The meeting held on August 8, 2025, hosted by the U.S. President, will be remembered as one of the most important milestones in terms of the prospects for peace and cooperation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as the establishment of a new geopolitical balance in the region. In particular, the resolution of disputes over the Zangezur (Syunik) transport and communication route — which has appeared since the autumn of 2020, after Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War, to be the most complicated problem and one that could even trigger another war — can be considered the most important outcome of the Washington meeting. This issue is reflected in two documents signed there: in the Joint Declaration (Articles 3 and 4) and in the Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. and Armenia on Partnership for Developing the Potential of the “Crossroads of Peace” project.
Article 3 of the Joint Declaration states:
We reaffirmed the importance of opening communications for the purpose of ensuring domestic, bilateral, and international transportation between the two countries to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the region and its neighborhood, based on respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction of states. These efforts include unimpeded connectivity between the main part of the Republic of Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and mutual benefits for the Republic of Armenia in terms of international and domestic connectivity.
Article 4 states:
The Republic of Armenia will cooperate with the United States of America and mutually designated third parties to define the framework for the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) connectivity project within the territory of the Republic of Armenia. We reaffirm our determination to make good-faith efforts to achieve this goal as soon as possible. (President.az – August 9, 2025)
What regime will be applied to the Zangezur road?
The text of the Memorandum of Understanding between Armenia and the United States has not yet been published. Most likely, it is in this document that the U.S. is granted long-term exclusive rights to implement projects related to transport communications passing through Armenia’s Syunik province (Zangezur). The Joint Declaration clarifies whether this communication will operate on an extraterritorial basis — that is, with corridor status under which Armenia’s sovereign rights will not apply and it will not be able to carry out any control measures. As stated in Article 3, communications will be opened on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction of states. However, this clause does not put an end to all uncertainties, since it speaks of creating an unimpeded connection between the main part of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. How, in what manner, the unimpeded passage of another state’s citizens and cargo through territory under a sovereign state’s jurisdiction will take place is an important technical detail.
The Azerbaijani side understands the concept of unimpeded passage as free travel from one part of the country to another without passing through any border checkpoint, and without encountering Armenian border guards or customs officers. However, after the tripartite meeting in Washington, Prime Minister Pashinyan told the national media that the instruments ensuring Armenia’s sovereignty could not be weakened, and that these instruments include passport and customs control (Arminfo.info – August 9, 2025). He then referred to his own “Crossroads of Peace” project, adding that the Armenian side is ready for certain simplifications. He did not rule out that in 5–10 years we might witness current border and customs control methods becoming outdated and crossings taking place thanks to modern technology. The U.S. will support the modernization of the technological capabilities of Armenia’s border and customs structures.
Can “unimpeded passage” and “sovereign control” coexist?
From the perspective of international law, it is difficult to say they are fully compatible, because:
- Unimpeded passage — if it means movement without border checkpoints, it effectively limits a state’s right to conduct border and customs control.
- Sovereign control — means the ability of a state to inspect movements within its territory. If you maintain such inspection in any form, the term “unimpeded” becomes nominal.
A practical compromise model
These two concepts can be reconciled only through technological and legal simplification:
- Electronic declaration system (pre-clearance)
- Pointless border control (spot checks)
- Video and sensor monitoring (without on-site inspection)
- “Virtual border” — where the state manages the border not at the physical crossing point but in a database.
In this model, formal sovereignty is preserved, but in practice, transit flows move without stopping.
International legal basis
a) UN Charter and state sovereignty
Under Articles 2(1) and 2(7) of the UN Charter, states possess equal sovereignty, and no state may operate on the territory of another without its consent. This includes full jurisdiction over border and customs control (United Nations Charter, Chapter I, VII).
b) 1965 International Transit Convention and WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement
These documents require facilitation of transit but also preservation of the host state’s sovereign rights. In other words, transit can be fast and simplified, but there is no obligation to completely abolish border and customs controls (International Transit Convention 1965, Agreement on Trade Facilitation 1994).
c) Examples of extraterritorial passage
In international law, there are some exceptions where state sovereignty is partially limited:
- Suez Canal — even for warships, “free passage” under certain conditions.
- West Berlin corridor (1945–1990) — passage from West Germany to Berlin under special agreements with the USSR.
- Lacorsine model (France–Italy) — technically “unimpeded passage,” but the sovereign state maintains minimal technical control.
These exceptions are regulated only by written and very precise agreements, usually through international treaties.
Here, the TRIPP project’s approximate legal balance between “unimpeded passage” and “sovereign control” is visually illustrated.
