(This article is prepared within the KHAR Center’s “Authoritarian Regimes and Transregional Influence Mechanisms” research series.)
Introduction
Germany and France are the two Western European countries most systematically exposed to Russian propaganda. Although the dynamics vary depending on the characteristics of each country and the changing effectiveness of Moscow’s influence agents, the Kremlin employs similar mechanisms in both. Their political and economic power, influence within EU decision-making structures, and pivotal roles in NATO make Germany and France primary targets of Russia’s information operations.
In Germany, factors such as its historical trajectory, the evolution of its relations with Russia (from war, to Cold War, to normalization, and now hybrid warfare), the influence of Russia in the former East Germany, domestic political polarization, the rise of nationalism and radicalism, migration-related tensions, and energy dependencies have all contributed to the effectiveness of Kremlin propaganda (ICCT, 2024a).
In France, in addition to its political-military might, its Gaullist tradition of pursuing “strategic autonomy,” long-standing undercurrents of anti-Americanism, widespread public discontent related to social justice and migration issues, and protest movements like the “Yellow Vests” provide fertile ground for Kremlin narratives (Geopolitics, 2024a).
In this article, KHAR Center examines how the Kremlin’s propaganda mechanisms are constructed in Germany and France and which local vulnerabilities they exploit.
Research Question: Through which gaps does Kremlin propaganda penetrate into Germany and France — Western Europe’s leading powers — and what factors enable it to maintain its influence?
GERMANY: A STRATEGIC TARGET OF RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA
Russia’s propaganda ecosystem in Germany comprises interlinked components and operates through several key mechanisms:
Energy Dependence and Interest Groups
For many years, Germany was heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies. Until Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, Germany was among the primary advocates of Kremlin interests within the EU and was a strategic partner in the energy and economic domains (Mankoff, 2020a). Although public backlash against Russia increased after the annexation of Crimea, energy ties remained intact. Then-Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel even sold Germany’s gas storage facilities to Gazprom, while Chancellor Merkel resisted U.S. pressure — under both Trump and Biden — to cancel the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project (Stelzenmüller, 2022a).
These energy ties created a powerful political and economic network, extending far beyond the energy sector and exerting influence at both national and EU levels (Bros, Mitrova, Kirsten, 2017). One example of this was Germany’s (along with France’s) leadership in launching the Minsk Agreements and Normandy Format as a response to the Russia–Ukraine conflict. Despite criticism from Eastern European countries that these efforts were ineffective, Germany insisted on de-escalation, inadvertently aligning with the Kremlin’s deception tactics (Stelzenmüller, 2022b).
Russian energy-linked interest groups in Germany — including energy companies, industrial associations, and East German business circles — promoted the narrative that “cheap Russian gas is the foundation of energy security,” shaping public opinion and policy for years. Figures such as former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and companies like Uniper and Wintershall played key roles (Mankoff, 2020b).
Although Germany’s dependency on Russian energy declined after 2022, lobbying groups continue to echo Kremlin narratives in political and economic discourse. Recent studies show that even after the rapid reduction of Russian gas imports, energy actors persist in promoting slogans such as “return to energy cooperation” and “economic rationality,” thus reinforcing pro-Russian messaging within Germany’s domestic resonance space (Finanzmarktwelt, Feb 2025; Ingenieur, Mar 2025).
Anti-System Forces, Radical Movements, and “Representatives”
Russian propaganda in Germany draws substantial strength from anti-system political forces and radical right-wing movements. All modern far-right organizations in Germany — including the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD) — maintain a friendly stance toward Russia. This reflects a legacy of post-war “Soviet-neutralist” traditions within the German far-right.
The main political vehicle for both targeting and disseminating Kremlin narratives, however, is the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Since its founding in 2013, AfD has adopted a clear pro-Kremlin stance and become a key apparatus of Russian influence in German politics. During the annexation of Crimea and the separatist insurgency in Donbas, AfD voiced strong support for Russia (Shekhovtsov, 2023).
