The meeting, which Ankara had long been working to realize, finally took place last week – Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with U.S. President Donald Trump. This was Erdoğan’s first meeting with Trump since his return to power earlier this year, and the first encounter between the two leaders since 2019.
Both sides declared satisfaction with the meeting. Trump said they had a “very beautiful” meeting, while Erdoğan stated that “it was such a beautiful visit that it cannot be stained with the mud that is thrown.” (Communications Directorate, September 2025a)
For Ankara in particular, the meeting itself and Trump’s kind words about Erdoğan will likely be used for a long time in domestic politics as a tool of legitimacy. In fact, before the meeting, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack openly stated that Trump had said: “What Erdoğan wants is legitimacy, let’s give it to him” (Euronews, September 2025). Although he later clarified that what he meant was not legitimacy in the context of Turkish domestic politics, but Erdoğan’s legitimacy in the eyes of the American public and Congress due to his image as a NATO-skeptic and pro-Russian figure in the U.S. (T24, September 2025), there are strong grounds to believe that these two issues are not separate. One of the most obvious reasons for this is the U.S.’s “turning a blind eye” to recent opposition crackdowns in Turkey’s domestic politics.
Ankara’s Gift-Laden Visit and the Translation Storm
Erdoğan arrived at the meeting with Trump bearing gifts – three days before the meeting, Turkey announced the removal of tariffs it had imposed on the U.S. (Reuters, September 2025). Covering about $1.6 billion worth of imports, these tariffs had originally been imposed in 2018 as a retaliatory measure during Trump’s first term in response to U.S. additional tariffs on steel and aluminum imports. Back then, Turkey had slapped extra tariffs on passenger cars, alcoholic beverages, coal, paper products, cosmetics, agricultural goods, and various industrial products. The removal of these tariffs on Erdoğan’s way to the U.S. was interpreted as the beginning of a new warming period in trade relations between the two countries (Bloomberg HT, September 2025).
One day later – on September 24 – it was announced that Turkey’s energy company BOTAŞ had signed a 20-year agreement with “Mercuria” and “Woodside Energy” in the U.S. for liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply (AA, September 2025).
At the same time, news leaked to the press that Turkey would purchase 225 aircraft from Boeing, and just a few hours after the meeting, this information was confirmed (“Dünya” Newspaper, September 2025).
However, just two days before his meeting with Trump, Erdoğan’s interview with the “Fox News” channel demonstrated that maintaining the sensitive balance in political relations was harder than warming trade ties. In the interview, Erdoğan said: “You may recall that the esteemed Trump once said, ‘I will end the Russia-Ukraine war.’ Has it ended? It still continues. In the same way, he said, ‘I will end the Gaza war.’ Has it ended? No.” These words drew a sharp reaction from Washington. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio responded: “Everyone comes to the White House to meet President Trump and wants him to fix the situation. They can say whatever they want, but the truth is, today we have meetings and leaders are begging to attend them” (X, September 2025).
The Turkish government chose not to respond to Rubio’s statement. AK Party spokesperson Ömer Çelik criticized opposition representatives who interpreted Rubio’s use of the word “begging” as an insult, accusing them of political missionary work (Cumhuriyet, September 2025).
The Presidency’s Directorate of Communications sent a correction letter to Fox News’ “Special Report” program, claiming that Erdoğan’s words had been mistranslated during interpretation, and that what he had actually said was that ending the war requires serious difficulties and costs, and that he appreciated Trump’s efforts in this regard. The channel, however, announced that the translation was accurate and stood by it (Fox News, September 2025).
According to Gönül Tol, director of the Turkey program at the Washington-based Middle East Institute (MEI), Erdoğan’s words had angered Trump, who conveyed this to Erdoğan directly, after which the Directorate of Communications hurriedly attempted to fix the situation with a correction note (Medyascope, September 2025a).
Thus, Erdoğan came to the White House with a few commercial gestures and a near-crisis, patched up somewhat by the Turkish government’s retreat.
Authoritarianism Veiled with Praise
Turkey’s “submissive” attitude continued during the September 25 White House meeting, which both sides described with expressions such as historic and excellent.
When Erdoğan appeared before the press prior to the meeting with Trump, he chose to remain in the background – limiting himself to saying that they hoped to elevate Turkey–U.S. relations to another level, and that they were ready to do their part to reopen the Halki Seminary, which has been closed for more than half a century.