U.S. support for Pashinyan’s project
Leaving aside uncertainties in the technical details, the main political outcome is that the U.S. has officially supported Armenia’s vision for unblocking regional transport communications. The Memorandum of Understanding signed by Trump and Pashinyan on Partnership for Developing the Potential of the “Crossroads of Peace” project confirms this. The chairman of the Armenian parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Sargis Khandanyan, stated that the U.S. will help Armenia implement this infrastructure program and attract investment (Arka.am – August 9, 2025).
Pashinyan presented this project in October 2023 at the Silk Road conference in Tbilisi (Azatutyun.am – August 26, 2025). He stated that the main goal of the project is to develop communications between Armenia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran through the repair, construction, and operation of highways, railways, pipelines, cables, and power lines. Explaining the principles of the “Crossroads of Peace,” Pashinyan had also declared in that speech that each country must carry out border and customs control within its own territory through its state authorities, ensuring the security of infrastructure, as well as the safety of goods, vehicles, and people. At the same time, countries may make certain simplifications in border and customs control procedures on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
The Zangezur communication falls within the Armenia–U.S. bilateral framework
Thus, it appears that all details, including the functions of companies to be engaged as operators for the Trump Route, will now be determined bilaterally between Armenia and the U.S., with Azerbaijan not directly participating. On July 19 — just 20 days before the Washington meeting — Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, in response to a question at the Third Shusha Global Media Forum, said:
“As for your question about an American company supposedly leasing the Zangezur corridor, this should be addressed to the Armenian leadership. In our territory, there can be no operator, no trader, no lessee. What does Armenia want to do? They can do many things, I have no knowledge of that. They have already invited so-called ‘European observers’ to the border. They are professional spies and conduct espionage against Iran. Especially during the recent Iran–Israel conflict, they were moving along the Iranian border…” (President.az – July 19, 2025)
From these words, it is clear that Azerbaijan views any foreign presence on its borders with suspicion and did not participate in discussions on TRIPP before the Washington meeting. The matter has now become a local issue within Armenia–U.S. bilateral cooperation. Yet after the war, the Zangezur corridor issue was a priority for Azerbaijan and had become a propaganda topic used in domestic politics in the context of a “return to historical lands” and the “Turan road” that would unite the Turkic world, stirring national sentiments. Consistently returning to this topic and making strong statements, President Aliyev had declared that whether Armenia liked it or not, Azerbaijan would implement the Zangezur corridor:
“If they want, we will solve it more easily; if they don’t, we will solve it by force. Just as I said before and during the war — leave our land willingly, or we will drive you out by force. And so it happened. The fate of the Zangezur corridor will be the same” (President.az – April 20, 2021). He also emphasized that the term “Zangezur corridor” had already been accepted worldwide (Report.az – January 28, 2025).
However, the signed documents make no mention of the Zangezur toponym or the term “corridor,” and the project will be implemented jointly by the U.S. and Armenia. Of course, there is nothing to prevent anyone from rhetorically referring to the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” as the Zangezur corridor.
The fate of the November 10 Declaration
The Washington agreements signal a paradigm shift in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. Until recently, Baku was demanding the implementation of the November 10, 2020, tripartite Declaration signed with Armenia and Russia. Even on January 7, 2025 — just two weeks after relations worsened due to the downing of an Azerbaijani passenger plane in Russian airspace on December 25, 2024 — President Aliyev told local media that Armenia must fulfill the provisions of the November 10 Declaration, where everything is clearly stated (President.az – January 7, 2025).
The unblocking of transport communications in the region is noted in the 9th article of the Declaration in a way that suits Russia’s interests:
“All economic and transport links in the region are unblocked. The Republic of Armenia guarantees the safety of transport links between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to organize the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles, and goods in both directions. Control over transport links is exercised by the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia” (President.az – November 10, 2020).
After the tripartite summit at the White House and the documents signed there, the November 10 Declaration lost its relevance and political weight. After the Karabakh war, Russia sought to build the new regional economic cooperation and security architecture precisely on the basis of this document. But events did not proceed as Moscow had planned or expected. In particular, as the war in Ukraine dragged on, Russia was forced to concentrate all its strength and resources there, and gradually began to lose its positions in the South Caucasus, just as it had in Syria. The U.S. took advantage of both this vacuum and the instability in Russia’s relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan after the Second Karabakh War.
However, it would still be premature to say that everything has been finalized, because although the peace treaty — the most fundamental document — has been initialed, it is not yet known when it will be signed and enter into force. Much will depend on the parliamentary elections to be held in Armenia on June 7, 2026.
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