AfD leaders openly embrace ties with Russia and actively promote the “Russian world” in Germany, using special networks, Russian-language programs, and voter-targeted messaging to appeal to Russian-German constituencies. Pro-Kremlin positions are evident in AfD’s election manifestos, policy proposals, and speeches in the Bundestag (Bensmann, 2023a).
Another pillar of radical right-wing pro-Russian forces in Germany includes organizations and politicians affiliated with AfD and Russia-linked interest groups. These include figures like Manuel Ochsenreiter, Markus Frohnmaier, Heinrich Groth, and Waldemar Herdt, as well as think tanks such as the Analytical Media Eurasian Studies (AMES) led by Yuri Kofner and the German Center for Eurasian Studies (GCES), which reportedly maintain ties with Russian intelligence (Laruelle, 2019a).
Russia’s ties to Germany’s far-right also extend into radical subcultures — from neo-Nazi groups like “White Rex” to biker gangs like the “Night Wolves.” The Patriotic Union, also known in the media as the “Reuss group,” exemplifies this nexus. Its leader Heinrich Reuss, now imprisoned, and other members made repeated efforts to establish links with Russia. While no evidence conclusively proves that Russian state actors directly guided their coup plot, their radicalization was clearly inspired by Russia’s actions (ICCT, 2024b).
On the left, certain radical and anti-imperialist circles — including factions within Die Linke — exhibit ideological sympathy toward Russia. These groups frame the war in Ukraine as a Western geopolitical provocation and echo Kremlin narratives in the media, though they play a more supportive than directive role in the information ecosystem (Stepanovs, 2024).
Other Kremlin narrative carriers include conspiracy-prone and anti-establishment groups like the “Querdenker” (Lateral Thinkers) movement, which emerged during the COVID-19 protests and united anti-vaxxers, far-right elements, and various dissenters (Deutschlandfunk, 2022).
Kremlin-Funded Operations: Official Media, Mirror Sites, Social Media, and Alt-Platforms
The German version of the Kremlin’s flagship propaganda outlet RT began operations in 2014 — the year Crimea was annexed — under the name RT Deutsch. It rebranded to RT DE in 2020, while Sputnik replaced Voice of Russia and later became SNA News (Stöber, 2022).
Russia’s first overt propaganda campaign targeting German elections occurred during the 2017 Bundestag vote through a Twitter storm under the hashtag #Wahlbetrug (“election fraud”). During the COVID-19 pandemic, RT DE, Sputnik, and the Berlin-based video agency Ruptly became mouthpieces for groups opposing the German government’s policies (ICCT, 2024c).
Although EU sanctions officially shut down Russian media operations in Germany, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) identified at least 20 RT DE mirror domains and 11 subdomains still active online, shared by Kremlin-aligned actors. Many were newly registered, exposing loopholes in sanctions enforcement. Notably, Germany’s fourth-largest ISP had blocked none of them. While RT DE traffic dropped post-sanctions, these mirror sites continue to attract as much or more traffic than before (ISD Global, Feb 2025).
Platforms such as Telegram, X (formerly Twitter), and Yandex are also key vehicles for Russian influence. In addition, alternative German media outlets help disseminate Kremlin content. A 2022 study found that 20 of Germany’s most popular “alt-media” websites were linked to Russia, including Tichys Einblick, Reitschuster, and Achse des Guten. These platforms make Russian propaganda appear as domestic dissent rather than foreign influence (Beseler & Toepfl, 2024).
Russian propaganda primarily targets the emotions of vulnerable and marginalized social groups. One notable case is the 2016 Lisa Case, where fake news spread that a Russian-German girl had been raped by migrants. Despite the police disproving it quickly through phone tracking and a confession, the incident sparked widespread outrage and protests, and served as ammunition against Germany’s refugee policies. Even Russia’s foreign minister Lavrov accused Germany over the case, amplifying the propaganda (NTV De, 2016a; 2016b).
