Introduction
When explaining Azerbaijan’s foreign policy course during the period up to 2020, it is notable that terms such as “balanced,” “multi-vector,” and “multi-dimensional” were used in parallel. Former Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov described Azerbaijan’s foreign policy course as “a sensitive balance between a multi-vector proactive strategy aimed at restoring territorial integrity, strengthening independence and sovereignty, and flexibility in relations with various regional and global actors that follow different political lines” (Mammadyarov, 2009). As can be seen, the terms “multi-vector” and “balanced,” used to describe the country’s foreign policy, are not different expressions of the same concept, but rather two distinct approaches. At the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is presented as the preservation of equilibrium between these strategies.
The concept of a “balanced foreign policy” is well known in International Relations theory and widely applied. Its essence consists of the set of steps and political moves undertaken by a state to level the playing field against more powerful states. According to structural realists, balancing can be understood in two forms: internal and external balancing. Internal balancing is more characteristic of powerful states and entails countering other states through one’s own internal resources and military capabilities. External balancing, meanwhile, applies mainly to weak and small states and involves forming alliances and partnerships to balance against stronger states (Parent & Rosato, 2015). In addition, since the early 2000s, the notion of soft balancing has also been discussed. The logic of this approach is that a state uses economic and diplomatic tools to constrain a more powerful state (or states) and prevent it from resorting to force (Pape, 2005).
In the case of Azerbaijan, a “balanced” foreign policy is primarily explained as maintaining regional equilibrium in the context of U.S.–Russia geopolitical confrontation, upholding a form of neutrality by joining no military alliance and belonging to no political bloc (Eureporter, 2005; Olke.az, 2024). Here, neutrality refers to maintaining balance between the Western bloc (the United States and Europe) and its geopolitical rivals, Russia and Iran, through flexible maneuvering. By not being a member of NATO or the CSTO, Azerbaijan preserves neutrality between these two poles and attempts to reconcile their competing interests through diplomatic and economic tools (soft balancing). According to this logic, Azerbaijan is considered a “sandwiched country” situated between Russia and Iran due to its geopolitical position. Finding a delicate equilibrium without entering direct confrontation with regional and global powers, and neutralizing pressures from both powerful neighbors and external actors, is presented as one of the country’s main foreign-policy priorities (Chiragov, 2024).
The concept of “multi-vector foreign policy,” meanwhile, emerged as a result of attempts to find balance among multiple vectors in foreign policy. This notion has been used particularly since the 1990s to describe the foreign policy course of Central Asian states (Yuneman, 2023). A “multi-vector foreign policy” is considered a strategy that builds relationships with other states on a pragmatic rather than ideological basis (Hanks, 2009). It is understood as a set of activities that allow states to maximize economic opportunities, safeguard political sovereignty, and reduce security risks. This political course is implemented by maintaining diversified diplomatic relations with global and regional powers and actively using these relations in various sectors (economic, security, cultural, etc.). Through such an approach, states undertake political moves to compensate for different risks, increase economic benefits, and mitigate uncertainties in relations (Nasibov, 2025).
At the level of state officials and parliamentarians, the concept of “multi-vector foreign policy” is more often used and is presented as Azerbaijan’s development of diplomatic relations with other states and organizations on the basis of mutual benefit, economic interests, and political neutrality (Manset.az, 2025). When explaining this course, additional emphasis is placed on reducing security risks, preventing economic losses, and minimizing potential damage (Mammadli, 2023). From this perspective, Azerbaijan is portrayed as striving not merely to maintain balance between two poles, but to pursue diversified cooperation formats with various states and organizations worldwide. This is considered a necessary condition for renewing the country’s global image and reinforcing the role of a state that has restored its territorial integrity and sovereignty in the international arena.
Thus, we understand the concepts of “balanced” and “multi-vector” foreign policy as two different strategies within Azerbaijan’s unified foreign policy concept. Like two arms of a scale, depending on the character of the international environment, one strategy comes to the fore while the other remains somewhat in the background. Official Baku’s foreign policy course consists of transitions between these strategies and maintaining equilibrium between them.
