisms but also has the potential to reshape the state’s ability to monitor political opponents and suppress protest movements.

Studies on “networked authoritarianism” draw on academic materials from the 2000s that examine how governments exert control over the internet. The model of networked authoritarianism refers not to digital and mobile technologies broadly, but specifically to internet-focused “cyber-strategies” like content censorship, firewalls, and legal restrictions on online access (Li X., Lee F., & Li Y., 2016). These regimes often permit individuals greater online communication freedoms while simultaneously constraining this “freedom” through content control, censorship, and mechanisms for manipulating public opinion.

Tools of Digital Authoritarianism

Online censorship encompasses restrictive digital practices such as filtering the internet, blocking websites, banning keywords, limiting or shutting down internet access, and suppressing freedom of speech. In many countries, laws require internet companies, social media platforms, and internet cafes to monitor users and online content, often resulting in self-censorship (Sinpeng, 2013a). Governments invest in local infrastructure that can redirect internet traffic and allow shutdowns, website blocks, and content censorship (Sinpeng, 2013b).

Digital surveillance involves mass monitoring by security services not only of activists, journalists, and opposition politicians—so-called “persons of interest”—but of entire populations (Feldstein, 2021b). China is a prime example, with a high-tech surveillance architecture using AI for facial and voice recognition to identify and monitor individuals (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019b). The mandatory registration of SIM cards and use of biometric digital identification systems make it practically impossible to maintain anonymity. Research shows that authoritarian regimes have developed extensive legislation enabling digital surveillance and censorship to track dissenters (Roberts & Oosterom, 2024b).

Digital disinformation refers to false or distorted information intentionally spread or shared without awareness of its falsity (Freedom House, 2018). Recent studies show that governments are moving beyond simple digital repression tactics like blocking internet access and instead adopting more sophisticated strategies to manage public discourse within regime-aligned boundaries. Russia is among the leading countries employing such tactics both domestically and internationally.

In addition, manipulation, hate and hostility rhetoric, and psychological tactics aimed at controlling mass sentiment are widely used by authoritarian regimes in practice. The increasing sophistication and large-scale deployment of AI have created broader opportunities for the algorithmic development of digital authoritarianism.

Actors of Digital Authoritarianism

Actors involved in digital authoritarianism include both state and non-state entities (including regime-aligned “patriotic hackers” and private companies using bots and trolls). A real-world example is the “troll factory” operating in St. Petersburg, a private business project serving state interests (Volchek, 2021). The case of “patriotic hackers” supporting the Assad regime in Syria illustrates that digital authoritarianism can exist beyond population surveillance and take on transnational dimensions. “Patriotic hackers” are presented as “civilians with technological expertise who self-mobilize to engage in cyber-activism in defense of their country” (Conduit, 2023). The growing demand for technological infrastructure has led Western companies representing democratic societies to increasingly export tools necessary for digital authoritarianism to repressive regimes. For many authoritarian states—including China and Iran—investments in this field have evolved beyond “cybersovereignty” into projects of economic development. China’s model of internet state control functions not only as a tool of governance and repression but also as an economic investment sector with importance for both domestic and export markets (Freedom House, 2018b).

Mechanisms of Impact and Counter-Impact

The utility and effectiveness of digital technologies depend on the ability to adapt to new technologies and find innovative uses for them. In 2011, social media played a major role in mobilizing mass protests in the Arab world. As a result, governments in the region and beyond learned important lessons about how to use the same technologies to prevent protests, monitor dissent, and track demonstrators who spark unrest (Feldstein, 2021c). Digital tools offer wide-ranging capabilities: for civil society activists to connect and protest against governments, and for regimes to surveil dissenters, control public discourse, and disseminate disinformation. Repression through digital technologies against civil society, media, and other spheres by authoritarian regimes undermines trust in activists, politicians, and journalists, while also damaging institutional functionality. This practice has shifted the global paradigm of digital technology use in politics. Research predicts that the cycle of technological innovation will further intensify the global struggle between autocratic regimes using communication technologies for control and the civil society actors resisting them with the same tools (Roberts & Oosterom, 2024c).