Russia also actively employs cyber operations against Germany. In 2015, the Bundestag was hit by a massive hacking attack (APT28), which paralyzed its internal networks and led to the theft of thousands of documents (DW, 2015).
Russian-Speaking Groups and “Social Allies”
Germany’s “Russian world” consists of three main groups:
- Russlanddeutsche — ethnic Germans born in the Soviet Union who later migrated to Germany;
- Russian citizens residing in Germany;
- Ethnic Russians who are now German citizens, descending from earlier waves of emigration.
Russian-speaking users online often portray Germans as “weak,” “incapable of making decisions,” and burdened by guilt over Nazi-era crimes. In contrast, they present themselves as “defenders of German culture.” Politically, this often translates into support for AfD (Sablina, 2019).
Social affinity with Russia is most visible in the eastern regions of Germany. Mental closeness to Russia makes this region fertile ground for Kremlin propaganda. Despite the deterioration in Berlin-Moscow relations after the Ukraine war and declining national sympathy for Russia, Eastern Germans increasingly favor Moscow and oppose military aid to Ukraine. For instance, in 2023, while 47% of Western Germans opposed supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine, the figure was 70% in Eastern Germany. Eastern Germans remain more understanding of Russia and less critical (Khorolskaya, 2025).
FRANCE: THE KREMLIN'S BUSINESS AND SOFT POWER LABORATORY
Russia’s propaganda mechanism in France encompasses numerous elements — from access to political elites through economic and diplomatic channels, to ideological affinity with far-right and left-wing populist forces, use of official and unofficial media platforms, cyber operations, and long-term influence built on soft power infrastructures such as the Orthodox Church, cultural centers, and business circles.
Trade, Energy, and Lobbying
While France’s dependence on Russian gas is not as high as Germany’s, Moscow has long been an important partner for Paris in trade and energy. Particularly, the involvement of “TotalEnergies” in projects like Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2, and its decision not to fully withdraw from them after the war, kept the line of “not burning bridges with Russia” alive within the French business elite for a long time (Mann, 2022).
France is one of the countries where Russia’s business and political lobbying is the most powerful. These lobbyists are key to promoting “pragmatic Russophilia” and transmitting Kremlin narratives in France. At the same time, this system is based on the deep connections between major French corporations operating in Russia and the Kremlin. Many of the CEOs of these industrial giants have close ties to the Kremlin’s inner circles and have acted as intermediaries in shaping views aligned with Russian interests (CSIS, 2022a).
One of the most well-known Russian business lobbying structures in France is the Franco-Russian Dialogue, founded in 2004 and long chaired by Alexander Trubetskoy. With the participation of many major companies and numerous far-right French politicians, this structure is recognized as one of the Kremlin’s key influence hubs in France (Laruelle, 2018a). Although the association’s activities diminished after 2022, it did not cease entirely. Thierry Mariani, a Member of the European Parliament and co-chair of the association, announced plans for a trip to Russia by the end of the year (Intelligence, January 2025). However, after the EU’s latest sanctions package came into force, the trip was canceled.
The Franco-Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which brings together many large companies, and the Franco-Russian Monitoring House, established in 2012 as an academic platform under the chamber, have long been key elements of this lobbying-propaganda apparatus. Among more informal lobbying entities are the Pushkin Circle, which sits between “Droite Populaire” and “Front National,” and the Association for Mutual Assistance between Enterprises (AREP), led by Michel Lebedev, former director of Total in Russia (Laruelle, 2018b).
Charitable foundations and other organizations run by Kremlin-linked oligarchs like Vladimir Yakunin and Konstantin Malofeyev have long formed another pillar of Russia’s influence in France. These two oligarchs have used their extensive resources to become central drivers of Kremlin narratives. Yakunin primarily targeted official segments of Franco-Russian relations — focusing on the Franco-Russian Dialogue and ties with major French companies. Malofeyev, on the other hand, worked almost exclusively within the far-right environment, funding regular meetings to connect far-right actors from Europe and Russia with monarchist circles (CSIS, 2022b).
