On 28 September 2025, Moldovans will head to the polls in what may prove the country’s most consequential parliamentary elections to date. The vote will not only determine Moldova’s geopolitical orientation but may also influence the war in neighbouring Ukraine.
If Moldovans re-elect the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), the country will continue along its path of European integration and move closer towards realising its goal of joining the European Union by 2030.
This is an outcome Russia, which considers Moldova to be firmly within its sphere of influence, is unwilling to accept. In the run-up to the elections, the Kremlin has committed unprecedented resources to unseating PAS and replacing it with a pro-Russian government (Milena Onisim 2025).
To this end, Moscow has employed all of its usual tactics. The Kremlin is thought to have provided material and financial support to virtually all parties opposing PAS and played an important role in forming the Patriotic Electoral Bloc, which united Moldova’s main pro-Russian parties. Moscow has also launched a relentless disinformation campaign, portraying PAS and President Maia Sandu as aspiring fascist dictators who could drag Moldova into the war in Ukraine.
This campaign has also unveiled a striking new tactic: the mobilisation of voters in separatist regions. Russia and its Moldovan allies are urging the more than 274,000 Moldovan citizens eligible to vote in Transnistria*, a pro-Russian enclave in the country’s east, to take part in the election. Even more remarkable, the separatist authorities in Tiraspol, who for decades sought to suppress participation in Moldovan politics, are now echoing these appeals.
The convergence of voices suggests a coordinated effort and marks a new form of hybrid interference: separatist regions are no longer just instruments of destabilisation by their mere existence but are now being used to shape electoral outcomes directly in the Kremlin’s favour.
From Civil War to Electoral Tool
Moldova lost control over Transnistria following a brief but bloody war in 1992, which saw Russian forces intervene on the side of the separatists. Moldova has never recognised the breakaway region’s independence and formally continues to regard it as sovereign territory (Harrington 2022).
Despite its lack of international recognition, Transnistria has survived as a de facto state for over three decades, largely thanks to Russian financial and humanitarian support, including free gas.
Roughly three-quarters of Transnistria’s 465,000 residents, around 347,000 people, hold Moldovan citizenship (“347,161 Residents of the Transnistrian Region Hold Citizenship of the Republic of Moldova | Government REPUBLIC of MOLDOVA” 2025). Yet citizenship does not necessarily translate into loyalty to Chișinău. Surveys show Transnistrians overwhelmingly identify with their de facto state and prefer continued independence (Cojocaru 2006). Most retain Moldovan passports for pragmatic reasons, chiefly the ability to travel to the EU, and, more recently, the security of an escape route should war spill over from Ukraine (Erizanu 2022).
Since Moldova’s first parliamentary elections in 1994, the authorities in Chișinău have grappled with how to accommodate Transnistrian residents. Legally entitled to vote, they could not be reached directly, as polling stations could not be opened in the separatist region. Instead, stations were placed in the “security zone”, Moldovan-controlled settlements along the de facto border (“Constituirea Secțiilor de Votare Pentru Alegătorii Din Stânga Nistrului” n.d.).
For much of the 1990s and early 2000s, Transnistria’s leadership actively obstructed participation, closing roads and pressuring employers to seize Moldovan passports. That stance began to shift in 2016, when for the first time Transnistrian voters made up around one percent of the national electorate. But this was quickly tainted by credible reports that the Russian-backed Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) organised transport to polling stations for Transnistrian voters, and paid them to vote for their candidate, Igor Dodon (“Constituirea Secțiilor de Votare Pentru Alegătorii Din Stânga Nistrului” n.d.).
Nevertheless, turnout amongst Moldovan citizens living in Transnistria has remained low. Fewer than 30,000 Transnistrian voters cast ballots in both the 2021 parliamentary elections and the 2024 presidential elections and EU referendum. Based on these figures, Moldova’s Central Election Commission (CEC) reduced the number of polling stations available to Transnistrian residents in 2025, from 41 down to just 12 (Sandu Unguri͡anu 2025).
A Manufactured Controversy
The reduction sparked an unusual chain of events. In early August, Transnistria’s Supreme Soviet, the region’s de facto parliament, issued an appeal condemning the decision as a violation of “democratic and human rights” and demanded at least 40 polling stations. This was soon followed by petitions from local authorities and newly created Transnistrian NGOs.
Days later, the Patriotic Bloc staged a protest outside the CEC in Chișinău, dominated by its largest party, the PSRM. Its leader, Igor Dodon, accused the government of discriminating against Transnistrians and, strikingly, argued that reducing polling stations amounted to recognising the separatists’ independence (PSRM, 2025). Normally, such language would provoke a furious reaction from Tiraspol. Instead, the separatists ignored Dodon’s remarks and continued to criticise the Moldovan authorities.
Kremlin officials and Russian state media quickly amplified the issue. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova called on Moldova to guarantee Transnistrians’ voting rights, while outlets such as Komsomolskaya Pravda accused PAS of purposely excluding a fifth of the electorate (Novosti PMR, 2025).