The Normative Framework of Digital Authoritarianism

Authoritarian regimes seek to legitimize and legalize state intervention aimed at controlling citizens, repressing dissent, and regulating institutional activity in society through the creation of a legal framework that enables top‑down governance via digital technologies. These regimes operationalize such control within two main dimensions — ideological and institutional. The ideological framework shapes public opinion and provides a moral justification for repressive measures, while the institutional framework consists of concrete state organs and structures that implement this ideology through legal instruments.

Combating terrorism and extremism has become one of the most popular ideological tools employed by 21st‑century authoritarian regimes. Under the pretext of ensuring public safety and protecting citizens from threats, authorities adopt laws that prohibit online anonymity, enable mass surveillance, and restrict freedom of expression. For instance, in Kazakhstan, legislative amendments banning bloggers’ anonymity were justified as part of anti‑terrorism measures (Freedom House, 2023).

The propaganda of “traditional values” or “morality” is also used to justify legal steps that suppress public activism and silence criticism of government policies. The Iranian case clearly demonstrates the use of such ideology, where legislation on “moral values” forms the foundation of digital censorship. In Iran, the enforcement of digital censorship and surveillance under the pretext of protecting “national security” or preventing threats to “moral values” has become a common practice.

Narratives such as the protection of “national security,” “stability,” and “law and order” serve as the underlying justifications for adopting normative acts designed to suppress public resistance and discontent.

State institutions become instrumentalized within this institutional framework. For example, in Russia, the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media — known as Roskomnadzor — is the body responsible for implementing internet censorship, blocking critical websites, and enforcing the “sovereign internet” law (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2019).

Judicial institutions are subordinated to political interests and used to legalize measures that ensure regime survival. By issuing politically motivated rulings, courts confer legitimacy upon repressive laws (KHAR Center, 2025).

State‑owned media and propaganda apparatuses dominate the information space, disseminating official ideology, discrediting the opposition, and shaping public perception of government actions as both necessary and legitimate. In Azerbaijan, the government’s control is manifested in the hegemony of pro‑government TV channels and the fact that the National Television and Radio Council (NTRC), which regulates and approves broadcasting licenses, was established and is financed by the state itself (Amnesty International, 2011).

In addition, in some countries, the normative framework governing digital authoritarianism is regulated through unrelated legal instruments — including construction codes, tax laws, criminal codes, and intellectual property laws.

Legal mechanisms are also being developed to enable digital authoritarianism to transcend national borders and evolve into transnational cooperation. For example, Russia’s digital technology cooperation with former Soviet republics is regulated through “information security” treaties it has signed with them (Russian MFA, 2017).

The Pollution of the Information Ecosystem

The survival of democracy depends on the free flow of reliable and fact‑based information. In the 21st century, this free flow primarily occurs online, especially on social media platforms — key branches of digital infrastructure. In this context, the interference in the 2016 U.S. elections and the Brexit referendum through disinformation and manipulative tactics can be considered a shocking revelation for the foundations of democracy (Steinwehr, 2017). The recent Moldovan elections also demonstrated that this dynamic has since become a normalized tool for exporting and spreading authoritarian influence (Meduza, 2025). This illustrates how digital technologies can be used to contaminate and erode the information ecosystem — a core pillar of democratic governance — thereby degrading democratic systems (Rest of World).

Disinformation campaigns and manipulations that pollute the information ecosystem are often carried out by trolls who create, disseminate, and amplify false stories online. Such waves of disinformation largely stem from the algorithmic dynamics underlying social media content recommendations, which prioritize emotionally charged content to maximize user engagement. This, in turn, facilitates the spread of sensational and false political messages while trapping users within deliberately constructed content bubbles. The result is a digital space saturated with falsehoods and an obstruction of users’ exposure to diverse and alternative information sources. This polluted informational ecosystem undermines healthy democratic discourse.

The Geography of Digital Authoritarianism

A systematic monitoring of 105 academic papers published in 2024 on digital authoritarianism revealed significant geographical asymmetry in country‑specific research focus (Roberts & Oosterom, 2024b). Most studies focus on China, followed by Russia; the only other countries covered by multiple articles are Iran and Syria. However, there is a lack of in‑depth research on countries such as Eritrea, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Belarus — regimes that rank even higher than China on the authoritarian scale in the V‑DEM Democracy Index, likely due to the unavailability of reliable data (V‑DEM, 2024).