Key Question of the Analysis
In recent years, local media have regularly highlighted the “successes” of the “multi-vector foreign policy” and presented this approach as an unrivalled success story (Azerbaijan-news.az, 2025). But is the “multi-vector foreign policy” truly as successful as claimed? And what is its real success potential?
In this analysis, we argue that Azerbaijan’s “multi-vector foreign policy” has in recent years undergone several serious tests and that the outcomes have not been as successful as claimed. We evaluate “success” or “failure” based on whether foreign-policy steps and their outcomes align with the core principles of the multi-vector course. If political actions and their results align with these principles (e.g., increasing economic benefits, reducing security risks, safeguarding political sovereignty, adhering to political neutrality), then the course can be considered successful. If these actions and results violate those principles (e.g., cause economic loss, create security risks or threats to sovereignty, undermine political neutrality), then the course is unsuccessful.
To support this argument, we analyze Azerbaijan’s activities in recent years within organizations such as BRICS, the SCO, and the OTS, as well as its position during the 12-day war between India and Pakistan. Since the elevation of “multi-vector foreign policy” and its gradual replacement of the “balanced” strategy is a very recent shift, we assess the government’s actions in this new direction in order to evaluate the new strategy.
It should be noted at the outset that several local authors agree on the risks inherent in the “multi-vector foreign policy” course. They emphasize that regional volatility increases the risk of security spillover, and that the flexibility which once defined multi-vectorism now increases rather than reduces strategic dangers. In an environment where the liberal order is eroding, Azerbaijan’s ability to balance is said to be weakening, and differing commitments now require harder concessions. As the unipolar, neoliberal framework recedes and external pressures intensify, Azerbaijan’s “multi-vector foreign policy” is facing growing challenges (Hajiyev, 2025).
Shifting Priorities in Foreign Policy
In this analysis, we emphasize that until 2020 the “balance” factor was more decisive in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy course, while the “multi-vector” approach played a secondary role (Modern.az, 2017). The main reason for the application of this approach in foreign policy was undoubtedly the Karabakh problem and the search for ways to resolve it. The OSCE format—where the United States, France, and Russia held decisive influence—forced Azerbaijan to pursue a balanced foreign policy and, most importantly, to reconcile the interests of both poles (the West and Russia). President Ilham Aliyev’s statement at the “Facing the New World Order” International Forum held in April 2025—“Throughout the years of occupation, the main priority of our foreign policy has been the restoration of territorial integrity. The ultimate goal of all our efforts has been to restore sovereignty and territorial integrity”—openly reflects this reality (Eureporter, 2025).
During this period, the “multi-vector” direction of foreign policy consisted mainly of strategic lines outside these two poles, such as the Organization of Turkic States and the Non-Aligned Movement. However, since the resolution of the Karabakh problem depended primarily on the Western and Russian vectors, Azerbaijan was largely compelled to regulate and balance relations between these two sides. At the time, solving the issue appeared possible only with the participation of both actors. Other organizations or potential alliances had secondary significance in resolving the conflict. For this reason, the Organization of Turkic States, established in 2009, was declared a foreign-policy priority only after 2020 and became central to the “multi-vector foreign policy” course (Azertag, 2024).
Undoubtedly, the emphasis on the “balanced” approach also included the Azerbaijani government’s attempts to conceal its own authoritarian character. Integration with Europe required the development of democratic institutions in Azerbaijan, a condition that increasingly contradicted the interests of a progressively authoritarian regime. President Ilham Aliyev himself openly stated in 2004: “Our current strategic choice is integration into Europe, the European family, and its institutions. We are very committed to this policy. We will do everything in our power to ensure that Azerbaijan meets all standards and criteria characteristic of Europe” (Huseynov, 2024). In the early years of his rule, Aliyev supported integration with Europe, but amid the growing geopolitical confrontation between the West and Russia, the narrative of integration was gradually pushed into the background and reframed as a strategy to “avoid provoking Russia’s anger.” As a result, instead of democratizing, the government gained new opportunities to become even more authoritarian.