Trump, on the other hand, showered him with praise – “He is a very tough and stubborn man. I don’t like stubborn men, but I like this man,” he said, adding that Erdoğan was a man respected everywhere and that they had always had good relations (Al Jazeera, September 2025). He highlighted that Turkey’s president was the architect of Syria’s liberation from Assad, that he was respected by both sides in the Russia–Ukraine war, and that he could play a bigger role.
All of this was exactly what Erdoğan needed, and most likely, Ankara’s maximum expectation from the meeting was nothing more than this – Trump generously provided Erdoğan with the legitimacy to cover up flaws and shortcomings in domestic politics and the systematically growing authoritarianism. Trump’s quip, “Erdoğan knows how to run tricky elections,” though interpreted in different ways, was essentially meant to show that he saw the Turkish president as close to himself.
The Embargo Labyrinth
A previously announced joint press conference was not held after the meeting. According to reports circulating in the corridors, it was the Turkish side that requested no press conference, but the U.S. president decided to answer journalists’ questions. His answers revealed that the meeting had been a well-prepared PR act, but had yielded no concrete results on critical issues.
It is true that some sources say the “Halkbank” problem – where the U.S. accused Turkey of violating sanctions on Iran – was resolved through a bargain, with Turkey paying a $100 million fine to escape legal liability, and that the two sides were aligned on the Syria issue (Medyascope, September 2025b). However, these were not the main items on the meeting agenda.
One of Turkey’s biggest expectations was the lifting of the embargo on F-35 fighter jets and sanctions on its defense industry. But on this issue, Trump said after the meeting: “I could easily resolve it if I want to. It depends on the situation, if Erdoğan does something for us.”
During his first presidency, Trump had removed Turkey from the F-35 program in response to Ankara’s purchase of S-400 air defense systems from Russia. Now he says “I could bring them back if I want,” but this does not seem so easy.
Firstly, Turkey has not taken any steps back regarding the S-400s that triggered the sanctions, nor does it show any intention to. Last year, it was reported that Turkey proposed a formula to bypass the F-35 embargo by “keeping the S-400s under U.S. control and not using them,” but Ankara denied this, insisting the S-400s would remain in the Turkish Armed Forces’ inventory (The National Interest, 2024).
For Turkey to acquire the F-35s, the U.S. defense budget and the legislation governing foreign arms sales – the NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) – would need to be amended.
The NDAA not only removed Turkey from the F-35 program, but also prohibits all licenses, materials, and support needed for the maintenance of these aircraft:
“No funds authorized to be appropriated for the Department of Defense or otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be used to –
– Transfer to Turkey, or authorize the transfer of, any F-35 aircraft or related support equipment or parts;
– Provide any intellectual property, technical data, or material support needed for the maintenance or support of the F-35 aircraft to Turkey;
– Construct a storage facility or otherwise facilitate the storage of any F-35 aircraft in Turkey.” (Congress.gov, 2019a)
According to the law, for this embargo to be lifted, Turkey must provide assurances that it does not possess the S-400 systems or related equipment, will not acquire them in the future, and since 2019 has not purchased any other defense equipment from Russia that threatens the F-35 program (Congress.gov, 2019b).
Amending these heavy conditions falls within Congress’s authority, not Trump’s, and seems unrealistic at this stage. In fact, even the proposal of new sanctions on Turkey in 2026 is on the agenda (Middleeasteye, September 2025).
This is why Ankara is seeking the repeal of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). After Erdoğan’s visit, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said Turkey could not begin production of its KAAN fighter jet due to the lack of an engine license, and argued that CAATSA was incompatible with the spirit of alliance (Medyascope, September 2025).
Turkey was targeted by these sanctions for purchasing the S-400s from Russia, as CAATSA applies not only to Russia, Iran, and North Korea, but also to third countries doing business with them (State.gov, 2020).
As a result of these sanctions affecting Turkey’s defense industry, Ankara cannot obtain U.S. defense-related products or technology licenses, cannot secure loans exceeding $10 billion from U.S. financial institutions, and cannot obtain defense industry credits from organizations such as the World Bank and IMF. Moreover, personal embargoes are applied against officials of the Defense Industry Presidency.