Digital authoritarian practices are also widespread across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. For example, Malaysia applies facial recognition technology within its army; Singapore is integrating it into a nationwide street‑camera network; and Ethiopia’s security forces use telecommunications equipment from ZTE to monitor opposition activists and journalists (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019c). In Dubai, a project called “Police Without Police” replaces human officers with video surveillance and facial recognition systems based on Chinese technologies (Gulf News, 2018).

In post‑Soviet autocracies, the following types of digital authoritarianism are prevalent (Access Now, 2022):

• Online censorship: restricting free speech, blocking independent media and internet resources;
• Internet shutdowns: deliberate disruptions of internet networks and blocking of communication platforms;
• Disinformation and hate speech: state‑funded propaganda and disinformation campaigns, as well as the promotion of hostility and hatred;
• Surveillance: the use of spyware against critics, mass monitoring of personal data, including biometric tracking.

The country where digital authoritarianism is most developed and constantly refined is China — simultaneously the flagship and the largest exporter of digital authoritarian practices.

The Mechanisms of Exporting Digital Authoritarianism

The global and interconnected nature of the internet has made authoritarianism increasingly transnational in the 21st century. This transnational character plays a key role in exporting and spreading digital authoritarianism, enabling similar regimes to dynamically replicate their models elsewhere. At the same time, authoritarian governments exploit existing social and political tensions in democracies via digital technologies to deepen radical tendencies, sow distrust in democratic institutions and processes, and discredit democracy domestically.

Furthermore, transnational campaigns of surveillance and hacking targeting activists and regime critics abroad — including digital threats, spyware‑based harassment, and intimidation — exemplify how digital authoritarianism penetrates the geography of democracy. Transnational digital authoritarianism is particularly cost‑effective, as it requires no physical travel. Governments such as those of China, Qatar, Russia, Iran, Rwanda, and Saudi Arabia are notable for threatening and monitoring their citizens living abroad (Lamensch, 2021).

The technologies enabling digital authoritarianism are often developed and sold by Western companies, meaning Western countries indirectly participate in the market for control technologies that benefit repressive regimes. For example, after the 2020 presidential elections in Belarus, the government used website‑blocking technology purchased from Sandvine, a U.S. company headquartered in Canada, to restrict internet access (Gallagher, 2020). In 2021, the directors of French firms Amesys and Nexa Technologies were charged with supplying surveillance technologies to the governments of Libya and Egypt, allegedly facilitating torture and enforced disappearances (MIT Technology Review, 2021).

Regimes such as those of China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia export not only repressive technologies but also data architectures and surveillance methodologies. China’s extensive use of digital tools for censorship and surveillance has made it a preferred supplier for illiberal regimes — 24 governments, particularly in sub‑Saharan Africa, now employ Chinese surveillance technologies (Feldstein, 2020). According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI, 2019), China’s expanding global presence of tech firms has made it a model of digital authoritarianism for non‑democratic states.

Globally, many countries with similar capacities and resources to Russia prefer the Kremlin’s model of digital authoritarianism because it offers a less advanced yet cheaper alternative compared to the Chinese model.

For Beijing, the export of information technologies provides not only significant new revenue and data resources but also the formation of major strategic influence over the West. A striking example occurred during the 47th session of the UN Human Rights Council, when Canada’s initiative to investigate human rights abuses against Uyghurs received support from 44 countries, while 65 others sided with China and condemned “politically motivated, baseless accusations against China based on disinformation” (Feng, 2021).

Signs of Digital Authoritarianism in Democracies

The global decline of democracy coincides with the rapid development of new technologies for data collection, communication, and surveillance (Mantelassi, 2023c). The capacity of digital technologies to undermine democracy and reinforce authoritarianism is not confined to rigid autocracies — it has also become a global phenomenon affecting democratic regimes. A significant portion of the technologies that enable authoritarian control originate from the West and are widely used in democratic states.