After 2020, however, the concept of “multi-vector foreign policy” began to occupy a more prominent place in the presentation of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy course. The Karabakh issue had already been resolved, and Azerbaijan was no longer directly dependent on the positions of the West and Russia. The complete restoration of state sovereignty in 2023 and the subsequent withdrawal of Russian troops further strengthened this discourse. It is no coincidence that precisely after 2020 Azerbaijan began experiencing sharp tension with Russia, the United States, and also Iran. Yet this stands in contradiction with the components of the previously dominant “balanced” strategy—balancing, neutralizing pressure, and avoiding confrontation.
From this perspective, the long-term escalation with Russia and Iran occurred due to a strategic shift—prioritizing the “multi-vector” approach instead of the “balanced” one. Both the United States and Russia, as well as Iran, preferred the pre-2020 “balanced” framework and were reluctant to adapt to the new “multi-vector” model. The Azerbaijani government does not deny this strategic substitution; rather, it presents it to public opinion as “a victorious state claiming its rightful place in the international arena,” while those who question this are branded as enemies (Azevoice.com, 2024; Yenisabah.az, 2024).
Based on these points, we argue that after 2020 Azerbaijan has prioritized the “multi-vector” strategy in its foreign policy course. For the Aliyev government, the new priority has become a key condition for creating new economic partnerships, ensuring economic development in the post-war period, attracting investment for the reconstruction of Karabakh, and gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. This is the fundamental reason why the term has been increasingly highlighted and emphasized in recent years by the media, state officials, and members of parliament.
On the other hand, it is evident that Azerbaijan’s “balanced foreign policy” strategy has also changed, particularly the soft-balancing approach that had been relevant for a long time. Azerbaijan is no longer reluctant to damage diplomatic and economic relations with powerful actors such as Russia, Iran, and the United States. Before 2020, such openly confrontational behavior was difficult to imagine. Over the past five years, external balancing through alliances—primarily the military alliance with Turkey—and internal balancing through increases in the military budget and rapid militarization have gained prominence. In Ilham Aliyev’s speeches in recent years, the importance of alliances and military strength is regularly emphasized (Azadlıq.org, 2024). Yet this militarist policy and new alliances do not entirely align with the currently promoted “multi-vector foreign policy.”
The Turkic States and the Cyprus Issue
One of the main strategic priorities of Azerbaijan’s “multi-vector foreign policy” is clearly the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). In his 2024 inauguration speech, Ilham Aliyev stated: “The OTS is our main international organization because it is our family. We have no other family. Our family is the Turkic world. If someone thinks we should look for a family elsewhere, I can say that no one is waiting for us anywhere else, and they no longer even hide it,” thus emphasizing the organization’s importance and framing it as the only path to integration (President.az, 2024). Since 2020, the president has regularly exchanged high-level visits with OTS member states, strengthening bilateral relations. The media consistently highlights the geopolitical importance and economic potential of the OTS, often presenting a vision of its transformation into a regional power (Veliyev, 2024).
However, it is also evident that the member states are far from unified on many issues, and their political interests differ. The clearest example is the joint declaration signed at the EU–Central Asia summit held in April 2025 in Samarkand (European Council, 2025). According to the declaration, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan recognized the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus (Sorbello, 2025). In the following months, diplomatic missions were opened in Greek Cyprus by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and later Turkmenistan (The Times of Central Asia, 2025).
It should be recalled that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) holds observer status within the OTS. From this joint declaration, it becomes clear that Turkic states represented in the same organization do not recognize the independent existence of another state that is also represented there as an observer. The reason for this contradictory stance is largely economic. The EU’s sanctions against Russia affected Central Asian states, and to mitigate this impact, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan signed a €12 billion agreement with the EU in April 2025. One of the conditions was opening diplomatic missions in Greek Cyprus and recognizing its territorial integrity (BBC, 2025).
