This study demonstrates that Kazakhstan’s political regime is based on a complex and adaptive governance model combining elements of classical authoritarianism, hybrid regimes, and resource-based authoritarianism. Behind the façade of formal democratic institutions and liberal-style reforms, the regime centralizes political power and maintains authoritarian stability. Revenues from energy resources serve as key tools for ensuring social control and political loyalty. The reforms implemented during Tokayev’s era should not be interpreted as a regime transformation but rather as a re-legitimation and reinforcement of the regime in a new format. Thus, the case of Kazakhstan offers both theoretical and practical insight into the dynamics of contemporary adaptive authoritarianism.
Introduction
Kazakhstan holds a strategically important position in observing the evolution of political regimes in the post-Soviet space and across Central Asia. Possessing abundant natural resources—particularly oil and gas—the country embarked on building its own political and economic model following its independence in 1991. This model was founded on principles of authoritarian governance and, over time, evolved into a distinctive form of authoritarianism shaped by changing international and regional conditions (Collins, 2006a).
The evolution of Kazakhstan’s authoritarian political regime is significant not only for understanding the country’s internal political development but also for grasping how authoritarianism has transformed in the modern era. At a time of global democratic decline, the durability of authoritarian rule in countries like Kazakhstan—its tools of legitimacy, forms of social contract, and mechanisms for merging with modernization—generates serious scholarly and political interest (Levitsky & Way, 2010a).
The political relevance of this topic also stems from Kazakhstan’s function as a potential model for other post-Soviet countries where authoritarian tendencies are on the rise. As Western liberal influence weakens and authoritarian powers such as China and Russia increase their regional presence, Kazakhstan’s regime—enriched with hybrid elements—presents itself as a stable partner for both domestic and international actors (Isaacs, 2011a). This reality poses a particular threat as it signals the diffusion of a “modern” and seemingly attractive version of authoritarianism.
From a scholarly perspective, this research demands the application of both classical theories of authoritarianism and newer approaches that emphasize hybridity, institutional flexibility, and adaptability. Through the example of Kazakhstan, one can examine how normative political theories operate in practice and how ideological and institutional instruments are used to manufacture political legitimacy (Heathershaw & Schatz, 2015). Furthermore, this study enables broader analysis within frameworks such as regional political security, energy geopolitics, and international cooperation models of authoritarian regimes.
In conclusion, studying the evolution of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan offers important analytical insight not only into a single country's political development but also into broader political trends of the 21st century. This makes it a highly relevant topic at both academic and strategic-practical levels.
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
This research draws upon three main theoretical perspectives to analyze the development and transformation of Kazakhstan’s authoritarian regime: authoritarianism theory, the concept of hybrid regimes, and resource-based authoritarianism. Each framework offers a distinct lens through which to interpret different aspects of the country’s political dynamics.
Authoritarianism Theory
Modern authoritarian regimes utilize various strategies throughout different stages of formation and evolution, necessitating diverse scholarly evaluations. Leading theorists offer different definitions and typologies of authoritarianism. Juan Linz describes authoritarianism as a non-democratic form of governance characterized by centralized power, restricted political competition, and limited public expression. According to Linz, authoritarian regimes typically involve leader cults, dominance of security structures, and a legal system subordinated to political power (Linz, 2000).
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way introduce the concept of "electoral authoritarianism," highlighting regimes that formally conduct elections but lack effective competition. Within this framework, Kazakhstan’s electoral system and constraints on political pluralism exemplify such regimes (Levitsky & Way, 2000).
Hybrid Regimes and Political Transformation
Larry Diamond and Andreas Schedler analyze hybrid regimes as political systems combining democratic and authoritarian elements. These regimes formally maintain democratic institutions, yet they operate in a limited or manipulated fashion. Hybrid regimes often represent transitional stages in political change (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2006). In Kazakhstan’s case, the post-2019 period of formal power transfer and reforms can be analyzed as a hybrid regime combining authoritarian foundations with limited liberalization.