Transnistria, Russia, and Moldova’s pro-Russian parties have not only fixated on the same issue but are also voicing identical criticisms, pointing to an unprecedented level of coordination. Each has accused the Moldovan authorities of “electoral engineering” and seized on the reduction of polling stations to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the elections before a single vote has been cast.
Why the Push for Transnistrian Votes?
While the three actors are working in concert, each has its own reasons for pushing greater Transnistrian participation in the elections.
For the Patriotic Bloc, increased Transnistrian participation in the parliamentary elections offers a chance to win additional seats and counterbalance the diaspora vote, which has consistently helped keep Moldova’s pro-EU authorities in power.
Moldova uses proportional representation in a single nationwide constituency. Transnistrian voters have historically backed pro-Russian parties and, as past elections suggest, can be mobilised in a particular direction. If even a majority of the more than 200,000 Moldovan citizens in Transnistria were to participate, the Patriotic Bloc could gain 15 to 20 seats, an enormous boost in a system where margins matter. This is especially significant given PAS’s declining domestic popularity, even if it is still projected to remain the largest party.
Most importantly, Transnistrian turnout would help offset the diaspora vote, a critical base of support for PAS. The 2024 EU referendum, for instance, only passed thanks to diaspora mobilisation (Rickard Lindholm and Masa Ocvirk, 2024). Moscow has even tried to tap into this dynamic: Moldovan expatriates in Italy recently staged a protest outside the consulate in Milan, calling for more polling stations for Transnistrians, a bizarre spectacle almost certainly orchestrated with Kremlin input.
For Russia, the stakes are existential. Since the early 1990s, the Kremlin has sought to shape Moldova’s political trajectory, but the 2025 elections carry added urgency. A pro-Russian government would not only restore Moscow’s influence in the “Near Abroad” but also hand it a rare foreign policy victory at a time of mounting difficulties in Ukraine, and declining influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Moscow may also see this as its last real chance to halt Moldova’s drift westward. Although PAS’s goal of EU accession by 2030 is ambitious, given the stalled candidacies of Albania and North Macedonia, the Kremlin is unwilling to risk another post-Soviet state slipping from its grasp. After all, the justification for invading Ukraine was to prevent its NATO accession, even though no such prospect existed in 2022.
The elections also intersect with Russia’s war planning. Leaked Ukrainian documents suggest the Kremlin hopes a pro-Russian government in Chișinău will permit up to 40,000 Russian troops to transit Moldova and be stationed in Transnistria, from where they could launch an assault on Odesa (Milena Onisim 2025).
Domestic Kremlin politics add another layer. In July, reports surfaced that Sergei Kiriyenko, Putin’s powerful First Deputy Chief of Staff, often dubbed Russia’s “second most powerful man”, had taken Moldova onto his portfolio (Andrey Pertsev, 2025). Kiriyenko is an advocate of more overt Russian interference in the Near Abroad and has experience in engaging with electoral manipulation and is credited with ensuring that Badra Gunba was elected Abkhazia’s de facto president in 2024, despite a wave of anti-Russian protests that proceeded the vote. He is thought to be behind the push for Transnistrian mobilisation in Moldova, with Ukrainian sources claiming he has earmarked $30 million to transport and bribe voters.
While it is easy to assume Transnistria is simply following Kiriyenko’s orders, the separatist region also has clear self-interest. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has hit Transnistria hard. Kyiv’s closure of the border severed Transnistria from one of its key trading partners and blocked access to Odesa port, the lifeline for much of its import and export traffic.
The absence of an international airport meant that all imports and exports had to come through Moldova, a fact that the PAS government used to their advantage. All trucks crossing the de facto boundary were maliciously inspected, and customs excises and taxes were placed on Transnistrian exports. The separatist leadership have accused Moldova of imposing a blockade, which Chișinău obviously denies (Madalin Necsutu, 2024). To make matters worse, Transnistria was left without gas for several weeks after Ukraine refused to renew its transit deal with Gazprom, which brought the region to the brink of economic collapse.
For Transnistria’s leadership, a Patriotic Bloc victory would mean a friendlier government in Chișinău. While formal recognition is not on the table, they hope for relief from customs controls, renewed trade, and perhaps even the resumption of Moldovan imports of Transnistrian electricity, suspended under PAS.
Conclusion: A Win-Win for Moscow’s Allies
Whether Transnistrians turn out in large numbers remains uncertain. But for Moldova’s pro-Russian parties, it is a win-win scenario. High participation could tip the election in their favour, pleasing both Moscow and Tiraspol, and potentially reshaping the war in Ukraine. Low participation, meanwhile, offers an excuse to delegitimise the vote and fuel prolonged anti-government protests, once again backed by the Kremlin and exiled oligarch Ilan Shor.
* Transnistria refers to the self-proclaimed, unrecognized entity existing within the sovereign territory of the Republic of Moldova.
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