For Azerbaijan, which has made OTS cooperation a foreign policy priority, this development is deeply concerning and unexpected. Azerbaijan’s discomfort is clearly reflected in analyses and public statements circulated in the local media (Crossmedia.az, 2025). Turkic states that develop diplomatic relations with Greek Cyprus are accused of “betrayal” (Musavat.com, 2025). On one hand, Azerbaijan seeks to transform the OTS into a regional power; on the other, internal divisions within the organization indicate that achieving its goals will not be easy.
The India–Pakistan Conflict
The second event testing the “multi-vector foreign policy” course was the 12-day period of intense military clashes between India and Pakistan in April–May 2025. In the early days, Azerbaijan issued a diplomatic statement calling on both sides to show restraint, reduce tension, and avoid unilateral steps in favor of constructive dialogue (Mfa.gov.az, 2025). However, as clashes escalated, this diplomatic position transformed into an open statement of support for Pakistan—Azerbaijan’s traditional strategic partner (Mfa.gov.az, 2025a). India responded harshly, and Azerbaijani–Indian relations entered their worst period since independence.
India soon halted imports from Azerbaijan (Sfera.az, 2025). In 2024 alone, bilateral trade reached $958 million, of which Azerbaijani exports accounted for $750 million (Sfera.az, 2025). Imports from India amounted to only $223 million. Azerbaijan’s trade turnover with Pakistan, by contrast, was $27 million in 2023 and $22 million in 2024 (State Statistical Committee, 2024).
Azerbaijan’s open support for Pakistan was presented as reciprocation for Pakistan’s statements supporting Baku during the 44-day war, and as a reaction to India’s military cooperation with Armenia. Yet this approach contradicts the principles of “multi-vector foreign policy,” which prioritize mutual benefit, economic interests, political neutrality, reducing security risks, preventing economic losses, and minimizing potential costs. Instead, Azerbaijan’s stance increased its economic losses, weakened opportunities for mutual benefit, and amplified rather than minimized risks. Given India’s expanding arms cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan’s political move also created new security risks.
As a result, by taking sides during the 12-day conflict, Azerbaijan significantly damaged its relations with India. Yet neither side—and not even Pakistan—expected or demanded such a firm and explicit Azerbaijani position. Although the damage is primarily explained as economic, it also highlighted a fundamental problem in implementing the multi-vector policy: Azerbaijan is not a large enough actor to maintain equally close relations with two eternal rival states such as India and Pakistan simultaneously.
Azerbaijan’s Prospective Membership in the SCO
The next test for the “multi-vector foreign policy” came at the SCO summit held in Tianjin, China, in September 2025. Azerbaijan has been a dialogue partner since 2016 and has consistently kept observer-membership discussions on the agenda, presenting this step as part of the multi-vector strategy (Shahbazov, 2025; Telegraf.az, 2025). Before 2020, when the “balanced foreign policy” approach dominated, SCO membership was considered a secondary issue. Only after 2020 did it begin gaining priority.
The Tianjin summit was not very successful for Azerbaijani diplomacy. Azerbaijan’s application for full membership was blocked by India (Eurasianet.org, 2025). Baku stated that India’s move was linked to the strategic alliance between Azerbaijan and Pakistan (News.az, 2025). Ilham Aliyev declared that India was “seeking revenge” against Azerbaijan in international organizations due to Azerbaijan’s support for Pakistan (Trtworld.com, 2025).
As a result, Azerbaijan suffered economic losses for the second time due to the stance it took during the India–Pakistan clashes. It is clear that Azerbaijan is interested in continuing diplomatic efforts to change or soften India’s position, since the current state of relations makes SCO membership impossible. The government views cooperation with the SCO as economically and geopolitically beneficial and as a direction offering major prospects (Azertag, 2024). However, in pursuing this goal, it is extremely difficult to predict how Pakistan will react.