Countries such as the United States, Germany, France, and Japan are both sellers and users of such technologies. As these technologies evolve, Western democracies themselves become increasingly entangled in digital authoritarianism, facing growing risks of misuse. For example, digital tracking applications introduced during the COVID‑19 pandemic provoked serious debates (SSRC, 2021). The discussions centered on how these tools, lacking adequate legal safeguards, infringed on the right to privacy and normalized state surveillance over citizens (Mantelassi, 2021). Another example is the protests by NGOs in the United Kingdom against the use of facial recognition technology by police (Big Brother Watch, 2023).

Modern technologies, on one hand, make it possible to carry out large‑scale, automated, continuous, cost‑effective, and targeted surveillance; on the other hand, they increase the likelihood that governments will exploit these capabilities in ways incompatible with democratic standards, privacy principles, and human rights. Although they may not always be used for social control, the 2013 Snowden revelations exposed the full scope of problematic domestic and international digital surveillance mechanisms in the United States (The Guardian, 2013).

The ability of tech corporations to influence consumer behavior through targeted advertising has also spread into the political sphere, with devastating consequences for democracy (Feldstein, 2019). Unprecedented and unrestrained access to citizens’ personal data has granted private and unaccountable corporations extraordinary power over public and political life, including the ability to influence voters’ choices in elections.

The Chinese Model of Digital Authoritarianism

Research shows notable differences between Chinese and Russian approaches to digital authoritarianism. Unlike Russia, which relies more on cost‑effective disinformation tactics, China focuses on high‑technology surveillance systems.

Beijing employs information technologies for both online and offline control. Applications and websites that fail to comply with government requirements are blocked, while internet censorship is enforced through the so‑called Great Firewall.

In 2005, China’s Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology launched a project aimed at installing cameras across public spaces and key industrial sectors (Zhang, 2012). Integrating smartphones, smart TVs, and surveillance cameras, this project enables the state to monitor citizens’ movements and behaviors in detail. Artificial intelligence is used to identify and track individuals. One of the most ambitious initiatives in 2018 aimed to develop a system capable of processing 100,000 high‑definition video streams simultaneously and tracking people in real time (Bloomberg, 2018).

The first experiment with this network was conducted by police: in May 2018, during a concert in Tianjin, a facial recognition program alerted security services that one of the 60,000 spectators was a wanted suspect, who was located and arrested within minutes (Wang, 2018). Tianjin — a region populated by Uyghurs — has become a testing ground for Beijing’s most repressive technologies. Uyghurs are frequently subjected to DNA testing and iris scans at police checkpoints (Haas, 2017); spyware is installed on their phones to monitor online activity, and navigation systems are embedded in their vehicles (Kieren, 2017). In areas without surveillance cameras, small bird‑like drones are deployed to monitor movements from above (Chen, 2018).

Alongside this total surveillance and data collection system, China has introduced a social credit system (SCS) — a mechanism designed to evaluate citizens’ loyalty to the government (RBC, 2016).

Citizens who comply with state‑defined rules receive privileges, while violators are punished. Points are awarded for law‑abiding behavior and positive civic contributions, such as timely loan repayments, while points are deducted for infractions. Those failing to reach the required “passing score” find everyday life severely restricted. The penalties imposed on low‑scoring citizens include:
 — prohibition from working in state institutions;
 — denial of social benefits;
 — intensive customs inspections;
 — bans on holding managerial positions in food and pharmaceutical industries;
 — denial of flight tickets and sleeper train berths;
 — refusal of service in luxury hotels and restaurants;
 — prohibition of children’s enrollment in expensive private schools.

Researchers have described China’s model as an Orwellian dystopia (Chin & Wong, 2016). The situation observed in China stands as one of the most striking examples of digital totalitarianism in the modern world.

The Russian Model of Digital Authoritarianism

Unlike China, Russia does not rely heavily on the widespread application of high-tech systems that require extensive resources. Instead, it integrates elements of digital totalitarianism into public life primarily through institutional mechanisms to place society under total control.

Since the 1990s, the government has begun adapting Soviet-era surveillance technologies, known as the System of Operative Investigative Measures (SORM), to the digital sphere. However, rather than focusing on filtering information before it reaches the public, the Russian government has prioritized establishing a repressive legal regime that tightens control over information and keeps internet providers, telecommunications operators, private companies, and civil society groups under threat (Freedom House, 2018a).