While the activities of this network encountered obstacles after 2022, their physical presence and narrative dissemination have not disappeared. Analyses show that Yakunin’s Dialogue of Civilizations (DoC) initiative and related organizations — established and financed by him — continue pro-Kremlin political engagements and propaganda production across Europe, including in France (Brussels Watch, October 2025). Although Yakunin is under sanctions from Canada and the U.S., he has not been sanctioned by the EU, and his son Andrei, a British citizen, has not faced any restrictions — allowing them to operate freely within Europe (The Insider, August 2025).
Konstantin Malofeyev is under EU sanctions, which has limited his physical activity in France. Nevertheless, his propaganda tools like Tsargrad, Katehon, Double-Headed Eagle, and others continue to foster ties with far-right groups in Europe through intermediaries (Rondeaux, April 2025).
Political Allies and Representatives – Russia’s Friendship with French Radicalism
France has always played a key role in Russia’s influence operations in Europe. Although in recent years Paris has criticized Russian propaganda and supported sanctions against Moscow over Crimea, Donbas, and the poisoning of Navalny, it still treated Russia as a legitimate partner until 2022 — a country not to be isolated but engaged in dialogue (CSIS, 2022c).
Despite being the only non-pro-Russian candidate in the 2017 presidential election and being targeted by Russian election manipulation, Emmanuel Macron, after becoming president, initially sought to warm relations with Moscow. For years, he believed that direct dialogue with Putin could solve problems with Russia — to the extent that he spoke with Putin almost daily even months into the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, thinking he could end the war. However, by mid-2022, he realized the futility of this approach. Macron entered his second presidential term not as a Gaullist or Mitterrand-style diplomat, but as one of Ukraine’s strongest defenders (Geopolitics, 2024b).
The National Rally (RN), formerly the National Front, is the most prominent pro-Russian force in France’s political landscape. Party founder Jean-Marie Le Pen maintained ties with radical Russian nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Sergey Baburin, Eduard Limonov, and Alexander Dugin, and his daughter Marine Le Pen continued this Russophile line. Her call for an “advanced strategic alliance” between Paris, Berlin, and Moscow made her one of the Kremlin’s favorite European politicians. The close ties between many RN members and Russia are well known (CSIS, 2022ç).
Russia has supported RN in ways that often exceed legal boundaries. In 2014, RN took out a €6 million loan from Russia, and in return, openly supported Kremlin narratives on anti-globalism, anti-liberalism, anti-LGBTQ+, anti-immigration, and opposition to the “Muslim world.” Although RN later condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, analysts believe this was driven by electoral concerns and that the party’s fundamental alignment with the Kremlin remains unchanged. RN remains opposed to deploying French troops in Ukraine and to supplying Kyiv with long-range missiles capable of striking Russian territory (Geopolitics, 2024c).
Russia’s second political ally in France is the populist party Reconquête (“Reconquest”), founded around Éric Zemmour ahead of the 2022 elections. With xenophobic, racist, and Islamophobic rhetoric and support for the “Great Replacement” theory, Zemmour’s worldview aligns ideologically with Kremlin-endorsed ideas of “conservative revolution.” In 2015, even before entering politics, the Russian ambassador reportedly praised Zemmour as the most insightful French political analyst and a valuable partner (ICCT, 2024d).
There are also pro-Russian figures within France’s traditional center-right party Les Républicains. Notable among them are the 2017 presidential candidate François Fillon, known for his Gaullist stance, his foreign policy advisers, and former president Nicolas Sarkozy (Open Society Foundation, 2018a).
A more “sovereignist” Russophile subgroup includes Philippe de Villiers (Mouvement Pour la France) and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (Debout la République). While their direct links to Russia are weaker, they are ideologically aligned. A few members of the small Christian-Democratic Party also hold pro-Russian views (CSIS, 2022d).