Azerbaijan and BRICS Membership
Unfortunately, the tension with India appears unlikely to remain limited to the freezing of the SCO membership process. Azerbaijan is also seeking to develop relations with BRICS—another organization in which India plays a leading role. On 20 August 2024, the Azerbaijani MFA officially announced that Azerbaijan intends to join BRICS (En.apa.az, 2024). According to the ministry, the initial decision was taken at the SCO summit held in Astana on 3 July 2024. In accordance with clause 4.5 of the joint declaration on establishing a strategic partnership signed with China, Azerbaijan expressed its desire to join BRICS, and China welcomed the move (Report.az, 2024).
At approximately the same time, Turkey also announced its intention to join and submitted a formal request. However, at the following summit held in Sochi in October, neither Turkey nor Azerbaijan were accepted. Although such applications are rarely assessed as realistic within such a short period, there were expectations of success (Huseynov, 2024a). Nevertheless, Azerbaijan’s BRICS membership has now been postponed indefinitely.
It should be noted that Turkey and Azerbaijan took similar positions in supporting Pakistan during the recent clashes. Consequently, India’s position toward both countries was nearly identical (Dw.com, 2025). Unsurprisingly, at a moment when both countries submitted membership requests, the main supporter of the argument that “it is too early to accept new members into BRICS” was India.
Azerbaijan’s cooperation with BRICS could create new investment channels for developing the non-oil sector, provide opportunities for cooperation on international transportation and logistics infrastructure, and enable preferential customs tariffs, free-trade agreements, and investment-promotion treaties (Guliyev, 2024). However, given the current state of relations with India, the likelihood that Azerbaijan will face in BRICS the same obstacles encountered in the SCO is quite high.
Conclusion
The above points show that the multi-vector foreign policy course brought to the forefront by Azerbaijan after 2020 differs substantially from how it is portrayed. On the one hand, the Azerbaijani government emphasizes that it prioritizes principles of mutual benefit, economic interests, and political neutrality. On the other hand, as in the India–Pakistan conflict, it relies on traditional “alliance” logic and adopts partisan positions. Yet, in essence, the “multi-vector” approach is not ideological (Islamic unity, religious brotherhood, etc.) but pragmatic: it requires maximizing economic benefits, avoiding losses, and minimizing risks. Through its recent political actions, the government violates the principles it claims to uphold and contradicts its own narrative. These choices have resulted in deteriorating relations with India, difficulties in joining the SCO and BRICS, and significant economic losses.
Secondly, Azerbaijan calls on Turkic states to demonstrate unity and seeks to transform the OTS into a global actor with a unified position. However, in doing so, it disregards the fact that each Turkic state has its own national interests, which do not always coincide with Azerbaijan’s vision. Decisions and actions that do not align with Azerbaijan’s expectations are met with disappointment and are portrayed as harmful to unity. Baku aspires to impose its geopolitical vision on other Turkic states but does not acknowledge that it lacks the political and economic power to do so. Despite being a small country, Azerbaijan aspires to behave like a “middle power,” expending more diplomatic energy and resources than necessary—resources that could be redirected toward areas where national interests are more realistically achievable.
Thirdly, it becomes evident that the principles guiding the Azerbaijani government in foreign policy do not represent a system of mutual values. Rather, to preserve its authoritarian character, the government demands political neutrality from foreign states toward Azerbaijan and insists that cooperation remain within the boundaries of mutual economic interests. Yet it does not offer the same in return. Numerous examples, such as Azerbaijan’s open interference in Turkey’s presidential elections, demonstrate behavior inconsistent with political neutrality.
Furthermore, the government’s abandonment of European integration and its stated desire to join the SCO—considered the “authoritarian alliance,” and a geopolitical rival to the West—also casts doubt on its claims of political neutrality.
Overall, the examined developments show that the “multi-vector foreign policy” course has the potential to bring success to Azerbaijan in areas such as economic relations and mutual cooperation. However, failure to take diplomatic steps aligned with the goals and principles of this course, together with rigid, partisan, and uncompromising positions in bilateral relations, leads to setbacks. As uncertainty in the global geopolitical environment and chaos in the liberal world order increase, such critical moments and turning points will become more frequent. Continuing the current approach will lay the groundwork for new failures in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy.
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