Move forward on the path of European integration or turn back – return to Russia’s sphere of influence? The people of Moldova had to give a decisive answer to this dilemmatic question, and that is why the September 28 parliamentary elections were viewed as the decisive election in Moldova’s modern history. Whether the process of joining the European Union would be halted or acquire an irreversible character depended precisely on the outcome of these elections. Prime Minister Dorin Recean called the elections the “final battle for Moldova’s future” (Moldpress – September 24, 2025).
Moldova is a parliamentary republic, with executive powers vested in the government – headed by the prime minister – formed by the parliamentary majority. Parliament also has the right to impeach the president with a two-thirds majority vote. In recent years, President Maia Sandu’s particular activism and her prominence in decision-making derived from the fact that the legislature was under her party’s control. Losing the majority there would have resulted in Sandu being confined within the limited presidential powers. Therefore, the political significance of the 2025 parliamentary elections was even greater than that of the presidential elections held a year earlier.
The Moldovan people made their choice and supported the European vision.
Results
According to the final data of Moldova’s Central Election Commission, the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won 50.20% of the vote, thereby managing to preserve its parliamentary majority (CEC Moldova). The Patriotic Bloc of Socialists and Communists (Blocul Patriotic), representing the antagonistic political-ideological pole, gained 24.20% of the vote, a result that fell short of both its voters’ and Moscow’s expectations. Three other political forces managed to pass the minimum threshold of 5% for parties and 7% for blocs: the “Alternative” bloc (BE Alternativa) – 7.96%, “Our Party” (Partidul Nostru) – 6.20%, and “Democracy at Home” (PPDA) – 5.62%, thereby gaining representation in the legislature. Based on this, in the 101-seat parliament, PAS will have 55 seats, the Patriotic Bloc 26, the Alternative Bloc 8, and “Our Party” and “Democracy at Home” will each have 6 mandates (Interfax – September 29, 2025).
Had PAS failed to secure a single-party majority, a different political situation would have arisen in the country. The necessity of forming a coalition would have turned the outsiders who gained 6–8 seats into important political players, and their geopolitical priorities, i.e. which political pole they would align with, would have become significant. However, the election results left no room for uncertainties or questions. PAS will form the new government on its own initiative, without needing coalition partners or compromises.
The Sandu Factor
In characterizing Moldova’s domestic politics during the independence period, the most fitting word would be “chaos.” Until Maia Sandu became the dominant political actor, there had been no political stability in the country. Political institutions, including state agencies, functioned not as problem-solvers but as problem-creators. The constant alternation of pro-Russian and pro-Western presidents and governments, and in some cases, the simultaneous existence of a pro-Russian president alongside a pro-Western parliament, had also impacted Moldova’s foreign policy. There was no consistency or stable line in defining and implementing foreign policy priorities. For example, in 2014 Moldova signed an Association Agreement with the European Union, but in 2018, under Socialist leader Igor Dodon’s presidency, it obtained observer status in the Eurasian Economic Union.
Maia Sandu managed to achieve consolidation within the fragmented pro-European political camp and was consecutively elected president in 2020 and 2024. The fact that this consolidation occurred not at the level of elites but at the lower level – among citizens and voters – was the main reason for her success. Her party, PAS, in turn, won over 50% of the vote in two consecutive parliamentary elections (2021, 2025). By the end of her current term, President Sandu and the PAS government will have been in power continuously for 8 years. This signals a new reality in Moldovan politics that had not been observed before – the provision of stability and continuity in governance. Maia Sandu’s reputation as an uncorrupted, clean politician, as well as her ability to present citizens with a clear development perspective, were the key factors that led her and her party to victory in four major election campaigns over the past five years.
Russia–Romania: A Clash of Civilizations
Due to historical-cultural, including religious, reasons, both Russia and Romania wield strong influence in contemporary Moldovan society. The current territory of Moldova (part of historical Bessarabia) came under the control of the Russian Empire under the terms of the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1812. After a short-lived independence in 1917–18, it united with Romania. In 1940, following the USSR’s ultimatum to Romania, Bessarabia was annexed by the Soviet Union and the Moldavian SSR was established.
The vast majority of Moldova’s population are Orthodox Christians. The political polarization in society has also extended into the religious sphere. Currently, two churches operate in Moldova: the Moldovan Orthodox Church, under the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Metropolis of Bessarabia, under the Romanian Orthodox Church. Most believers remain loyal to the Russian church, and in theological terminology, Moldova is considered the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate. However, the Metropolis of Bessarabia, which resumed its activities in Moldova in 1992 and was officially registered in 2002, has been gradually strengthening (Union of Orthodox Journalists – September 19, 2024). At the same time, Romania’s influence is expanding. The number of Moldovan citizens who have obtained Romanian passports has reached 1.2 million, nearly 40% of the country’s population (TV8 – February 6, 2024). The procedure for Moldovans to acquire Romanian citizenship is quite simple: any Moldovan citizen who can prove that their ancestors were born on Romanian territory (Bessarabia) prior to 1940 can obtain a Romanian passport through the repatriation program (Rumunia.ru). Moldovans have even begun influencing Romanian domestic politics. For example, in the second round of Romania’s presidential elections held on May 18 this year, over 158,000 Moldovans participated, with 88% voting for Bucharest’s mayor, liberal Nicușor Dan (Interfax – May 19, 2025).
