Every democrat who closely follows Azerbaijani politics carries the same question in mind: How long will the Aliyev regime last? Answers to this question are usually emotional in nature, sometimes generating sharp pessimism, sometimes unexpected optimism. Yet the longevity of authoritarian regimes must be evaluated strictly through structural analysis. In this context, it is appropriate to note that the Azerbaijani political system also fits this criterion.
For example, unlike Erdoğan’s Turkey, Aliyev’s Azerbaijan is not an example of accidental charismatic leadership. On the contrary, it is a fully-formed authoritarian architecture built on internal mechanisms, risk zones, and pillars of durability. One effective way to understand this architecture better is to divide it into stages. It is crucial to understand what is happening at which level, at what point the regime begins to bend under its own weight, and which stage can truly be considered weakening.
With the seven-stage model below, I try to answer these questions. This model shows that no matter how powerful the Aliyev regime appears, its mechanisms erode over time, its elasticity diminishes, and it gradually changes under the impact of reality.
The Invisible Pillar of Stability
Like most post-Soviet authoritarianisms, the main nourishment of the Azerbaijani regime is energy revenues. A decline in oil and gas inflows does not only generate economic consequences, but also political ones (Michael L. Ross, 2001). In such a situation, loyalty resources shrink, disputes over distribution among elite groups increase, and the state’s role as a “social shock absorber” begins to lose effectiveness.
So far, Azerbaijani authoritarianism has not fully entered this stage. Foreign currency reserves remain stable, and demand for the European energy market continues (Trading Economics, Sept. 2025). However, in the long run, this situation represents one of the most serious structural risks for the regime.
The Illusion of a Strong State
One paradox of authoritarian states is their illness of believing in the image of a “strong state” (Francis Fukuyama, 2004). In reality, however, administrative capacity dulls over time. Azerbaijani authoritarianism is currently experiencing this: appointments prioritize loyalty over professionalism; the number of public services formally increases, yet their actual functions narrow.
This stage does not yet signify collapse, but it reveals the regime’s most dangerous feature — the habit of sweeping problems under the rug rather than solving them.
Closing Authoritarianism
One reason authoritarian regimes survive for long periods is their flexibility. Small concessions, minor reforms, and responses to societal signals allow such systems to renew themselves. However, the Azerbaijani regime is moving toward a more closed model. Criticism receives no response, reform mechanisms are entirely dismantled, and a political system suffocating under family-based governance has lost the ability to self-renew.
This stage may appear attractive to an authoritarianism that is not under external pressure, but historical examples show that the loss of elasticity is a major catalyst for authoritarian systems eroding from within.
Silent Cracks in the "Monolith"
The collapse of authoritarian regimes does not always begin with mass protests; it can also begin with internal elite fragmentation (Barbara Geddes, 1999). This process has not yet begun in Azerbaijan, but faint signals can be heard.
Examples include:
– the 2005 accusations of an attempted coup involving the Minister of Health, the Minister of Economic Development, and numerous current and former officials;
– the 2015 Ministry of National Security (MNS) scandal;
– and most recently, the accusation of Ramiz Mehdiyev — once the chief ideologue of the Aliyev regime — of attempting a coup.
Even the internal family balance has experienced major tests (e.g., the MNS scandal). The increasingly relevant issue of succession may again shake this balance. Additionally, secondary power groups may trigger the process by shifting toward different choices.
Of course, these are only “micro-cracks.” But if they widen in the future, the structures that ensure the regime’s stability will be seriously disrupted.
Shifts in the Geopolitical Balance
Azerbaijani authoritarianism is significantly affected by regional and international power balances. As Russia weakens, as Turkey’s priorities shift, and as Western energy dependence decreases, small changes will occur in Baku’s geopolitical position.
These tremors do not yet mean systemic collapse, but they may create a geopolitical environment that limits the regime’s maneuvering capacity. Azerbaijani authoritarian stability has always been built on the formula:
“internal rigidity + external softness.”
If this balance is disrupted, internal pressure within the system will increase.
Silent but Deep Decay
Authoritarian regimes do not operate through public affection, but through mechanisms that ensure obedience. For a long time, this mechanism was lubricated not only by fear but also by “compensation narratives”: stories of stable provision, success, and development.
The 2020 war granted the government significant legitimacy.
But that legitimacy is now fading. Economic difficulties in daily life are increasing, and the new generation does not trust war propaganda to the same extent. They do not openly protest this, but their actions increasingly reflect distrust. Victory-based legitimacy collapses not with noise, but with silence.
The Erosion of the Repression Apparatus
The strongest pillar of authoritarian regimes is the apparatus of repression. When this machine loses its effectiveness, motivation, or shifts toward self-preservation, the system enters an irreversible collapse phase.
This phase is not visible even on the horizon in Azerbaijan. The State Security Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Prosecutor’s Office remain disciplined and carry out political orders with zeal. But in the long term, material, psychological, and institutional exhaustion is inevitable.
Once this stage begins, a system has almost no chance of restoration.
Instead of a Conclusion…
The seven-stage model of weakening in the Aliyev regime shows that although Azerbaijani authoritarianism appears stable from the outside, multiple lines of tension lie beneath its structure. These resemble the inner layers of the Earth’s crust — moving tectonic plates that cause earthquakes. Just as constant seismic risks exist under the Earth’s surface, the structure of Azerbaijani authoritarianism similarly contains tense tectonic layers where anything may happen at any moment.
Each stage — from declining rent revenues to the loss of legitimacy — is interconnected. These mechanisms, which ensure systemic continuity, are now gradually undergoing a process of ageing.
For over 30 years, the Aliyev regime has been governed through rent distribution and a fear mechanism. But history shows that authoritarian stability never remains unchanged; it is a paradox that consumes itself. As energy revenues decline and societal demands evolve, the concept of “stability” and its instruments also begin to age. For Ilham Aliyev's rule, the concepts of “modernization” and “stability” have already lost their substantive meaning — these words now remain merely a discursive tool for generating legitimacy.
At the same time, predicting the end of Azerbaijani authoritarianism is extremely difficult. This system differs from classical authoritarian models. It will not collapse suddenly, nor will it fall for ideological reasons. The weakening of Azerbaijani authoritarianism will occur gradually, in multiple stages.
Currently, the government is applying harsher measures of repression to consolidate its position. But such an approach will not increase systemic stability. At first glance, everything may appear normal, but beneath the surface lie deep institutional fatigue, ideological emptiness, and social discontent. In the near future, the regime will enter a post-stability phase. This is an irreversible process.
In this context, a crucial question arises regarding the future of the Aliyev regime:
Does it possess the capacity to manage its own decline?
References:
Michael L. Ross, 2001. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” p 356. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236710633_Does_Oil_Hinder_Democracy
Trading economics, sep 2025. Azerbaijan Foreign Exchange Reserves. https://tradingeconomics.com/azerbaijan/foreign-exchange-reserves
Francis Fukuyama, 2004. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. “Authoritarian regimes tend to conflate state scope with state strength: they build large bureaucracies and coercive instruments, mistaking control for capacity.” https://dokumen.pub/state-building-governance-and-world-order-in-the-21st-century-9780801455360.html
Barbara Geddes, 1999. “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?”. P 121. “Authoritarian breakdowns usually begin with elite defections rather than popular uprisings; mass protests tend to succeed only after divisions emerge within the ruling coalition.” https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115
Milan W. Svolik, 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. “Authoritarian politics is about maintaining obedience, not affection. Citizens comply because of fear, habit, or material dependence, not because they believe.” https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/politics-of-authoritarian-rule/7F78A8828A5714F0BE74E44A90A44868