Beyond RN, there are countless smaller right-wing movements and individuals in France that support Russia — often splintered from or in conflict with RN. Figures like Alain Soral, Jean-Yves Le Gallou, and Renaud Camus, among others, have long histories of promoting Kremlin-aligned narratives (ICCT, 2024e). Another group, dubbed “ultra-yellows” by the media and “conspiracy theorists” by intelligence services, also overlaps with pro-Kremlin positions. This movement emerged during the 2018 “Yellow Vests” protests — initially apolitical, it was gradually radicalized and co-opted by the far right. Many anonymous influencers who played major roles in the movement were later found to have received systematic support from Kremlin propaganda. After the social unrest subsided, some movement leaders reactivated during the COVID-19 pandemic, first embracing skepticism about vaccines, and later adopting pro-Kremlin narratives following the invasion of Ukraine (ICCT, 2024f).
Another important carrier of Kremlin messages in France is the far-left populist La France Insoumise (LFI). As an heir to France’s anti-American and radical left traditions, LFI and especially its leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon continue to admire Moscow — not because of socialism, but out of hatred for U.S. policy and liberal democracy. Although Mélenchon eventually condemned the invasion of Ukraine after 2022, he did little more than make statements. In 2024, he even claimed that Putin was acting in his country’s best interests and that “no one can defeat the country that defeated both Napoleon and Hitler” (Geopolitics, 2024ç).
Media Operations
The strengthening of Russia’s official propaganda tools in France began after the annexation of Crimea. The French branch of Sputnik, which rapidly expanded across the world after its 2014 launch, opened in 2015 (Euractiv, 2015). In 2017, RT France began broadcasting (Le Parisien, 2019). These propaganda outlets, which marketed themselves as “alternative media,” gained significant online traction by capitalizing on themes such as police violence, the migrant crisis, COVID-19 policies, and anti-EU/NATO rhetoric. They became especially popular during the Yellow Vests movement.
In 2019, a report by Avaaz revealed that fake news about the Yellow Vests protests had gathered over 100 million views on Facebook. In that information ecosystem, RT France became one of the most-watched YouTube channels on the “Gilets Jaunes” topic. According to the report, without Russia Today, the Yellow Vests’ online presence would not have been as extensive (La Stampa, 2019).
The 2022 EU sanctions led to the suspension of Sputnik and RT France, causing a decline in viewership (The Russian Program, 2024). However, Russian propaganda quickly adapted. Reporters Without Borders noted in its 2024 report that accessing RT content in France remained “as easy as child’s play.” According to the report, over 50 websites and social media accounts provided unrestricted access to RT’s English, German, Spanish, and Arabic versions in France, without the use of a VPN (RSF, 2024).
Moreover, just as in Germany, alternative platforms, mirror sites, and proxy networks are widely used in France (Diderot Committee, 2024). For example, the French-language Telegram channel “@Vbachir” is among the 50 most notorious global disinformation channels linked to Russia. Created in 2022, it has been cited as a source in over 53,000 articles spreading Kremlin-aligned narratives and disinformation (DFRLab, April 2025).
In 2024, the French government identified systematic interference campaigns conducted by Russia-linked actors via dozens of fake news portals, social media networks, and cyber operations. Monitoring by VIGINUM uncovered a network known as “Portal Kombat” or the “Pravda Network,” which included over 220 fake “information portals” (Prime Ministre FR, 2024). The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a special statement revealing this network, citing VIGINUM’s technical findings that the goal was to undermine Ukraine’s legitimacy and manipulate public opinion within the EU ahead of the European Parliament and national elections (France MFA, 2024).
Even in 2025, Le Monde reported that Kremlin propaganda content — from RT, Sputnik, Rossiya 1, RTR-Planeta, and others — remained accessible in France. According to the paper, the main reasons are the failure of internet service providers (ISPs) like Orange, Free, SFR, and Bouygues to fully implement sanctions; the hesitation of satellite operator Eutelsat to cut Russian channels; and the delayed response of the media regulator Arcom (Le Monde, March 2025).