Romania is one of Moldova’s main lobbyists within the EU, and the realization of Moldova’s membership aligns with Bucharest’s long-term strategic vision of unification. President N. Dan has already issued an optimistic forecast that Moldova will become an EU member in 2028 (Point.md – September 12, 2025).
The Test of Fragile Moldovan Democracy Against Russian Subversion
Having concentrated all of its resources and attention on the war of aggression in Ukraine, Russia is increasingly struggling to protect and maintain its interests across the post-Soviet space. The United States taking the initiative in the Azerbaijan–Armenia peace process, with the transport corridor through Armenia placed under American supervision and dubbed the “Trump route,” is the most recent example. In Central Asia, Russia is no longer the dominant player it once was, with the growing influence of China and the West diminishing its weight. Against this background, Moscow extensively employed illegal and destructive methods in Moldova to achieve a pro-Russian comeback and return this small European country bordering Ukraine into its sphere of influence. By regaining control over Moldova, Moscow could have opened a new front against Ukraine and created a springboard to attack the region it calls “Novorossiya” (Odessa and Mykolaiv regions).
Moldova’s Intelligence and Security Service had already announced in November 2023 that Russia had been preparing various sabotage scenarios since the second half of 2022 – after the start of the war in Ukraine – to overthrow the Moldovan government by force and enable criminal groups to seize control of the country. For this purpose, 1 billion lei (55 million dollars) had been spent (Eurointegration – November 3, 2023). During the latest election campaign, Moldovan police carried out continuous operations to expose and neutralize networks involved in bribing and directing voters, as well as to thwart plans to create chaos after the elections. One of the most high-profile incidents was the arrest of 74 people, trained in Serbia and sent to Moldova just days before the vote. Moldova’s Organized Crime Directorate announced that weapons, explosives, military uniforms, and cash were found on these individuals and in their accommodations, and accused them of links to Russian intelligence services (BBC – September 29, 2025). The Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, confirming the Moldovan police’s information, also arrested two people who had provided military-tactical training to a group of Moldovan and Romanian citizens, proving that even for Belgrade – Russia’s strategic partner in the Balkans – European integration was the higher priority (Die Welt – September 26, 2025).
Russian intelligence services also relied on the resources of businessman and politician Ilan Shor in their covert operations in Moldova. Shor was one of those involved in the notorious 2012–2014 bank theft – the embezzlement of 1 billion dollars siphoned out of Moldova’s banking system into offshore accounts – and was sentenced in absentia to 15 years in prison. Having fled Moldova in 2019, initially to Israel, he now lives in Russia. His bloc was banned from running in the recent elections (Eurointegration – July 20, 2025). Immediately after the referendum held simultaneously with the first round of presidential elections in October 2024, M. Sandu declared in a special statement that an unprecedented attack on freedom and democracy had occurred and that attempts had been made to buy 300,000 votes (Die Welt – October 29, 2024). Recall that in the referendum, the proposal to enshrine European integration in the Constitution was adopted by a narrow margin of 50.35%, thanks to the diaspora. Ahead of the parliamentary elections, Moldovan security structures remained more vigilant and carried out large-scale search and counter-sabotage operations (Die Welt – September 22, 2025).
One of Russia’s traditional pressure tactics against Moldova is the separatism card. The territories on the left bank of the Dniester River have been under Russia’s de facto control since 1992. The Operative Group of Russian Forces is illegally stationed there, alongside Russian peacekeepers. About half of the 455,000 local residents are Russian citizens. Moscow occasionally reactivates this problem. For instance, in February 2024, a general assembly of deputies of all levels was convened in Transnistria, and an appeal was sent to the Russian State Duma and Federation Council requesting assistance (Meduza – February 28, 2024). However, this story did not develop further. The main reason, undoubtedly, is that neither Transnistria nor Moldova as a whole has a direct land border with Russia. The geographic factor – being surrounded only by Ukraine and the rest of Moldova – influences the nature of Transnistrian separatism, compelling it to pursue a more constructive rather than aggressive policy.
The European Union has become the main foreign trade partner of the region, while trade with Russia has significantly declined. For example, exports from the region to Russia, which peaked at 253 million euros in 2008, dropped sharply to just 21 million euros in 2024. Exports to the European Union, meanwhile, exceed 320 million euros (Moldpress – August 4, 2025). As for Moldova’s overall exports, the EU now accounts for 67%, while Russia’s share is only 3% (Moldpress – August 4, 2025).
