Relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the People’s Republic of China are experiencing an upward trajectory. Over the past year, the signing of two official documents on strategic partnership, the introduction of a mutual visa-free regime starting from July, and a significant increase in trade turnover stand as clear indicators of progress in bilateral relations. Although President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev’s participation in the “SCO+” format meeting held in the Chinese city of Tianjin on August 31–September 3, as well as in the parade in Beijing dedicated to the 80th anniversary of victory in World War II and Japan’s capitulation, were realized within a multilateral framework, they once again demonstrated the elevation of bilateral ties to a new level.
The first of the two strategic partnership documents between the two countries—the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the People’s Republic of China—was signed on July 3, 2024, during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit held in Astana. The second—the Joint Statement on the Establishment of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the People’s Republic of China—was signed nine months later, on April 23, 2025, during Ilham Aliyev’s official visit to China (President.az, 2024; Azertag.az, April 2025). The fact that less than a year after the first, the need arose to proclaim strategic partnership once again is a crucial point. A plausible explanation may lie in the emergence of a new geopolitical situation on a global scale following Donald Trump’s election as U.S. president. While the Declaration and the Statement essentially share the same or similar content, there are also certain fundamental differences.
The Taiwan Issue: Azerbaijan Supports a Military Option
The first article of both documents deals with the Taiwan issue, which, without doubt, stems from this being a top priority of Chinese foreign policy and for the state overall. Article 1.1 of the 2024 Declaration states:
“The Azerbaijani side … supports the peaceful development of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, as well as the efforts of the Chinese government toward China’s reunification.”
However, in the 2025 Statement, this sentence was revised:
“The Azerbaijani side … supports the Chinese government in the realization of the country’s reunification.”
As is evident, the phrase “peaceful development of relations” has been removed. This is not a technical but a political edit. Recently, the Chinese government has more frequently emphasized that it may resort to military force to establish control over Taiwan. China is pursuing rapid militarization, and the recent military parade in Beijing was a clear demonstration of power. Should China attempt in the future to forcibly reunify Taiwan, it risks confrontation with the U.S. and its allies (the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia). By implication, Azerbaijan has expressed support for China’s reunification by any means, including war.
Climate Change: Azerbaijan Shares China’s Vision
Another key difference concerns climate change. In the 2024 Declaration, the issue was mentioned only briefly, with a stronger emphasis on cooperation in the field of green energy (Article 2.8). In the 2025 Statement, however, additional provisions were included in line with the changing global context. For example, Article 11 reads:
“The parties call upon all countries to support the process of global climate governance, to fully and conscientiously fulfill obligations and responsibilities in accordance with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement. The parties call on developed countries to approach their historical responsibilities with dignity, to provide financial, technological, and intellectual support to developing countries, and to assist them in enhancing their capacity to combat climate change…”
This addition is undoubtedly linked to the Trump administration’s view of climate change. As is known, after Trump came to power, the U.S. withdrew from the Paris Agreement, which implemented the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The radical right wing of the U.S. Republican Party regards the Paris Agreement, which regulates measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere, as a Chinese conspiracy aimed at de-industrializing the United States. One of Trump’s first decisions was to declare an energy emergency, announcing that the exploitation of natural resources, especially oil and gas deposits, would be maximized. By signing the 2025 Statement, Azerbaijan has aligned itself not with Trump’s approach but with China’s vision in this field—despite the fact that Azerbaijan’s economy is based precisely on the extraction and export of traditional energy resources.
International Trade: Azerbaijan and China Against Trump
The most critical “frontline” of U.S.–China rivalry is international trade. During Trump’s term, the U.S. rejected all forms of supranational regulation in this area and pursued a protectionist policy, while China, conversely, strongly championed free trade and economic globalization. The strategic partnership documents signed with Azerbaijan specifically underline commitment to the multilateral trading system. The wording of the 2025 Statement on this point clearly reflects the impact of the “Trump factor.” For example, Article 12 contains direct criticism of the U.S.:
“The parties support the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment, oppose unilateralism and protectionism, despotism and violations of world trade rules, and jointly strive to defend the multilateral trading system for the sake of common prosperity.”