The NDAA adopted in 2021 grants the president authority to lift CAATSA, and Ankara hopes Trump will use this authority. But the law explicitly sets out the conditions for this: the president must report to the Senate and House Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that –
– The Turkish Government and no person acting on its behalf possesses the S-400 system or any replacement system;
– The S-400 system or its replacement is not operated or maintained in Turkey by Russian citizens, the Russian Government, the Russian defense sector, or any of its representatives;
– The president has received credible assurances from the Turkish Government that it will not reacquire the S-400 system or its replacement, nor allow any foreign person to do so on its behalf. (Congress.gov, 2021)
Energy Ties, Political Contradictions
Before the meeting, Trump said of these sanctions: “If our meeting goes well, we can lift them immediately.” After the meeting, however, he demanded that Turkey stop buying oil and gas from Russia: “The best thing Erdoğan can do is not to buy oil and gas from Russia.” He did not say Erdoğan made any promise on this, but with his words “if I want, I will do it,” he sent the message that the bargaining card is in his own hands (Euronews TR, September 2025a).
U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack, when asked whether Ankara was receptive to this demand, replied: “That’s something to ask them,” thus passing the ball back to Ankara (AP, September 2025).
In other words, Washington put Ankara before an even bigger demand than giving up the S-400s, the direct cause of sanctions: it asked Turkey to cut its energy ties with Russia. Erdoğan made no statement about this demand in Washington. Returning from the U.S. with BOTAŞ LNG agreements, a memorandum of cooperation in the field of strategic civilian nuclear energy, and an agreement to restart the oil flow through the Iraq–Turkey pipeline, Erdoğan also did not touch upon this issue in his traditional in-flight interview with journalists (Communications Directorate, 2025). The questions in this interview, pre-determined in advance, did not include perhaps the most critical sentence of the meeting.
Most likely, Erdoğan will continue his silence on this issue to maintain his balancing policy with both sides. But the real answer to whether Trump will accept this silence lies in the U.S. president’s words: “He has some needs, we have some needs…” (Euronews TR, September 2025b).
As with other issues, regarding the Israel–Palestine war and the Gaza ceasefire, the result of the meeting was declarative. Although both leaders said they had reached a “common understanding” on peace and ceasefire in Gaza, and Erdoğan declared support for Trump’s global peace vision, no concrete roadmap, plan, or proposal was presented. On the contrary, this meeting took place against the backdrop of the U.S. vetoing a UN resolution just a week earlier calling for an immediate, unconditional, and permanent ceasefire in Gaza, and Turkey signing a multi-billion-dollar deal with Boeing – one of 15 companies Amnesty International identified as supporting genocide in Gaza (SDE, September 2025).
Conclusion
The Erdoğan–Trump meeting can be seen as the first step in a softening or a “reset” in high-level communication after six years of evident chill in Turkey–U.S. relations. But despite all the kind words, gestures, and praise, both the statements made after the meeting and the geopolitical contradictions between the two countries, along with the authoritarian tendencies and sharp maneuvers of the leaders, necessitate caution in optimistic expectations about the future of this thaw.
True, this meeting served the Erdoğan government’s desires in terms of Turkey’s international prestige, its legitimacy in the eyes of the West, and its image as “a U.S. ally.” But in particular, regarding the balancing policy between the U.S. and Russia, it narrows Erdoğan’s room for maneuver. Although the Trump administration signaled willingness to lift the F-35 and other defense industry embargoes, and although there are optimistic forecasts that the president could persuade Congress to agree, there is no concrete promise or plan. On the contrary, there are new and tougher demands – such as not buying gas and oil from Russia. Meeting these conditions would mean Turkey facing Russia not only economically but also geopolitically.
Ankara does not seem close to making this choice. This means contradictions with the U.S. will persist. True, there is also the possibility that Trump might drop the “Russian gas or American planes” condition through a deal with Putin or some other bargain, but this too would not be a solid or lasting solution.
It is clear that there are very serious problems of trust, contradictions, and misunderstandings between the U.S. and Turkey. These cannot be eliminated merely by the two leaders praising each other. In this regard, the Erdoğan–Trump meeting should be seen not as a new beginning in problem-solving, but as a symbolic reset or an attempt to create great expectations.
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