Resource Authoritarianism and the Resource Curse
Michael Ross and other scholars of the resource curse theory argue that the presence of oil and natural resources increases the likelihood of enduring authoritarian rule. This theory posits that states use resource revenues to co-opt political rivals, maintain public support, and finance coercive apparatuses (Ross, 2001). In Kazakhstan, the use of oil revenues to legitimize social policies while reinforcing authoritarian power represents a classic manifestation of resource-based authoritarianism.
Research Objective
The primary aim of this research is to systematically examine the institutional and personal mechanisms of Kazakhstan’s authoritarian regime, particularly the transition processes under President Tokayev after 2019. The study also seeks to identify the main structures and instruments employed to preserve and legitimize political power.
Research Questions
- Through which institutional (legal and administrative) and personal (leader cult, clan ties) mechanisms has Kazakhstan’s authoritarian regime been formed and strengthened?
- What roles have state structures such as the military, the National Security Committee, the judiciary, and the media played in maintaining the regime and shaping its coercive apparatus?
- What changes has the transition from Nazarbayev to Tokayev introduced into the structure and governance model of the authoritarian regime? Have these changes signified democratization or the preservation of authoritarian stability?
Historical Context: The Nazarbayev Era
The formation of authoritarian governance in Kazakhstan is directly linked to the political legacy of its first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. After declaring independence in 1991, Kazakhstan built its statehood based on the political and ideological practices of the former Soviet elite. During this phase, rather than developing political pluralism and democratic institutions, the state prioritized the consolidation of centralized authority. Consequently, under Nazarbayev’s leadership, the regime evolved into an authoritarian model in which formal political institutions existed, but real power was concentrated around the presidency (Olcott, 2002a).
From its early years, the regime derived legitimacy from slogans such as “stability” and “economic development.” Political competition was either neutralized or incorporated into a controlled opposition. A 1995 referendum introduced a new constitution that significantly expanded presidential powers and reduced the role of parliament to a formal level. The presidential elections of 1999 and 2005 were deemed unfair and non-competitive by international observers (OSCE/ODIHR, 2005).
One key feature of Kazakhstan’s authoritarian evolution was its adaptive nature. The regime constantly sought international legitimacy and took symbolic steps—often under cooperation with the West—toward liberal reforms and human rights. This duality gave rise to the regime’s hybrid character: built on authoritarian foundations but employing democratic institutions for legitimacy (Schedler, 2006). In practice, however, these institutions remained strictly subordinated to the presidential apparatus, with elections and the judiciary tailored to serve regime interests.
The creation of a personal cult around Nazarbayev also played a central role in the regime’s durability. In 2010, a law granted Nazarbayev the title of “Elbasy” (Leader of the Nation) and guaranteed his immunity. Renaming the capital as “Nur-Sultan” and glorifying him in school textbooks contributed to symbolic hegemony and served to personalize the ideological foundations of power (Isaacs, 2010a). These developments echo the charismatic legitimacy seen in classical authoritarianism.
In sum, the Nazarbayev era represented a phase during which authoritarianism in Kazakhstan was consolidated not only in governance practices but also at ideological, institutional, and symbolic levels. While the Tokayev period introduced some modifications, the core authoritarian structure of governance has remained resilient.
From Soviet Legacy to the Era of Consolidation (1991–1995)
Following independence, Kazakhstan faced deeply entrenched political and institutional structures inherited from the Soviet Union. This legacy constituted the foundational context for the evolution of authoritarianism. Between 1991 and 2010, Kazakhstan’s political system experienced initial fragmentation followed by the gradual consolidation of an authoritarian model. Under Nazarbayev’s leadership, this period witnessed the suppression of political pluralism, the subjugation of media, and the use of oil revenues to fortify the regime.
Soviet Governance Structures and Elite Control
Kazakhstan’s transition to independence retained strong imprints of Soviet governance. Despite the collapse of the USSR, Soviet bureaucratic and nomenklatura systems remained functional and served as the foundation of the modern state apparatus. These structures did not undergo radical transformation; instead, their functionality was preserved and continued to be controlled by former Communist Party cadres and Soviet-trained political elites (Schatz, 2004). The Soviet nomenklatura thus retained its dominant position, merely rebranded as the post-Soviet elite.
This elite configuration manifested classical features of post-Soviet authoritarianism: centralized decision-making, lack of transparency, elite insulation, and weak democratic institutions. The continued dominance of former Communist Party officials obstructed democratic transformation and accelerated the restoration of authoritarian governance (Dave, 2007; Way, 2005a).