In the parliamentary elections, 12,000 Moldovan citizens from the left bank voted at polling stations established in government-controlled territory. The fact that 30% of them voted for PAS provides certain insights into the mood of the region’s population. By comparison, in Gagauzia PAS won only 3% of the vote, while the “Patriotic Bloc” gained 82%, reflecting the Gagauz population’s negative attitude toward European integration and the preservation of Russia’s influence there. Gagauzia’s president, Evghenia Guțul, is currently in prison. She was elected head of Gagauzia in 2023 as a candidate of the Shor Party, which is banned in Moldova. On March 6, 2025, she met with Putin in Moscow, and shortly afterwards, on March 25, she was detained by police in Chișinău. In August, she was sentenced by the court to 7 years in prison (BBC – August 5, 2025).
The preventive measures taken played a crucial role in ensuring that the elections were held in safe conditions and that the will of the people was expressed without outside interference. Planned subversive actions were neutralized in time. Had Moldova’s security forces not carried out these measures, voters would have been subjected to serious manipulation and direction, as in the 2024 referendum. This could have affected the final results. On the other hand, there was the risk of destabilization and the emergence of an unmanageable situation in the country. The neutralization of all these risks by the police and intelligence services is also proof that significant progress has been made in nation-building under Maia Sandu. Democracies must be able to defend themselves.
References:
1.Премьер-министр Дорин Речан о подготовке страны к противодействию вмешательству России в парламентские выборы. https://www.moldpres.md/rus/oficialnyj/premer-ministr-dorin-rechan-o-podgotovke-strany-k-protivodejstviyu-vmeshatelstvu-rossii-v-parlamentskie-vybory-gosudarstvo-respublika-moldova-soprotivlyaetsya-i-prinimaet-otvetnye-mery-chtoby-pomeshat-rossijskomu-planu-okkupacii
2. Парламенстские выборы в республике Молдова. https://pv.cec.md/preliminare
3. В Молдавии завершен подсчет голосов на парламентских выборах. https://www.interfax.ru/world/1049894
4. Более 60 общин Православной Церкви Молдовы перешли в Бессарабскую митрополию. https://spzh.eu/ru/news/82122-bolee-60-obshchin-pravoslavnoj-tserkvi-moldovy-pereshli-v-bessarabskuju-mitropoliju
5. "В Молдове проживает 1,2 млн граждан Румынии". https://tv8.md/ru/2024/02/06/chokan-o-deyatelnosti-ruminskikh-partii-v-rm-v-moldove-prozhivaet-1-2-mln-grazhdan-ruminii/250786
6. КАК МОЛДАВАНАМ ПОЛУЧИТЬ РУМЫНСКИЙ ПАСПОРТ. https://rumunia.ru/grazhdanstvo-rumunii/dlya-moldovan#close
7. На выборах в Румынии проголосовало рекордно много жителей Молдавии с румынским гражданством. https://www.interfax.ru/world/1026374
8. Никушор Дан: Молдова может вступить в ЕС в 2028 году. https://point.md/ru/novosti/politika/nikushor-dan-moldova-mozhet-vstupit-v-es-v-2028-godu/
9. Спецслужбы Молдовы: РФ потратила $55 млн на дестабилизацию в стране. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/news/2023/11/3/7172793/
10. Власти Молдовы: Россия готовила молдаван в Сербии для организации беспорядков в Кишиневе. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/clyl304jg2yo
11. Подготовка беспорядков в Молдове: в Сербии арестованы двое. https://www.dw.com/ru/v-serbii-arestovany-dvoe-po-delu-o-podgotovke-besporadkov-v-moldove/a-74153985
12. ЦИК Молдовы не пустила на выборы пророссийский блок олигарха Шора. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/news/2025/07/20/7216290/
13. Как был организован "подкуп" голосов на выборах в Молдове. https://www.dw.com/ru/kak-byl-organizovan-podkup-golosov-na-vyborah-v-moldove/a-70630934
14. Перед выборами в Молдове проходят масштабные обыски. https://www.dw.com/ru/pered-vyborami-v-moldove-prohodat-masstabnye-obyski/a-74092229
15. Участники съезда депутатов в Приднестровье попросили у России «защиты» в связи с «усилением давления Молдовы». https://meduza.io/news/2024/02/28/uchastniki-s-ezda-deputatov-v-pridnestrovie-poprosili-u-rossii-zaschity-v-svyazi-s-usileniem-davleniya-moldovy
16. Экспорт в Россию снижается. Приднестровье переориентировало экономику на Запад. https://www.moldpres.md/rus/ekonomika/eksport-v-rossiyu-snizhaetsya-pridnestrove-pereorientirovalo-ekonomiku-na-zapad
17. Вице-премьер Дойна Нистор: «Экспорт в ЕС в ближайшее время ещё больше увеличится». https://www.moldpres.md/rus/ekonomika/vice-premer-dojna-nistor-eksport-v-es-v-blizhajshee-vremya-eshyo-bolshe-uvelichitsya
18. Молдавский суд приговорил главу Гагаузии Евгению Гуцул к семи годам тюрьмы. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cvgn948pgx2o