It is obvious that the references to unilateralism, protectionism, despotism, and violations of world trade rules are aimed at the policies of the Trump administration. In other words, Azerbaijan has also aligned itself with China’s vision in the field of international trade.
Azerbaijan’s WTO Membership: Beijing Supports, Baku Evades
The multilateral international trade system is regulated by the World Trade Organization (WTO). China has long supported Azerbaijan’s membership in this body, and this support is explicitly expressed in the signed documents. While the 2024 Declaration states that China supports the measures undertaken by Azerbaijan in the process of accession to the WTO (Article 3), the 2025 Statement is more explicit: “China supports Azerbaijan’s early accession to the World Trade Organization” (Article 12).
The reason China is open to Azerbaijan’s and other countries’ WTO membership is clear: China seeks to preserve a liberal, multilateral trading system that suits its interests and provides a legal basis for its economic interventions. By contrast, the U.S. now believes that the system it helped build no longer serves its interests and has taken steps leading to its erosion. Washington has halted its financial contributions to the WTO and raised tariffs in foreign trade, preferring to secure favorable bilateral agreements with its partners.
As for Azerbaijan’s membership, Baku formally submitted its application to the WTO Secretariat back in 1997 (Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2020). That year, a working group on Azerbaijan was established at the Secretariat. Multilateral negotiations on Azerbaijan’s membership have since been conducted within this group, while bilateral negotiations are held with member states separately, culminating in final protocols. However, Azerbaijan’s accession process has been extremely slow—undoubtedly for political, not technical, reasons. Chief among them is the monopoly-dominated economy, lack of transparency, and absence of competition (Azadliq Radiosu, 2021).
For comparison, the accession timelines of some post-Soviet states are instructive:
- Kyrgyzstan: 2 years 10 months (1996–1998)
- Georgia: 3 years 11 months (1996–2000)
- Moldova: 8 years (1993–2001)
- Armenia: 10 years (1993–2003)
- Tajikistan: 11 years 9 months (2001–2013)
- Ukraine: 15 years (1993–2008)
- Russia: 18 years (1993–2012), largely due to prolonged negotiations with the U.S., the EU, and Georgia (TASS, July 27, 2015).
By contrast, Azerbaijan’s accession process has now lasted 28 years. In a February 2025 interview with China’s CGTN channel, President Aliyev explained the reasons, indirectly criticizing Trump’s policies. He stated that Azerbaijan’s non-membership stemmed from protectionism, double standards, and tariffs, all contrary to the fundamental values of the WTO (Vergiler.az, February 12, 2025). Yet even during periods when the U.S. was not pursuing trade wars and protectionist policies, Azerbaijan’s accession process did not accelerate.
It is evident that the Azerbaijani authorities attach little importance to participation in the WTO. Aliyev approaches membership in international organizations that set rules and monitor their implementation with caution. He is a typical authoritarian leader who does not accept any restriction on his unshared rule and exclusive will, seeking to remain the sole decision-maker in all matters related to the country, including foreign economic relations.
Record Trade Deficit Against Azerbaijan in Bilateral Trade
When discussing international trade, it is also necessary to consider bilateral trade between Azerbaijan and China, which shows remarkable dynamics. In 2024, trade turnover between the two countries increased by 20.7 percent compared to the previous year, reaching $3.744 billion (President.az, April 21, 2025). Last year, 7.9 percent of Azerbaijan’s total foreign trade volume fell to China’s share. China is now Azerbaijan’s fourth-largest trading partner and, for the first time, has risen to first place in Azerbaijan’s imports.
Statistics from the State Customs Committee of Azerbaijan highlight the extent of imbalance in Azerbaijan–China trade. In 2024, while Azerbaijan imported goods worth $3.725 billion from China, its exports to that country amounted to only $19.7 million—a symbolic figure. Azerbaijan’s exports to China accounted for just 0.07 percent of its total exports, whereas imports from China made up 17.69 percent of its total imports. These figures show that the entire growth in bilateral trade is completely in China’s favor (Customs.gov.az, 2024).