Formation of the Presidential Institution
One of the most significant political developments of the independence period was the establishment of the presidential institution under Nursultan Nazarbayev. Having served as First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party since 1989 and President of the Kazakh SSR since 1990, Nazarbayev was elected as the first president of independent Kazakhstan in December 1991 (Olcott, 2002b).
This institutional transition did not merely signify formal independence—it also laid the groundwork for a hyper-presidential model. Presidential powers were progressively expanded, and decision-making authority was completely centralized (Kalyuzhnova & Nygaard, 2008). From the early years of Nazarbayev’s rule, this model manifested itself through repression of the opposition, media censorship, and harassment of political rivals (Way, 2005b).
Weakening of Early Pluralist Initiatives and Constitutional Shifts
While some signs of political pluralism were observable between 1991 and 1993, these quickly dissipated. The 1993 constitution nominally enshrined democratic rights and freedoms but failed to translate into meaningful power-sharing or democratic governance (Kaplan, 2007).
The 1994 dissolution of parliament and subsequent constitutional amendments significantly expanded presidential authority. These changes entrenched authoritarian characteristics in the political system, while the new constitutional framework served to legitimize centralized power rather than promote democratic governance (Shaikhutdinova, 2015). Parliament and other democratic institutions lost functional relevance, and the space for political competition and opposition activity was severely constrained (Freedom House, 1995).
Thus, during this period, the suppression of pluralism, the consolidation of presidential power, and the entrenchment of elite dominance reflected the core characteristics of post-Soviet authoritarianism (Collins, 2006b).
Authoritarian Consolidation (1995–2010)
The 1995 constitutional referendum significantly expanded the powers of the President, granting him legislative initiative, authority over the appointment of government and judicial officials, and the ability to declare a state of emergency (Isaacs, 2011b). These changes enabled the transition to a centralized, hyper-presidential model. The role and independence of the parliament were weakened, with deputies’ powers significantly curtailed. Notably, the shift from a proportional electoral system to a majoritarian one further limited political competition and contributed to the centralization of the political elite (Freedom House, 2000). This process accelerated authoritarian consolidation.
Dominance of the Nur Otan Party and Marginalization of the Opposition
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Otan Party (renamed Nur Otan in 2006) emerged as the dominant force in Kazakhstan’s political life. It became the primary institutional pillar of presidential political hegemony. In the 2007 parliamentary elections, the Nur Otan Party secured 88.41% of the vote in a controversial process, thereby monopolizing all parliamentary seats (Freedom House, 2009). This outcome effectively confirmed the absence of pluralism and competition in the political system. Opposition parties either failed to register or were forced to operate within the bounds of system-loyal frameworks (Way, 2010). This led to the de facto elimination of political competition and the exclusion of dissenting forces from the public arena.
Media Censorship and Control
Control over mass media became one of the main pillars sustaining Kazakhstan’s authoritarian regime. Major television channels, radio stations, and print media were either state-owned or controlled by oligarchs close to the ruling elite (Reporters Without Borders, 2010). Independent media outlets often struggled to operate under heavy tax, legal, and technical restrictions. Regulatory bodies such as the Media Council applied pressure on journalists, imposed censorship, and severely curtailed freedom of expression (Human Rights Watch, 2008). As a result, most of the media landscape became a tool serving regime interests, while independent journalism was reduced to near extinction.
The Role of Oil Revenues in Regime Legitimacy and Fiscal Redistribution
Between 1995 and 2010, Kazakhstan's oil industry and high global oil prices became the backbone of its economy. The state used these revenues through the “National Fund for Social Stability” to maintain citizens' welfare (Luong & Weinthal, 2010). This mechanism reduced social discontent and supported the regime’s political stability. At the same time, economic redistribution was systematically used to reinforce political loyalty. High revenues were channeled primarily to oligarchs close to the President, as well as to key regime strongholds such as strategic regions and labor groups (Shaikhutdinova, 2015). This strategy not only created a social base for the regime but also weakened the economic foundations of potential rivals.