Russia’s media-based operations in France are not limited to official state channels. Conservative Catholic media, sovereigntist blogs, and right-wing populist television networks like those under Bolloré Media also act as Kremlin narrative multipliers. A clear example is Ksenia Fedorova, the former editor-in-chief of RT France, reappearing on a media outlet owned by pro-Russian billionaire Vincent Bolloré (Le Monde, May 2025).
Cyber Operations
Cyber operations also play a significant role in Russia’s hybrid warfare against France. In 2015, an attack on the TV5Monde channel paralyzed its broadcasts for hours. French and international cybersecurity experts later attributed the operation to APT28/Fancy Bear, a hacking group linked to Russian military intelligence (Radware, 2024).
In the 2017 presidential elections, the Russian GRU carried out the notorious Macron Leaks operation, involving hacking and leaking nearly 15 GB of campaign materials and 20,000 emails from Emmanuel Macron’s campaign — just two days before the vote. The leaks were widely spread through support from U.S.-based far-right activists on X (formerly Twitter) and various Telegram channels (ICCT, 2024g).
For a long time, Paris refrained from openly accusing Moscow. However, in April 2025, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a special statement explicitly naming Russia’s military intelligence (GRU) and its hacking unit APT28 as responsible for the TV5Monde attack, Macron Leaks, and cyber operations targeting institutions linked to the Paris Olympic Games (France MFA, April 2025).
Soft Power – The Russian Church’s Influence over the Diaspora and Catholic Partnership
France holds a privileged place in Russia’s soft power vision. The mass migration of Russians to France between the world wars — and their continued presence — has made the country particularly receptive to Russian cultural narratives. After the 2007 canonical agreement between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, Moscow gained control over many Russian émigré communities. Despite some resistance, Russia largely succeeded in consolidating influence.
The 2016 construction of the largest Orthodox cathedral in Western Europe — in Paris — is seen as symbolic of Russia’s reasserted presence in the West (Open Society Institute, 2018b).
The role of several prominent figures in France who converted from Catholicism to Orthodoxy demonstrates that religious ties between France and Russia may run deeper than observers often acknowledge.
The reemergence of political Catholicism in France has also helped Moscow attract new allies sensitive to its “traditional values” agenda. In recent years, the warming of ties between the Kremlin and the Vatican — including regular meetings between Orthodox officials and Pope Francis — has drawn the attention of many conservative Catholics worldwide (Laruelle, 2018ç).
The Russian Orthodox Church uses the Russian diaspora and conservative values as entry points to extend Russia’s interests into French political and corporate spheres. Foundations under the Church’s umbrella finance Russian émigré associations in France (CSIS, 2022d).
Russia’s allies also include:
- La Manif pour tous (anti-gay marriage movement),
- Alliance Vita (anti-abortion group),
- SOS Chrétiens d’Orient (uniting pro-Assad circles, French far-right fundamentalist Catholics, and Russian actors).
These organizations share ideological affinity with Russia and often work toward common goals (CSIS, 2022e).
CONCLUSION
The examples of Germany and France show that Russia’s propaganda in Western Europe is based on systematically exploiting internal vulnerabilities. Historical traumas, social discontent, and political polarization in Berlin and Paris are key fuel sources for Moscow’s influence.
Energy dependence, business interests in Russia, alliances with far-right and left-wing populist parties, Orthodox and Catholic networks, the Russian-speaking diaspora, soft power infrastructure, and both official and alternative media ecosystems serve as channels for Kremlin strategy.
The overall picture reveals that Russia views these countries as key platforms for hybrid warfare. Though 2022 created temporary difficulties for these operations, the Kremlin’s propaganda apparatus — experienced in adapting to changing conditions — has successfully circumvented sanctions with the help of its domestic allies in France and Germany.
Traditional tools like media regulation, intelligence operations, and sanctions are insufficient to counter this machine. To combat a multilayered, adaptive, and deeply embedded propaganda mechanism, what’s required is a more complex, long-term, coordinated strategy — one that is firmer, more detailed, and more proactive.
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