Azerbaijan’s Flickering BRICS Aspiration
Another noteworthy point in comparing the two strategic partnership documents is Azerbaijan’s stance toward BRICS. The 2024 Declaration mentions Azerbaijan’s aspiration to join BRICS and states that China welcomes Azerbaijan’s participation in BRICS cooperation (Article 4.5). However, the 2025 Statement contains no such reference to BRICS. This indicates that Azerbaijan no longer seeks BRICS membership. This shift can be explained by the deterioration in interstate relations following the downing of an Azerbaijani passenger plane over Russian airspace in December 2024, as well as by the changing geopolitical environment after Trump’s election and Baku’s inclination toward rapprochement with Trump’s America.
The Failed SCO Membership Bid
Both documents note China’s support for upgrading Azerbaijan’s legal status within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). At present, Azerbaijan holds the status of dialogue partner and applied in 2024 for observer status (Modern.az, July 18, 2024). According to reports in Azerbaijani media, at the most recent SCO summit in China, India vetoed Azerbaijan’s membership (Oxu.az, September 1, 2025). The pro-government APA agency, citing diplomatic sources, reported that Russia played a role in blocking Azerbaijan’s SCO membership. According to the source, Russia pushed India to the forefront while remaining in the background (Apa.az, September 5, 2025). These reports indicate that Azerbaijan has, in fact, applied for full SCO membership. Until now, no such information had been publicly available, and it remains unclear when exactly Azerbaijan submitted its application.
Thus, Azerbaijan, which has moved toward strategic partnership with China, sought to join the SCO as an alternative to U.S. (Western) hegemony, built allied relations with Russia (despite current difficulties in relations), and is now preparing to sign a Strategic Partnership Charter with the United States, for which a working group has already been created (President.az, August 29, 2025). The Azerbaijani authorities present these steps as a “multi-vector” foreign policy. But can this truly be assessed as multi-vectorism, or is the government simply adapting its direction in line with the demands of the moment—especially the interests of those in power? We shall attempt to address this question in another article.
References:
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Azertag.az, aprel 2025.Azərbaycan Respublikası ilə Çin Xalq Respublikası arasında hərtərəfli strateji tərəfdaşlıq əlaqələrinin qurulması haqqında Birgə Bəyanat imzalanıb. https://azertag.az/xeber/azerbaycan_respublikasi_ile_chin_xalq_respublikasi_arasinda_herterefli_strateji_terefdasliq_elaqelerinin_qurulmasi_haqqinda_birge_beyanat_imzalanib-3518335
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Oxu.az – 1 sentyabr 2025. Hindistan Azərbaycanın ŞƏT-ə üzvlüyünə növbəti dəfə veto qoydu. https://oxu.az/dunya/hindistan-azerbaycanin-set-e-uzvluyune-novbeti-defe-veto-qoydu
Apa.az – 5 sentyabr 2025. Azərbaycanın Şanxay Əməkdaşlıq Təşkilatına üzvlüyünün bloklanmasında Rusiya da yaxından iştirak edib – EKSKLÜZİV https://apa.az/xarici-siyaset/azerbaycanin-sanxay-emekdasliq-teskilatina-uzvluyunun-bloklanmasinda-rusiya-da-yaxindan-istirak-edib-ekskluziv-915539
President.az – 29 avqust 2025. Azərbaycan Respublikası ilə Amerika Birləşmiş Ştatları arasında Strateji Tərəfdaşlıq Xartiyasının hazırlanması məqsədilə Strateji İşçi Qrupunun yaradılması haqqında Azərbaycan Respublikası Hökuməti və Amerika Birləşmiş Ştatları Hökuməti arasında ANLAŞMA MEMORANDUMU https://president.az/az/articles/view/69974