Thus, the 1995–2010 period can be characterized as one of institutionalization and consolidation of authoritarian rule in Kazakhstan. During this phase, Soviet-era administrative structures were adapted, and new coercive mechanisms were introduced, placing political power firmly under presidential control. While democratic institutions existed formally, they functioned as buffers against opposition and competition. The dominance of Nur Otan, censorship of the media, and political allocation of economic resources became the three pillars of authoritarian stability (Way, 2010).
Personal and Institutional Authoritarianism (2010–2019)
Development of the Elbasy Cult
Starting in 2010, the personality cult around Nursultan Nazarbayev assumed not only symbolic but also legal-institutional dimensions. That year, legislation granted him the title Elbasy (“Leader of the Nation”). This status allowed him to remain a decisive political actor even after formally stepping down from power. The law also provided legal protection from criticism and guaranteed his privileged position within the political system ("On the First President"; OCCRP, 2010).
Moreover, the Elbasy cult was not solely rooted in personal loyalty—it extended to the influence of his family and close oligarchic circles on political and economic processes. Key figures such as his daughter Dariga Nazarbayeva and son-in-law Timur Kulibayev held strategic roles in both state institutions and the energy and banking sectors, reinforcing a clan-based authoritarian model (Biyimbetov, 2020).
Kulibayev, referred to as the "oil prince," headed sovereign wealth fund Samruk-Kazyna and held leading positions in major state companies like KazMunayGas and Kazatomprom between 2008–2009 (Kulibayev, 2009). Meanwhile, Dariga played a central role in media and politics, from leading media holdings to founding the Asar Party.
This familial dominance coincided with privatization efforts, and under the guise of “economic liberalization,” contributed to the intra-family consolidation of political power (Collins, 2008). Many initiatives introduced as “economic reforms” during this period were, in fact, structural adjustments aligned with clan interests. The modernization of the economy was driven not by liberal market principles but by the goal of maintaining political control.
In this framework, the clan-centered management of the economy prioritized political loyalty in both resource distribution and investment decisions. For instance, under Kulibayev’s leadership, gas projects such as the Southwest Gas Pipeline enabled the informal transfer of millions of dollars to family-affiliated companies (ForeignPolicy, 2021).
The Coercive Apparatus and Legal Infrastructure of Authoritarian Governance
The key institutional pillars sustaining the authoritarian regime included the National Security Committee, the Prosecutor General’s Office, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These bodies served not only traditional security functions but were also used to neutralize political opponents, suppress civic activism, and manipulate the electoral process in favor of the regime (Chatham House, 2019a).
Despite the formal existence of institutions like a multi-party system and electoral mechanisms, actual governance adhered to authoritarian principles. Institutions such as the Central Election Commission were functionally subordinate to the President and the ruling Nur Otan party, ensuring the preservation of political hegemony (Chatham House, 2019b).
The legal infrastructure of authoritarian governance was reinforced by repressive legislation, particularly targeting civil society. This included laws establishing the “foreign agent” designation and mechanisms for controlling NGOs receiving foreign funding (The Diplomat, 2025a). As a result, NGOs faced additional bureaucratic hurdles and reporting obligations that made effective operation nearly impossible. Simultaneously, the media faced increased administrative sanctions, including the criminalization of “spreading false information,” which brought online discourse and information circulation under state control (CIVICUS Monitor, 2023).
Oil Revenues and the Economic Foundations of Authoritarianism
The durability of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan was underpinned by high revenues from the oil and gas sector. The state used these resources to fund social welfare, sustain public sector employment, and meet citizens’ basic expectations. This approach aligned with a “resource-loyalty pact” model, in which political participation is exchanged for economic stability (Satpayev & Umbetaliyeva, 2015a).
In this model, political legitimacy is derived not from democratic institutions but from economic performance. Furthermore, foreign investments—particularly from Western countries and China—played a crucial role in shaping Kazakhstan’s image as a “stable and predictable partner,” thereby insulating the regime from external pressure and prolonging its survival (E-IR, 2019a, 2019b).