Since the early 2000s, the Russian state has passed a series of laws that have effectively criminalized criticism of the government, legalized unlimited surveillance of citizens’ online activity, and strengthened state control over the Russian internet (RuNet) (Meduza, 2019). From 2014 onward, the government began taking legal and technical steps to create a "sovereign internet" modeled after China’s system. In May 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Sovereign Internet Law, granting the state media regulator Roskomnadzor the authority to take control of the Russian internet if it becomes disconnected from the global network (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2019).

Additionally, several government agencies have been granted the authority to block content without a court order (Freedom House, 2018b). In the fall of 2017, President Putin signed a law allowing the Russian government to label media outlets receiving foreign funding as “foreign agents” (President of Russia, 2017). This law gave Russian authorities broad powers to block online content, including social media websites deemed “undesirable” or “extremist.” A law passed in January 2018 banned anonymity for users of social media and communication platforms (Polyakova, 2017).

Attempts by users in Russia to access foreign internet resources via VPNs or other tools are restricted by regulations and punishable by law. According to a law passed by the State Duma, citizens who search the internet for content related to individuals or groups labeled by the government as extremists, terrorists, foreign agents, or critics of the regime — including content critical of Russian state policy — can be held criminally liable (TASS, 2025). In an earlier stage, many critics of the regime — including journalists, human rights defenders, academics, artists, and teachers — were already labeled as “foreign agents” by law enforcement authorities.

Access to websites of U.S.-based companies such as YouTube is restricted in Russia. Meta (which owns Facebook and Instagram) and X (formerly Twitter) have been banned as extremist organizations. At the same time, under the concept of a “sovereign internet,” the Russian government has launched new state-controlled social media platforms and applications under the oversight of the Federal Security Service (FSB) (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2019b). This provides the state with control not only over the content of online information but also over the physical infrastructure of the internet. While the concept of a sovereign internet has been discussed for years, its full-scale implementation began following Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Russia has also drawn on certain Chinese digital surveillance and control projects. For instance, beginning in September 2025, an experimental regime will be introduced in Moscow to monitor migrants using a mobile application modeled after China’s surveillance program targeting Uyghurs (Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2025). The system, accessed via a special app, will be mandatory for all migrants. Starting from September 1, 2026, the project will also apply to all foreign nationals who stay in Russia for more than 90 days, even if not for work.

Among the mechanisms of digital authoritarianism, disinformation and censorship are used more broadly in Russia than in many other cases. The state actively uses online media in propaganda and disinformation campaigns to incite hatred against targeted individuals or communities. Trolls and bots play a major role in polluting the Russian-language information ecosystem (Radio Azadlıq/Radio Liberty, 2018).

Online censorship in Russia is not limited to disproportionate restrictions on freedom of speech, blocking of independent media and civil society websites. It also involves repressive legislation that aims to intimidate and push these actors into self-censorship.

Russia’s low-tech surveillance model is attractive to low-resource governments that lack China’s economic power, human capital, and centralized state control. Its affordability and adaptability make it an appealing alternative.

Tools of Digital Authoritarianism Used in Azerbaijan

Research shows that the tools of digital authoritarianism most commonly used in Azerbaijan include surveillance, online censorship, disinformation, and hate speech (Geybulla, 2019). During the 44-day war in 2020 and in times of mass protests, instances of restricted or blocked access to social media platforms were observed.

The Azerbaijani government imports surveillance technologies from abroad. For instance, the “Pegasus” spyware developed by the Israeli cyber-intelligence company NSO Group has enabled the government not only to track its critics, but also to automatically turn everyone in the infected phone owner’s contact circle into surveillance targets (Patrucic & Bloss, 2012). Pegasus is capable of recording phone calls, reading text messages, accessing photos and passwords, tracking GPS location, and secretly activating audio and video recordings — all of which can be transmitted to covert operators.

According to the results of a 2023 survey conducted by the Baku Research Institute among Azerbaijani civic and political activists, 68% of respondents expressed concern about the government’s monitoring of their online accounts and activities. Furthermore, 75% of participants stated that due to the government’s capacity to control the internet, they were cautious when using social media (Kamilsoy & Bedford, 2023a).