Public Stability and Political Management Strategies
The government launched infrastructure and employment programs financed by oil revenues to generate loyalty among the population and neutralize potential sources of unrest (Satpayev & Umbetaliyeva, 2015b). Although official rhetoric emphasized values like “ethnic and religious tolerance” and promoted the “Kazakhstan model,” these were instrumentalized to legitimize authoritarian governance. In this way, economic welfare functioned as a soft mechanism of authoritarian control while civil society and political participation were systematically restricted (The Diplomat, 2025b).
International Integration and Strengthening of the Regime
Kazakhstan’s active participation in regional and global economic initiatives—particularly the Eurasian Economic Union and China’s Belt and Road Initiative—served to institutionalize its authoritarian legitimacy and economic resilience. These efforts brought economic gains while also functioning as a shield against international criticism (E-IR, 2019c).
In sum, the 2010–2019 governance model in Kazakhstan exhibited features of “personal-institutional authoritarianism.” Power was extensively centralized through security structures, institutional oversight over opposition and civil society was intensified, and the legal system became a tool of repression. Oil-financed social policies and foreign investments bolstered both internal and external legitimacy, enabling the regime to manage dissent effectively and maintain political competition at a symbolic level.
Ideological and Institutional Instruments of Kazakhstan’s Hybrid Authoritarianism
What differentiates Kazakhstan’s authoritarian model from classical authoritarian regimes is its hybrid nature. The regime combines authoritarian control and restricted competition with the formal presence of democratic institutions and normative values. While this creates an illusion of democratic processes, in practice these institutions are instrumentalized to ensure regime survival (Levitsky & Way, 2010c).
- Ideological Instruments: National Unity, Leader Cult, and Stability Discourse
- National Unity and Multicultural Harmony: The existence of diverse ethnic groups in Kazakhstan is presented by the regime as a symbol of stability and security. Institutions like the “Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan” reinforce centralized control over ethnic politics (Dave, 2007).
- Leader Cult and Elbasy Ideology: The state’s success and people’s welfare are ideologically linked to Nazarbayev’s leadership, fostering an ideological mythology around him and branding dissent as unpatriotic (Isaacs, 2010b).
- Stability and Modernization Dualism: The regime portrays itself as a “natural authority,” arguing that Western-style democracy threatens regional stability. This fosters a belief in the indispensability of stability, discouraging transformation.
- Institutional Instruments: Elections, Parliament, Judiciary, and Media
- Elections: While held regularly, elections are marked by exclusion of opposition, media censorship, and administrative bias favoring regime candidates—hallmarks of “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler, 2006).
- Parliament and Political Parties: Parliament acts as a rubber-stamp body with no genuine debate or opposition. Until 2021, Nur Otan dominated the political field, while rival parties were either co-opted or barred from registration (Freedom House, 2022).
- Judiciary and Law Enforcement: Courts lack independence and serve executive interests, especially in politically sensitive cases. Criminal charges such as tax evasion and corruption are used to suppress opponents.
- Media and Information Control: Most media outlets are state-owned or controlled by affiliated oligarchs. Online platforms face blocking, persecution, and disinformation tactics. Notably, the 2022 protests saw widespread internet shutdowns and censorship (Reporters Without Borders, 2022).
- Synthesis of Formal and Informal Structures
Kazakhstan’s hybrid authoritarianism is characterized by the simultaneous operation of formal institutions and informal political mechanisms. The regime exerts control not only through legal tools but also via patron-client networks, regional clans, and security apparatuses (Cummings, 2005).
Conclusion
Kazakhstan’s political regime synthesizes multiple conceptual frameworks—classical authoritarianism, hybrid regimes, and resource authoritarianism—into a complex and flexible system. On the one hand, it ensures stability through centralized power, restricted pluralism, and coercive governance. On the other, it maintains symbolic democratic institutions to enhance internal legitimacy and present itself as reform-oriented on the international stage.
Mechanisms of resource authoritarianism—particularly the strategic use of energy revenues—are employed to manage social stability and suppress opposition. Patronage networks funded through oil wealth provide the regime with both social foundations and tools of repression.
Kazakhstan’s model of authoritarianism thus represents a significant contemporary case where repression, legitimacy, and symbolic democratization merge to create a resilient and self-replicating regime. This synthesis offers both theoretical and practical relevance not only for post-Soviet states but for authoritarian systems globally.
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